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Abstract.
This thesis is a comparative analysis of how the conflict over membership in the 
European Union (EU) affected people and parties in four Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden) between 1985 and 1997. The purpose of the thesis is to 
analyse how and why a) the people, and b) the political parties in these four countries 
have reacted to the prospect of membership -  or, in the case of Denmark, continued 
membership -  in the EU.
The thesis is divided into two main sections. Section one consists of three theoretical 
chapters. Chapter one explains why European integration has conflict potential in the 
Nordic countries, and why this conflict has increased in salience since the mid-1980’s. 
Chapter two outlines and develops a political cleavage model. This has two purposes: 
firstly, to explain the nature of the Nordic party systems; secondly, to outline social, 
ideological and institutional limitations to the effect of the conflict over EU membership 
on the party systems of these countries. Chapter three develops two models derived 
from rational choice theory. The first assesses how EU membership might be expected 
to affect the utility of individual citizens. The second focuses on how political parties 
might be expected to react to the prospect of (continued) EU-membership.
Chapters four to seven (section two) assess the explanatory power of the models 
developed in chapters two and three for each of the countries concerned, by analysing 
the hypothesised effects of the EU-conflict on individual utility and on the party 
systems. Chapter eight compares the results of chapters four to seven. Finally, the 
conclusion assesses the heuristic value of the methods employed, and the implications 
for theory.
In summary, it is argued that, firstly, expected consequences for individual economic 
utility and left-right ideological position are the most important variables for explaining 
differences in attitude to membership, both within each country and between the four 
countries. Secondly, for the majority of parties the increased salience of this conflict 
complicates their strategy, in particular with regard to the ability to pursue vote 
maximisation and office maximisation simultaneously. A partial solution is to off-load 
the EU-conflict away from national elections. This explains in large part why in each of 
the countries the EU-conflict has been off-loaded from the arena of national elections to 
that of référendums and elections to the European Parliament.
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Preface.
References to newspapers, magazines and periodicals such as ‘Nordisk Kontakt’ are 
made by date of publication on an individual basis in each chapter, and not included in 
the bibliography. References to Internet sources are also made individually and not 
included in the bibliography.
The following two paragraphs are inserted at the request of the Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services. They regard the use of data on the Norwegian 1993 Storting 
elections and the 1994 referendum.
“(En del av) de data som er benyttet i denne publikasjonen er hentet fra de/n norske 
valgunders0kelsen/e i 1993. Data i anonymisert form er stilt til disposisjon gjennom 
Norsk smafunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste (NSD). Bemt Aardal og Henry Valen var 
ansvarlige ledere for underspkelsen, og Statistisk sentralbyra sto for innsamling av 
dataene. Hverken ansvarlige ledere, Statistisk sentralbyra eller NSD er ansvarlig for 
anal y sen av dataene eller de tolkninger som er gjort her.”
“(En del av) de data som er benyttet i denne publikasjonen er hentet fra NSDs 
Meningsmalingsarkiv. Data er levert av Markeds- og Media-Instituttet (MMI), og er 
stillt til disposisjon gjennom Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste (NSD). 
Hverken NSD eller MMI er ansvarlig for analysen av dataene eller de tolkninger som er 
gjort her.”
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Introduction.
I .l Introduction and purpose of thesis.
“Economies is all about how people make choices. Sociology is all about why they don’t 
have any choices to make.”^
This thesis is a comparative study of how the populations and the political parties of 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden^ have responded to the increased political 
salience of issues related to European integration since 1985, in particular the question 
of membership in the European Union (EU) Four inter-correlated areas of 
investigation are covered. Firstly, the factors which divide the populations of these 
countries over the question of membership in the EU are identified. Secondly, the 
relative importance of these factors in each country is evaluated in terms of the effect of 
EU membership on individual utility. Thirdly, the effect the conflict over EU- 
membership has had on the domestic party systems is analysed. Finally, the attitudes of 
the populations towards EU-membership and the effects of the EU-conflict on the party 
systems are analysed in a comparative perspective.
1 Dusenberry, 1960, p. 233
2 Iceland is not included in this study, mainly because it has never applied for full 
membership in the EU. Moreover, the literature and data on popular attitudes, as well as 
on the effect on the party system, are very limited. For a good account of Iceland’s 
relationship with the EU, see Kristinsson (1996).
 ^ The European Community (EC) officially became the EU on November 1, 1993, 
incorporating the old EC as ‘Pillar 1’. Hence, this thesis refers to the ‘EC’ when events 
before this date are discussed, and the ‘EU’ thereafter, although in some cases it is 
necessary to use the amalgam EC/EU. The EU term is also used when dealing with the 
more general concept of European integration. Before the second Danish and Norwegian 
applications of 1967, the term European Economic Community (EEC) is also used.
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In terms of formal hypothesis, the purpose of this thesis can be stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: The attitudes of the populations of Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden towards EU-membership can be explained in terms of the effect of such 
membership on individual utility.
Hypothesis 2: Political parties will react to the increased salience of EU-membership as 
a political dimension so as to maximise their potential for holding political office.
The majority of academic literature on popular attitudes to European integration in the 
Nordic countries takes the form of individual country-studies, and much of it coincides 
with the référendums held over membership in the EC and the EU. Comprehensive 
analysis of popular attitudes have been carried out in conjunction with the 1992 and 
1993 référendums in Denmark in two books in Danish by Siune, Svensson and 
Tonsgaard^. An article in English by the same authors covers both the 1992 and the 
1993 référendums^, and there are also individual contributions by Siune^ and by 
Svensson^, as well as by Worre^. Danish popular attitudes towards EU-membership are 
also analysed in conjunction with elections to the European Parliament (EP), for 
instance by Worre^, and T h o m s e n ^ ®
4 1992 on the 1992 referendum, 1994 mainly on the 1993 referendum.
^ Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, 1994a.
61993.
^ 1994, also partially in his 1996 contribution on the referendum in Denmark. 
8 1995.
91987.
10 1995b.
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Similarly, a comprehensive study of Finnish attitudes towards EU-membership was 
carried out in conjunction with the 1994 referendum on membership, and published in a 
book edited by Pesonen^h Briefer accounts can be found in Pesonen and S a n k ia h o ^ ^  and 
Arter^^. Pehkonen*'^ gives a view of the development of Finnish popular opinion in the 
period from the time the EU-conflict became salient until the 1994 referendum. Suksu^^ 
also covers popular opinion in his account of the referendum in Finland. An example of 
the study of popular opinion towards EU-membership as expressed at elections to the 
EP can be found in Ankcar^^.
The Norwegian 1994 referendum is covered extensively in Jenssen and Valen et al.*? 
Sogner and A r c h e r provide a briefer account. Matlary^^ and Ludlow^o both discuss 
public opinion prior to the 1994 referendum. Among literature on popular opinion of 
Swedish EU-membership, the book edited by Gilljam and Holmberg^i is quite 
comprehensive. Miles^^ also deals with this. A briefer account is provided by 
Widfeldt23. Berg24 covers the development of public opinion in the period leading up to 
the referendum in Sweden.
11 994.
12 994.
13 995b.
14 994.
15 996.
16 997.
17 995.
18 995.
19 993.
20 994.
21 996.
22 997, e
23 996a,
24
There is considerably less literature on the effect of the EU-conflict on national party 
systems. Regarding the Danish party system there appears to be little substantial 
literature in English beyond the odd comment in election reports. Worre^^ discusses 
differences between the national and European Danish party systems. In the case of 
Finland, chapters by Pesonen and Sankiaho in Pesonen^^ address some effects of the 
EU-conflict on the party system, the latter primarily which parties were split and which 
were united; the former covers some correlations between party support and attitude to 
EU-membership. Tiilikainen^^ covers correlations between some social structures and 
attitudes to Finnish EU-membership.
With regard to the Norwegian party system, Jenssen^s evaluates the effect of the EU- 
conflict on volatility and electoral behaviour, based on inter-party flows of voters 
between the 1989 and 1993 parliamentary elections, and the 1995 local elections. There 
are also brief discussions of effects of EU-membership on voting behaviour and 
coalition formation in election reports by Archer^^, Valen^^ and Aardal^h On the 
Swedish party system, H o lm b e r g ^ ^  provides an account of the limited effect of the EU-
24 1994
25 1987.
26 1 9 9 4 , pp. 54-63 and pp. 164-173.
27 1996.
28 1995.
29 1993.
30 1994
31 1994a
32 1996.
25
conflict on electoral volatility. Widfeldt^^ very briefly considers the effect of the EU- 
conflict on the Swedish party system.
Other studies, mainly in the field of International Relations, focus almost exclusively on 
the elite level and notions of ‘national i n t e r e s t ’ There is also at least one comparative 
study in this field^^.
There are very few writings in English that compare popular opinion in all four 
countries, and even fewer that discuss the effect of the EU-conflict on the Nordic party 
systems. An exception with regard to public opinion is the study, based mainly on 
Eurobarometer data, carried out by Ârebrott, Berglund and Weninger^^. The ‘European 
Union and the Nordic Countries’, edited by Miles^^, covers all five Nordic countries. 
However, it is a compilation of individual essays rather than a comparative study 
(although some of the individual essays are comparative), and includes little on the 
effect of the EU-conflict on party systems.
Ludlow38 carries out some basic comparisons of attitudes towards EU-membership in 
the three Nordic candidate countries in the run-up to the 1994 référendums. Bjdrklund^^ 
compares the 1994 référendums in Finland, Norway and Sweden, analysing a variety of
33 1996, pp. 114-116.
34 On Denmark: Pedersen (1996) Petersen (1995, 1996). On Finland: Tomudd (1996).
35 Mouritzen (1993) analyses the EU-policies of the elite and the governments in 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
36 1995.
37 1996.
38 1994
39 1996.
26
factors and their relationship with public opinion on EU-membership. His article does 
not consider the effect on party systems, and is stronger on Norway than the other two 
countries. Jahn and Storsved^o also contribute similar analysis, as does Fitzmaurice'^^ 
Neither of these includes analysis of the effect of the EU-conflict on the party systems in 
the area, nor do they include Denmark. Svâsand and Lindstrom"^  ^carried out a study that 
compares the stands of the parties in all four countries. However, they concentrate on 
outlining the actual position of each party and that of their voters, with very limited 
emphasis on effects of the EU-conflict on the respective party systems.
None of the studies mentioned above are based on a formal model like the one employed 
in this thesis, although Ârebrott, Berglund and Weninger differ from other efforts in the 
field in that they formally test competing hypothesis about popular opinion to EU- 
membership"^^. Most of the literature in the area tends to be based on interpreting 
statistics. Importantly, there is a lack of studies that analyse how EU-membership might 
actually affect people’s utility, and then proceed to study to which extent the data 
support the hypothesis and models derived from this analysis. And with regard to the 
effect on the party system, there is simply little literature available, less of a comparative 
nature, and very little that employs a systematic modeM.
40 1995a, 1995b.
41 1995.
42 1996, pp. 205-219.
43 Aardal (1983) makes an interesting comparison, based on a rational choice 
framework, of the behaviour of Danish and Norwegian interest organisations in the 
campaigns for the 1972 référendums.
Hix and Lord (1997, especially chapter two) carry out a study of the positions of 
political parties across the EU towards European integration. They employ some of the 
ideas used in this thesis, but in a considerably less formal and comprehensive manner. 
More importantly, their methodology in this area is flawed. This is because they 
operationalise the parties’ attitudes towards European integration by looking at the
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In contrast, this work considers which factors (or variables) EU-membership is actually 
likely to affect, and how individual utility is likely to be affected with regard to each 
factor. The model is then applied in each country chapter, and a comparison of the 
results made in Chapter 8. Two theoretical models are employed to assess how the party 
system might be affected by the EU-conflict. Firstly, the cleavage model described in 
Chapter 2 is utilised to assess the crosscutting potential of this conflict. Secondly, a 
rational-choice based model is developed in Chapter 3, explaining the challenges the 
political parties might face due to the salience of the EU-conflict. This model is also 
then evaluated in the country chapters (four to seven), and used as a basis for 
comparison in Chapter 8.
The starting point for this thesis is the assertion that European integration has 
considerable potential to generate political conflict within the individual countries of the 
Nordic area. The overall reason for this conflict potential derives from the transfer of 
power and legislative authority from the national to the European level. This has the 
potential to change the utility function for individual citizens of (potential) EU member- 
states relatively to what they would enjoy if power and legislative authority remained at 
the national level. This general conflict potential of European integration is 
demonstrated in Chapter 1.
attitudes of voters who identify with each party (Hix and Lord, 1997, p. 28). This, as 
will be shown in this thesis, is often far removed from the attitudes of the parties 
themselves. Moreover, their book does not consider the position of many of the Nordic 
political parties.
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In order to understand the potential and limitations of the effect of the conflict over 
European integration on both popular attitudes and the party systems, it is necessary to 
develop an understanding of the nature of the Nordic party systems. In this respect, 
political cleavage theory, as developed by Stein Rokkan and others^^, is utilised. In the 
context of this thesis the term ‘cleavage’ will be employed only to describe socio­
political divisions of particular importance. Chapter 2 develops the theoretical 
implications of this approach, and separates political cleavages from more shallow 
divisions. Based on cleavage theory, a detailed description of the party systems of the 
four countries is then made.
The first section of Chapter 3 builds a model intended to increase our understanding of 
how people’s utility is affected by HU membership. This model is utilised in explaining 
attitudes towards EU membership in each country in chapters four to seven. The 
approach to this is similar to what Rokkan and Campbell referred to as 'micro-politics'^^. 
This expression refers to a focus on the individual and his political attitudes and 
motivations, as an individual or as a member of a sample of a larger population.
The second main research question addressed here is how the increased salience of the 
conflict over EU membership affects the party system in these countries. The second 
section of Chapter 3 builds a model designed to provide a structured theoretical 
explanation of the effect of the EU membership conflict on the party system. This model
Important contributions in this field include Bartolini and Mair (1990); Franklin, 
Mackie and Valen (1992); Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1992); Lane and Ersson (1994); 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967); Rae and Taylor (1970); Allardt and Littunen (1964); Jahn 
(1993); Knutsen (1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1990); and Zuckerman (1975, 1982).
4^ Rokkan and Campbell, 1970, chapter 12.
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is then utilised in chapters four to seven in explaining the effect of the conflict over EU 
membership on each country’s party system.
The first section of each country-chapter covers each country’s international relations 
generally, and relations with the EC/BU in particular. The second section evaluates the 
relative importance of the factors likely to influence an individual’s estimation of the 
effects of EU membership on his expected utility. Section three evaluates the effect the 
conflict over EU membership has had on the party system, employing both the cleavage 
model developed in Chapter 2, and the rational choice based model developed in 
Chapter 3.
1.2 Comparative Methodology.
This thesis is intended to be a contribution to the field of comparative politics. It is the 
view of the author that comparison leads to insights not available to the researcher that 
concentrates on one country. Knowledge of the self is gained through knowledge of 
others. Indeed, one may question whether any research is possible without some element 
of comparison: "there is no nation without other nations"47.
There is, however, another very good reason for comparison in political science. As 
Dogan and Pelassey^s point out, "political phenomena are not the object of an 
experimental science; that is all too clear." One cannot test how groups are formed or 
how conflicts mature. Hence, early sociologists such as John Stuart Mill, Auguste
47 Dogan and Pelassey, 1990, p. 5.
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Comte, and Emile Durkheim rapidly came to view comparison as the best substitute for 
experimental method in the social sciences^^. In contrast to natural science, general 
statements are improper in social science. Nomothetic statements are never universally 
true with regard to social reality. Hence, social science is idiographic, natural science 
nomothetic: "natural science seeks for law, history for the particular"^^.
There are two main reasons why general statements concerning social reality are not 
universally true. Firstly, there is the problem of potential errors of measurement in the 
observed variables. This is also a problem in the natural sciences. Secondly, selected 
sets of social variables are hardly ever autonomous. There are always other factors that 
can influence any observed relationship. There are two interpretations of this incomplete 
determination of social phenomena.
One interpretation involves focusing on the incompleteness of the system of variables - 
if all relevant factors were known, then we would be able to develop a deterministic 
model regardless of time and space. This implies a research strategy so far not 
attempted. It would involve random sampling of the world population, regardless of the 
social systems to which individuals, groups, or subsystems belong. "Social science 
based on this kind of assumption would be a-historical: historical circumstances in
48 1990, p. 15.
49 Dogan and Pelassey, 1990, p. 15. They also note that comparison does form the basis 
for experimental research. But the manipulation of variables and the keeping of some 
variables constant is not available to the researcher of human behaviour.
Aron, 1959, p. 157.
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which particular observations were made would be ignored since they are assumed to 
have no significance."
The second interpretation is that social science statements cannot be universally true 
because each social system contains unique patterns of determination relative to other 
social systems, due to the interaction of various characteristics. In an extreme 
interpretation, this makes all general statements across social systems impossible, and all 
social science statements must be confined to specific social systems. "In a less extreme 
version, probably dominant within political science today, social science statements are 
relative to classes of nations or ’areas’ that share syndromes of historical, cultural, and 
social characteristics."
A further type of objection against general statements about social reality is based on the 
argument that social phenomena are not the same in any two systems. In the strong 
ontological version, this argument is based on arguing non-comparability of social 
phenomena "as if it were the nature of social reality rather than a property of statements 
made about reality that is being disputed. Social phenomena do not have a property of 
’being comparable’ or ’not comparable’. ’Comparability’ depends upon the level of 
generality of the language that is applied to express observations. The response to the 
classical objection to comparing ’apples and oranges’ is simple: they are ’fruits’. T h a t  
being said, the selection of the four countries analysed here is intended to allow for a 
high level of comparability.
Przeworski and Teune, 1985, p. 7.
52 Przeworski and Teune, 1985, pp. 7-8. 
55 Przeworski and Teune, 1985, p. 10.
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1.3 Selection of countries for comparison.
In the terminology of comparative politics, this thesis is best described as an ’area study’. 
This is a much-used strategy applied to compare countries that are analogous with 
respect to history or geography. Its main advantage would appear to be the facilitation 
in a natural manner of keeping certain variables constant as the researcher observes the 
fluctuation of others. A main aim of comparative politics is to keep variables that we are 
not especially interested in as close to constant as possible. In other words, they can be 
used as elements of control. The area study is one way of progressing towards this goal. 
The reasoning behind this is well put by Dogan and Pelassey '^^:
"The comparativist, unlike the chemist, can never eliminate the impact of the 
environment. [...] Similarity is not necessarily linked to proximity. 
Nevertheless, in the search for analogy the most natural approach is to limit 
the analysis to a geographical area that, in effect, delineates a homogenous 
milieu in more than one respect: history, culture, level of development - so 
many dimensions can be used as elements of control."
There is an intuitive logic to selecting these four countries, since they are all part of the 
Nordic area of Europe^^. "The five states of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden can be characterised as a family of nations at the north-western comer of 
Europe.”56 As such, they have a lot in conunon. Ties between them include geography.
Dogan and Pelassey, 1990, p. 133.
Scandinavia is probably a more commonly known term. However, strictly speaking 
this only includes Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. (The narrowest definition of 
Scandinavia is in fact limited to Norway and Sweden.) The Nordic countries' includes 
the independent countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; as well as 
the semi-independent territories The Aland Isles (Ahvenanmaa in Finnish), The Færpe 
Islands, and Greenland.
Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, p. 1.
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history, culture, language (except the majority of Finns), religion, political system and 
party-system. These are all similar across the region. This situation creates a good 
starting point for a comparative study. “Scandinavia [...] fulfils the first requisite for 
comparative analysis. The countries form an easily identifiable cluster.
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are clustered together in the far north of 
Europe, bordering Russia in the east (Finland and Norway), Germany in the south 
(Denmark), and the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Arctic Ocean 
elsewhere.
History ties the four countries together, but it is also a potential source of division. 
Between 1375 and 1523 Denmark, Norway and Sweden were united in the so-called 
Kalmar Union. This broke down at the onset of the Reformation, but Denmark and 
Norway remained in 'union'. In practice, this meant continued domination of Norway by 
Denmark. Hence, for over 400 years (1375-1814) Norway was ruled from Denmark. 
When Denmark found itself on the losing side of the Napoleonic wars, it was forced to 
cede Norway to Sweden. Norway remained under Swedish rule for another 90 years 
(1814-1905). In 1905 Norway gained its independence without bloodshed.
Finland was gradually conquered by Sweden in the 13th and 14th centuries. It remained 
under Swedish rule until 1809, when it was lost to Russia. Finland was then under 
Russian rule until 1918, when it gained its independence after a bloody civil war 
between nationalists and communists. Hence, Finland and Norway have historically 
been dominated by Sweden and Denmark.
Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p. 10.
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Culturally there are strong similarities in this region^^. The languages of Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, and the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland are very similar, and 
the speakers of these languages can usually understand each other. Finnish, however, is 
entirely different. Until recent immigration, the ethnic homogeneity of the area was 
another unifying factor, and it remains a feature of similarity. Again, Finland is an 
exception.
Religiously, these four countries make up one of the most homogenous areas of Europe. 
The Reformation was completely successful. Scandinavia is the only part of Europe 
where Lutheranism is totally dominant. Another common factor is very low church 
attendance across the region, and participation in religious activities is generally low^9.
As for the political system, parliamentarism and suffrage developments took place 
around the same time in all four countries. These are all democratic countries, although 
in three of them the head of state is a Royal - the Finnish republican system being the 
exception. The mainland areas of the four countries are also unitary states^®. There are 
few federal features, although delegation of responsibilities to the local authorities is 
common.
After being relatively backward at the turn of the century, the Nordic countries are now 
among the most developed and prosperous in the world. They are also highly developed
See, for example, Thomas (1996). 
Thomas, 1996.
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welfare states^i, with mixed economies. In many ways these countries can be seen as 
archetypal representatives of the social democratic form of democracy. In terms of 
electoral support, the success of the main social democratic parties of the region, 
especially in Norway and Sweden, has indeed been “extraordinary”, to borrow a phrase
from Thomasson^2
The party systems in the region are strikingly similar - or at least they were until the 
1970's. So much so, in fact, that it became popular to speak of a Nordic - or 
Scandinavian - party system^^. This has usually been argued to be a five-party system 
with some exceptions, mainly located along a left-right axis: far left/communist, social 
democrats, centre party, liberals, and conservatives. Until recently, Sweden fit this 
model perfectly with regard to parliamentary representation. In Denmark there have 
been some minor party deviations from the model, and various parties vying for the far- 
left position. In Norway the main deviation until the 1970's was the Christian People’s 
Party (NKRF), which has routinely polled around ten percent since 1945. But Christian 
parties were formed in the other three countries as well: in Finland in 1958, Sweden in 
1964, and Denmark in 1970. Their electoral success, however, has been limited. In 
Finland the main deviance has been the Swedish People’s Party (SFF). However, from 
1970 onwards, the relative neatness and similarity of these party systems has given way
The Aland Islands (Finland) the Færpe Islands and Greenland (Denmark) have 
special arrangements similar to provinces in a federal union.
Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988, p. 22) argue that "the growth of welfare provisions, 
in fact, became almost a facet of nationalism in these countries."
1969, writing about the Swedish Social Democrats.
For instance: Berglund and Lindstrom (1978), Shaffer (1991) and Pestoff (1977). 
Castles (1978) and Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988) also stress the similarities, without 
referring specifically to a Scandinavian party system.
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to increasing fragmentation and differentiation. This development is described in 
Chapter 2 and the relevant country chapters.
One could argue homogeneity is so great across the region that a merger of some or all 
of these countries would appear to be reasonably logical. And there is a certain Nordic 
loyalty present. However, it is a secondary loyalty for most people. The primary loyalty 
appears to be to the nation-state. In the words of Stanley Anderson: "the consciousness 
of distinguishing characteristics, real or imaginary, is stronger than the sense of shared 
values"6"^ . Scandinavianism came to an end in 1864, when Sweden-Norway refused to 
come to Denmark’s assistance in its war with Prussia. The plans for a Scandinavian 
defence union 1948-1949 broke down because Sweden could not accept it as a link with 
Western military co-operation, and Norway would not accept an alliance which could 
make military supplies from the USA unavailable in case of emergency^^. The Nordic 
customs union negotiations 1947-1959 broke down when the Nordic countries joined 
the European Free Trade Association (BETA), led by UK, instead. The Nordek plan for 
a common market around 1970 broke down because Finland could not accept it as a link 
with the EEC^^. Hence, all these Nordic co-operation attempts were dependent on 
developments in the external world. This reluctance to form a Nordic union of some 
kind is perhaps indicative of the potential for opposition in these countries to other types 
of supra-national political integration.
^4 Anderson, 1967, p. 144.
Thomas, 1996, p. 20.
See Thomas (1996) for a comprehensive account of these developments.
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Although attempts at supranational Nordic integration have failed, the Nordic countries 
have agreed on extensive co-operation under the auspices of the Nordic Council, which 
held its first meeting in Copenhagen in 1952. This co-operation was formalised in the 
Treaty of Helsinki in 1962^ .^ The most important agreements reached within this 
framework include the 1952 passport union, the 1954 Common Labour Market Treaty 
and the 1955 Nordic Social Security Conventions^, but there are also a variety of other 
co-operation projects and programmesS^. However, all decisions have to be made by 
unanimity, and in the fields of a cross-national common market, trade and defence, the 
Nordic countries have not been able to reach comprehensive integration agreements.
1.4 The development of the relationship between the Nordics and the EU.
Until the mid-1980’s, the EC was a somewhat limited project in practice, although the 
organisation had far-reaching aims in theory, as set out in the Treaty of Rome. 
Membership in the EC would not seem to be that different from membership in EFT A, 
in that economic co-operation - mainly free trade - was also the main area of co­
operation within the EC. Importantly, two major exceptions were fisheries and 
agriculture, two areas of integrated common policy in the EU, but not in EFT A.
The history of the Nordic countries and European integration tends to be concentrated in 
two periods when the question of membership in the EC/EU was relatively high on the
Thomas, 1996, p. 23. 
Thomas, 1996, p. 25. 
Thomas, 1996, pp. 23-29.
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political agenda. The first period runs from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. It was in 
this period membership first became a realistic option for these countries.
After 1972 the situation clarified. After its membership application was supported in a 
popular referendum in 1972, Denmark joined the EC in 1973. Norway, after the 
population had rejected membership in a referendum, negotiated a free-trade agreement 
(July 1973). Sweden did likewise (July 1972), after deciding not to apply for full 
membership. As for Finland, foreign policy constraints meant that it was unable to apply 
for membership'^o, but it also signed a trade agreement with the EC, in October 1973. 
Most tariffs on industrial trade between EFTA and the EC had been abolished by 1977; 
the remaining ones were removed by 1994^1. In the period between the mid-1970's and 
mid-1980’s, the debate over EC-membership slowed down considerably.
It is the second period of intensified debate over European integration that is the main 
concern of this thesis. Hence, the time frame is mainly 1985-1997, with the 1998 Danish 
national election the last significant event to be included. Since 1985, important changes 
have taken place in the external environment of the Nordic countries. These changes 
have had a considerable effect on the Nordic countries’ relationship with the EC/EU. 
The most important external changes can be combined into two categories.
Firstly, those related to the development of the EC/EU. From the mid-1980’s onwards, 
EC integration accelerated dramatically. The most important events in this development 
were the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
For specific references concerning these events, see chapters four to seven.
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of 1992. These developments led to a considerably more deeply integrated Community, 
and are described in some depth in Chapter 1 below.
Secondly, developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (SU). The 
process labelled XSlasnost’ and attributed to the former Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbatchev was of some importance, especially for Sweden and Finland. But eventually 
this ’relaxation’ of the Cold War was far less important than the eventual collapse of 
Communism in Eastern Europe and of the old Soviet Union itself. Again, this 
development was especially important for Finland and Sweden^^. But on a more general 
level, this development changed the whole scope for European integration. It also 
changed the dynamics of Nordic countries’ relationships with the EU. Suddenly the EU 
could potentially unite not just Western Europe, but all of Europe (or at least the part to 
the west of the Ukraine)'^^.
These developments led to the Nordic countries re-evaluating their relationship with the 
EC. One result has been a sharpening of the conflict over European integration across 
the whole area: between those who support participation in this deeper and, potentially 
at least, considerably wider integration project, and those who do not.
Phinnemore, 1996, p. 43.
This development was mainly important for Finland in two ways. Firstly, it had 
considerably more room to manoeuvre in its foreign policy and thus in its relations with 
the EC/EU. Secondly, it contributed to a collapse in the Finnish economy (with 
repercussions also for Sweden). Hence some impetus was added to the idea of joining 
the EU. A more limited version of the same arguments can be made for Sweden.
See also Svâsand and Lindstrom (1997, p. 206).
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In the Danish case, the increased pace of integration created domestic political problems. 
The SEA was voted down in the Danish Parliament in 1986. The then Prime Minister, 
Paul Schluter, called an ad-hoc referendum, held on February 26, 1986, to override the 
Parliamentary vote. The referendum was passed, and the government then signed the 
SEA. With the TEU, the problem for the Danish government was not Parliament, but 
rather the people. In a 1992 referendum Danish voters narrowly rejected the TEU. After 
a compromise was worked out, giving Denmark opt-outs in certain areas, a second 
referendum in 1993 gave the government the outcome it wanted.
For the three non-members, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the effects of the above 
developments were more indirect. Denmark, as an EC member, had no choice but to 
react to the proposals for further integration. On the other hand, this country also had an 
opportunity to influence the shaping of the EC. For the other three the situation was all 
too familiar. Developments outside their control forced them to react. Of particular 
importance was secure access to the internal market.
At a speech to the EP on January 17, 1989, the President of the European Commission, 
Jaqcues Delors, offered the member-countries of EFTA the option of seeking a more 
structured partnership with the EC, including common institutions. At a meeting of the 
EFTA heads of government in Oslo, Norway, on March 14-15 1989, the official EFTA 
response emerged, and it was positive'^^. In October 1991 the EFTA countries^^ and the
Laursen, 1993, p. 123.
At this time consisting of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland.
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EC agreed on creating a European Economic Area (EEA) comprising of the members of 
the two organisations. Urwin'^^ provides a brief explanation of the essence of the EEA:
"It was essentially to be a gigantic free trade area rather than a customs 
union with a common external tariff. The EFTA states were not obliged to 
harmonise taxes or tariffs, or to accept the CAP and CEP. The EEA treaty 
also excludes the development towards Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). Neither does it include political co-operation, nor a common 
foreign- and security-policy. Crucially, it excludes participation in the EC’s 
supra-national decision-system and unanimity, not majority-voting, will be 
the decision-making mechanism. On the other hand, [the non-EU EEA 
member-states] committed themselves to accepting future EC legislation and 
to providing substantial funding to assist the economic development of the 
EC's poorer states, as well as agreeing to adopt EC legislation on turning 
some 1500 acts into national law. An EEA Council was to supervise the new 
structure and there was to be a Joint arbitration procedure to mediate 
disputes. The EFTA states had won access to the single market, but largely 
on the EC's terms."
The implementation of the EEA was postponed by two developments. First the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) objected to the proposed joint arbitration authority 
because it felt that it contravened the Treaty of Rome. This was resolved when the 
EFTA countries agreed to all arbitration in the EEA being in the province of the ECJ. 
Then Switzerland rejected the EEA in a referendum. The EEA was implemented 
(without Switzerland) in January 1994, one year later than planned^^. Thus, Nordic 
economic integration had finally been achieved, but within the EU framework^^
1995, p. 247. Regarding the EEA, see also Gjems-Onstad (1993), Gstohl (1993), 
L0chen (1991), Sæter (1996, pp. 140, 142).
Urwin, 1995, pp. 246-7.
Thomas, 1996, p. 22.
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At the European Council sununit of June 1990, a list of states eligible for EC- 
membership in 1995 was produced. It consisted solely of the EFTA states'^ .^ Over the 
next three years, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Austria applied for membership in the 
Community. Although only Austria was constitutionally obliged to hold a referendum 
on membership, the other three also decided to do so. The strategy behind the order in 
which these referenda were held is fittingly described by Jahn and Storsved^^ as a 
“domino-strategy”.
Public opinion appeared to be more pro-membership in Austria, than, in descending 
order of pro-EU public opinion, in Finland, Sweden and Norway. The idea captured in 
the phrase 'domino-strategy' was to hold the referendum first in the most pro-EU country 
and proceed towards that with the highest resistance in ascending order by opposition to 
membership. This is indeed what took place in the summer and autumn of 1994. Hence, 
the référendums on EU membership were held first in Austria, then in Finland, then 
Sweden, and, finally, in Norway. The thinking behind this was correct insofar as the size 
of the 'yes'-vote did indeed descend in that order. However, the 'domino-strategy' did not 
quite work in that the Norwegians voted, albeit narrowly, no' to membership. These 
events (except with regard to Austria) are described in more detail in chapters five to 
seven.
Urwin, 1995, pp. 246-7. 
80 1995.
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1.5 Conclusion,
The conflict over European integration is, ultimately, about where political power 
should reside, and who benefits from such power being concentrated where. If the 
current level of European integration persists - and especially if it deepens - then it is 
unlikely that this conflict will disappear. This thesis seeks to explain popular attitudes 
towards EU-membership in these four countries through focusing on how such 
membership affects individual utility. Furthermore, it will be shown that the distribution 
of pro- and anti-EU voters, as well as the position of other actors, and the resulting party 
strategies, can make the difference between a limited and a wide-ranging effect of the 
European integration conflict on the party system. The conflicts related to European 
integration are likely to remain on the political agenda for the foreseeable future. As 
long as this remains the case, the EU-conflict also retains the potential for affecting both 
voter behaviour and the party systems in the Nordic countries.
44
Chapter 1. The development of the European integration process and its potential 
for creating political conflict in the Nordic countries.
“It should be home in mind that there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful 
o f success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a state’s 
constitution. The innovator makes enemies o f all those who prospered under the old 
order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under 
the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear o f their adversaries, who have the 
existing laws on their side, and partly because men are generally incredulous, never 
really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience.
1.1. Introduction.
This chapter outlines the development of the European integration process and its 
potential for creating political conflict in the Nordic countries. It shows that the potential 
for such conflict has increased over time because this project involves an increasing 
number of countries and policy areas, and also an increasing depth of integration in 
various policy areas.
The core hypothesis in this context is that the basic reason for the conflict potential is 
that a transfer of political power from the nation-state to the EU is in the interest of 
some actors, and against the interest of others. At the centre of the conflict is the 
perpetual question of whom decides what and its corollary: who benefits from the fact 
that decision-making powers reside at one level rather than another.
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The main sections of this chapter outline the process of the transfer of power from 
nation-state to European level. Chapter 3 develops a model concerning the conflicts of 
interest associated with this transfer of power. This model is then utilised in the country 
chapters. Some of the more complicated concepts involved in these conflicts of interest 
are discussed in this chapter, partly so that these concepts can be employed in later 
chapters without much elaboration. These include nationalism and the nation-state, 
sovereignty, democracy and legitimacy implications of EU-membership, and alternatives 
to the EU-form of co-operation.
The first section of the chapter discusses in general form the implications of 
participation in the EU. This includes an exploration of the transfer of power from 
nation-state to European level that EU-membership involves. Special emphasis is placed 
on the increased degree of integration established by the SEA and the TEU. This 
increased integration involves both more supra-nationality and the power of the EU 
being extended to a greater number of policy and sub-policy areas. This dual shift 
expands the conflict-potential of EU-membership. The following section addresses the 
lack of alternative centres of political power to the nation-state and the EU. The 
following sections deal with the status of the nation-state as a locus of political power, 
the notion of ‘sovereignty’, and the relationship between EU-membership and 
democracy. Next, the general property of EU-membership having the potential to affect 
individual utility is established. Finally, the broad implications of EU-membership for 
the national political system are outlined.
1 Machiavelli, 1995, p. 19.
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1.2. Implications of EU-membership.
This section outlines the powers transferred from the nation-state to the EU when a 
country becomes a member. It also indicates how the character of European integration 
has changed over time. The most important development is the move towards supra- 
nationalism that has taken place since the mid-1980s.
1.2.1. The transfer of power from the nation-state to the EU on entrv.
By becoming a member of the EU a state formally, by acceding to The Treaties, cedes 
some legal authority to the main supra-national institutions^ of the EU: the European 
Conunission (Commission, hereafter), the EP, and the ECJ. Furthermore, when the 
Council of Ministers (Council) votes according to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)^ 
rules, it too formally takes on a supra-national character. And, as Coombes argues, there 
are substantial federal elements in the treaties:
2 For a description of the main intergovernmental and supranational features of the EU, 
see Nugent, 1994, pp. 432-433.
^ Article 148.2 of The Treaty of Rome: "Where the Council is required to act by a 
qualified majority [...] For their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least 62 
[out of 87] votes in favour where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a proposal 
from the Commission, 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members, in other cases." 
However, if there are 23 or more votes against a measure it is withdrawn for a period of 
reflection before being reintroduced. (George, 1996, p. 23)
47
“The founding treaties and their subsequent development, as well as the 
consequent actions of the Community’s institutions themselves, were in part 
inspired by a federal vocation. That vocation, already embodied in the 
transfer of legal authority itself, was sustained throughout by the 
Commission, European Parliament and Court of Justice. All the institutions, 
including the Council, were to some extent deliberately designed in 
accordance with federalist principles.
Through its role as main initiator of legislation, the Commission plays a very important 
role in setting the agenda of the EU. The power of the EP to influence legislation has 
increased significantly over time, in particular through the SEA (1986) and the TEU 
(1992). This is especially due to the co-operation procedure (introduced through the 
SEA) having been extended, as well as the introduction of the co-decision procedure 
(introduced through the TEU). The Amsterdam Treaty, if ratified, will increase the use 
of the co-decision procedure and reduce the use of the co-operation procedure. 
Furthermore, EU members accept the supremacy of EC law over national law and, 
consequently, the rulings of the ECJ.
Throughout the EU’s history, many areas of legislative and other activity have been, and 
still are, subject to unanimity in the Council. Hence, member-states have a formal veto 
in these areas. In other areas a more informal veto was firmly entrenched as a result of 
the so-called ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ of 1966. This allowed a member state to 
exercise a veto if it believed its ‘national interests’ were threatened^. Although final
4 Coombes, 1994, p. 161.
^ In the mid-1960's the EEC faced a serious crisis that essentially was concerned with 
the direction of the organisation. The crisis arose from several connected issues. Firstly, 
the EP, supported by the Netherlands, wanted to increase its powers and become a 
proper legislature. Secondly, the Commission advocated a proposal that the EEC should
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authority in areas of EU activity where the veto still exists rests with the member-state, 
the process of compromise-finding and negotiations removes the decision-making 
procedure from the level of the member-state to the supra-national level of the EU. After 
the TEU and if the Amsterdam Treaty is implemented, the veto only applies to very few 
areas of Pillar 1, but to virtually all decisions made within the framework of the other 
two pillars.
The areas where legal authority is most obviously transferred from nation-state to EU- 
level are those where the Council makes decisions through the QMV mechanism. QMV 
mainly applies to internal market legislation in what has become ‘Pillar One’ after the 
TEU was implemented. This allows for a ‘super-majority’ in the Council to override the 
objections of one or more member-states against a particular measure. Although the 
Council is inter-govemmental by nature of representing the governments of member- 
states, when it votes through QMV it takes on a supra-national character. QMV deprives 
the member-state of control in the areas where this voting mechanism applies. 
Importantly, the tendency in the EU since the SEA has been to increase the use of QMV.
have its own independent source of revenue. Thirdly, the Commission wanted a clear 
agreement to use the treaty provisions on QMV in the Council. These proposals would 
make the EEC more supranational, and were for that reason objectionable to France and 
its president, Charles de Gaulle. However, the Commission also proposed reforms in the 
EEC agricultural policy. This was strongly supported by France, but Germany objected. 
The Commission tried to find a way out of the conflict by linking these issues in a 
package deal. France refused to accept this, and in 1965 simply ceased to attend Council 
of Ministers meetings for seven months. In the end, a compromise had to be found, as 
the whole existence of the EEC became threatened. The crisis essentially occurred 
because France felt its basic national interests were threatened. "The Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966 permitted a member state to exercise a veto on discussion of 
matters which it believed might affect its own national interests." (Urwin, 1989-1993, p. 
224) In the end, France emerged ‘victorious’ from the debacle, as the balance of power 
had moved away from the EEC institutions towards the national governments. (Urwin,
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As more and/or larger parts of policy areas are transferred to an increasingly supra­
national organisation, the EU affects people’s lives to a greater extent than before. "In 
terms of width, there are now few significant areas which have completely escaped the 
EU's attentions. In terms of depth the pattern varies, but in many important areas, such 
as external trade, agriculture, and competition policy, key initiating and decision-making 
powers have been transferred from the member states to EU authorities."^
With more power and legislative authority in a policy area being transferred to the EU- 
level, an individual who benefits from such a policy area remaining in the national arena 
will have increasing reason to oppose European integration. Conversely, a person who 
benefits from such a decision or policy area being removed to the European level will 
have increasing reason to support such integration. The more important these policy 
areas and decisions are judged to be, the more intense conflicts of interest related to 
European integration are likely to get.
1.2.2 The Single European Act.
Essentially, the SEA aimed to create the single market originally set out in the Treaty of 
Rome, initially scheduled for 1970. In addition, the SEA included extensions to the 
scope of the EC to cover foreign policy by incorporating European Political Co­
operation (EPC) into The Treaties, and - importantly - new forms of decision-making 
(essentially more QMV) and new legislative processes within the EC.
1989, 1993, pp. 220-224, Wallace and Wallace, 1996, pp. 45-46) 
6 Nugent, 1994, p. 431
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The SEA may have looked like more economic integration, but it implied political
integration^. Economic integration made wide-reaching political integration possible*. 
This possibility was pursued in the TEU, which has a political content more explicit 
than that which had been common for the Community. The reaction to its proposals, 
however, demonstrates the difficulties this European project runs into once it moves 
from the economic sphere to more openly political integration.
There were especially two elements of the SEA that constituted a move towards a more 
supra-national EC. Firstly, it vastly increased the scope for majority voting, thus further 
limiting the power of the veto. The SEA limited unanimity regarding the creation of the 
single market to tax matters, conditions of employment, and the movement of people. 
Secondly, the member-states agreed to the principle of ‘mutual recogn itionT hus, the 
members of the EC "conceded that many laws made by their national parliaments could 
be rendered illegal or unworkable by a vote between ministers of other countries
^ Urwin, 1995, pp. 229-32. See also Taylor (1989).
8 Osmondsen, 1990.
9 The principle of ‘mutual recognition’ was established through an ECJ ruling in the 
‘Cassis de Dijon’ case. (ECR 649 of 1979) West-Germany prevented the import of a 
French drink called Cassis de Dijon on the grounds that its alcohol content was too high 
for wine and too low for spirits. The court ruled that French regulations ensured that the 
drink was safe, and that therefore West-Germany had no right to prevent its import. 
Such exclusion can only be justified if the product can be shown to be damaging to 
health, safety, the environment, or other aspects of public interest. Essentially, what can 
be sold in one Member State cannot normally be prevented from being sold in another. 
The Commission has utilised this principle to speed up the slow process of achieving 
European specifications, using it as an alternative for removing technical barriers to 
trade. Hence mutual recognition has played an important role in the realisation of the 
internal market.
Colchester and Buchan, 1990, p. 15.
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The SEA also increased the power of the EP by giving it the right to amend drafts of 
European law. Through the SEA the scope of the EC was widened to include Research 
and Development (R&D), environmental protection, and health and safety in the 
workplace. It also substantially increased the scope of regional policy. Moreover, it laid 
out plans for how to achieve Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)^^ and recommitted 
the member-states to the goal of ‘European U n i o n ’
The logic of the single market leads to spill-over effects into fields of policy such as 
immigration, refuge and asylum, health, secondary and higher education, industrial 
competitiveness, air and sea transport, and infrastructure^^. One could also argue that 
EMU constitutes such a spill-over effect^^. Overall, the SEA considerably diminished 
the self-determination of the member-states. Therefore, this development increased the 
potential for conflict between opponents and proponents of EU-membership and further 
European integration.
The development of a genuine internal market in the EC increased the political salience 
of the European integration process in the Nordic countries. On the one hand, access to 
the internal market was seen as a necessity, in particular by many political and business 
leaders. On the other hand, there was substantial opposition in all four countries to many 
of the implications of full EC membership (in Denmark, to further integration), and in 
particular the supranational elements of the EC. By the late 1980’s, the European
11 SEA, Article 20.
In the ‘Introduction of Signatories’ to the SEA. See, for example. Finder (1989), 
Nugent (1994, pp. 256-257).
13 Butt-Philip, 1994, p. 124.
14 George, 1996, p. 205.
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integration process placed increasing pressure on the political parties in the Nordic 
countries to develop positions on European integration generally and on membership in 
particular.
1.2.3 The Treaty on European Union.
The Treaty on European Union was signed at Maastricht in the Netherlands on February 
7, 1992. The last country to ratify the Treaty was Great Britain^in  the summer of 1993. 
It was finally implemented in November 1993^ .^ The treaty divides into three ‘pillars’. 
The first contains Titles U, XU and IV and amends the EEC, European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and Euratom Treaties, formally naming them the European 
Community. The second pillar (Title V) concerns foreign and security policy and is 
based on the existing intergovernmental procedures of the EPC. The third pillar (Title 
VI) covers justice and home a f fa i r sT i t l e s  I and VII contain a Preamble and Final 
Provisions, seeking to bind the three pillars into the EU.
The J ’EU was a move towards more integration and supra-nationality in both political 
and economic terms. This treaty took the Community closer to a political union in 
several areas. Many of the more explicitly political moves were modest and limited. But 
many are of great symbolic significance, and have obvious potential for becoming more 
wide reaching in the future. This especially holds for the provisions contained in Pillars 
n and m.
Laursen, 1997, p. 59.
Edwards and Pijpers, 1997, p.l.
Denmark later negotiated exemptions from future participation in common defence
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Foreign and security policy, as well as judicial affairs, were both developed further but 
as separate pillars outside the EC decision-making system. Essentially, the Treaty states 
that the members will work towards a Conunon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
eventually including a common defence policy. The CFSP “shall include all questions 
related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”^^ .
Control, at least formally, over foreign and defence policy are core symbols of the power 
and ‘self-determination’ of the nation-state. One on-going and symbolic erosion of 
national power over foreign policy is the fact that the Commission had established over 
100 diplomatic missions by 1994^9 Another is the agreement that member-states that 
are members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council undertake that they will 
concert and keep other member-states fully informed^^. The CFSP has a strong potential 
for eroding further the authority and power of the nation-state. However, for now the 
CFSP remains intergovernmental and largely outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ, the EP 
and the Commission^k
In the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar the procedural arrangements are 
comparable to those of the CFSP. The ECJ is largely excluded, there is only very limited 
majority voting and according to the stricter qualification, and the EP has only a
and home affairs policies. See Chapter 4 for details.
TEU, Article J4.
Edwards and Nuttall, 1994, p. 95.
20 TEU, Title V, Article J.5.4.
21 For a detailed description of the changes the TEU made in foreign and defence
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marginal role. The one exception from this is visa policy. This was made subject to 
normal EC legislative procedure, although with unanimity required in the Council and 
the EP only to be consulted^^. There is, however, the possibility that in the future some 
aspects of member states’ interior policy can be transferred to the EC pillar, but only on 
a case-by-case basis and according to a unanimous decision made by the Council and 
then ratified by all member states.
Nevertheless, the TEU establishes criminal and police matters, and also immigration and 
policies towards third-country nationals as legitimate areas for a common policy^^. The 
importance of this pillar is mainly prospective; it establishes a framework for increased 
integration in the areas of justice and home affairs.
A rather vague notion of 'union citizenship' 24 was also agreed, giving people across the 
union the right to vote and stand at local and European elections on the basis of 
residence rather than nationality25. This “may be interpreted as being of deep symbolic 
importance”26. If nationality is no longer the condition for political participation, then 
the legitimacy of the nation-state as the supreme political unit is diminished.
The TEU also included reforms giving the EP more power. The main reform was the co­
decision procedure as laid down in Article 189b. This gives the EP the right to block
policy, see for example Edwards and Nuttall, 1994, pp. 84-103.
TEU, Article 100c.
23 Anderson, den Boer and Miller, 1994, p. 115.
24 TEU, Article 8. Denmark later negotiated an exemption from this. (See chapter 4 for 
details.)
25 For an account of the origins of EC citizenship, see Anderson, den Boer and Miller, 
pp. 106-107.
55
legislation in certain areas. It is prescribed in the TEU for a number of sectors, including 
environment policy, most internal market legislation, free movement of workers, self- 
employed workers, cultural and educational measures, the framework programme for 
research, and guidelines for trans-European networks^^. Except for in R&D and 
education policy, the Council acts by QMV under the co-decision procedure.
The introduction of an EP vote of confidence in the new Conunission (the EP and 
Commission terms of office coincide from 1994/1995 onwards) was another important 
reform of the TEU. The EP also has to be consulted on the appointment of the 
Conunission president. The EP earned numerous other minor increases in its power as 
welps. The ECJ also had its powers strengthened in the TEU by the introduction of a 
provision giving the Court the right to sanction member states failing to respect its 
judgements.
The most important aspect of the TEU was to lay down the objective of EMU, together 
with a timetable and schedule for the achievement of monetary union. The EU leaders 
agreed to move from step one (tighter budgetary discipline) to step two at the end of 
1993. This step established the European Monetary Institute (EMI), intended as a 
precursor to the European Central Bank (ECB). Furthermore, member governments 
were encouraged to prepare for stage three of EMU by amending policies so that they 
would be able to meet the convergence criteria^^.
26 Duff, 1994, p. 29.
27 For a detailed list of which policy areas and treaty articles the various EP legislative 
procedures apply to, see, for example, Corbett (1994, pp. 225-228).
For details, see, for example, Corbett (1994, pp. 215-217).
29 TEU, Title VI.
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Stage three involves the freezing of exchange rates, followed by the introduction of a 
single currency and the ECB. This stage was made dependent upon whether a majority 
of states were judged to have satisfied the four convergence criteria set out in the TEU^o. 
On March 25, 1998, the European Commission published its Convergence Report and 
Recommendation, in which eleven^^ countries were judged to meet the necessary 
conditions to participate in the EU’s single currency, the euro, which will be introduced 
on January 1, 1999. If it succeeds, EMU removes a substantial element of power that 
has, at least nominally, been an important part of the authority of the nation-state:
“The Treaty gives the Community exclusive authority over money. It pools 
the monetary sovereignty of the member states, and supersedes any 
independent activity by them in that field. It ascribes the management of the 
Emu to a new supranational institution, the European Central Bank [...]”32
In addition to this and previous encroachments on nation-state power, it is as yet unclear 
to what extent monetary union will require further co-ordination of fiscal policy - 
including taxation levels^^. But it is quite clear that there will be little scope for 
substantially independent economic policies at the nation-state level:
These are: inflation no more than one and a half percent above the average of the 
three best performing states; government deficit no more than three percent of GDP, and 
public debt no more than 60 percent of GDP; the currency to have been within the two 
and a quarter percent band (fifteen percent since August 1993) of the ERM for at least 
two years; and interest rates during the previous year should have been no higher than 
two percent above those of the three best performing states.
Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal and Finland. The Council meeting in Brussels on May 2, 1998, 
confirmed this.
32 Duff, 1994, p. 21.
33 For a detailed discussion of this, see Johnson (1994).
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“Given EC control of the customs union, common trade policy, single 
market and single currency, it is an important element of Emu that the 
political management of the economy - in other words, fiscal policy - will be 
shared but well co-ordinated between the EC institutions and member
governments.’’^ ^
According to the Treaty itself, the internal market and EMU requires “the adoption of an 
economic policy, which is based on the close co-ordination of Member States’ economic 
policies”^^  and “member states shall regard their economic policies as a matter of 
common concem”^^ .
One might of course argue that small and medium-sized nation-states of the 1990’s do 
not in any case have much autonomy over economic policies. Globalisation, 
international finance, foreign exchange markets untamed by borders, the opening-up of 
markets and the presence and power of global organisations such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) severely curtail the powers of the nation-state. But EMU and fiscal 
co-ordination formalises the loss of control in a manner that these other developments 
do not. In this respect, EU-membership can increasingly be viewed as a symbol of the 
nation-states’ loss of control over monetary and fiscal policy.
The TEU also extended EU competence in the fields of consumer protection, 
environment, education, health and transport^^. The social charter extended EC 
competence to fields such as health and safety at work, working conditions, consultation
34 Duff, 1994, p. 23.
35 TEU, Article 3a.
36 TEU, Article 103.1.
37 See, for example, Butt-Philip (1994, pp. 129-139) for details of these changes.
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of workers and various other areas connected with the work place^^. A cohesion fund 
was established to assist the poorer member-states in moving closer to the conditions set 
for further integration.
As Sbragia notes, the Community of the mid-1990’s was a very different and more 
integrated one than that which existed only ten years earlier:
"Members entering the Community before 1992 essentially joined, in 
economic terms, a customs union and an incomplete common market with a 
multiplicity of non-tariff barriers. Agricultural policy was much more 
developed than industrial or financial policy. Countries entering the EC after 
1992 will be joining an economic system with both a common agricultural 
policy and a largely completed common market in industrial goods and 
financial services, as well as a system committed to the creation of a central 
bank and common currency by the year 2000. They will therefore be joining 
an economic entity very different from that which Spain and Portugal joined 
as late as 1986."^^
The TEU entailed a further instalment of transfer of power from the level of the 
member-state to the Community. Of course, the member-states retain power and 
legislative authority over many policy-areas, but the SEA and the TEU have shifted the 
balance of the European project towards supra-nationalism.
Although the SEA and the TEU were the most important, other developments have also 
moved the Community further in the supra-national direction. The Schengen Agreement 
aimed at abolishing border controls among its signatories, and thus implemented an
See, for example, Butt-Philip (1994, pp. 129-139) for a discussion of the negotiations 
and details of the Social Charter. The UK did not sign up to this, and hence it could not 
be incorporated as the ‘Social Chapter’ as intended. However, at the Amsterdam 
meeting in June 1997, the UK signed up to this agreement. Pending ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Social Chapter will be incorporated into the treaties.
Sbragia, 1992, pp. 14-15.
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integral part of the internal market^o. Norway has reached an agreement with the EU, 
which effectively means it also implements the Schengen Agreement"^h The Amsterdam 
Treaty will bring the Schengen arrangement into the EU proper in conjunction with 
asylum- visa- and immigration policy being incorporated into the supra-national Pillar 
One^2 One important consequence of this is the extension of ECJ jurisdiction to this 
area, and after five years the member-states can decide to apply QMV-voting to this 
area. The rest of Schengen was incorporated into the inter-govemmental Pillar Three'^^
Increasing trade dependence is also an important aspect related to European integration. 
Trade dependence between the EU member-states is only partly an effect of 
membership, as members are in many cases natural trading partners. Nevertheless, trade 
between these states has increased as a percentage of each individual state’s total trade, 
and they have no doubt become more dependent upon each other in this respect"^. All 
these developments make it increasingly difficult to maintain a high level of national 
self-determination.
40 The SEA stipulates that “the internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers” (Article 8a). However, political and technical objections have prevented this 
from being implemented.
41 As the only Non-EU State, Norway signed a modified version of the Schengen Treaty 
in 1996, and the Norwegian parliament ratified that Treaty in June 1997.
42 The main provisions relating to this are to be found in ‘Protocol integrating the 
Schengen Acquis into the framework of the European Union’ and the following annex 
on the ‘Schengen Acquis’ in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
43 Europabevegelsen i Danmark, Sidste Nytt.
(http://www.zapp.dk/wwwebev/snam02cl .htm, 2/2/98).
44 See, for example, Wijkman (1990, pp. 89-139) for a description of the increasing 
European trade dependencies.
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1.3. Ambiguities and Alternatives.
At this point it is necessary to deal with the observation that the EU is hardly the only 
possible form of co-operation between European states. However, it is the only political 
integration project that properly transfers legislative authority to a level above the 
nation-state available to the people, politicians and nation-states of Europe for the 
foreseeable future. It is important to distinguish between European ‘integration’ and ‘co­
operation’"^ .^ Because European integration is ultimately a political project, some 
political whole must be created. This means that there must be European decision­
making institutions whose decisions are binding throughout the entire integrated area. If 
a project has no integrative element and nation-state veto is retained, then the conflict- 
potential of such a project is very likely to be considerably more limited. Crucially, such 
a project would not formally delegate legal authority to an organisation outside formal 
nation-state control.
In this thesis, the term ‘European integration’ refers to what is represented by the 
organisation or project currently known as the EU. The more specific term ‘EU- 
membership’ refers to the level of integration implied by the implementation of all 
treaties and agreements up to and including the TEU. A variety of other co-operation 
and integration projects have been proposed, and some have been attempted. Below 
follows a catalogue of the most important of these projects and ideas that are relevant to 
this thesis.
Integrate: “combine (parts) into a whole, complete by adding parts”. Co-operate: 
“work or act together in order to bring about a result”. (Hornby, 1978).
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a) EFTA, established in November 1959. This had^^ as its aim only free trade between 
its member-states, and was as such not a project directed at European political 
integration. However, the idea of a free-trade agreement as an alternative to European 
integration long remained popular in the Nordic countries. But several factors also 
pulled these countries towards the EU. Many of these factors are connected to the
attraction of the internal market^^, including fear of tariffs and of companies moving 
facilities to the EU. Moreover, to some people, and crucially this includes many in the 
political and other elites, the idea of European political integration is an attractive one 
not provided by EFTA.
b) Nordic union in various shapes and forms. This was a regional, not European, project. 
Some type of Nordic co-operation agreement has been suggested several times since the 
late 1940’s, and progress has been made in many areas. However, no formal agreement 
of a supranational character has ever been made. With Denmark’s entry into the EC this 
became an even more difficult task to achieve. Now that Sweden and Finland have also 
joined the EU, a separate ’Nordic solution’ seems further away than ever. The limits of 
Nordic integration are covered in the introduction, and in the specific context of each 
country in chapters four to seven.
c) North-Atlantic co-operation. This might include Greenland, the Fær0e Islands, 
Iceland, and Norway. The main problem of this solution is the very limited market this
EFTA still exists, but now includes only Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland.
And, for Denmark, the need to secure access for its important agricultural exports.
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would provide. Dependency upon and conflicts of interest over fisheries is also 
problematic. This option has never been seriously attempted.
d) Galtung has proposed several co-existing alternatives such as a Nordic, Neutral, 
Central European (Habsburg-empire recreated) and an Eastern European project. There 
might be some kind of double membership in the EC and these other projects, or maybe 
a wider but shallower organisation similar to EFTA^^. The main problem with this 
proposal is that most of the countries that might consider such a project are already 
members of the EU or are aiming to become EU-members. Thus, the realisation of the 
project requires the reduction of the EU to a co-operation project rather than an 
integration project.
e) Some argue for wider solutions that incorporate states outside Europe, in particular 
poorer ones. Although assistance is given to poorer countries, no serious such 
integration project has been attempted.
f) Wider internationalism tends to be promoted mainly by left-wing parties such as the 
Socialist Left Party (SV) in Norway and the Socialist People’s Party (SF) in Denmark. It 
can take many shapes, but they can be narrowed down to two main directions:
1. Utopian internationalism, which would include some type of world government and 
either no armed forces or an army controlled by an organisation such as the UN. This 
option is entirely unrealistic in the foreseeable future. There is no evidence that the 
population of the countries analysed here could be persuaded to follow such a course.
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And even if the population of the Nordic countries could be persuaded, they remain 
small states, with only modest power on the world political scene. Hence, they are likely 
to remain reactive rather than proactive players. This means that they have to relate to 
organisations initiated by other states, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)AVTO, EFTA and the 
EU.
2. A socialist (or green, or libertarian, or even xenophobic) vision that is ultimately 
distinctly nationalist in character. At the core of such visions is the presumption that it is 
possible to obtain a popular majority for a certain vision in one country that it is not 
possible to obtain across Europe. Thus, because of often undisclosed or vague obstacles, 
it is not possible to achieve a ‘better’ society as an EU member. It follows that EU 
membership must be resisted. It is assumed that those promoting a vision of a different 
(and, according to its protagonists, better) society can obtain the support of enough 
people in one nation-state to form a government. At the same time, the same 
protagonists argue that this better society cannot achieve majority support across the EU. 
The conclusion must be that it is only in their particular, ‘chosen’, nation (and perhaps a 
few others that are very similar) that people will support the better society. EU 
membership would therefore make it impossible, or at least considerably more difficult, 
to achieve this better society, because the ‘chosen’ nation lose control over its political 
destiny.
It could be argued that devolution of power to sub-national regions is a further 
alternative to the nation-state and the EU. Such arrangements exist in many European
48 Galtung, 1989, pp. 33-35.
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countries, including Belgium, Germany, Spain and, increasingly. Great Britain. 
However, although local and regional authorities have considerable power in areas such 
as health and education in the Nordic countries, there is no pressure towards or popular 
movements advocating considerable devolution of power downwards, and certainly no 
pressure for federal solutions^^. The Nordic countries are among the most unitary states 
in Europe. Debate over alternative loci of power is firmly focused on supra- or inter­
national alternatives to the nation-state, not sub-national ones.
Whilst many of the above mentioned alternatives to power remaining with the nation­
state or being transferred to the EU are still theoretically possible, they are not on the 
political agenda as realistic alternatives. The extension of the EU to fifteen member- 
states in 1995 and the invitation to a further eleven to join - including ten Eastern 
European ex-communist states - further reduces the potential for alternative projects. For 
the foreseeable future, the nation-state and the EU are the only available centres of 
power relevant to the Nordic area^ ® the current situation, therefore, whilst in theory 
an anti-EU position can involve support for alternative types of integration, in practice it 
denotes support for power remaining with the nation-state.
49 There are some exceptions to this, but they mainly concern overseas territories. The 
Fær0e Islands and Greenland are part of Denmark, but have considerable autonomy with 
regard to domestic affairs. There is a similar relationship between the Aland Islands and 
Finland.
Matlary (1995, p. 114) argues that the EU is the only ‘rival’ to the state in terms of 
making a claim to be governing legitimately.
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1.4. The nation-state alternative to the EU,
The importance of the nation-state in this context is its position as the most powerful 
political unit and essential to the concept of ‘national self-determination’. As important 
as it has become, the concept of the ‘nation-state’ deserves some elaboration. There is, 
both in academic and popular terms, confusion about the use of the concepts 'state' and 
nation'. In contrast to the 'nation', the 'state' is fairly straightforward to define: "The state 
is the major political subdivision of the g l o b e . A s  such, it can be easily defined and 
conceptualised as a ‘territorial-political unit’ covering a certain area. Defining 'nation', is 
a different matter: "Defining and conceptualising the nation is much more difficult 
because the essence of the nation is i n t a n g i b le .
The core definition problem is to decide what turns a group of people into a nation. The 
title of an article by Connor puts the problem succinctly: “When is a Nation?”^^  
Similarly, "if the concept of 'nation' can in any way be defined unambiguously, it 
certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as 
members of the 'nation'. In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept 
undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific 
sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus, the concept belongs in the
Connor, 1978, p. 379. 
52 Connor, 1978, p. 379. 
55 Connor, 1990.
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sphere of values. Yet, there is no agreement on how these groups should be delimited or 
about what concerted action should result from such s o l i d a r i t y . ” ^^
However, whether or not an ‘objective’ definition of ‘nation’ exists is not material for 
the argument made here^^. The nation-state is the dominant political unit of this 
century^^. It provides the only viable alternative seat of political power to the EU, and 
thus a focal point for opposition to European integration.
The development of nation-states is closely connected to the ideology of nationalism^^. 
Nationalism is commonly seen as a political phenomenons^, and indeed many authors 
view it as primarily, or even exclusively, a political concept or ideologyS^, originating 
around 1800^°. As a political doctrine, nationalism is related to the boundaries of the 
state and the legitimacy of its government:
54 Weber, 1948, p. 172.
55 For an example of an attempt at setting objective criteria for defining ‘nation’, see 
Tivey (1981, pp. 5-6).
For critical views of the idea of ‘national identity’ as the ‘natural’ division of 
territory into separate political units, see Gellner, (1983, especially pp. 47-49) and 
0sterud (1991, especially p. 161).
See Anderson (1983) for an account of the most important elements in the 
development of nationalism, and Breuilly (1982) for an elaboration and history of 
nationalist ideology. See also Kohn (1945) regarding the connection between 
nationalism and the nation-state.
Although some authors also or primarily consider it to be a cultural concept. See for 
example Hutchinson (1987). See also Smith (1981, 1991) for a more primordialist view, 
with a strong focus on the ethnic and cultural elements of nationalism.
See, for example. Alter (1985), Gellner (1983), Greenfeld (1992), Kedourie (1993), 
and Naim (1977).
Kedourie, 1993, p. 1.
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"Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and the national unit should be congruent.
"Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19th 
century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of 
population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the 
legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a 
society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally 
divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which 
can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is
national self-government.
Gellner argues that the worst violation of the nationalist principle occurs where the 
rulers of the political unit belong to a nation different from the majority of the ruled. 
This can be the case with an empire, or local domination by outsiders^^. Clearly, the EU, 
with its supranational elements, can be construed as representing such a violation.
1.5. Sovereignty and self-determination.
The concept of ‘sovereignty’ is frequently invoked in debates over European integration. 
The central question in this regard is the effect EU-membership and different degrees of 
integration have on sovereignty. The view taken here is that what happens when a 
nation-state joins the EU is better described in terms of a limited transfer of legal 
authority than in terms of whether, and to what extent national sovereignty is delegated, 
transferred or surrendered.
61 Gellner, 1983, p. 1.
62 Kedourie, 1993, p. 1.
63 Gellner, 1983, p. 1.
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Nevertheless, sovereignty has become virtually synonymous with self-determination, 
and is commonly used with the pre-fix ‘national’. It is necessary for a state to claim to 
be not only a nation-state but also ‘sovereign’ in order to be accepted as an independent 
actor in the international community. “The mutual recognition of state sovereignty can 
conveniently be dated to the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, where the norm of 
sovereignty based on territorially defined states as separate and autonomous entities was 
laid down.” "^^
The theoretical and traditional meaning of sovereignty relates to supreme authority and 
control over a certain population or territory. For example, Minogue^^ argues that 
"sovereignty is a basically legal term used to refer to the ultimate authority which can 
determine the law and government of a human community", whilst Krasner^^ asserts that 
core element in any definition of sovereignty is the assertion of final authority within a 
given territory. In modem day Europe this community or territory is usually a state. 
Sovereignty allows the government of the state to issue legislation that is binding for the 
population of the state. However, there is also an element of freedom from outside 
interference involved. Thus, Strayer argues that “sovereignty requires independence 
from any outside power and final authority over men who live within certain 
boundaries’’^ .^ But ultimately sovereignty relies on state control over the military forces 
- the idea that the state has the sole right to the legitimate use of violence on its territory. 
In this sense, ultimate national sovereignty is retained as long as the military forces 
remain (predominantly) under national control.
^4 Matlary, 1995, p. 101.
65 1992 pp. 23-4.
66 1980, p. 86.
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Ideas of how a state or government acquires the authority to legislate have varied over 
time. In medieval and early modem times, sovereignty was exercised by a monarch 
and/or religious leader. Today, sovereignty is commonly (and as a mle within the EU) 
exercised through democracy, and hence rests with the people, or to be precise, citizens 
with the right to vote. The modem democratic form of govemment usually involves 
elections of representatives to an assembly or parliament that has the right to issue 
legislation. This legislation is usually (proposed and) implemented by a govemment that 
relies on the support of the majority of the legislature to remain in office. Hence, we 
have the notion of popular sovereignty; sovereignty vested in the population of the state. 
Sovereignty becomes a legal claim arising out of popular mle, or democracy. The nature 
of democracy is arguably affected by European integration. This is discussed below.
However, if one views sovereignty as intrinsically bound up with the nation, and the 
nation as somehow a separate entity from the population of the nation-state, as ‘national 
sovereignty’ rather than ‘popular sovereignty’, then European integration involves 
giving up sovereignty.
Thus, sovereignty is a very ambiguous concept. It has at least two distinct meanings: 
ultimate legal authority and popular mle. In the first sense, sovereignty has come to be 
associated with the nation-state. In this denotation EU membership implies a loss of 
sovereignty. The Commission initiates and influences legislation, seeking to enlarge the 
EU's competence. The member-states' parliaments have minimal direct influence on EU 
legislation. QMV is increasingly applied to EU legislation. Hence, EU directives can be
Strayer, 1970, p. 58. Also see Finer (1974, pp. 79-126)
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enforced in national courts even if the member-state in question voted against this 
legislation and did not implement it in its own law. Furthermore, the decisions of the 
ECJ can only be overturned by Treaty amendment. All this amounts to a loss of power at 
the national level. However, the view taken here is that this process is better assessed in 
terms of the degree of transfer of legal authority from the nation-state to the EU, than in 
terms of whether or not sovereignty is given up. When ‘national sovereignty’ is debated 
in relation to EU-membership, the question is really one of where power should reside. 
However, loss of national sovereignty is not equivalent to a loss of popular sovereignty - 
rule by the people.
Popular sovereignty involves a notion of popular self-determination. And popular 
sovereignty means that it is the people who decide to whom to delegate sovereignty - a 
city council, a regional govemment, a national president, a national parliament, a 
European institution, or a world institution. Viewed in terms of popular sovereignty, the 
question becomes how EU-membership affects the say of the people in affairs that 
concern them.
1.6. Democratic legitimacy and European integration.
The EU-conflict in the Nordic countries has included a debate over the effect of EU- 
membership on democracy and legitimacy. Broadly, three overlapping sub-areas of this 
debate can be identified: those pertaining to the ‘democratic deficit’ (narrowly 
conceived), a debate over the ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’ of the EU institutions, and a 
‘closeness’ debate over the connection between the size of the political unit and 
democracy.
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The ‘democratic deficit’ derives, in its most narrow conceptualisation, from the gap 
between the powers transferred to the EU-level and the control of elected representatives 
over EU-legislation emanating from these powers:
"The ‘democratic deficit’ is the gap between the powers transferred to the 
Community level and the control of the elected [European] Parliament over 
them, a gap filled by national civil servants operating as European experts or 
as members of regulation and management committees, and to some extent 
by organised lobbies, mainly representing business.
The Council is perhaps the biggest ‘problem’ in this respect, in that it operates as the EU 
final decision maker. But nobody can force a vote of confidence on the Council of 
Ministers - it is not responsible to any popularly elected organisation or assembly. 
Furthermore, Lodge^^ notes that any expansion of the EC's competence expands the 
democratic deficit, unless the power-balance between the institutions changes. Similarly, 
Coombes argues that:
“The prevailing doctrine seems to condone the cumulatively joint or 
collusive exercise of functions of public policy by states’ governments 
without a concomitant transfer of political, or even legal, authority.’’'^ ®
Another aspect of the deficit is the consequence for the balance of power between 
elected representatives and the executive organs:
68 Williams, 1990, p. 306.
69 1991, p. 151. See also Sbragia, 1992, pp. 277-278. 
Coombes, 1994, p. 163.
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“The effect of the peculiar assignment of powers to the community, as 
endorsed and extended by the Maastricht Treaty, is a usurpation of 
legislative power by the executive branches of states. But states’ executives, 
even so, are authorised to use that power collectively, and in many crucial 
aspects of public policy, only when they are able to act through their 
representatives by unanimity. The effective transfer of law-making power to 
the executives of states by means of the treaties, which is potentially 
overriding when the state’s own executive representatives can act by 
unanimity, makes a nonsense of the separation of powers at both national 
and European levels. Equally importantly, the capacity of the states’ 
executives to assume discretion to act authoritatively outside the 
Conununity’s legal framework, for example in the sphere of CFSP, or even 
in spheres where powers have been duly assigned to the EC, has a similar 
consequence.”^^
Various measures have been taken or suggested to increase democratic accountability. 
The most obvious is increasing the power of the EP^^ Some argue for an elected 
Commissions^, others have suggested the creation of a second chamber consisting of 
national parliamentariansS^. Also, citizenship is linked with popular sovereignty and 
democratic participation. In this context, the development of EU citizenship in the TEU 
is one way of addressing the democratic deficits^. Finally, the national parliaments are 
set to take a more active role after the TEU. They have been encouraged to co-operate 
with each other and with the EP, and many member states have introduced measures 
designed to enhance national parliamentary scrutinyS^. However, this does not 
necessarily improve public participation:
Coombes, 1994, pp. 172-173.
Featherstone, 1994, p. 166-167; Lodge, 1991, 1994.
Bogdanor and Woodcock, 1991, pp. 483-484,489-490.
Herman and Lodge, 1978; Heseltine, 1989a, 1989b.
Anderson, den Boer and Miller, 1994, p. 107.
Corbett, 1994, pp. 217-218. See Fitzmaurice (1996) for an overview of the national 
parliamentary control of EU policy in Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
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“In practice it has always proved difficult to interest the public in an elite- 
driven process of functional integration focusing largely on economic 
activities and governed by opaque procedures of intergovernmental decision- 
making.”'^ '^
An alleged lack of openness and transparency in the EU’s institutions forms another 
aspect of the democracy and legitimacy debate. It is a widespread assumption in the 
Nordic countries that their national political institutions and processes are considerably 
more open and transparent than elsewhere, in particular when compared with those of 
the EU. This belief is based mainly on the ability and ease with which Nordic citizens 
can access public records of various kinds. Some authors claim that more ‘openness’ in 
the Council would improve the democratic accountability of the EU"^ .^ Similarly, 
Jacobson^^ argues that “the root of EU’s legitimacy problems [...] is in the non- 
communicative nature of the legislation process, both nationally and supranationally.”
At the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992, a series of measures designed to 
enhance transparency in the EC’s decision-making process were made. These included 
greater access to documents and information, and the holding of certain Council 
meetings in public. However, there are clear limits to how far this transparency can be 
taken with regard to the Council or any other government:
Anderson, den Boer and Miller, 1994, p. 106.
Colchester and Buchan, 1990, pp. 236-237; Boyce, 1993, p. 470. 
79 1997, p. 86.
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“Because the [...] Council is what it is, an intergovernmental negotiating 
forum with the difference that some of its products pass into national law, 
open and public sessions cannot give an authentic picture of its work. The 
observer affects the phenomenon. By its nature a negotiation cannot be open 
to public view. The negotiator needs to be able to take positions and change 
them in a way which would upset particular interest groups and weaken its 
bargaining stance. Open sessions are for the delivery of set piece 
speeches.” ®^
A related assertion states that the Scandinavian form of democracy brings democracy 
closer to the people^i, involving a high number of individuals and organisations in the 
decision-making process, and therefore is more legitimate than other types of 
g o v e r n m e n t s ^  por example, Jacobson^^ describes the Swedish law making system with 
its public inquiries, reports, and circulation of bills and public hearings. Jacobson then 
argues that the communicative element of Swedish democracy is connected with a 
traditionally high degree of legitimacy. However, if this communicative element is 
eroded, without any compensation (for example at the supranational level) then there is 
a risk of legitimacy being eroded as well^^.
A more basic argument can also be invoked with regard to the ‘closeness’ discussion. 
Decentralisation of power should give each individual more say over his own situation. 
Hence, if the value of a lower level of delegation outweighs advantages (if there are any) 
of higher levels of delegation, then the individual can be expected to prefer that lower
SONicolI, 1994, p. 192.
See, for example, Frihet - i en liten ume (Ungdom mot EU, Leaflet, 1994, Oslo); 
Norge og EU - Virkninger av medlemskap i Den europeiske union. (Nei til EU, Oslo, 
1994).
Rousseau (1968, especially pp. 90-96) puts forward a strong argument for the virtues 
of the small state. Also see Pedersen (1992).
83 1997, p. 81.
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level. Based on this argument in isolation, government at the national level is preferable 
to the European level in terms of popular self-government. For example, while the 
people in a Nordic state elect all representatives to their national parliament, they will 
have very few representatives in either the Council or the EP. Hence, influence will be 
greater per person in the national parliament than in a European institution. However, 
this argument is compromised if the existence of the EU affects the freedom of action of 
the non-member. If this is the case, it could be argued that some chance of influence in 
decisions and legislation that affects the people of the Non-member State would increase 
legitimacy and democracy
These democracy and legitimacy issues form an important part of the debate over EU- 
membership in the Nordic countries. It is unlikely that these problems can ever be 
solved to the satisfaction of all the actors involved^^. After all, they go to the core of the 
debate of what is the appropriate level of government. However, the overall effect of 
EU-membership on the quality of democracy and legitimacy is difficult to evaluate.
1.7. The influence of EU membership on individual utility.
When power is transferred from the national to the European level, individual utility 
may be affected in various ways. These effects can be grouped into three categories. 
Firstly, the individual may approve of or reject the transfer of legal authority from the
Jacobson, 1997, p. 82.
See, for example, Nugent, 1994, p. 441. See also Gstohl (1994, p. 335) for the 
argument that EU-membership has both positive and negative effects on state autonomy.
For a thorough discussion of democracy problems in the EU, and proposed remedies, 
see Boyce (1993), Featherstone (1994).
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national to the EU level per se. Secondly, he may condone or disapprove of the form of 
European integration manifest in the shape of the EU. Third, it is highly likely that EU- 
policy will not be the same as national policy.
These various (potential) conflicts of interest emanating from European integration have 
two features in common. Firstly, they all result from the transfer of power from the 
nation-state to the EU. Secondly, they all have the potential to affect individual utility. 
Some individuals will benefit and some will incur a loss to their utility because of EU- 
membership, relative to their position had power remained at the national level. This is 
dealt with extensively in general terms in Chapter 3, and in country-specific terms in 
chapters four to seven.
1.8. EU-membership and the national political system.
Joining the EU, in the parlance of a world where the nation-state is the dominant 
political unit, involves a ‘transfer of sovereignty’ to an ‘international organisation’. 
According to the constitutions of the four countries discussed here, such a transfer 
requires either a ‘super-majority’ in parliament, or a popular referendum. In Denmark it 
has become the norm to hold référendums over any Treaty revision or major 
development such as ÉMU. This practice looks likely to be at least partially adopted by 
Sweden, and perhaps also by Finland. Elections to the EP add a new feature to the 
political system. So far, these have also functioned largely as ‘mini-referendums’ on 
EU-membership.
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EU-membership transfers substantial legislative authority from the national parliament 
to the EU-level. However, the effect on the power of the national executive is more 
ambivalent. Through participation in the European Council and the Council of 
Ministers, the members of national governments have substantial influence over 
decisions they would have little or no influence over if their country were not a member 
of the EU. Hence, one effect of EU-membership is a relative increase in power for the 
national executive vis-à-vis the national legislature. The fact that executives negotiate 
treaties has a similar effect^^. Overall, however, all national institutions lose power 
through EU membership. Furthermore, there is a decline of the state as the source of 
political l e g i t i m is a t io n * ^  ^  related consequence is a much more diffuse distinction 
between the foreign and the domestic:
“The European Community represents a second arena for national or 
domestic policy-making which may strengthen some groups within a state 
and sometimes weaken the national government. Thus it may no longer be 
very useful to speak of the state as a unitary actor on the European scene or 
even an actor that can be classified as domestic: the state border, itself to a 
large extent an imagined divide between one state and the other, is now less 
and less powerful and less useful as an empirical distinction. Domestic and 
EU-level politics become confused or at least entangled.”^^
The increased salience of the conflict over European integration also has the effect of 
making the national party system more complicated by introducing another dimension. 
This can create numerous problems for the parties because a variety of actors and groups 
take different positions on this dimension. These actors and groups include voters, party 
members, other parties, European politicians, and the EU institutions. Thus, the parties
87 Sbragia, 1992, pp. 271-274.
88 Matlary, 1995.
89 Matlary, 1995, p. 110.
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have to consider the position of all these actors when deciding on a position on 
European integration. These complications are discussed in detail in chapters three to 
eight.
1.9. Conclusion.
Because of the limited scope of the EC, and a largely inter-govemmental decision­
making mechanism, political conflict over European integration was not so overt in the 
early years of the Community. However, with the SEA and the TEU there has been a 
clear move towards deeper integration and supra-nationalism. The conflict over 
European integration is arguably becoming one of the most important political divisions 
in Europe in the 1990’s.
For the foreseeable future, conflicts over European integration are likely to remain 
important in Nordic politics. There are two main reasons for the likelihood of this 
continued salience. Firstly, these conflicts are about power and authority - about who 
decides what. Secondly, where decisions are made has the potential to affect people’s 
utility. Therefore, people have an interest in where power and influence resides.
The formal transfer of legal authority from the nation-state to the EU-level makes these 
conflicts particularly contentious. The status of the nation-state as the dominant political 
unit has become so entrenched in this century that any change in this status seems 
destined to lead to conflict. Furthermore, European integration affects core notions such 
as democracy and legitimacy. These have also been strongly linked to the nation-state. 
But when the nation-state is no longer the ‘sole and supreme’ legal authority, then it
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cannot remain the sole focus for democratic government and legitimacy either. This 
leads to both disagreements over this development in principle, as well as arguments 
over how to rectify problems related to democracy and legitimacy. As chapters three to 
seven will show, it is very difficult to evaluate the overall effect of EU-membership in 
these important areas.
The political system is affected by EU membership in various ways, as outlined above. 
In the rest of this thesis, the focus will, in this respect, be more specifically on how the 
EU-conflict affects the party system and coalition patterns in the Nordic countries. Of 
particular interest is the very limited representation among political parties and in the 
national parliaments, arguably with the exception of Norway, of the strong anti-EU 
sentiments in all four countries.
Expansion of European integration since the mid-1980s has increased the potential for 
conflicts of interest over this development, and the degree to which such conflicts affect 
the domestic politics of actual and potential member-states. The next two chapters set 
out frameworks for understanding how and why this might take place. Chapters four to 
seven analyse how important this conflict has become in Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden; and to what extent it has affected their domestic political systems. Chapter 8 
then compares these developments.
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Chapter 2. Political cleavages and the party systems of the Nordic countries.
2.1. Introduction.
This chapter outlines the political cleavage model and the Nordic party systems. The 
first section of the chapter deals with the more theoretical aspects of the cleavage model. 
The second section applies the cleavage model, as described in the first section, to the 
analysis and description of the party systems of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
The application of the political cleavage model serves four purposes. Firstly, it offers a 
very useful framework model for a description and understanding of the party systems of 
these countries. Secondly, it makes a major contribution to the evaluation of the effect of 
the conflict over European integration on their party systems. This is achieved through 
assessing the crosscutting potential of this conflict. Thirdly, the cleavage model will be 
employed in chapters four to eight to evaluate the hypothesis that the conflict over 
European integration is a new cleavage. Finally, the model illustrates some of the 
limitations of the rational choice model developed in Chapter 3 below.
The political cleavage model has, over the last thirty years, been an important element of 
a multitude of works on electoral behaviour and party systems \  It has also been the
 ^ Aardal (1994b) argues that the concept of ‘cleavage’ is one of the most conunon in 
political science. To list all the works that employ the concept would be beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Most books that cover electoral behaviour, political parties, or 
party systems will use the concept in some form. Examples include Smith (1989, chapter 
2); Meny (1990, chapter 1); Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1992, chapter 4) and Ware 
(1996, chapter 6).
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subject of various criticisms, both with regard to methodological aspects and relevance. 
In particular, it has been argued that the model has become less relevant over time.
The starting point for this chapter is Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal work ‘Party Systems 
and Voter Alignments’^ . Importantly, this work emphasises that not every conflict of 
interest becomes a cleavage, and that the cleavage hierarchy changes over time and 
differs between polities. Essentially, Lipset and Rokkan’s model is a framework model. 
It is an aid for further analysis, not a static construct. Moreover, it focuses attention on 
the central role of what the authors call ‘critical junctures’ - important historic- 
sociological developments such as the French Revolution.
If the cleavage model is to be employed in any meaningful way, then the concept of 
political cleavage must have meaning beyond being a substitute for words such as 
‘conflict’, ‘division’ or ‘dimension’. Lipset and Rokkan looked at cleavages in society, 
and then on how these were translated into the party system. The position taken here is 
that today the focus for the cleavage model should be more directly on the political 
system.
Several conflicts have been suggested as giving rise to new political cleavages in the 30 
years that have passed since ‘Party Systems and Voter Alignments’. However, in many 
cases, labelling these conflicts of interest ‘cleavages’ does not add to our understanding 
of politics. And that must remain the test for the application of the model to any such 
conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to establish some criteria for determining which
 ^ Aardal (1994b) argues that this remains the central reference point for the cleavage 
concept.
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conflicts of interest should be analysed as cleavages, and which should not. The criteria 
developed in section one of this chapter are taken into account when describing the 
cleavage system in the Nordic area in section two.
2.2 The Lipset and Rokkan model.
Lipset and Rokkan identify "four critical lines of cleavage"^. Two of these result from 
the (French) National Revolution. Firstly, the centre-periphery cleavage between the 
central nation-building culture and the subject populations based on some ethnic, 
linguistic or religious differences. Secondly, the Church-State cleavage between the 
emerging Nation-State and the historically entrenched and privileged Church'^. The other 
two are products of the Industrial Revolution^, although one is partly the result of the 
later Russian Bolshevik revolution of 1917^. Firstly, a cleavage between landed interests 
and industrial entrepreneurs, and secondly one between owners and employers on one 
side and workers and tenants on the other^. According to Lipset and Rokkan, the deepest 
of these cleavages were caused by the National Revolution^.
Most of the literature in this area includes these cleavages or some variation on them. 
That is, one or more territorial cleavages (usually centre-periphery, urban-rural or ethnic 
conflicts), a religious cleavage, and some form of class, left-right or socio-economic
 ^Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 14.
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 14.
 ^This is the assertion made at an early point in the chapter but it is modified later.
 ^On pages 47-50 the authors argue that the last cleavage is partly a result of the Russian
Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Unfortunately, this is not acknowledged earlier on.
 ^Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 14.
 ^Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 15.
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cleavage^. Many authors also include some reference to ‘new cleavages’ such as the 
‘the new politics cleavage’, ‘the green cleavage’ or ‘the post-materialist cleavage’
It is not necessary to restrict applications of the cleavage model to conflicts based on 
social structure. It is quite likely that those who insist on this limitation do so because 
the relevant variables for analysing such cleavages are more readily available from data 
sets than variables of a more ideological or value-based character. Lipset and Rokkan 
point out that "a concrete conflict is rarely exclusively territorial or exclusively 
functional but will feed on strains in both directions"^\ Furthermore, cleavages do not 
have to be exclusively structural or exclusively ideological
Lipset and Rokkan stressed that cleavage constellations will vary between different 
polities^Furtherm ore, they also emphasised that the cleavage hierarchy would vary 
over time. Hence, their model does not posit that certain cleavages will be dominant 
everywhere all the time. It is a framework-model rather than a ‘universal truth’ model:
 ^ Examples include Smith (1989, chapter 2); Dalton (1988, chapter 8); Meny (1990, 
chapter 1); Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1992, chapter 4) and Ware (1996, chapter 6).
See for example; Dalton (1988), Knutsen (1990), and Jahn (1993). These are 
discussed in more detail below.
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p . 11.
An example of this view of cleavages can be found in Rae and Taylor (1970).This 
kind of simplification is unrealistic. It assumes that a conflict of interest can actually be 
exclusively based in ideology or in social structure.
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 14.
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“We are less concerned with the specifics of the degrees of fit in each 
national case than with the overall structure of the model. There is clearly 
nothing final about any such scheme; it simply sets a series of themes for 
detailed comparisons and suggests ways of organising the results within a 
manageable conceptual framework. The model is a tool and its utility can be 
tested only through continuous development: through the addition of further 
variables to account for observed differences as well as through refinements 
in the definition and grading of the variables already included.” "^^
2.3. Specifying the political cleavage model.
“Concepts are neither right nor wrong but are more or less useful; their 
utility is determined by the twin and mutually dependent requirements of 
empirical precision and theoretical importance. ‘Empirical precision’ has to 
do with a concept’s ability to ‘carve up’ the world of phenomena without 
unnecessary ambiguities; ‘theoretical importance’ has to do with the utility 
of a concept in the development of statements of wide explanatory and 
predictive power. “
The negative side of the flexible nature of the Lipset-Rokkan model is that they did not 
explicitly define what they meant by ‘cleavage’. It is arguably one of the most imprecise 
and ambiguous concepts in the study of politics^^. There is a variety of terminology that 
is used to describe the cleavage concept, sometimes as synonyms. For example: conflict, 
line of division, dimension, contrast, difference, and opposition. At the extreme, one 
could argue that any difference in attitude on any issue between groups of people is a 
cleavage.
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 41.
Zuckerman, 1975, p. 231, writing about cleavages.
See, for example, Zuckerman (1975), Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Aardal (1994b).
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If the cleavage model is to be utilised for analysis of more recent developments, then it 
is necessary to focus more clearly on the political aspect of cleavages. Thus, it will be 
argued that a political cleavage is a conflict of interest that has a substantial effect on the 
party system.
It is important here to emphasis that cleavage patterns and hierarchies will change over 
time Cleavage 1 may be dominant at time A, at time B it may be over-shadowed by 
Cleavage 2. The correlation between a party and some variable may well reflect an old 
conflict of interest that has become much less relevant for the political system.
Also, over time different aspects of a cleavage may become more important whilst 
others become less so. Eventually, such a development may change the character of the 
cleavage into something very different from its previous incarnation.
One example of such a development is the Church-State cleavage described by Lipset 
and Rokkan. This cleavage itself is no longer manifest in most countries, but could be 
argued to have several reincarnations. In the case of the Nordic countries, a moral- 
religious cleavage has developed.
Similarly, it may no longer be appropriate to talk about a ‘class-cleavage’ that is based 
mainly in social structure^^. Policy differences along a left-right ideological dimension 
were always part of this cleavage, but have become increasingly more relevant over
See, for example, Aardal (1994b, pp. 231-32).
In the Lipset-Rokkan model the worker vs. employer cleavage is similar to the class 
cleavage.
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time, especially in terms of operationalisation. So much so, in fact, that it is now more 
appropriate to talk about a left-right ideology cleavage rather than a class cleavage.
2.3.1 The continued relevance of the Cleavage Model.
Over the last thirty years, two lines of argument in particular have led to assertions that 
political cleavages are of declining relevance for the analysis of electoral behaviour and 
party systems. Firstly, based on electoral upheavals in the 1970’s, assertions have been 
made about increased electoral volatility and an ‘unfreezing’ of the Western European 
party systems^^. Whether volatility actually is increasing is questionable^^. However, 
even if increased volatility is taking place, this does not necessarily mean declining 
relevance for the cleavage model.
It is a simplistic account of cleavages, limiting the concept to social structures, which 
enables the dismissal of the cleavage model. Similarly, segmentation of the cleavage 
concept into structural, ideological and attitudinal cleavages enables other writers to 
argue that ‘social structure cleavages’ are in decline and that new, mainly ideology 
based, cleavages are on the rise.
Social structures will change over time. If cleavages are defined based entirely on such 
structures, then the character or importance of the cleavage will change if the structure 
changes. But if the concept is broadened to include elements of social structure, 
ideology and values, then it is clear that not only do cleavage hierarchies change over
For examples of such assertions, see Pedersen (1979), Maguire (1983), and Wolinetz 
(1979).
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time, but so does the nature of the cleavages themselves. The validity of a framework- 
model such as the cleavage model depends largely on the continued usefulness of its 
application to the current situation, not the continued importance of time- and situation- 
specific applications of the model.
Careful consideration should be given to how many dimensions of cleavage to include in 
analysis of party systems. The number of dimensions must be limited for analytical 
purposes. A model that is to create an analytical simplification and be useful empirically 
must be based on a small number of cleavages. One implication of this is a need to be 
conservative in the search for ‘new’ cleavages, unless they are substitutes or variations 
on ‘old’ ones. This is discussed below. First, however, it is necessary to develop a 
coherent model of what constitutes a political cleavage.
2.3.2. Towards a definition of political cleavage.
The main area of conceptual disagreement in the literature that incorporates the cleavage 
concept is with regard to the position of social structure in the cleavage model. 
Zuckerman^^ adroitly summarises the different positions on this disagreement:
(a) Social divisions are a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of 
political cleavages;
(b) Social divisions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of 
political cleavages;
See, for example, Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Mair (1993).
1975, p. 237.
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(c) Social divisions are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence 
of political cleavages.
As noted above, Lipset and Rokkan were rather vague on the definitional aspects of 
cleavage. However, their model did not dictate a social structure element as a necessity 
for cleavage formation. Zuckerman^^ more explicitly argues that there is not necessarily 
a link between socio-economic structure and cleavages. Daalder^^ identifies nationality 
and regime change as two of five historically important cleavage types in Europe. And 
Dogan argues that political cleavage differs from political division in its persistence over 
time and extensive nature of membership as measured by electoral behaviour. In the 
case of France, Dogan’s cleavages derive from particular crucial events in French 
history^ "^ .
In contrast, Bartolini and Mair argue that a cleavage must have a social structure 
element. They describe this as “an empirical element, which identifies the empirical 
referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms”^^ . This 
implies that the main reason for including a social structure element is its usefulness for 
operationalising the cleavage.
Some authors try to get around the question of social structure by dividing the cleavage 
concept into different categories or classes. Rae and Taylor make an unrefined attempt at 
this. They divide the concept into three ‘classes’. The social structure class they label
“  1975. 
“  1966.
24 Dogan, 1967, especially pp. 182-184.
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‘traits’. This includes class (confusingly) and language. The other two classes are 
‘opinions’, such as ideology and preference; and ‘behaviour’, such as voting and 
membership in organisations^^.
Allardt and Pesonen’s distinction between structural' and 'non-structural' cleavages is 
somewhat more elegant^^. The 'structural' definition is restricted to social groups, but 
also implies organisational and cultural attributes ('cohesion' and 'solidarity'). Similarly, 
Valen introduces the description ‘ideological cleavage’ to separate cleavages that can be 
traced to socio-economic differences from those where this connection is more 
unclear^^.
The position put forward in this chapter is that it may be useful to stress the relative 
importance of different aspects of a cleavage, but that rigid segmentation or required 
elements reduces the flexibility of the model more than is necessary.
The social structure and segmentation approaches are also in danger of neglecting the 
fact that it is necessary to account for changes in the cleavage structure over time. For 
example, Valen argues that the structural cleavages identify the long-term changes of 
society, the ideological cleavages the short-term and situational changes^^. Aardal argues 
that this creates a problem, since one of the main reasons for establishing cleavages as a 
tool for political science analysis is that these can be used as devices for understanding
^  Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 215. Dahrendorf (1965, p. 165) and Eckstein (1966, p. 
34) also take this view.
Rae and Taylor, 1970, p. 1.
Allardt and Pesonen in Lipset and Rokkan, 1967.
Valen, 1981.
Valen, 1981.
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political preferences and actions over time, i.e. lasting conflicts. This is one important 
aspect in which cleavages are separated from issues^^.
That cleavage structures change over time is a sometimes neglected aspect of the 
cleavage model. It is, however, crucial for it’s continued validity. Much of the criticism 
of the model seems to be based on focusing on the cleavages mentioned by Lipset and 
Rokkan, or, more often, on the pivotal position of the class cleavage and its (supposed) 
decline. It is also based on a view of cleavages as, partly or completely, tied to social 
structures. Once different elements of cleavages constituting dominant aspects of a 
cleavage at different times and changes to the cleavage hierarchy over time are 
accounted for, then the continued relevance of the cleavage model becomes clear.
The following, then, is a general model for identifying political cleavages. It aims to 
separate cleavages from politically less important conflicts. At the same time it also 
incorporates the reservations outlined above regarding social structure and efforts of 
segmenting the cleavage model. The model consists of three closely linked aspects.
Firstly, a cleavage must be centred on an important and observable conflict of interest 
between substantial groups of people. For example: between centre and periphery; left- 
and right-wing ideology; primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors of the economy; 
religiosity and secularity; environmentalism and the maximisation of economic growth.
“  Aardal, 1994b, pp. 229-30.
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Secondly, there must be awareness of the relevance of the conflict by significant 
elements of at least one side of the conflict. Unless a large number of people perceive 
the particular conflict of interest as important, then the conflict is unlikely to become a 
cleavage. There must be some feeling of common interest and identity, some 
involvement of the mass public, to turn a ‘private’ division into a political alignment^\
There is a further aspect to this. Changes in society are producing an increasing number 
of more diffuse communities, and sometimes there is a lack of identifiable ‘enemies’. 
Hence, many conflicts may never become obvious and/or intense enough to provide the 
basis for a cleavage.
Some expression in non-party organisational terms also makes it more likely that a 
conflict becomes a cleavage. Examples include trade unions, religious institutions and 
environmental organisations. Such organisations can focus attention on the conflict and 
form the basis for its political expression.
Thirdly, before a conflict can be argued to have developed into a political cleavage, 
there must be some translation of it into the political system. What is crucial is that the 
political system is substantially affected by the cleavage. The most obvious 
manifestation of this is occurs when a party (or parties) specifically support(s) the 
interests of one side or aspect of a conflict, and that those who identify with that side or 
aspect of the conflict vote in disproportionate numbers for that party (or parties). Other 
potential manifestations of a political cleavage include the emergence of new parties.
31 Mair, 1997, p. 951. See also Schattschneider’s (1960, p. 39) notion of “politics as the
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substantial changes in the relative levels of party support, and/or changes in co-operation 
or coalition patterns, related to changes in the relative saliency of political dimensions.
2.3.3 The search for new cleavages.
Ever since the cleavage model became widely known, there has been a search for ‘new’ 
cleavages^^. In addition, work that does not take its inspiration from this model quite 
often incorporates the term.
By ‘new’ it is not necessarily meant that the conflicts these proposed cleavages are based 
on are new. The term simply refers to cleavages that differ substantially from those 
proposed in Lipset and Rokkan’s model^^. Below follows an evaluation of the relevance 
of some of these ‘new cleavages’.
Foreign policy is sometimes proposed as a cleavage. For example, Allardt and Pesonen 
argue that foreign policy is a cleavage in Finland, based on Finland’s relationship with 
Sweden and Russia^" .^ Valen also sometimes presents foreign policy as an independent 
cleavage^^. But unless foreign policy issues are related to ideology or national self- 
determination, then a cleavage is unlikely to develop.
socialisation of conflict”.
For instance, Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992), Dunleavy (1979, 1980), Inglehart 
(1990) Dalton (1988, 1991) and Flanagan (1982).
Although many ‘new’ cleavages are very similar to those proposed by Lipset and 
Rokkan.
34 Allardt and Pesonen, 1967, p. 325. 
Converse and Valen, 1971.
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It should also be borne in mind that important foreign policy questions have a tendency 
to produce consensus in the political system. Therefore, a new party may be needed to 
turn the conflict into a cleavage, as no outlet may be available in the existing party 
system.
It has been argued that employment in and/or dependence upon the public sector vs. the 
private sector has become a cleavage^^. This division has particular attraction because it 
incorporates a social structure element. However, it fails to satisfy the criteria of 
common identity as well as some representation at the political level. It is highly 
questionable whether the connection to the private or the public sector provides the basis 
for a common identity. Furthermore, there are few organisations that are based entirely 
on either sector.
At the political level, there is little evidence of parties actively promoting the interests of 
people dependent upon either the public or the private sector. The promotion of this 
‘new cleavage’ is a good example of how simple correlation with party support is not 
enough to form the basis for a cleavage. Furthermore, as Aardal points out, it may be 
closely connected to other cleavages, in particular the left-right cleavage^^. Hence, 
conflicts of interest based on public vs. private sector may reinforce other cleavages 
rather than form a new one.
It might also be tempting to analyse gender as a political cleavage. However, there are 
several problems with this. Firstly, interests are very fragmented within the two groups.
For example Dunleavy (1979 and 1980). See also Knutsen (1986) on Norway.
37 Aardal, 1994b, p. 235.
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One might argue that sexual equality in various areas is in the interest of all women, but 
connotations such as feminism and family considerations can make the interests of 
women as a group very fragmented. Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that men 
would be any more united against equality than women would be for it^ .^ Hence, gender 
will not be considered as a cleavage here.
Some authors argue that a ‘green’ cleavage is developing in Western Europe^^. This is 
based partly on the rise of ‘green’ parties but also on the augmentation of 
environmentalist organisations and public concern over environmental issues. Both 
organisational strength and, connected to that strength, the development of a collective 
identity give credence to this claim. Furthermore, with its messages of anti-growth and 
protection of the environment at the cost of material wealth, the ‘green movement’ has a 
substantial element of an ‘us-against-them’ profile, which makes cleavage formation 
more likely. Finally, parties that specifically promote one side of this cleavage exist in 
many European countries. In Scandinavia specifically Green parties have been 
successful in Finland and Sweden, as have ‘red-green’ parties in Norway and Denmark. 
Arguably, the Finnish and Swedish far-left parties are also transforming into ‘red-green’ 
parties.
Among proposed new cleavages, the ‘Materialist/Post-Materialist’ (MPM) cleavage is 
the one that has probably received the most attention. The political science debate about
For example, in the 1994 Finnish presidential election, where there was one male and 
one female candidate in the second round, female solidarity did not make much of a 
difference. (Anckar, 1994, pp. 275-6)
For example, Jahn, 1993. Unfortunately, much of the work on a green dimension in 
politics is tangled up with the ‘post-materialist’ debate. Thus, Dalton (1988), Knutsen 
(1988b, 1990) discuss this dimension, but only as part of the post-materialist cleavage.
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the MPM cleavage has its origins in Ronald Inglehart’s 1977 book "The Silent 
Revolution". In this and later writings Inglehart attempts to distinguish two groups of 
people with different values and priorities: ‘materialists’ and ‘post-materialists’"^ .^ Since
41
then various other authors have written about the MPM dimension in politics .
Inglehart argued that people's values are changing in Western Europe because of the 
increasing levels of prosperity since World War H, and because of the absence of war in 
the same period. These changes are also linked to higher educational levels, the 
increasing importance of mass communications, and alterations in the occupational 
structure. Inglehart employs Maslow's hierarchy of needs to hypothesise that from the 
above developments it is reasonable to expect differences in priorities between older and 
younger generations. Specifically, those of the older generation (those brought up before 
the World War II) can be expected to place higher value on economic and physical 
security than those belonging to the younger post-war generation. This is because a 
person's political values depend to a large extent on the macro-economic conditions that 
were prevalent during one's formative years.
The MPM cleavage is derived from asking people several questions on political issues, 
ideology and preferred social arrangements and developments. On the basis of 
aggregating the responses to these questions, it is argued that a MPM cleavage exists. 
Hence, it is constructed from positions on various issues.
Inglehart, 1977, Chapter 2
For example, Dalton (1988), Knutsen (1988a, 1990).
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One problem with this approach is that one could create an indeterminable number of 
’cleavages’ in this manner. Put together any batch of questions and some kind of pattern 
will develop, and this pattern would no doubt have some correlation with party choice. 
Employed in this manner, the cleavage concept is broadened to such an extent that it 
loses its meaning.
A second, more technical problem makes a comparison of these ‘cleavages’ with other 
‘older’ cleavages rather problematic. How does one compare the importance of a 
cleavage based on an aggregation of variables to one based on one variable?
There are various other problems with the MPM cleavages. For example, they identify 
‘values’ that do not necessarily exist among people. No one is asked if he is a post­
materialist or a materialist, or neither. These ‘values’ are inferred from the aggregate 
responses of an individual, which are then again aggregated for the total population of 
the sample. (Knutsen"^  ^lists the questions most commonly employed in MPM-analysis.)
2.3.4. New junctures, new cleavages?
"With 'the end of history', the final triumph of liberal capitalism as a form of 
society, it is the cleavage between nationalists and internationalists that is 
likely to become a crucial one in the industrial democracies.""^^
Despite the above criticisms, some elements of the MPM literature are useful in that 
they draw attention to important changes that have taken place in society over the last
1988a, p. 350.
Article by V. Bogdanor in the British newspaper Independent on Sunday, June 25, 
1995.
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thirty years. Knutsen divides cleavages into three categories, and labels the last type 
‘post-industrial’"^ . This is similar to Lipset and Rokkan’s ‘critical junctures’, and an 
interesting notion. With fewer people dependent upon the industrial sector and with 
increasing wealth, it is not unreasonable to expect changes in values and in voting 
patterns. For example, a ‘green’ cleavage may be argued to be related to these 
developments.
With increasing internationalisation of trade, finance, media and other sectors; regional 
integration projects such as the EU; and the power wielded by organisations such as the 
WTO, the nation-state has become weaker. This can be viewed as a ‘counter-national 
evolution’. One potential cleavage that emanates from this juncture is one centred on 
European integration. The extent to which such a cleavage exists is addressed in 
chapters four to eight.
For the individual voter, the attraction of taking a position on EU membership is that it 
is much more tangible compared to effects on his life emanating from international trade 
or international finance. The EU has specific policies, and membership has 
consequences that one can, to some extent at least, evaluate and decide to be for or 
against and let this be reflected in national elections, and in some cases also vote on in 
référendums. If the voters’ country is an EU-member, he also has the opportunity to 
express his opinions on European integration in elections to the EP. In contrast, short of 
policies aimed at a completely free market or completely closed national borders, the
^  Knutsen, 1988a. He measures the post-industrial degree of a society by the percentage 
of the workforce employed in the service industries, and the size of GNP.
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evaluation of how to use one’s vote with regard to policies aimed at affecting the nature 
of international trade and finance is considerably more complicated.
Lipset and Rokkan, and most of the literature referring to their model, made each 
historical development correspond with one or two cleavages. The view taken here is 
that in some cases more than one ‘critical juncture’ was instrumental in leading to the 
cleavage. The resulting ‘revised’ scheme for the development of the cleavage model 
looks like this:
Table 2.1. Critical Junctures and Associated Cleavages.
Development Cleavages"^^
National revolution Centre vs. Periphery/Urban vs. rural
Church vs. State/Moral-religious
Industrial revolution Land vs. Industry
Industrial revolution/Russian Worker vs. Employer/Owner, Left vs. Right
revolution
Russian revolution/Post-industrial Left-socialist/Communists vs. Moderate
society Socialists
Post-industrial society Environmentalism/’Green’ vs. Materialism
Counter-national evolution Pro-EU vs. Anti-EU
Some of the older cleavages, such as the centre-periphery cleavage, are still represented 
in the Nordic party systems. Others, such as the Church/State cleavage and the 
Worker/Employer cleavage have changed radically over time, as explained in examples 
above. The Land/Industry cleavage is of little importance today, but arguably the ‘Green 
cleavage’ contains elements of that older cleavage.
In addition to these, foreign policy is a cleavage in some polities. However, the critical 
juncture that led to the cleavage varies widely. Therefore, this cleavage is not included 
in the table.
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The first four (and partly the fifth) of the above cleavages are covered in Lipset and 
Rokkan as well as in many text-books and other literature referred to above. The last 
three, however, require further explanation. Figure 2.1 below summarises how these 
‘newer cleavages’ are represented in the party systems of the Nordic countries, as well 
as some of the most important of the issues they are often associated with.
Figure 2.1. ‘Newer Cleavages’, Party System Divisions and Related Issues.
Cleavage Party System Division Issues
Left-Socialist/Communists 
vs. Moderate Socialists
Communists and left 
socialist parties vs. social 
democratic and other 
moderate socialist parties.
Communism or democratic 
socialism, the degree of 
state control and 
ownership, NATO- 
membership.
Environmentalism vs. 
Materialism
Greens and Left Socialists 
vs. most other parties in 
Finland and Sweden, left 
socialists and liberals 
(Norway) vs. most other 
parties in Denmark and 
Norway.
Protection of the 
environment, less or more 
economic growth, 
pollution, nuclear power.
Pro-EU vs. anti-EU Anti-EU factions or parties 
vs. a majority of parties. 
Usually most opposition is 
from the far right and/or 
the far left, from some 
Christian parties, and large 
sections of farmers parties 
in Finland, Norway and 
Sweden.
European integration per 
se, the EU is too capitalist 
or too socialist, foreign 
interference, immigration, 
too much bureaucracy and 
too many regulations.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how these cleavages are related to developments in the party 
systems in Western Europe. Some newer parties have emerged not because of the 
manifestation of a cleavage, but by representing aspects of cleavages already present in 
the party system. Examples of this include the Progress Parties of Denmark and Norway, 
and New Democracy in Sweden. These parties are mainly against big government and 
promote lower taxation. Thus they represent an aspect of the left-right cleavage. The
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Communist/Democratic Socialist cleavage has faded significantly since the collapse of 
the SU.
If a conflict of interest is to develop into a political cleavage, then it must have an effect 
on the party system. For this to happen, the conflict must crosscut already existing 
cleavages, and in such a manner that it cannot be accommodated by the existing party 
system. The most obvious way that this will manifest itself is through new parties 
entering the system. However, other developments also signify that a political cleavage 
exists. Firstly, a cleavage might exist if the conflict leads to large swings in party 
support. (This can of course happen for reasons very different from the emergence or re- 
emergence of a cleavage.) Secondly, previous coalition patterns may become untenable 
or new ones develop as the result of the emergence or re-emergence of a conflict of 
interest.
However, party tactics can moderate the effect of a potentially crosscutting dimension 
such as European integration. The most obvious manner of achieving this is for most, or 
at least the mainstream parties, to take up the same (or very similar) position (a 
‘common front’) on European integration generally and EU-membership specifically. 
However, this could be risky since voters might decide to vote for parties that do not 
part-take in the common front, or a new party might utilise the gap in representation. 
Hence, in combination with, and/or as a partial alternative to the common front tactic, 
the members of the common front might find it advantageous to off-load the potentially 
crosscutting conflict away from the national election arena. These tactics are discussed 
in depth in Chapter 3, and their usefulness evaluated in chapters four to eight.
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2.4. Cleavages and The Nordic Party System"*^ .
In the 1920s the basic five-party Scandinavian model was completed after the turmoil of 
parliamentary and electoral reform and rapid economic transformation of previous 
decades. This model remained fundamentally unaltered until the 1960s: Radical Left - 
Social Democrat - Liberal - Agrarian - Conservative. Until then, the model fit Sweden 
best, with no other party gaining more than two percent of the vote. And in the 1970s, 
the model continued to function in Sweden. In Denmark the share of the five main 
parties increased from 96.6 percent in 1932 to 97.3 percent in 1968 - although the 
radical left at that time consisted of three different parties. There were only two minor 
alterations to the model in the period until the 1960s: in Norway the NKRF from 1945 
nation-wide, in Finland the SFF^^. However, as shown below, all four party-systems 
have changed radically since the 1960’s, starting with the fragmentation and revival of 
the far left in Norway and Denmark in the early I960’s.
2.4.1. The left-right cleavage.
The class-cleavage has long been viewed by many as the dominant cleavage in 
Scandinavia. In 1978, Berglund and Lindstrom"^  ^wrote that "class is still the single most 
important determinant of voting behaviour in Scandinavia". And as late as 1988, Elder,
With a few exceptions, and for reasons of interest as well as space, only parties that 
have been represented in the respective national parliaments since 1970 are included 
here. References to ‘elections’ are, throughout the thesis unless otherwise noted, to 
national parliamentary elections.
Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, pp. 29-30. For detailed accounts of the development 
of the Nordic party systems, see Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988), Castles (1978), and 
Berglund and Lindstrom (1978).
1978, p. 16.
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Thomas and Arter"^  ^ argued that "class [...] is the chief determinant of how people cast 
their ballots in the region."
Building a model with several independent social variables, Worre found that 
occupation remained the most important variable in the early 1970’s, accounting for 
between eleven percent and 20 percent of total party variance. Occupation accounted for 
76 percent of the R-squared of the total model in Denmark, 70 percent in Finland, 66 
percent in Norway, and 56 percent in Sweden^^.
Thus, class was long a very important element in the analysis of voting behaviour, 
especially with regard to the social democratic and other left-wing parties. Until the mid- 
1960s, close to 3/4 of blue-collar workers tended to vote for parties of the left^\ Class 
interests were very important for the formation of certain parties, and for a long time 
class was considered the dominant cleavage. However, most parties no longer appeal 
directly to a particular class^^, and class seems to be much less correlated with voting 
patterns than before^^. (See Table 2.2 below.)
In keeping with the discussion above and for the analysis of the current party systems, 
the left-right cleavage is a much more relevant analytical device. This does not exclude
Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, pp. 16-17. See also Castles (1978, chapter three).
Worre, 1980, pp. 300-301. This article also gives a detailed account for the basis of 
what Worre calls the three ‘class parties’: the Social Democratic, Conservative, and 
Agrarian/Centre parties.
Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, p. 19.
Although the Centre Parties still owe a large part of their support to farmers.
Measured in terms of occupation, rather than by any ‘subjective’ notion of class. The 
latter, when correlated to left voting, becomes a substitute for left-right position. See for 
example Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992). See also Borre (1987, pp. 349-50) on 
Denmark.
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class or other social structure elements. It is, however, operationalised along a left-right 
ideological scale, rather than in terms of social structure. This cleavage is now 
considered dominant in most western European countries, and party-systems are usually 
operationalised along a left-right continuum based on this cleavage^" .^
Table 2.2. Relative effects of socio-demographic and attitudinal core variables in 
predicting socialist vote. The effect of the variable ‘manual occupation’ (‘working class
Denmark 1971 1987
SDG SDG OA SDG SDG OA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
0.44 0.43 0.41 0.24 0.20 0.21
Norway 1969 1977 1985
SDG OA SDG OA SDG OA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
0.26 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.08
Sweden 1964 1976 1985
SDG OA SDG OA SDG OA
0.37 0.30 0.24 0.15 0.19 0.11
SDG = Socio-demographic, OA = Overall, which includes attitudinal variables. In the 
Danish case the same data was not available for both years and hence the models are not 
exactly the same. Sources: Borre (p. 154), Valen (p. 313), and Oskarson (p. 348) 
chapters in Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992). There is no directly comparable data on 
Finland, but Sankiaho (1995, Chapter 4) shows that the trend is for less class-voting in 
Finland also.
The common interest element of this cleavage is based on the involvement of the state in 
society in general and the economy in particular. That is, state ownership, involvement 
through regulations, and redistribution. The particular operationalisation used in this 
thesis is from Laver and Hunt^^, with scores based on average expert scores of party 
leaders’ attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership vs. cutting tax/anti­
public ownership. For details see chapters four to seven.
54 In some writings this is explicit, in others implicit. See for example Downs (1957), 
Sartori (1976) and Ware (1996).
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A similar operationalisation is used by Knutsen^^, who includes three items in the 
measurement of his ‘left-right materialism’ dimension. These are all deemed to be 
associated with the left: the expansion of public ownership of industry, increased efforts 
to reduce income inequality, and a greater role for government in the management of the 
economy. He also amalgamates this ideological dimension with an industrial cleavage, 
hence combining ideological and structural elements. Harmel and Janda^^ use four leftist 
vs. rightist party positions: (i) governmental vs. private ownership of the means of 
production; (ii) a strong vs. a weak governmental role in economic planning; (iii) 
support vs. opposition to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor; and (iv) 
the expansion of vs. resistance to governmental social welfare programs.
The left-right cleavage is the dominant cleavage in all four countries. All the parties can 
be meaningfully placed relatively to each other on a left-right axis, and for some it is the 
only cleavage they can be usefully placed on. This cleavage has also traditionally 
defined potential coalition partners as well as a left-leaning ‘bloc’ and a right-leaning 
‘bloc’^^ . The relative placing of the relevant political parties on this cleavage can be 
found in chapters four to seven.
Denmark has had a multi-party system since the beginning of this century when the 
Social Democratic Party (DSD) began its challenge against the Conservative Party (KF) 
and the Liberal Party (DV). In 1905 the DV split into Radical (RV) and Agrarian 
Liberals (DV). Two blocs formed, with the DSD and the RV on the left, and the KF and
”  1992.
1988a, p. 350. 
1982, chapter 3.
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the DV on the right. The DSD’s share of the vote grew, and by World War II the norm 
had become DSD government with RV support^^.
The Danish Communist Party (DKP)^® was significant immediately after World War n, 
but declined thereafter. However, the SF has formed a more powerful left-wing threat 
since 1960. Some smaller parties, mainly on the left^\ have also been represented in the 
Danish parliament. On the right, the Progress Party (DFRP) formed in 1972. All these 
‘newer’ parties are based mainly on the left-right cleavage (as are the DSD and the KF), 
with the SF supporting a large role for the state and substantial redistribution. The DFRP 
is at the opposite side of the spectrum; it has traditionally particularly focused on tax- 
cuts. Berglund and Lindstrom argue that the DFRP is best described as an extreme anti­
tax party, with elements of early laissez-faire Liberalism^^.
A new far-right party, the Danish People’s Party (DFP) was formed in October 1995 by 
four DFRP members of the Danish parliament (the ‘Folketing’), with Pia Kjærsgaard as 
its leader^^. This party appears to have taken over most of the voters who supported the 
DFRP. It is more populist than the DFRP, and focuses more strongly on halting
See Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 103-107) regarding theories of the connection 
between policy-dimensions and coalition-formation.
”  Borre, 1992, pp. 145-147.
The DKP was founded as the Left Socialist Party of Denmark in November 1919. It 
contested its last elections as an independent party in 1988. Since then it has fielded 
candidates as part of the Unity List (EH).
The Justice Party (RF) formed 1924, centre-right, participated in its last election in 
1990. The Left Socialist Party (VS), formed 1967 from a split in the SF over devaluation 
(Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, p. 83), contested its last elections as an independent 
party in 1988, since then it has fielded candidates as part of the EH. The EH started out 
as a far-left electoral alliance consisting of the VS, the DKP and some smaller groups, 
and became a fully-fledged political party in 1994. Common Course (FK) on the far-left 
fought its last election in 1990.
Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, pp. 176-77.
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immigration and repatriation of refugees. At the March 1998 Folketing elections the DP 
received 7.4 percent of the vote, the DFRP 2.4 percent^" .^
In 1973 the Centre Democrats (CD) broke away from the DSD, originally in opposition 
to perceived excessive taxation of homeowners^^. The party has since established itself 
in the centre of Danish politics. Berglund and Lindstrom describe the CD as mainly an 
issue party, concentrating on issues like left-wing bias in public television and radio, 
property tax, and car excise^^. Since 1970 there has also existed a small Christian 
People’s Party (DKRF), which is slightly to the right of centre.
The Danish party system can be divided into centre-left and centre-right ‘blocs’, with the 
left consisting of the DSD and various smaller parties to its left, the centre-right of the 
CD, the DKRF, the DV, the KF and the DFRP/DFP. The RV inhabits the central 
position in the party system. This division is largely reflected in government formation, 
with only two exceptions since 1972^ .^
The Finnish Social Democratic Party (FSD) has not achieved the same strength as in the 
other three countries. The party faces unusually strong competition from the left, until 
1990 from an alliance called the Finnish People’s Democratic League (FPDL). The 
FPDL’s main element was the Communist Party. After a brief split in the late 1980’s,
Bille, 1996, p 319.
The Danish newspaper Politiken, 12/3/98, http://www.politiken.dk/valg/981ands.htm. 
Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, p. 83.
Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, pp. 176-77.
In 1978 the DSD formed a government with the DV, in 1993 with the DKRF and the 
CD, as well as the RV. (Petersson, 1994, p. 100) For details of the parties in government 
in this period, see Table 4.4.
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this party re-emerged as the Left Alliance (VF)^^. The Green Party (OF) is located on the 
centre-left.
In the Finnish centre, the Centre Party (CF)^^ and the Rural Party (FLP)^° are relatively 
close, with the Christian League (FKF)^^ somewhat further to the right, and the SFF and 
the National Coalition party (NSP/^ close to each other on the right. The Young Finns 
(UF) only registered as a party in December 1994^^, and won two seats at the 1995 
elections to the Finnish parliament (the ‘Eduskunta’). This party is located close to the 
NSP and the SFF on the left-right scale^^. Of these parties, the FPDL/VF, the FSD, the 
NSP, and the UF can mainly be differentiated on the left-right cleavage.
The Finnish party system cannot usefully be described as bloc-based. The only bloc- 
feature evident in government formation since 1970 has been the exclusion of the NSP.
The two wings of the Communist Party separated in 1986, with the majority a 
member of the traditional radical-leftists umbrella-group FPDL and the minority (hard­
liners) forming the dominant part of the newly-created Democratic Alternative (DA). 
(Arter, 1987, p. 171) In April 1990 the SKDL and the DA formed the VF. The VF 
committed itself to ‘“ social and ecological management of the market economy’” (Arter, 
1991, p. 175). For the sake of simplicity the various incarnations of the far left in 
Finland is referred to simply as the ‘VF’ throughout this thesis, except for when other 
descriptions are necessary.
Agrarian Union (AU) until 1965.
Splinter group from the AU.
Founded 1958.
Small right wing splinter groups from the NSP and the SFF formed the Constitutional 
Peoples Party in 1974.
Arter, 1995a, p. 201.
This party is a strong advocate of neo-liberalism, emphasising individual freedom and 
rejecting the Scandinavian welfare model. (Sundberg, 1996a, p. 323)
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This ended in 1987^ .^ The CF has often preferred to co-operate with the left rather than 
the right^^. However, the left-right cleavage remains central^^.
The flow of votes remains dominated by neighbours to the left or right on this scale. 
There is, however, a flow of votes between the FSD and the NSP. This is because “the 
two parties represent the same urban and industrial pole on the centre/periphery 
dimension; and they have a long history of co-operation on the local and regional 
levels^^”.
There have been several splits on the left of Norwegian politics. However, by 1960, only 
a few small parties remained to the left of the Labour Party (AP)’ .^ But a new party, the 
Socialist People’s Party, (later the Socialist Left Party, SV) gained two seats at the 1961 
election. This party remained represented in the Norwegian parliament in the 1990’s. 
Both the Danish SF and the SV were initially based on opposition to NATO 
membership, in particular the SV^°. However, by the 1990’s these parties were mainly 
defined by their position on the far left of the left-right cleavage.
In the centre of Norwegian politics, the old ‘Venstre’ (NY) has split several times, with 
the mother party nearly disappearing in the process. However, on the left-right scale all
For details, see Table 5.4. Since 1987, Berglund (1995) describes coalitions as ‘red- 
blue’ and ‘rainbow’. This indicates the absence of govemment-formation by blocks in 
modem Finnish politics.
Arter, 1987, p. 173.
Berglund, 1991, p. 259.
Berglund, 1991, endnote 7, p. 260.
Mainly the Communist Party (NKP), which has not been represented in the 
Norwegian parliament (the ‘Storting’) since 1961. Another far left grouping, the Red 
Electoral Alliance (RVA) gained representation in the Storting for the first time in 1993, 
with one seat in Oslo. It lost that seat at the 1997 election.
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these splinter groups remained close, and have often co-operated. The NV staged a 
revival in the 1990’s after its two most current factions (the Liberal People’s Party - 
DLF and the rump NV^^) re-united in 1988. The other two centrist parties, the Centre 
Party (SP)^^ and the NKRF^^, both resulted from splits in the NV.
Traditionally, the main party on the right of Norwegian politics has been the 
Conservative Party (H). From the 1973 election onwards, a new party established itself 
to its right. Its original name was Anders Lange’s Party for substantial reduction of 
taxes, duties and governmental intervention. It changed its name to the Progress Party 
(NFRP) in 1977. At the 1997 national election the NFRP vote surpassed that of the H.
All but one of the Norwegian governments since 1971 have either been AP single party 
governments, or centre-right coalition governments^"^. The SV, the RVA and the NFRP 
have never been in government.
The Swedish five-party system developed early this century and remained intact until 
1988. In this period the party system consisted of the Conservative Party (MP) on the 
right^^, the Liberal Party (FP)*  ^and the Agrarian Party (Centre Party, CP from 1958) on 
the centre-right, the Social Democrats (SSD) on the centre-left and the Left Party
Castles, 1978, pp. 37-38.
The NV split in 1972 over membership in the EC, the DLF being the pro-membership 
faction.
Contested elections from 1915 as the Agrarian League, from 1921 as the Farmers 
Party, and from 1957 as the SP.
Formed in 1933, for details see below.
For details, see Table 6.4.
The Right Party until 1969.
It has contested elections under that name since 1934, when two factions reunited. 
They had split over prohibition in 1923.
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(VP(K)) (then a communist party) resulting from splits in the SSD in 1917 and 1921, on
the far left^ .^
The Christian Democratic party (KD) was formed in 1964. It changed from a 
confessional party into a broader non-socialist party in the 1980s, emphasising moral 
and ethical values as well as a willingness to join a non-socialist government. On the 
left-right scale, the KD belongs slightly to the right of centre. The Green Party (GP) was 
formed in 1981, in the aftermath of the nuclear power referendum of March 1980. It 
belongs on the centre-left. In 1988 it became the first new party in the Swedish 
parliament (the ‘Riksdag’) for more than 70 years*^. On the right. New Democracy (ND) 
emerged in 1990, and gained parliamentary representation at the 1991 election. 
However, it was reduced to 1.2 percent of the votes and no seats at the 1994 election.
In the period 1932-1976 the SSD was in government, but very seldom in a majority 
alone. It governed in coalition with the Agrarian Party in the periods 1936-9 and 1951-7, 
and at other times relied on support from other parties^®. Centre-right parties were in 
government in the periods 1976-1982 and 1991-1994^*.
Oskarson, 1992, pp. 339-341.
The party changed its name from the Christian Democratic Assembly to the Christian 
Democratic Community Party (‘Kristdemokratiska Samhallspartiet’) in 1987, and to the 
Christian Democratic Party ( ‘ Kristdemokratema’ ) at the party congress of June 1996. 
(Information received from the KD’s international secretary, Goran Holmstrom.)
For a detailed account of the GP’s history, policies and electoral breakthrough in 
1988, see Bennulf and Holmberg (1990). Jahn (1992 ) compares the Swedish Greens to 
their German counterpart.
^  Oskarson, 1992, p. 341.
For details, see Table 7.4.
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2.4.2. The territorial cleavages.
"The main line of cleavage in the Scandinavian social structures, before the 
appearance of an appreciable industrial sector in the late nineteenth century, 
was between the economic and cultural interests of the rural independent 
peasantry and the urban aristocratic bureaucracy."^^
Based solely on the left-right cleavage, the fractured party systems of the Nordic 
countries would be difficult to explain^^. The secondary political cleavage(s) in all four 
countries tends to be territorial^" .^
The diversity on the non-socialist side is, at least partially, a "reflection of the interest 
cleavages in the pre-industrial social structure"^^. Two aspects of 19th century 
Scandinavian social structures are particularly relevant in explaining the weak and 
accommodating Right. Firstly, the unusually strong position of the independent 
peasantry led to distinctive interest cleavages at the time of increased political 
mobilisation^^. Secondly, late and rapid industrialisation led to peasants occupying an 
established position without having time to assume a conservative stance at the time of 
the arrival of industrialisation and the new social forces^^.
92 Castles, 1978, p. 138.
The existence of centre-left, far-left, centre-right and far-right parties can be 
understood based on this cleavage; but it is difficult to explain the centrist parties based 
solely on this cleavage, and in particular the fragmentation in the centre. Jahn and 
Storsved (1995a, pp. 22-23; 1995b, p. 242) argue that in Scandinavia, and in particular 
in Norway, the urban/rural cleavage does much to account for the nature of the 
Scandinavian multi-party system.
See, for example, Berglund and Lindstrom (1978, especially pp. 17-20 and chapter 4).
Castles, 1978, p. 134.
This is explained in detail in Castles (1978, pp. 135-138). See also Smith (1989, pp. 
31-32).
Castles, 1978, p. 134.
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The interests of urban and rural areas remain different. In particular, the conflict between 
producers and consumers of agricultural products remains, although the proportion of 
farmers in the population has declined dramatically^^. By 1993, the percentage of the 
civilian population employed in agriculture had dropped to five percent in Denmark, 
nine percent in Finland, six percent in Norway, and four percent in Sweden. The average 
for the EU-12 at this time was six percent^^.
In the case of Norway, fishing is also of great importance in many rural areas, and in 
Finland and Sweden forestry is a substantial industry in rural areas. Also, extending and 
modernising infrastructure to sparsely populated areas versus improving urban 
infrastructure pits rural and urban interests against each other.
In addition, as Worre argues, “agriculture provides, in many ways, very favourable 
conditions for class party formation. Farmers have a broad community of interests in 
their trade, income, and residence: they constitute a rural subculture more influenced by 
tradition and religion than the urban one. [...] Farmers have an extensive organisational 
apparatus, where the overlapping membership between the farmers’ associations, co­
operative societies, and the branches of the Agrarian parties is considerable, and the 
social pressure to follow the dominant political norms is strong.”^^
The lifestyles of urban and rural populations are often quite different. In particular, the 
rural population is often culturally more conservative. The most obvious manifestation
See for example Smith (1989, pp. 28, 32). 
Eurostat, 1995b, p. 147.
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of this is to be found in the three ‘counter-cultures’ of Norway, a well-established theme 
in Norwegian historical sociology^°\ These are centred on a preference for the ‘second’ 
Norwegian language, neo-Norwegian (‘nynorsk’); abstinence and teetotaller movements; 
and membership in confessional ‘free-churches’. Rokkan argues that the urban-rural 
divide was deeper in Norway than elsewhere in Scandinavia because centuries of foreign 
domination was channelled through the cities and a continuous link between rural and 
urban elite was missing^® .^
There is often a centre-periphery aspect to the territorial conflicts, pitting the interests of 
the periphery against those of the centre. These are largely based on the same factors as 
the urban-rural conflict. However, the centre-periphery conflict also includes an 
additional element, one of a cultural-political nature. The political power 
disproportionately resides in the centre, and this creates a political conflict between the 
low-powered periphery and the high-powered centre. This has a cultural element 
because the centre may make decisions that are less in accordance with the culture of the 
rural areas than with that of the centre. Examples include issues connected to religion, 
imposing urban standards as well as extensive rules and regulations on rural and 
peripheral areas, and accusations of generally neglecting the interests of the periphery 
and rural areas.
Territorial conflicts include all the elements of the cleavage definition set out above. 
Firstly, there are obvious and observable conflicts of interests present, based both on
Worre, 1980, pp. 308-09.
Ârebrott, 1982, p 82. For the importance of the cotinter-cultnres in Norwegian 
politics, see for example Valen and Martinussen (1972), Valen and Aardal (1983), 
Valen, Aardal, and Vogt (1990), Valen (1992) and Udgaard and Nilsson (1993).
114
social structure and on cultural values. Secondly, these conflicts are amenable to an 
awareness of their relevance, and to a feeling of common identity. The dichotomy and 
the many differences between centre and periphery, urban and rural, north and south, 
makes it relatively easy to identify ‘the enemy’. Finally, these conflicts are translated 
into the political system. Details about the current status of these cleavages are set out in 
chapters four to seven^® .^
In Finland, Norway and Sweden, Agrarian parties formed early in this century. These 
were based on promoting the interests of the food-producers against the interests of the 
rest of society, in particular the urban population. The Centre parties and the Liberals in 
Denmark were - and to some extent still are - class parties as much as the Social 
Democratic parties, they represent a particular group. "The farmers' interests are similar 
to those of primary producers the world over: higher agricultural prices and cheaper 
industrial products. As such, farmers' interests are opposed to those of both capitalists 
and the industrial working class."
The Conservative parties in the region tend to be substantially stronger in urban than in 
rural areas The support patterns for the rump Liberal parties tends to vary from 
country to country and over time. Generally, the Swedish party tends to be more urban, 
and the Norwegian party more rural. The Finnish party has virtually disappeared. 
However, one might argue that it has to some extent been replaced by the more
Rokkan and Valen (1964 pp. 162-238) and Rokkan (1966, pp. 70-115).
For a detailed account of the traditional regional strongholds of the various parties, 
see Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, chapter 4. A good detailed analysis of the historical 
as well as 1990’s strongholds of the Finnish parties can be found in Arter (1987, pp. 
197-202).
Castles, 1978, p. 113.
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libertarian and that the SFF represents traditional liberalism as well as the
Swedish-speaking community.
In the Danish case, the Liberal party did split into two parts, but the rump party retained 
the support of most of the farmers. The KF remains weak in the rural areas, and is often 
outvoted by the DV overall, especially of late. The DV has the support of the highest 
proportion of farmers in Scandinavia, and has traditionally been unsuccessful in the 
cities^ ^^ .
2.4.3. The moral-religious cleavage.
The Nordic countries are all among the more religiously homogenous countries in 
Europe insofar as most of their inhabitants are, nominally at least, Lutheran 
P ro tes tan tsM easu rin g  religious heterogeneity, Bartolini and Mair characterised all 
four countries as among the most hom ogenousH ow ever, there is some fragmentation 
among these Lutherans. The divisions are mainly between the mainstream state churches 
and the so-called ‘free-churches’. The latter have been particularly prominent in
Castles, 1978, pp. 114-115, also see chapters four to seven.
Mainly urban and well-educated voters in the Helsinki metropolitan area support this 
party. However, the party is neo-liberal rather than social liberal like the LPP. 
(Sundberg, 1996a, p. 323)
Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, chapter 3.
By the 1990’s, there were substantial Muslim and minor Catholic minorities in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden due to immigration over the past few decades.
On religious heterogeneity scores, with a scale of 0 (low) to 1 (high) Denmark scored 
0.06, Finland 0.10, Norway 0.09, and Sweden 0.09. (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, pp. 227- 
230)
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Norway. But it was moral issues related to religion that led to the establishment of 
specifically ‘Christian’ parties in the region*
Prohibition référendums split both the Swedish and the Norwegian Liberal parties. 
However, in Sweden in 1922 the prohibitionists lost (but received the support of 49 
percent of the population in the consultative referendum), whilst in Norway they won in 
October 1922 with 61.6 percent of the vote. In Sweden the two factions united in 1934, 
but in Norway a splinter group formed two years after the referendum never rejoined. In 
1933 there was a further split based on moral issues, and the NKRF was formed***.
The NKRF in Norway was established largely because of frustration with ‘Venstre’ not 
promoting low-church values, and failure to secure representation for ‘Christians’ on the 
party lists. The decisive episode, however, seems to have been the theatre piece ‘The 
Green Pastures’ by Marc Connelly, presented at the National Theatre in Oslo in 1932. 
The piece was seen as highly blasphemous among active Christians. Other controversies 
concerned conflicts between the Christian activists and ‘Venstre’ over temperance 
policy, a personal grievance over a NV nomination in the province of Hordaland, and 
the author Amulf 0verlands’ speeches about "Christianity - the Tenth Plague"**^.
The Norwegian NKRF**^ became a national party in 1945**\ Specifically ‘Christian’ 
parties - based mainly on moral issues and Christian values - were formed in the other
**** Madeley, 1977. He also provides a comprehensive account of the development of the
religious cleavage structures in the Nordic area.
*** Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, pp. 49-51.
**^  Karvonen (1993, pp. 29-30), Madeley (1977, pp. 381-382) and Madeley (1996).
**^  For a detailed account of the particular and ambiguous character of this party, and 
how it differs from Continental Christian Democratic parties, see Madeley (1996).
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three countries in the following decades. These have been strongly influenced by the 
Norwegian one, including detailed policies. The first programme of the Finnish FKF, 
founded in 1958, was close to a verbatim translation of the Norwegian NKRF 
programme^
The Swedish KD emerged in a period of heated debates over morality and religion, 
particularly about promiscuity, venereal diseases and abortion. There were also conflicts 
over non-conformist religious groups, over religious instruction in schools, and the film 
"491" which contained relatively explicit sex scenes^
The Danish DKRF was established in 1970, with a background similar to the situation in 
Sweden. It was partly related to liberalisation with regards to pornography and abortion, 
and also to school reforms reducing the time allotted to religious education^
The establishment of these parties led to further fragmentation on the centre-right of the 
party-systems in all four countries. However, the Norwegian party has so far been 
substantially more important and successful than the other three^^ .^
Madeley, 1996, pp. 149-150.
Karvonen, 1993, p. 30.
Karvonen, 1993, pp. 31-32.
Karvonen, 1993, p. 32, Madeley, 1977, p. 282.
See Madeley (1977, p. 269) regarding the history of electoral success for these
parties.
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2.4.4. Other cleavages.
With the exception of the Swedish-speaking Finns, there are no substantial minorities 
based on religion, language, or ethnic origin in Scandinavia^ Hence, such bases for 
political parties that in other countries have appeal across the left-right divide are 
missing, or at least very limited, in the area. In Finland there is a linguistic cleavage, 
with the SFF representing the interests of the Swedish minority.
On the left, the Communist parties were arguably separated from the mainstream left by 
their commitment to revolution and anti-system character. However, the Communist 
parties of Norway and Denmark have become very small. The Swedish VP(K) has 
moved away from its more radical socialist policies (‘democratic controls’ over the 
private sector, nationalisation of the entire financial sector) towards promoting itself as a 
‘red-green’ p a rty F u rth e rm o re , the revolutionary features of the larger parties on the 
far left have not been very prominent since the 1950’s, and these features virtually 
disappeared in the aftermath of the SU’s collapse.
The Finnish case differs strongly from the others historically. Here the 1918 Civil War 
divided the nation as well as the left between the FSD and Communists. "The civil war
See for example Castles (1978, pp. 106-108, although he mistakenly argues there are 
no such minorities present) and Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988, pp. 14-15). The latter 
lists many of the minorities present. See also Bartolini and Mair’s (1990, pp. 227-30) 
heterogeneity index, where Finland scores 0.18, 0.15, and 0.13 on a scale of 0 (low) to 1 
(high) in the periods 1918-44, 1945-65, 1966-85; and the other three countries zero. 
Berglund and Lindstrom (1978, pp. 19-20) also view the Swedish/Finnish division as a 
cleavage in Finland.
120 Yp(K) party programs 1985, 1988, 1991, and 1994.
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of 1918 may be interpreted as a nation-building crisis in the midst of a mobilisation of 
the electorate. The present day Communist/Non-Communist cleavage partly corresponds 
to the Civil War alignment.
Since World War H, however, the Finnish Communists participated in government both 
in the period immediately after the war and in most of the period 1966-83, and the 
current left-wing party, the VF, has been in government since 1985. Nevertheless, in the 
past ideological cleavages have run far deeper in Finland than elsewhere in 
Scandinavia^H ow ever, the VF appears to have developed into a party primarily 
distinguished by its relatively extreme position on the left-right cleavage.
The main left-socialist parties in Denmark (SF) and Norway (SV) were formed in 
opposition to NATO-membership, and as such they could be argued to be based on a 
foreign-policy cleavage. However, they have since developed into parties mainly 
differentiated by a far-left position, although foreign policy positions remain part of their 
distinctiveness.
A ‘Green’, or environmental cleavage can be difficult to identify because virtually all 
parties include some kind of commitment to the environment in their manifestos. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be good reasons to argue for the existence of such a 
cleavage. Firstly, there are obvious conflicts of interest between a preference for 
protecting the environment and aiming for increased material welfare. Specific examples 
include (the pace of) oil and gas extraction in Norway and nuclear power in Sweden.
Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p. 23. 
Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, pp. 12-13.
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More generally, clean air and water, protection of animal habitat, and the set aside of 
land for non-development can often be in conflict with projects that promote material 
welfare. Secondly, there are various environmental organisations, both national and 
international, that promote environmental causes. Thirdly, certain parties quite clearly 
represent ‘greener’ interests compared to other parties. Hence, it is argued here that there 
is a green cleavage present in these party systems.
In Finland and Sweden there are successful Green parties represented in parliament. In 
Sweden the rose partly from the ashes of defeat in the nuclear power referendum 
of 1980. Before it entered government in 1976-8 and had to compromise over the issue, 
the CP had benefited electorally from its opposition (together with the VP) to nuclear 
power.
In Finland the Green list incorporates several new social movements such as the 
environmentalists, the women’s movement, the movement for the disabled, and the 
peace movement. The list won 1.5 percent and two seats in 1983, and four percent and 
four seats in 1987*^ "^ . In the 1991 Finnish elections, the GF broke through across the 
party political spectrum, testifying to the presence of a green cleavage in Finnish 
politics. It is becoming more salient, but Berglund^^^ argues that it is still clearly 
dominated by the traditional left-right and urban-rural cleavages.
In Denmark and Norway, the far left, especially the SF and the SV, has developed into 
‘red-green’ parties, with a strong emphasis on protection of the environment. In
See for example Bennulf and Holmberg (1990) for an account of the rise of the GP. 
Knutsen, 1990, pp. 262-63.
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Denmark various small parties on the radical left have supported many ‘green’ values. In 
the Norwegian case, the NV has also become distinguished by its strong environmental 
stance. Part of the reason no new Green party has emerged in Norway is the fact that the 
NV, the SP and the SV support many green values^^^.
One might argue that immigration- and refugee- policies also constitute a cleavage in at 
least some of these countries. The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway, the ND in 
Sweden, and the FLP in Finland have all taken stances against immigration that have led 
to accusations of racism. However, by 1997 the FLP had ceased to exist and the ND 
seemed destined for oblivion. As for the two Progress parties, it appears that anti­
immigration sentiments forms part of their appeal. However, the Progress Parties and 
the ND were formed in opposition to high taxes and what they argued was too extensive 
state involvement. They remain distinguished largely on the left-right cleavage, although 
they also retain a large element of populism and protest - against the prevailing policies 
in areas such as taxes, immigration and crime.
2.5. The cleavage system and European integration.
In terms of the cleavage model, the conflict over European integration is likely to be 
most disruptive if it leads to a) substantive new parties being formed, b) substantial 
changes in the relative numbers of votes received by each party, and/or c) coalition 
patterns being substantially altered. In general, the more the EU-dimension crosscuts
1991a, p. 259.
Knutsen, 1990, pp. 262-63.
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other cleavages, the more likely it is that the existing cleavage system will be disrupted 
as a result.
The cleavage system also limits the choices with regard to position on European 
integration available to both voters and parties. It limits the choices of parties because 
their image and policies in other areas lead to them having strongholds among certain 
groups of voters whose view on the EU they need to take into account. Also, a party’s 
cleavage position(s) affects which parties are potential coalition partners. That is, when 
considering the party’s position on a newly salient dimension the existing cleavage 
system needs to be taken into account.
The cleavage system limits the choices of many voters because they are unlikely to base 
their vote solely on the question of EU-membership, or on other issues related to 
European integration. A party’s position on other cleavages, and on issues salient at the 
time of an election, will also influence the voters’ decision. This makes it difficult for a 
party to predict how the EU-dimension will affect its appeal with the voters.
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2.6. Conclusion.
The cleavage model helps us to understand and explain party system developments and 
how party systems differ from one country to another. Over time, the cleavages 
underlying the party-system tend to change character. They also change in importance 
relative to each other. Thus, if the strength of a conflict of interest underlying a certain 
cleavage fades, the importance of that cleavage is also likely to fade. Alternatively, it 
changes character and may arguably turn into a different cleavage altogether, but related 
to the original one.
In the four countries studied here, the left-right cleavage is dominant. But some conflicts 
cut across the left-right cleavage. Territorial cleavages have remained in the party- 
system, and thus enabled accommodation of conflicts of interest related to this cleavage. 
There is also a ‘Green’ cleavage present in all four countries, as well as a moral- 
religious one, and a few others as described above.
The development of a new political cleavage becomes more likely if an important 
conflict of interest cannot be accommodated by the current cleavage system. Such 
accommodation is more likely if a ‘new’ conflict closely follows other cleavage lines. In 
particular, the formation of a new cleavage becomes likely if the conflict does not 
correspond with the dominant cleavage at the time the conflict becomes salient.
Alternatively, some accommodation can take place along pre-existing but less important 
conflict-lines. However, the latter type of accommodation is more likely to lead to 
changes in the relative levels of party-support, and perhaps also in coalition patterns. If
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no accommodation along major existing cleavage-lines can be found, then a new 
political cleavage formation becomes likely. With respect to the cleavage model 
developed here, it is in terms of its crosscutting effect the importance of the conflict over 
European integration with regard to the party system will be measured.
The cleavage model generally, and its application to the Nordic party system 
specifically, as set out in this chapter, serves four purposes. Firstly, it helps us to develop 
a structured understanding of the development and current status of these party systems. 
Secondly, it provides us with the necessary background for developing an explanation 
for the effect the conflict over European integration has had on these party systems. 
Thirdly, the cleavage model provides the theoretical understanding needed to evaluate if 
the conflict over European integration is a new cleavage. And, finally, it implies some 
limitations for the room parties and voters have to react to the increased salience of the 
conflict over European integration. These are made more specific in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3. Voter and Party Behaviour on European integration.
3.1. Introduction.
The first section of this chapter develops a model aimed at explaining the logic behind 
opinion formation on European integration. The cleavage model outlined in Chapter 2 
above provides a framework for analysing which voting tendencies are prevalent among 
people who share certain characteristics. Members of group A tend to vote for a 
Conservative party, members of group C tend to vote for a Socialist party, and so on. 
But this does not tell us much about the reasons why these tendencies exist. If 
characteristic A is ‘urban inhabitant’ and characteristic C ‘industrial worker’, then all 
this tells us is that people with those particular characteristics tend to vote a certain way. 
The cleavage model does not enter into the logic behind why a certain factor or 
characteristic might influence an individual to behave in a certain way.
Membership in the groups ‘urban inhabitants’ and ‘industrial workers’ are not mutually 
exclusive. If a person lives in an urban area, is male, a low earner, and a Catholic, which 
one - if any - of these group memberships influenced him to be for or against EU- 
membership? This may not be possible to find out, even asking the person may not yield 
a satisfactory answer. But a model can be developed that systématisés the various 
influences that can reasonably be argued to affect his decision. Rational choice theory 
will be utilised to build such a model in the first section of this chapter. Such a model 
also allows for the inclusion of factors of a more individual nature that are not directly 
related to group-membership.
126
In the second section a model is constructed to enable an assessment of the effect of this 
conflict on the party system. The starting point for this section is the rational choice 
assumption that the main aim of political parties is to be in government. This aim 
implies that parties will aim to maximise its number of votes, unless other concerns 
intervene. But in the Nordic countries the multi-party system means that, for most of the 
time, most parties need coalition partners, or at least support from other parties, to form 
(part of) a government. In addition, concerns for party cohesion and conflicts between 
the personal opinion of key players may not correspond with the other aims of the 
parties. It will be demonstrated how this complicates the strategy of the parties with 
regard to position on European integration. This section will also investigate how the 
parties are likely to deal with the often conflicting aims of maintaining party cohesion, 
maximising votes and retaining coalition and co-operation potential.
3.2. Rational Choice Theory.
Essentially, rational choice models assume that people are rational actors\ and will act 
so as to maximise their utility, where utility is a measure of benefits in an individual’s 
mind which he uses to decide among alternative courses of action. “Given several 
mutually exclusive alternatives, a rational man always takes the one which yields him 
the highest utility, ceteris paribus’, i.e., he acts to his own greatest benefit.”^
Friedman argues that a distinction should be made between ‘Public Choice’ and 
‘Rational Choice’. Public Choice theory, according to its ‘Virginia School’ gives public
 ^For example. Downs (1957), Dunleavy (1991). For a particularly good elaboration and 
justification of the rationality assumption, see Diermeier (1996).
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choice theory a ‘thick’ connotation where it is assumed that political actors pursue their 
material interest. Rational Choice theory, on the other hand, includes “the much broader 
claim that, regardless of what sort of ends people pursue, they do so through strategic, 
instrumentally rational behaviour” .^ Rational Choice covers a wide field and intense 
disagreements. Hence, it is best understood as a family of theories
Downs defines ‘rational’ as "an ordering of behaviour [...] reasonably directed towards 
the achievement of conscious goals. [...] If a theorist knows the ends of some decision­
maker, he can predict what actions will be taken to achieve them as follows: (1) he 
calculates the most reasonable way for the decision-maker to reach his goals, and (2) he 
assumes this way will actually be chosen because the decision-maker is rational."^
A basic criticism of rational choice theory is that it is tautological^. This is directed at 
the basic assumption that people act in their self-interest in order to maximise their 
utility. On its own, this statement can rationalise any action through post-hoc goal- 
specification. But it is an assumption, not a theory:
“It is important to distinguish between the content of a statement and the 
content of a theory. While a particular statement, such as the fundamental 
law of a theory, may be tautological, the conjunction of fundamental law, 
specific law, constraints, and so on, typically will not. it is precisely the 
assumption of particular motivations in particular applications that would 
guarantee the empirical content of rational choice models even if  the 
fundamental assumption o f rational action were indeed tautological^
2 Downs, 1957, pp. 36-37.
 ^Friedman, 1996, p. 2. Also see Elster (1983).
 ^See, for example, Ferejohn and Satz (1996), Fiorina (1996), Kelley, (1996).
 ^Downs, 1957, p. 4.
 ^See, for example. Green and Shapiro (1994, chapters two and three in particular).
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Rational choice theory is applied to three aspects of this thesis. Firstly, the decision of 
individual voters to oppose or support EU-membership. Secondly, how the parties react 
to this relatively newly salient conflict entering the political system. Regarding the 
second aspect it is contended that parties are office-maximising. This leads to the 
contention that certain off-loading tactics are beneficial to most parties with regard to 
how to deal with European integration. The third aspect is the argument that the EU- 
conflict complicates voting decisions in national elections. In this regard, a separation of 
the EU-conflict from other issues is argued to be the preference of many voters.
Goal specification is more difficult with regard to the first aspect^. A large variety of 
areas that influence a person’s utility are affected by EU-membership. Similarly, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain information about how each variable affects a 
person’s decision. ‘“Disturbing causes’ may offset the action of the independent 
variable, diminishing the impact on the dependent variable or making it disappear. 
While a true theory may predict that X will cause Y to occur, not-Y may yet occur in the 
presence of X because of the overpowering effect of other variables.”^
 ^Diermeier, 1996, p. 67.
 ^ Fiorina (1996, p. 88) argues that “[rational choice] models are most useful where 
stakes are high and numbers low, in recognition that it is not rational to go to the trouble 
to maximise if the consequences are trivial and/or your actions make no difference”. See 
also Fiorina (1990). “Giving little or no thought to what you are doing is maximising 
behaviour when little or nothing is at stake and/or your actions make little or no 
difference. It is not that rational choice models cannot explain such behaviour, just that 
they do not say anything very interesting about it.” (Fiorina, 1996, endnote 4, p. 94) 
Hence, on work on mass behaviour Fiorina utilise minimalist notions of rationality 
(Fiorina, 1981, p. 83), whilst in work on elites he assumes a higher order of rationality 
(Fiorina, 1989, chapters 5 and 11).
 ^Friedman, 1996, p. 14.
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The contention promoted here is that people’s attitudes, in so far as these can be 
empirically studied, are affected mainly by those factors where EU-membership has 
obvious repercussions on their utility. Importantly, this implies that factors such as 
nationalism (in its pure form) and national sovereignty mainly affects the opinion of 
those who are not strongly affected by membership in more direct ways, or for whom 
other effects are very uncertain. Section 3.3 of this chapter will address each relevant 
factor in turn, in order to evaluate their likely importance for people’s attitude to EU- 
membership.
A further criticism of rational choice is that it often indulges in post-hoc 
rationalisation^^. That is, if the theory does not fit the empirical data, then the theory is 
modified. However, post-hoc developments improve many theories, and are, at least in 
the social sciences, often difficult to distinguish from the original theory. Diermeier 
argues that what Green and Shapiro label post-hoc theory development, Thomas Kuhn 
would call ‘puzzle-solving’ The view taken here is that such modifications and 
developments improve rather than jeopardise theories^^.
Another main area of criticism is that rational choice, if not tautological, merely restates 
earlier observations or that its contribution is simply stating the ‘obvious’. However, 
“even when deductions from a particular model reproduce what is already known, 
rational choice theory is valuable for specifying a causal mechanism behind the
See, for example. Green and Shapiro (1994, especially pp. 34-38).
Diermeier (1996, p. 61), Kuhn (1962, especially chapter 4).
For further justification of post-hoc theory development, see for example Chong 
(1996, pp. 44-6) and Diermeier (1996, pp. 61-63).
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phenomenon in question” In section 3.3 of this chapter, and in section two of each 
country chapter, this is held to be the main contribution of rational choice. However, the 
model developed in section 3.4 of this chapter, as well as its application in chapters four 
to seven, covers new ground and is of a more ‘non-obvious’ nature.
Some rational choice theories assume perfect information^"^. That is, the actors all have 
access to all relevant information. But in most decisions we are faced with the problem 
of having to make up our mind with only limited access to information relevant to our 
decision. Dunleavy argues that there is an assumption that plentiful and low-cost 
information on group-joining is available and that in public choice there generally is a 
rather simple approach to information, even in otherwise sophisticated work^^.
Unfortunately, some assumptions about access to information must be made here. It is 
assumed that all actors have access to the same information regarding European 
integration. For example, if one person knows the degree to which foreign policy is 
included in the EU framework, then everybody knows this. It is further assumed that all 
the voters are aware of the position of the various political parties with regard to 
European integration. With regard to the parties themselves, party leaders and party 
members, it is assumed that they are aware of their own and other parties’ position on 
the important policy dimensions, including positions on European integration.
Chong, 1996, p. 41.
See, for example, Laver and Shepsle (1996, p. 23).
15 Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 3-4.
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Another assumption often made is that a political party, which in most cases consists of 
more than one person, acts as a ‘unitary’ actor^^. Laver and Schofield^^ discuss and 
justify the unitary actor assumption with regard to coalition formation, although they 
also argue for consideration of splitting potential on certain policy dimensions. “Parties 
do in practice tend to go into and come out of government as single actors.”*^  This same 
assumption is applied in this thesis.
However, this assumption does not extend to there being no dissension from the official 
party line. Indeed, at the référendums held over European integration, most parties allow 
their members (even MP’s) to campaign against the official party line. However, it is 
assumed that when in government, a party will pursue the official policy of the party. 
Thus, insofar as a person votes for say, a pro-EU party, then that person is assumed to be 
aware that this party will (at least attempt to) pursue a pro-EU policy in government.
One might argue that, even if a person votes for a party that is split but officially pro- 
EU, he could still vote for an individual politician who is anti-EU. This could get anti- 
EU politicians elected on a pro-EU party-list. This could therefore increase the number 
of anti-EU MP’s in parliament. But because of the list-systems in these countries, it 
would in many cases be difficult for the voter to know which politician his vote will 
help to elect. Furthermore, the party whip will ensure that most MP’s follow the official
See, for example, Laver and Shepsle (1996, pp. 24-25), although they modify this in 
chapter 12.
1990, chapter 2.
Laver and Schofield, 1990, p. 15.
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party line, further increasing the uncertainty of voting for a politician one believes will 
vote against the party line^ .^
3.3 A rational choice model for attitudes towards EU membership.
This section builds a model based on factors likely to influence an individual’s 
estimation of the effects of EU membership on his expected utility. The main 
assumption of rational choice theory is applied, namely that people will act according to 
their self-interest. A citizen will only want his country to join, and/or remain a member 
of, the EU if he believes it will increase his utility.
In this thesis a distinction is made between ‘common’ and ‘group differentiated’ factors. 
The difference between these two main categories of factors is that group-differentiated 
factors can be analysed through related individual and aggregate level indicators. This 
makes this analysis more comparable across countries, and also less reliant on surveys 
having asked exactly the right question for our purpose. Both main categories are then 
divided into ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ sub-categories. It should be stressed that 
this analysis shows only the increased likelihood of an individual being for or against 
EU membership insofar as certain social, economic, ideological and value 
characteristics apply to him. Unless otherwise noted, each factor is analysed ceteris 
paribus in this section.
Laver and Shepsle (1996, p. 29) argue that the value of the party label and party 
discipline as an appealing feature for voters encourage non-defection from the official 
line.
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Some other ideas from economic theory are also utilised here. Firstly, it is assumed that 
people are generally risk-averse. Hence, they are unlikely to support actions that have a 
high risk of decreasing their utility. That is, they are unlikely to pursue a course of action 
where the chance of success is below 50/50.
Linked to risk-aversion is the theory that people prefer concrete and short-term gains to 
abstract and long-term ones. This even applies to situations where the latter has a far 
higher return than the former. This is because abstract and long-term benefits are 
discounted at a much higher rate than concrete and short-term ones. An often-used 
example is that of smoking. Many people will much rather have a cigarette today than 
reduce the risk of lung-cancer somewhere in the distant future. Similarly, it could be 
argued that people disadvantaged by particular changes in the short term are likely to 
resist change, even if long term benefits are likely, in particular if there is a high level of 
uncertainty, because in that scenario the long-term benefits cannot be persuasively 
demonstrated^^.
On the other hand, the European integration process is open-ended with wide-reaching 
aims as set out in the Treaty of Rome, the SEA, the TEU, and the Amsterdam Treaty. 
Nobody can be certain to which extent, or if at all, the welfare state, exports, oil 
revenues, food prices, culture, etc. will be affected by European integration, but it is 
reasonable to believe that these areas are likely to be affected sometime in the future. 
Hence, if a person believes EU policies in these areas will affect his utility, then he may 
to some extent base his attitude to EU-membership on these future contingencies.
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3.3.1 Common economic factors.
The most obvious factor in this category is the net contribution to/receipt from the EU 
budget. The average citizen is likely to view his utility income as increased if this is 
positive, and reduced if it is negative. A net contributor to the EU-budget would, as a 
non-member, be free to spend this money domestically. Conversely, a net recipient 
would have fewer funds as a non-member.
It is assumed that lower taxation increases individual utility. However, the effect of 
membership on the taxation level is difficult to assess. With the exception of Finland, 
the general taxation level is higher in the Nordic countries than is the EU average^ \  
Therefore, one could argue that, in the three other cases, membership is likely to reduce 
taxes due to the competitive pressures of the internal market^^. Also, additional 
downward pressure on taxation might result from the strict EU competition policy 
requiring the reduction of subsidies for certain firms and/or industries.
However, since most formal powers of taxation remain in the national domain, one 
could also argue that membership will have only minor effects on taxation. Furthermore, 
EEA-membership is likely to have similar effects as EU membership in this respect. The 
high level of uncertainty makes it difficult for an individual to assess how his utility will 
be affected in this respect. “Rational behaviour requires a predictable social order. [...]
Hannan and Freedman, 1977.
As a percentage of GDP.
More formally, EU-membership, as opposed to EEA-membership, includes moves 
towards the harmonisation of indirect taxes. (Gstohl, 1994, p. 349)
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Whenever uncertainty increases greatly, rationality becomes difficult.”^^  Thus, viewed in 
isolation, effects on the tax level appear to be a relatively unimportant factor for
people’s attitude to European integration^" .^
It is assumed that lower prices per se increases utility. As with taxation, one could argue 
that pressures from the internal market might lead to a lower price level than would be 
the case without membership. But EEA membership should, in theory, have much the 
same effect as EU membership in this respect. However, with regard to the price level of 
food and drink, cuts in subsidies may lower the price level to EU levels (or keep them in 
check in the Danish case). On the other hand, one could argue that cuts in these 
subsidies could be achieved without membership. Nevertheless, membership would 
ensure that this would happen, and that it would happen sooner rather than later. Hence, 
for the average Nordic, it is likely that his utility would increase somewhat with respect 
to the price level, although there are substantial differences between the four countries.
It is assumed that higher unemployment decreases utility. Although it is difficult to 
assess the impact of EU membership on unemployment, one option for the voter would 
be to compare unemployment rates in his own country with those of (other) EU 
member-states. In the 1990’s, there have been significant variations across the Nordic 
countries with regard to unemployment rates (see Table C) and it can therefore be 
expected that this factor affects utility differently in each country. However, there is not 
necessarily a connection between EU membership and unemployment. Witness, for
^  Downs, 1957, p. 57.
If only factors of such a nature were involved, the rational course of action would be 
for the voter to abstain in the referendum.
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example, the great variation in unemployment between the countries, at the time both 
members and non-members of the EU, listed in Table C.
3.3.2 Common non-economic factors.
EU membership implies the transfer of decision-making in many policy-areas from the 
national to the supranational (EU) level. The effect from this transfer per se on an 
individuals’ utility income is likely to vary according to whether the person in question 
is for or against European integration as represented by the EU. A person’s position on 
this issue depends primarily on two factors. Firstly, the value he puts on power resting 
chiefly with the nation-state. Secondly, the extent to which he approves of the specific 
version of European integration represented by the EU. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the 
likely outcomes of the ideal types of these positions. People can of course be placed 
anywhere between these extremes.
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Figure 3.1______________________________________________________________
Nation-state control vs. Approval of EU integration format.
Approval of EU integration format 
Extent to which value nation-state control Low
High
Low
Clearly anti-EU (1) Impartial (3)
Probably anti-EU (2) Clearly pro-EU (4)
The quality of democracy could arguably be affected by EU membership. The 
‘democratic deficit’ is an important factor in this equation. The gap, technically, 
culturally and geographically, between the voter and the decision-makers is likely to 
increase when a state joins the EU. Technically because the Council consists of 
government ministers, not parliamentarians^^. Culturally because national decisions- 
makers are likely to have more in common with his countrymen than European decision­
makers. And geographically the institutions in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg are 
further away than those in Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm.
On the other hand, non-membership can also be argued to be detrimental to democracy, 
in particular if the alternative is EEA membership. Such membership requires the 
whole-scale adoption of all EC legislation with regard to the internal market. EEA 
members are then required to adapt any EU legislation and regulations in the areas 
covered by the EEA Treaty. Although it is possible for non-EU members of the EEA to 
veto such legislation, this veto cannot be used extensively without jeopardising the 
entire treaty^^. Furthermore, EU initiatives such as the Schengen Agreement and EMU 
will affect most European non-members unless the EU is radically reduced in size.
Insofar as some government ministers are not members of their respective national 
parliaments, they are of course making decisions without being democratically elected at 
all.
In theory, EEA membership allows for the use of a veto against any piece of EU 
regulation or legislation. But if this is used to extensively limit the implementation of 
the single market it is highly unlikely that this will be tolerated by the EU. Hence, it is
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If popular influence over decisions that affect people is considered as important for 
democracy, then removing such decisions from the democratic process through non­
participation is also detrimental to democracy. On the other hand, non-membership in 
the EU does technically retain more national self-determination than membership does. 
Thus, while the effect of EU membership on democracy is difficult to determine, more 
national self-determination is retained by remaining outside. (The effects of membership 
and non-membership on democracy are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.) The 
effect on individual utility based on this factor is extremely difficult to ascertain. It will 
depend on whether the individual considers influence on EU-legislation or directness of 
democracy as more important. Individual survey data will to some extent enable us to 
make a meaningful evaluation of this.
Until recently, a high degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity set the Nordic countries 
apart from many other European countries^^. Immigration from other EU countries is 
unlikely to be either greater or less if an EEA-member joins the EU. Immigration from 
outside the EU is also unlikely to be affected, since most West-European regimes are 
committed to a restrictive immigration policy towards people from outside the EEA. 
However, if the planned common border and immigration policy comes into place, then 
any member-state would have to abide by these. Hence, the effect on utility would 
depend on two factors. Firstly, whether a person desires more or less immigration. 
Secondly, whether a national or an EU immigration policy would be more in tune with
assumed that any use of such a veto will be limited and not significantly affect the 
argument made here. However, the higher risk of the EEA-treaty being cancelled does 
affect the argument, and this point will be incorporated below.
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this person’s own views on immigration. It would be very difficult to evaluate this 
situation. Hence, views on immigration are unlikely to have more than a marginal effect 
on people’s attitude to European integration. However, such views may have an effect 
on people’s position on EEA-membership, since this could increase immigration 
substantially compared to remaining completely outside the EU. It is contended here that 
people’s attitude towards EU-membership is partially also a reflection of their attitude to 
EEA-membership.
Feelings of Nordic solidarity may affect utility incomes in relation to EU-membership. 
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not Nordic co-operation in some form is 
seen as positive or negative for utility incomes. Moreover, the significance of this factor 
has changed. The failure of Nordic integration efforts, Denmark's EC-membership in 
1973, and Swedish and Finnish EU membership in 1994 (with Norway and Iceland still 
outside) have shown that Nordic solidarity has its limits.
For most people, peace is likely to have a positive effect on utility income. It is not 
possible to ascertain what - if any - effect European integration has had on peace in 
Europe. However, war has been absent in the area covered by the ECSC/EC/EU since 
these organisations came into being. In this respect EU membership is likely to increase 
utility income, albeit modestly. One can also argue that increased trade dependency 
promotes peace between nation-states^^. Similarly, the potential for a stronger Europe is 
likely to affect utility, but whether negatively or positively depends on the individual 
view of how (un)desirable such a development is.
In the last thirty years substantial numbers of immigrants from countries such as 
Pakistan, Vietnam, and Turkey have arrived in Scandinavia.
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Other factors that may affect attitudes to membership irrespective of social and 
ideological characteristics include environmental concerns, food quality, control over 
pharmaceuticals, consumer issues, and treatment of farm-animals. For these factors, 
however, it is very difficult to discern the effect of membership, if any, on utility 
income. Hence, they will not form part of the analysis in chapters four to eight^^.
3.3.3 Group differentiated economic factors.
Belonging to the internal market of the EU affects many people’s income prospects 
differently. The most important and obvious distinction is between people whose 
income is derived from industries that are able to compete in the internal market and 
those employed in less competitive industries. Since for all four countries the most 
likely alternative to EU membership {de facto in the case of Norway, and also for 
Sweden and Finland in the period 1993-4) is EEA-membership, EU membership would 
primarily affect sectors of the economy not included in the EEA Treaty.
The main areas excluded from the EEA Treaty but included in EU membership with 
respect to the internal market are agriculture and fisheries. Therefore, those whose 
income is dependent upon these industries can be expected to be among those who are 
most strongly affected by membership or non-membership in the EU. If agriculture or 
fisheries are less competitive than elsewhere in the EU, then many of those involved in 
these industries can be expected to be against membership based on this factor alone.
Paine, 1791-1985, especially chapter on ‘Ways and Means’.
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The size of national subsidies to these industries relative to those obtainable in the EU is 
also likely to affect attitudes towards EU membership among those dependent upon 
these industries. In the case of Denmark it is difficult to estimate what the national 
subsidies would be if Denmark was not a member of the EU. For the other three 
countries comparisons are easier. If agricultural subsidies are higher through the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) than the national ones are, then most farmers would 
be expected to be pro-EU. With regard to both competitiveness and subsidies, the more 
extreme the discrepancies with the EU are, the more pronounced the effect will be on 
attitudes towards EU membership.
Changes in agricultural subsidies are also likely to lead to changes in the employment 
level in areas where agriculture is important. In the internal market, employment will to 
a greater extent depend upon the ability of the agriculture industry to compete with 
foreign products. For those employed in farming-related industries (such as food- 
processing), similar effects on utility income to that of farmers as a consequence of 
membership can be expected. Because farming and farming-related industries are mainly 
located in rural areas, a relatively distinct position among the rural population can be 
expected. They are among those most directly and obviously affected by EU 
membership.
For data on some of these issues, see Ringdal (1994, pp. 45-64) and Oskarson (1996,
pp. 124-148).
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Similarly, it is also likely that cutting farm subsidies generally would “trigger a perverse 
multiplier effect”^^  and accelerate the exodus of rural merchants, therefore impairing the 
quality of life in the rural areas. Traders, storers and food processors also have a 
substantial stake in the fate of farmers^ \
Furthermore, social and group pressures^^ can have a counter-balancing effect on more 
narrow self-interest. This might lead to an inclination to agree with the predominant 
community view on an issue^^. Another variation of this is ‘sociotropic’ (as opposed to 
‘egocentric’) voting. This model is narrower: it is limited to concerns about regional 
economic prosperity^" .^ Of course, this can apply equally to urban areas (or other in­
group/out-group situations). However, such effects are likely to be stronger the more is 
at stake.
One effect of EU-membership likely to increase the utility of people in rural areas in 
Finland, Norway and Sweden was the introduction of an ‘Objective 6’ in EU regional 
policy. This covers regions with “extremely low population density”^^ , defined as 
regions with “a population density of 8 persons per [square kilometre] or less”^^ . There
The Economist, A survey of Agriculture, 12/12/1992, pp. 13-14.
Keeler, 1996, p. 130. See also Tarditi et al. (1989) for a comprehensive account of the 
effects of agricultural trade liberalisation.
Janis (1972) describes what he calls ‘group-think’ i.e. mutually reinforcing bias. For 
example, if in an area some people have a very strong preference for an option then 
others will be affected by that. This is particularly likely if the ‘others’ do not have a 
very strong preference either way. Such pressures can lead to people’s opinion on EU 
membership being based on pressures from people around them.
Chong, 1996, p. 51.
See, for example, Johnston and Pattie (1995).
Accession Treaty, Protocol No. 6, Article 1. (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C241, 1994, p. 354.)
Accession Treaty, Protocol No. 6, Article 2. (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C241, 1994, p. 354.)
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were also EU regional policy allocations to the new members under Objectives 2 
(industrial regions in decline) and 5b (low level of socio-economic development 
combined with high level of agricultural employment, low level of agricultural income 
and low population density). Some of these funds are already allocated to Denmark. The 
specific geographical areas affected and the effect on utility are covered in chapters four 
to seven. Objective 2 allocations are likely to increase the utility of people in some urban 
areas, Objective 5b allocations the utility of people in many rural areas. However, due to 
lack of very detailed data, it is only possible to evaluate the utility-effect of these EU- 
funds in terms of a general effect on the utility of people who live in urban and rural 
areas.
With regard to the effect of EU membership on the formal position for state subsidies 
for other areas than agriculture, there is considerable room for interpretation. Articles 92 
to 94 in the Treaty of Rome set out the EU position on public subsidies which threaten 
competition between the member-states. In practice, objections have tended not to be 
raised against the majority of state aid cases. Therefore, the effect on the legality of such 
subsidies is likely to have limited effect on individual utility.
EU membership may affect people’s utility income with regard to public sector 
expenditure and social transfers. These are often referred to as the ‘welfare state’^ .^ 
When an individual considers the merits of EU membership, a comparison of the size
“A system in which the government undertakes the main responsibility for providing 
for the social and economic security of the state’s population by means of pensions, 
social security benefits, free health care, and so forth.” (Oxford Concise dictionary of 
Politics, p. 526)
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and nature of the welfare state in various European countries is likely to be made, 
especially since this institution has become very important in the Nordic countries^^.
Public sector expenditure and social transfers vary across the EU and the Nordic 
countries. So does the nature of the welfare state. Generally, the Nordic countries 
provide similar and relatively high universal State funded benefits, regardless of 
contribution. To varying degrees the coverage in other European countries depends to a 
greater extent upon personal contributions or insurance arrangements. Alternatively, the 
benefits are more universal, but relatively low. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that EU membership would lead to changes in the Nordic welfare model. Unless EU 
membership, explicitly or implicitly, requires the Nordic countries to change their 
welfare models, then it would appear that such membership is unlikely to lead to 
changes in the welfare state and the level of social expenditure. And it is very difficult to 
argue that EU-membership explicitly requires such changes.
However, by simple comparison^^ the voter may well conclude that there is a possibility 
of such changes implicit in membership. For example, it might seem reasonable to 
compare social legislation and the extent and nature of the welfare state in other 
European countries with the Nordic equivalents. (See Table F for data on social
See Lawler (1997). Millner (1994, 1996) shows that preference for an extensive 
welfare state is compatible with rational behaviour. Similarly, an experiment by Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer (1992) across three countries showed that a vast majority of the 
subjects of the experiment preferred an income floor to the worst-off individuals rather 
than maximisation of average incomes.
Downs (1957, chapter 3) shows how the voter compares the past performance of the 
government with the potential past performance of the opposition, and then calculates 
expected future utilities if either party was elected based one this. Similarly, with respect 
to EU-membership and the welfare state it is rational for the voter to compare the 
development of the welfare state in his country with that of the (other) member-states.
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expenditure.) Furthermore, the logic of the Treaty of Rome and the TEU makes future 
convergence in social policy at least possible, and reasonably believable.
The Treaty of Rome aimed ultimately for a political union. The development of the EU 
is towards more uniform policies in more areas, especially in the co-ordination of 
monetary and economic policies (EMU). The TEU brought this goal substantially closer, 
and if EMU is successful it will come closer still.
Because the Nordic countries are small and the trend of the EU is towards more majority 
voting, the Nordic welfare-state model is unlikely to be adopted by the EU. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume the extent of the welfare state is considerably more likely to be 
reduced than increased as a result of EU membership"^®. The same applies to the position 
of women and other areas where differences between the Nordic countries and the rest 
of the EU are obvious and substantial.
Another argument is that the logic of the internal market dictates that high social costs 
means that, other things being equal, locating a business in another area of the internal 
market where such costs are lower would be beneficial for a company. Therefore, social 
costs must be kept low in order for the national economy to be able to compete. 
Consequently, if social costs are substantially higher than elsewhere, then the welfare 
state must be reduced. Non-membership is likely to allow for more national control over 
the development of the welfare state.
Although such reductions are unlikely to be very radical. Social expenditure is high in 
most EU countries.
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Although the Nordic welfare states make payments to most of their populations, it is 
those who benefit disproportionately from social expenditure who would see their utility 
level decline most distinctly in the case of membership with regard to this factor. 
Members of such groups can be expected to be disproportionately more likely to oppose 
EU membership. Conversely, those who contribute disproportionately to finance social 
expenditure compared to their benefits derived from this expenditure are likely to derive 
increased utility from EU membership. This factor is operationalised through 
public/private sector employment, income, and gender.
Public employees have an interest in maintaining an extensive welfare state. For many, 
their employment and career depend on it. The poorer sections of the population also 
have an interest in maintaining the welfare state. Without it, they would have to rely 
more on private provision of services like health-care and education. Without subsidies 
from the wealthier sections of the population in the form of transfers, they may not be 
able to afford such services, or see a deterioration in the quality of these services.
The welfare state benefits women disproportionally, both as recipients and employees'^\ 
Hence the utility of women is more likely to decline as a consequence of EU 
membership than that of men. Relative to men, women’s income, subsidies, 
employment and career prospects are likely to be adversely affected by a reduction of the 
welfare state.
For data, see country chapters.
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The Nordic countries are highly dependent upon trade"^ .^ Traditionally, much of this 
trade has been with other Nordic countries, the UK, and some other European countries. 
Thus, it is crucial to secure access to the market represented by the EU and to avoid 
restrictions such as duties and other trade barriers.
Because EEA membership secures access to the EU market for most goods and services, 
one might conclude that for those not employed in the primary industries EU 
membership will make little difference to their income and employment arising from 
patterns of trade. However, if people are generally risk-averse, then this might not be the 
case. EEA membership is less secure than EU membership for market access"^ .^ This is 
because the arrangement can be cancelled by giving a year’s written notice by any of the 
parties'^. In contrast, there is no facility for expelling a member from the EU, and no 
country has been forced out of this organisation or its predecessors. Hence, EU 
membership can be expected to increase the utility of those whose income and welfare is 
particularly dependent upon international trade.
3.3.4 Group differentiated non-economic factors.
People may derive utility from an extensive welfare state for other reasons than 
economic benefit. In general terms, support for the welfare state can be viewed as 
ideological, and more specifically as support for a large sector of the economy being 
controlled by the state. Such policies are more likely to be supported by those on the left 
of the political spectrum than those on the right. This argument is reinforced by the
For data, see country chapters. 
See, for example, Kekko (1994).
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possibility of many votes against the EU also being votes against the internal market, 
including an arrangement such as the EEA.
Opposition to EU-membership based on concerns for detrimental effects on the welfare 
state is likely to be based on three elements: comparisons, a vote against the internal 
market/EEA, and fears about future developments. In addition, the EU can also be seen 
as symbolising developments that are difficult to change through changing party 
preferences in a small country, such as the rule of market forces, globalisation, and trade 
liberalisation. The EU is a potent symbol for these more subtle forces that limit a small 
country’s freedom of action in fiscal and monetary policy. Based on this factor, it is 
likely that opposition to EU membership will be higher on the political left than on the 
right.
In addition to the economic factors mentioned above, it is possible that women’s 
position in society could be altered through EU membership. Women may view the EU 
more negatively than men partly because EU membership is seen as a threat to the status 
women have achieved in the Nordic countries over the last few decades. In most of the 
member-states of the EU, women have less representation in political institutions and 
organisations than has been achieved in the Nordic countries"^ .^
Another factor is the Catholic influence in the EU, which may affect liberal legislation 
in areas such as abortion and divorce, if these become EU-level issues in the future. 
Together with the economic factors mentioned above, these factors are likely to make
Article 127, EEA Treaty.
For evidence and examples of this, see the relevant sections in chapters four to seven.
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women more negative to EU membership than men. This argument only holds, however, 
for women who actually want such rights and a high level of equality. It is assumed that 
this is the case for a high number of Nordic women.
Some other factors will also be taken into consideration. However, since these are more 
country specific, they will be covered in chapters four to seven.
3.4 The effect of the conflict over European integration on the party system.
In this section the effects of the conflict over European integration on the party system is 
analysed. The starting point for this analysis is that this conflict has become more salient 
in the Nordic countries since the SEA in 1986"^ .^ However, the importance of this 
conflict is reflected differently in the various countries. This section provides a model 
aimed at improving our understanding for why this is, to be employed in the country- 
specific analysis that follows in the next four chapters.
A core concern is why so few relevant political parties in the Nordic countries oppose 
EU membership. The SEA and the TEU led to a revival of European integration. With 
this revival, political conflict over this development has also intensified, and the conflict 
over EC/EU-membership has become increasingly salient. In Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, 40 percent or more of the population has for most of the time since
This conflict is very similar to what Laver and Shepsle term a ‘shock’ to the party 
system. (However, it cannot be described as an ‘unanticipated event’.) (Laver and 
Shepsle, 1996, pp. 196-97) “[One] type of shock that might destabilise an equilibrium 
government is the emergence of a new issue. In its most dramatic form, this may result 
in the creation of a completely new policy dimension [...]. In a less dramatic form, it
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the late 1980’s been opposed to EC/EC membership. At times, opposition has been 
twice as high as the support for EU membership in Norway and Sweden. (For data, see 
tables 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2).
As observed in Chapter 1, European integration is affecting large areas of what used to 
be national policies, as well as changing the status of the nation-state itself. If large 
segments of the population oppose this development, then it would appear rational for at 
least some parties to oppose participation in this integration project. Nevertheless, as 
tables 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3 show, with the exception of the situation in Norway, most of 
the relevant"^  ^political parties have remained (officially) supportive of EU membership.
Both parties and voters are faced with a difficult situation because of the salience of the 
EU-conflict. For the parties, there appears to be votes to be gained by establishing a 
strong position on this issue - especially by opposing EU-membership. But the parties 
are tom between various aims -  in particular between maximising votes, keeping the 
party together, and retaining coalition potential. For the voters the EU-conflict 
complicates their voting decisions and increases the cost of information needed to make 
these decisions.
may result in the perturbation of party positions on existing policy dimensions, changing 
interparty distances. [...]” (Laver and Shepsle, 1996, p. 197).
Sartori’s ‘criterion of irrelevance’ is employed to determine which parties to consider 
as relevant. Inclusion is based on two conditions. Firstly, coalition potential. A relevant 
party must be needed, on at least some occasions, for a feasible coalition that can control 
government. Secondly, (and this criterion is secondary to coalition potential), blackmail 
potential. For this term to apply, a party’s existence must affect the tactics of party 
competition of those parties that do have ‘coalition potential’. The second category 
refers to large parties that no other parties would consider as coalition partners. This
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3.4.1 The problems faced by the parties.
When considering the motivations of politicians, one of two aims tend to be assumed: 
office maximisation or policy maximisation"^^. Office maximisation implies that the 
general aim for any political party is to get elected so that it can partake in government. 
Unless there are complicating factors, this aim implies vote-maximisation"^^. Therefore, 
rational action for a political party is to pursue a strategy that will maximise its number 
of votes^^. In the extreme version, office-maximisation assumes that parties will do 
anything to get into office. Hence, it must appeal to as many voters as possible. This 
includes changing policies purely for instrumental reasons.
Office-maximisation is famously argued by Downs. His model assumes that every 
government seeks to maximise political support, that the governments' prime goal is re- 
election, and that election is the prime goal of the parties not in government^\ Downs 
takes this assumption to the extreme, assuming that party members act “solely in order 
to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office. Thus 
politicians in our model never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; 
their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office per se. [...] [Hence,] parties
could be either because of their extreme views on policy, or because they are opposed to 
the regime itself (Sartori, 1976, pp. 121-123).
See Laver and Schofield (1990, chapter 3) for a more detailed elaboration of these two 
aims and the interaction between them.
Some authors also distinguish between vote- and office-maximisation, where the 
former is concerned with maximising the number of votes so as to control government, 
while the latter aims solely to maximise the spoils of office (Strom, 1990).
Laver and Schofield, 1990, p. 36.
Downs, 1957, p. 11.
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formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to 
formulate policies.”^^
The other main motivation attributed to parties and politicians is policy maximisation. 
Laver and Schofield^^ argue that proponents of this view tend to regard membership of a 
coalition cabinet as a purely instrumental means to affect policy, rather akin to the way 
Downs viewed office maximisation. However, policy maximisation requires the power 
to affect government policy-making. The best way to achieve this is government 
participation. This allows more control over policy formation and legislation not subject 
to direct legislative review compared to a powerful parliamentary position. The second 
best way to achieve influence is to maximise votes so as to have parliamentary power to 
influence policy "^ .^ It will be noted in this connection, however, that unless a party 
controls a majority of seats in parliament, then the party risks getting none of its policies 
through.
Similarly, Lewin^^ argues that strategic assessment is always present in politics. An 
ideological programme, no matter how carefully thought out, will be of little use in a 
democracy if it is not supported by a large number of people. To become and remain 
important, a politician must achieve a position of influence.
Downs, 1957, p. 28.
1990, p. 38.
See, for example, Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 53-57). 
1988, p. 10.
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Or, as Isaksson^^ argues, “ in the long run, a typically policy-seeking party must be a 
vote-seeker as well.” Hence, the argument that parties seek to get elected in order to 
carry out particular policies is compatible with the argument that the primary aim of 
parties is to get elected to govemment^^. The pursuit of particular cabinet posts is not 
considered here^^.
It should be noted that even instrumental office-maximisation does not necessarily imply 
that politicians pursuing such a strategy will necessarily change their policies to suit the 
perceived current mood of the population (or the specific population it seeks to appeal 
to). “The need to maintain long-term credibility, both with fellow politicians and with 
voters, may well provide politicians with incentives to stick with a policy that in the 
short term has come to look like a liability.”^^
Even if parties pursue office-maximisation strategies it is not implied this will 
necessarily result in ‘minimal winning coalitions’^ .^ Parties are not considered to be 
solely interested in the spoils of office, but as also interested in the implementation of 
their policies. Hence, they tend to aim for government with compatible parties^\ both 
for the purposes of remaining in office and in order to be able to pursue their policies.
“  1994, p. 105.
Laver and Schepsle (1996, especially pp. 8-9) make the assumption that politicians are 
policy-seeking, but they show that this does not contradict the assumption that they are 
office-seeking.
See, for example, Laver and Schofield (1990, chapter 7) for such a consideration.
Laver and Shepsle, 1996, p. 19.
Riker, 1962. A minimal winning coalition contains only as many members as are 
necessary to win, usually in terms of a majority of seats in parliament. Gallagher, Laver 
and Mair (1995, p. 319) found that only 27 percent of cabinets formed in fifteen Western 
European parliamentary democracies in the period from the end of World War II to 1993 
were minimal winning. For a detailed further discussion of circumstances favouring 
minority and surplus majority governments, see Laver and Shepsle (1996, chapter 12).
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This can lead to both minority and surplus majority coalitions being more viable than 
minimal winning coalitions.
Ultimately, it appears that the pursuit of office or the pursuit of policies - be it in 
parliament or in the cabinet - requires the party to aim for vote-maximisation. The more 
seats the party has in parliament, the more influence it is likely to have on policy, and 
the more likely it is to form (part of) the government. Unfortunately for the parties, vote- 
maximisation is often incompatible with either, or both, of the ultimate aims of policy- 
and/or office-maximisation. And the emergence of a conflict such as that over European 
integration in a party system derived from cleavages related to other dimensions makes 
such compatibility considerably more difficult to achieve. This is the core of the 
problem for the parties when the EU-conflict is salient.
When faced with a newly salient or resurgent political conflict, many political parties are 
faced with cross-pressures from various different ‘actors’, who may differ on which 
position to take on the issue(s) at hand. This affects the degree of synergy between the 
aims of party-, policy-, and office-maximisation, and party unity. Some of these actors 
are internal; party history, the party elite, and party members. Others are external; 
current voters, potential voters, coalition partners, as well as parties and actors outside 
the national arena. These are discussed in general terms below, and in country-specific 
terms in chapters four to seven. Figure 3.2 below illustrates the different environments 
and actors that a party may have to consider^^.
See, for example, Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 80-81).
See Tsebelis (1990) for an in-depth discussion of games in different arenas.
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Figure 3.2. Party Environments and Relevant Actors
Arena
No.
Environment Actors Concerns
1 Intra-party Party-elite, party members Cohesion, compatibility with vote- 
maximisation and coalition- 
potential, jobs for party elites
2 Electoral Voters Vote-maximisation
3 Inter-party (Potential) coalition 
partners
Compatibility with other parties
4 European Foreign and pan-European 
parties and governments, 
EU institutions
Co-operation, recognition, power, 
influence
Another consideration is the information a party has from previous elections and the 
behaviour of party-members and -leaders on the dividing potential of the EU-conflict 
and on the willingness of pro/anti-EU voters to keep supporting the party. If it changes 
position, then it knows neither the extent to which this change would divide the party, 
nor how many of the party’s voters would be willing to keep voting for it.
3.4.2 Intra-partv conflicts.
Intra-party conflicts can lead to constraints on party policies. For example, rank-and-file 
party members may disagree with the party leadership and thus prevent certain policies 
from being pursued, even if they seem likely to win votes^^. From what was argued 
above, this would appear to be irrational. However, this depends on the aim of the 
persons involved. For the political leadership, members of parliament and potential 
members of parliament, election and government power are likely to be the rational 
aims. But for the rank-and-file members other aims - identity, comradeship, common 
purpose, ideology per se - may be more important than election^. Also, some party
Tsebelis (1990, chapter 5) illustrates this with the British Labour Party. 
^  See also Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 23-24, 57).
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members may argue that although certain policies may appear popular and advantageous 
in the short term, other policies will give the party the advantage in the long term.
It should be stressed that it is not attempted here to explain how politicians initially 
formed their positions on EU-membership. This would involve a different research 
strategy from that employed here, focusing on the opinion formation of elites. Some 
politicians might have considered the position of their voters and party-members before 
making up their mind, others may not have. Some might listen to their spouses, their 
children, or their parents. It would appear, as outlined in the first section of chapters four 
to seven, that the majority of political leaders in these countries view EU-membership as 
a necessity for reasons of trade dependency and market access. Furthermore, it should 
not be discounted that political leaders consider the effect of EU-membership on their 
career prospects. It should also be noted that most party leaders decided on their initial 
attitude towards EU-membership before the EU-conflict reached a high level of salience. 
But once the party has established a policy, then the puzzle becomes why not more 
parties, upon realising the under-representation of the anti-EU view, pursue the anti-EU 
voters.
3.4.3 Vote-maximisation concerns.
Following Arrow^^, parties can essentially adopt three positions on EU membership. 
They prefer membership in the EU (M) to non-membership (NM), they prefer NM to M,
Arrow (1963) states that, given the choice between two alternatives (e.g. X and Y), an 
individual has three options: to prefer X, to prefer Y, or to be indifferent. He then goes 
on to state that if an individual prefers X to Y and Y to Z, then he also prefers X to Z. 
This is the essence of what is termed transitivity of choices.
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or they take an indifferent position. At time X (here the focus is on the last election 
before a EU-referendum) each party takes position M, NM, or indifferent with regard to 
EU-membership. Although there appears to be votes to be gained by assuming an anti- 
EU position, several factors complicate vote-maximisation based on the EU-conflict, 
even before the potential for intra-party conflicts and coalition problems are taken into 
account.
In order to account for the situation in the Nordic countries, the cleavage system must be 
taken into account. All four countries have multi-party systems. Many of the parties are 
supported by very distinct sections of the population. None of the parties are true 'catch- 
air^^ parties. Nor are any of the party systems truly or completely uni-dimensional. 
Therefore, party competition does not conform to the central or median voter theorem^^. 
This limits the effect of any newly salient^® issue such as European integration, since 
none of the parties are likely to be able to appeal to all voters who agree with them on 
the EU-conflict. Parties have other policies and they also have identities, both of which 
limit their appeal to certain voters. History and tradition are also important in this 
respect. An ex-communist (or other far-left) party may find it difficult to appeal to more 
centrist, and especially right-leaning, voters even after it has shed its ideological 
baggage. And an ex-farmers party re-labelling and re-positioning itself as a Centre Party 
may still find it difficult to appeal to urban voters.
Kirchheimer, 1966.
Black, 1958. This theorem makes the assumption that voters can be modelled based 
on a ideal point on a single policy dimension. Black then showed that this point is the 
only one that is preferred by some majority of voters to any other point on the policy 
dimension. Also see Downs (1957, chapter 8).
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Thus, even with the conflict over European integration salient, voters are unlikely to cast 
their vote solely based on their position on European integration. And, if they do change 
their vote, then they are more likely to vote for a party close to their previous party on 
other dimensions, not one that is completely different^^.
Furthermore, it may be in the interest of certain parties to attempt to limit the influence 
of a new conflict on voting behaviour purely for vote-maximisation purposes. Given the 
socialisation and institutionalisation of conflicts, it is of utmost importance to political 
actors that it is ‘their’ conflict(s) which become(s) salient. Hence, if a conflict involves 
parties A and B, it is in their mutual interest, despite their disagreements, that this 
conflict remains to the fore^°. Conversely, “the substitution of conflicts is the most 
devastating kind of political strategy”  ^\  In this case, the parties that are mainly 
differentiated along the left-right axis and have succeeded electorally based largely on 
this division have a considerable interest in trying to limit the effect of the EU-conflict 
on voting behaviour.
As argued above, it is the voters who oppose EU membership who lack representation in 
their respective parliaments. There may of course be some votes to be gained by a party 
stressing its pro-EU stance, but there appears to be more scope for increasing the party’s 
number of votes by stressing an anti-EU stance. Thus, the main puzzle is why more 
parties do not oppose European integration.
One might argue that this conflict re-emerged in the late 1980’s, rather than being 
new.
This thesis will not develop a elaborate model for examining multidimensional 
equilibria. For investigations into this, see for example Kadane (1972) and Laver and 
Schepsle (1996).
™Mair, 1997, p. 951.
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One explanation may be that the net effect of taking a strong position on EU- 
membership could alienate more voters than it will attract. This is of course a difficult 
assessment to make for the parties. However, from information sources such as opinion 
polls, local party branches, the media and public debate it will be possible for the parties 
to form a reasonable opinion of whether focusing on opposition to or support for EU 
membership is likely to be a vote winner.
The temptation to stress opposition to or support for EU membership will vary between 
the parties. If it appears that a clear majority of the party’s voters are for EU 
membership, then it would appear that opposition to such membership risks alienating 
more voters than it will attract, and vice versa for a party whose opposition to EU 
membership is supported by a clear majority of its voters^^. The closer a party’s voters 
appear to being evenly (50/50) divided on this issue, the more difficult it will be for that 
party to position itself on EU-membership. Crucially, however, the potential for gaining 
new voters based on positioning on the EU-issue also depends upon how the other 
parties position themselves.
The next section will illustrate how a party might decide to position itself on this issue. 
For the purpose of this theoretical discussion, only three of the parties in the party 
system are considered for now. The three parties. A, B and C, are normally (without the 
EU-conflict being salient) potential coalition partners. Also, for now, it is assumed that 
voters will switch only between these parties based on position on the EU-conflict, and
Schattschneider, 1960, p. 91.
Unless the electorate is extremely volatile.
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not to any other parties. The parties’ share of the vote is not material to this part of the 
discussion, so let it add up to 100 percent. It is also assumed that the EU-conflict is 
salient, and that the voters take it into consideration when they decide how to vote.
For illustration, it is assumed that a majority of the population in a certain country 
support EU-membership. Assuming all three parties remain in support of EU- 
membership, suppose the following distribution of opinion and share of the vote 
between three parties:
Table 3.1. Theoretical Distribution of Position on EU Membership and Share of Vote.■
Party Support Oppose Support Oppose
A 90 10 60 54 6
B 10 90 20 2 18
C 40 60 20 8 12
Total 100 64 36
This situation gives parties B and C an incentive to change their stance and oppose EU- 
membership. Assuming that the voters would all change their preference based on their 
position on the EU-issue, then if either B or C change to opposition, the distribution of 
votes would change in accordance with the table below.
Table 3.2. Potential vote for parties if voters change party based on position on EU 
issue.
Party Party Share of Party Share of Party Share of
position vote position vote Position vote
A 0 36 s 55 s 58
B s 29 0 36 s 6
C s 35 s 9 0 36
Key: o = oppose, s = support EU membership. It is assumed that each party keeps the 
voters who agree with the party’s position, and that the distribution of changing votes is 
equal for each party.
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As can be observed, party A is better off remaining in support of EU-membership. But 
each of B and C are worse off than before if the other changes position to opposing such 
membership. The rational action if one party defects from the common position appears 
to be for the other to also defect. Now the situation changes to that illustrated in table 
below. Note that with an unequal distribution among B and C of supporters and 
opponents of European integration one will be better rewarded for its opposition than 
the other.
Table 3.3. Potential vote for parties if voters change based on position on EU issue.
Party Party Share of Party Share of Party Share of
position vote position vote position vote
A o 12 o 15 s 64
B 0 24 s 64 o 21
C s 64 o 21 o 15
Key and assumptions as in the previous table.
For party A, opposing European integration will invariably lead to an outcome worse 
than if it remains supportive of such integration. For B and C opposition is a tempting 
option. However, if B decides to oppose European integration this would then force C to 
do the same, and vice versa. Otherwise it would come out as the overall loser^^.
It is unlikely that all voters will change their vote based solely on the EU-issue 
becoming salient. Although in reality the effect will be less dramatic than that in this 
illustration, the direction of the effects is likely to be similar.
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3.4.4 Coalition considerations.
In the Nordic multi-party systems, it is rare for one party to have a majority of seats in 
parliament^" .^ Therefore, coalition or some form of minority government is the norm. 
Even if a party can keep or increase its share of votes by opposing EU-membership, it 
still has to consider how this affects its potential as a coalition partner.
“Parties seek spatially closer coalition partners because they forecast 
eventual government policy to be closer to their own preferred policy as a 
result. It is also easier to arrive at a joint policy position with those whose 
preferences are substantively similar than with those whose preferences are 
different - each side needs to concede less to reach an agreement.
The left-right cleavage is normally dominant in the Nordic countries. Government 
alternatives are normally minority Social Democrat governments with support either 
from the far-left, centrist parties or ad-hoc support; or a coalition centred on the centre- 
right, excluding the far right^^. This could limit a party’s opportunities to exploit the EU- 
issue to increase its share of the vote. It is unlikely that a party will be able to co-operate 
with another party based only on their policies towards EU-membership coinciding.
Sartori^^ used the term ‘coalition potential’ as a post-dictive rather than as a predictive 
term. Following this, a party’s coalition potential is determined by observing past
No party has achieved a majority on its own since 1970.
Laver and Shepsle, 1996, pp. 186-187.
The coalition alternatives are somewhat different in Finland. Traditionally they have 
been based mainly on the left-right axis, but after the last couple of elections the left- 
right dimension appears to have become less important for coalition formation.
1976, p. 123.
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participation. Parties of the far-left and the far-right^^ are considered unlikely, but not 
impossible, coalition partners^^. They have never formed part of a formal coalition 
agreement in three of the countries. In Finland, however, this exclusion has not applied.
The debate over, as well as the fact of, EU-membership entails numerous practical 
policy decisions that must be taken by the government. Hence, any government must be 
able to reach agreement on a whole host of policies related to European integration, both 
with regard to integration as such, and with regard to specific policies.
Again considering the relationship between parties A, B and C, let us now evaluate how 
the EU-conflict might affect coalition formation. It is again assumed that the parties 
support EU membership, and also that they are able to form a coalition. In coalition they 
are likely to be able to form a government. It is also assumed that co-operation between 
all three parties is needed to form a viable coalition, two is not sufficient. Disagreement 
on European integration among the coalition partners would be detrimental for the 
overall coalition. For this reason, the parties have an incentive not to defect from a 
common position as long as the others do not defect either.
However, as demonstrated above, because of lack of representation for opponents of 
EU-membership, there appears to be votes to be gained by changing position on this 
dimension. Unless all three parties change position, however, the coalition will be 
jeopardised and none of the parties will be able to participate in government.
Laver and Schofield (1990, p. 200) classify the DFRP and the NFRP among, at one 
stage or another, ‘pariah parties’.
Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 200-201) outline the dangers of assuming any party is 
actually ‘uncoalitionable’.
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An additional incentive to co-operate is present if a majority of the leaders of the 
coalition-partners (assuming they can get agreement from the rest of their respective 
parties) have strong and similar beliefs about European integration. In the cases 
considered here that position would seem to be support for such integration, given the 
party positions. This will then reinforce the incentive to co-operate and not defect.
Yet another incentive for a pro-EU position is that EU-membership increases the 
numbers of high-powered, highly paid jobs available to politicians. This is especially the 
case for politicians in a small country. There is the highly coveted job as member of the 
EU Commission, and various jobs in the Commission bureaucracy. There are also 
positions in the EP. This also gives an extra element of motivation to aim for 
government, since members of government parties are more likely to receive many of 
these positions.
A related concern is the need to consider the interests and views of other European 
politicians and of the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU. Even as a member of a 
coalition government containing pro-EU parties, anti-EU politicians would be unlikely 
to be met with a positive attitude from pro-EU politicians from other countries and from 
representatives and employees of the EU. (A wholly anti-EU government would 
presumably aim to leave the EU.)
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Now let it be assumed that one of the parties, A, has pre-committed itself to supporting 
membership no matter what B and C do^°. This makes sense considering the great 
majority of A’s supporters who support such a policy. Now B and C are involved in a 
non-zero-sum^^ game^^. If one of them defects it has great potential to increase its vote, 
mainly at the expense of the other. However, at the same time the coalition is 
jeopardised. This is illustrated in the model below, where D = defect, and C = co­
operate.
Figure 3.3. Co-operation Game.
Party B
C D
Partv C C 4,4 1,3
D 3,1 2,2
The model has two equilibria, D,D and C,C. However, only C,C is pareto-optimal. That 
is, no other outcome is preferred unanimously^^. If one of B or C defects, then it is 
rational for the other to also defect. However, by doing so, they jeopardise the coalition. 
Thus, it would be better to remain in support of European integration and retain the 
coalition arrangement. This is the only pareto-optimal outcome. The likely outcome of 
A’s action is therefore to force B and C to co-operate, and the game becomes a co­
operative game.
For the effects of pre-commitment in n-person games, see Taylor and Ward (1982, 
especially pp. 365-370).
That is, a game in which some outcomes yield a greater aggregate outcome than 
others, hence the parties have a common interest in achieving a higher-payoff outcome. 
See, for example, McLean (1991, p. 498).
The theory of games was invented by John von Neumann in the 1920s. It was first 
applied to social science in the ‘The Theories of Games and Economic Behaviour” by 
von Neumann and Morgenstem (McLean, 1991, p. 498).
See, for example, Schofield (1996, p. 197).
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As long as party B supports membership in the EU, then party C is likely to do the same 
(and vice versa), because to do otherwise would jeopardise the coalition. But if either 
one defects, then the other is likely to do the same, as the coalition is already ruined and 
non-defection could lead to massive loss of votes.
But if priority is given to vote-maximisation over coalition considerations, then the 
parties are faced with a collective action problem. “A collective action problem is any 
situation in which players’ individually rational actions lead to an outcome which could 
have been bettered if players had chosen differently.”*"^ The potential outcomes would 
change to those in the illustration below.
Figure 3.4. Prisoners Dilemma.______________
Partv B
C D
Partv C C 
D
3,3 1,4
4,1 2,2
Now the parties face a classic prisoner’s dilemma*^. There is no longer a pareto-optimal 
outcome, both parties prefer defection to co-operation. If the other player does not co­
operate, then each player prefers D. But if the other player does co-operate, then each 
player also prefers D. Therefore, D,D is the only equilibrium. But D,D is pareto-inferior, 
since it destroys the coalition. However, this may not be the case if B or C can form an 
alternative coalition, and/or increase its share of the vote sufficiently. This is considered 
below.
McLean, 1991, p. 500.
See, for example, Taylor and Ward (1982, pp 351-352)
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Let us now remove the assumption of voters only moving between the coalition partners, 
A, B and C, and consider the effect of, and positions taken by, X other parties in the 
party system. With the EU issue salient, and potential for loss of voters to parties outside 
the coalition, the situation becomes quite different.
If a large number of their voters consider EU-membership to be important, then parties 
B and C may not be able to maintain their position. A new party may form and drain 
their support from opponents of EU-membership, or other parties in the party system 
may hold or take up an anti-EU position, with similar results. This increases the pressure 
on B and C to defect. If their share of the vote declines sufficiently, then they may not be 
able to form part of a coalition anyway. At some point it becomes rational to pursue pure 
vote maximisation, even if this is detrimental to coalition potential. It would seem that 
these parties face a choice between keeping the coalition intact and losing, or forfeiting a 
chance to increase their share of, votes, or destroying the coalition but retaining or 
increasing their share of the vote.
However, there are other options. If the coalition is to be kept, then these are basically 
two. One is to persuade a large enough majority of voters to support a pro-EU position, 
so that the temptation for vote-maximisation based on an anti-EU position is reduced. 
So far, this strategy has not been successful in any of the Nordic countries. A second, 
and as will be shown in this thesis, more common strategy, is to remove the issue from 
the political agenda related to national elections, or at the very least relegate it to where 
its impact is reduced as much as possible. For this purpose, the referendum is a very 
useful device. In addition, the direct elections to the EP are also helpful.
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It might still be tempting for a political party to focus on the EU conflict simply to 
increase its share of votes. However, if the party in doing so makes coalition with (a) 
previous coalition partner(s) impossible, then in order to retain or improve its chances of 
governing the party must achieve one out of two feats, or a combination of the two. The 
first is to increase its share of the vote to a level where it compensates for the loss of 
coalition partner(s). The second is to find new coalition-partners. However, this option 
is complicated by at least two difficulties. Firstly, the new partners must be in close 
agreement on this dimension. Secondly, this option requires that votes gained must not 
be excessively at the cost of the votes of potential new partners. If they are, then the net 
gain for the new coalition may not be sufficient. Furthermore, it may lead the potential 
new coalition partners to reject such an arrangement. Figure 3.5 below illustrates these 
options.
Figure 3.5. Party options.
Party
V
enough votes 
to rule alone
V
focus on EU 
conflict
V
need alliance 
to rule
coalition 
parties 
agree on
coalition 
parties 
do not
EU conflict agree on
EU conflict
focus on EU do not focus
conflict on EU conflict
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These considerations are less likely to apply to the parties on the extreme left and the 
extreme right. These parties are not likely to form part of a government coalition. 
Therefore, the incentive to stick to the dominant position is much smaller or even non­
existent^^. Their main concern on this dimension is more likely, compared to the more 
‘mainstream’ parties, to be geared towards vote-maximisation. However, even such 
parties need to balance their efforts somewhat:
“The outsiders, parties which are never or seldom in office, have the best 
opportunities of being effective vote seekers. However, if such a party wants 
to be an office-seeking party as well, the forms of vote seeking must be 
moderate. If the major cabinet parties are attacked too aggressively, the party 
remains an outsider. On the other hand, the greater the legislative weight of 
the party, the greater value the party will receive as a potential partner in 
future governing coalitions.”^^
Thus, for these parties the decision of whether to support or oppose EU membership will 
mainly depend upon two factors. Firstly, the attitude of the parties’ supporters to this 
question. This is important for the judgement of which position would alienate more old 
supporters and members than it would attract new ones, and also which position is more 
likely to lead to internal party conflicts. Secondly, how the other parties behave. If they 
are all supporting EU membership, then there is greater potential for gaining votes than 
if some other parties are, or if one other party is, also opposing EU membership.
At this point two further elements need to be considered. One is ‘rational extremism’. 
This involves trying to conunit your party to a position which is a vote-loser. If
Although the size of this incentive does vary. As shall be demonstrated in chapters 
four to seven, some of the extreme parties do co-operate with other parties, even if they 
are not in a formal coalition arrangement with them. Hence, these parties have some 
incentive to stick to the dominant position.
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members, activists and leaders of party B see little difference between the policies of the 
coalition it can participate in and those of other government alternatives, and believe 
opposition to EU-membership is important over all other issues, then there is little 
reason for not focusing strongly on this opposition. With this scenario, you are no worse 
off if your party loses than if your party wins. In this situation, ‘policy sincerity’ could 
override coalition concerns.
For some parties there might be alternatives to coalition that can also give considerable 
influence. If, for example, party C can reasonably expect to be able to influence 
government policy through more informal influence over government policy-making, 
then defection becomes a more attractive option - even more so if combined with policy 
sincerity. However, this is only an option if it is not possible to form a majority 
government without C’s participation. Furthermore, without ministries and access to 
government meetings C’s influence would be much reduced compared to coalition 
participation^^. Hence, on its own this may not be enough to persuade C to defect. 
However, if combined with potential loss of voters, policy sincerity, other potential 
coalition partners and rational extremism, then it might be. And, of course, the more of 
these factors that combine in favour of defection, the more attractive this option 
becomes.
However, the main problem for the parties when deciding how to deal with the EU- 
conflict is to find a balance between maximising votes and retaining both party cohesion 
and its coalition potential. For many parties maximising votes on the basis of the EU-
Isaksson, 1994, p. 106.
Laver and Schofield, 1990, chapter 3, especially pp. 53-57.
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conflict is such an uncertain proposition that it is not worth the concurrent risk of 
jeopardising party cohesion and coalition potential. That is, a vote maximisation strategy 
would be in conflict with other aims. In this situation, the latter considerations get 
priority, but only as long as a substantial vote loss can be prevented.
3.4.5 The voter and the EU-conflict. The problem of cross-pressures and objectionable 
parties.
As the data on the voting in EU-referendums by party in Appendices 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and
7.3 and Tables 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3 on party position show, many voters face cross­
pressures when the EU-conflict is salient. If this dimension is important enough for the 
voter, then he may vote for a party different from the one he would otherwise (this 
conflict not being salient) vote for. But the salience of the EU-conflict may also lead him 
to abstain, so that he will neither vote against his otherwise favoured party, but nor will 
he support a position on European integration that he disagrees with. Of course, the 
difficulty faced depends very much on how strongly the voter supports any one party, 
and how strongly he feels about European integration. This is illustrated by Figure 3.6:
Figure 3.6.
Voter disagrees with his party’s position on European integration
Partv support
Strong Weak
Degree of disagreement
Strong Abstain Vote against party
Weak Vote for party ?
Take the case of a voter who would, without the EU-conflict being salient, have a clear 
preference for a certain party. If he disagrees with that party’s position on EU-
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membership, then his decision is now more complicated. The salience of the EU-conflict 
may move him from strong support for a certain party to weak support, or even to 
support another party. By moving away from one party he has to consider the merit(s) of 
supporting other parties. These parties may be parties he has previously been able to 
dismiss with ease, because they were clearly objectionable in some important respect. 
But now his previously favoured party is also objectionable in an important respect. 
Therefore, he must seek more information about other parties than was previously 
necessary. This increases the cost of voting, and therefore the chance of the abstention^^.
But even abstention, if that is an option the potential voter is comfortable with, is likely 
to be costlier than being able to vote for an established favoured party. In order to reach 
the abstention decision, he would have to evaluate the importance of disagreeing with 
his (previously) favoured party’s position on European integration, and probably do 
some research on other parties to establish whether he can vote for them. It would 
therefore be preferable to such a voter not to have to deal with the EU-conflict in 
national elections. Removing the conflict from this arena would reduce his information 
costs, and also reduce the chance of abstention, which may be an undesirable option.
However, many voters will also want a say in their country’s policies with regard to 
European integration. Establishing a preference over whether your country should be a 
member of the EU and which level of integration is the most desirable requires 
information. But if this decision can be removed from the normal national election 
agenda, then the decision becomes simpler. The voters’ concern for the position of his
89 See, for example. Downs (1957, chapters 12-14) for the cost of information and the 
likelihood of abstention.
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otherwise favoured party would be greatly reduced if the EU-conflict does not affect, or 
has a very limited effect on, the domestic political system. Hence, his information costs 
would be reduced. Therefore, the holding of référendums over European integration is 
likely to be in the interest of the voter who finds himself in a cross-pressure situation on 
this dimension.
EU-référendums also provide a good opportunity for a protest-vote, in the cases 
considered here in the form of a vote against the predominantly pro-EU ruling elite. This 
can be done in the knowledge that the government will keep the country close to the EU 
anyway, through arrangements such as the EEA, economic policy adjustments, free- 
trade agreements, etc. This also goes some way to explain the very different voting 
patterns in elections to the EP. These elections provide an opportunity to voice an 
opinion on the process of European integration without considering how your vote 
affects the domestic party system.
The difficulty faced by voters in a cross-pressure situation is often exacerbated by the 
‘objectionable factor’. In particular, this is a problem for anti-EU voters. With the 
exception of Norway, nearly all relevant parties opposing membership are to be found 
on the far left or the far right, or among protest and anti-establishment parties. This 
makes it less likely that the voter will cast his vote on the basis of his position on 
European integration. Although he can find parties that agree with his position on this 
issue, the likelihood is also that he so strongly disagrees with many other policies of 
these parties that he either remains loyal to his old party or abstains.
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However, if many voters disagree with their party’s position on EU-membership, then it 
is likely average party loyalty will decline as a result of the EU-conflict being salient. If 
this happens, then the number of ‘floating voters’ will increase. This is likely to lead to 
changes in voting patterns, although these may not be directly related to the fit of a 
voters’ EU-position with that of a party. Disagreement with the position of a previously 
favoured party may simply lead the voter to consider other parties, and hence to greater 
volatility.
3.4.6 The solution for both parties and voters: Remove the conflict from the national 
election agenda as much as possible.
Référendums on European integration.
Lewin proposes ‘8 strategies if you are losing’ at a meeting of an association^^. These 
include denying that the body is qualified to make a decision. Lewin contends that this is 
often argued on constitutional grounds^\ This is the strategy followed by a majority of 
the Nordic political parties with regard to the EU-conflict. By holding référendums on 
EU membership and further integration and through EP elections most parties and voters 
avoid or at least reduce the problems outlined above. This allows the majority of the 
parties to reduce, or perhaps even avoid, loss of votes due to discrepancies between the 
party’s position on European integration and the position of its (potential) voters. Most 
parties also reduce the risk of internal splits, and the risk of coalition breakdown is 
limited. Many voters avoid the cross-pressures created by a salient EU-conflict.
Lewin, 1988, pp. 13-21. 
Lewin, 1988, p. 15.
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Another strategy is to refer the issue to another body where the potential loser has better 
hopes of success^^. This has also played a part in the strategies followed by the parties. 
This latter strategy becomes necessary when constitutional requirements for super­
majorities apply to EU-membership or participation in further European integration, and 
such majorities cannot be found. The referendum then becomes an alternative way of 
securing the governments’ (and its supporters’) preferred outcome.
Elections to the European Parliament.
As is the case in other countries, turnout at EP elections has been low in the Nordic 
countries compared to national elections^^. Considering the very limited powers 
exercised by the EP, this is entirely understandable, and compatible with rational 
behaviour. When the institution itself has a low level of power, the differentiation in 
policy between the parties becomes less important as well.
The EP elections in Denmark have turned into ‘mini-referendums’ on Danish EU- 
membership, and it looks as if EP elections in Sweden and Finland might follow similar 
patterns. (See chapters four, five and seven for data.) This further alleviates pressure on 
the national election agenda. Attention to EU-matters - including the question of 
membership itself - can be referred to EP-elections (and référendums).
Lewin, 1988, p. 15-16.
52.9 percent in Denmark in 1994, 61.1 percent in Finland in 1996, and 41 percent in 
Sweden in 1995, compared to between 70 and 90 percent at national elections.
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Through this disassociation of European integration from the national electoral arena, 
the parties can hope to avoid or reduce internal splits^ "^ , loss of votes and damage to 
coalition prospects. And the voter can avoid or at least reduce cross-pressures.
3.5 Conclusion.
Rational choice theory is introduced for the purpose of addressing two of the main 
aspects of this thesis. Firstly, in building a model for understanding the effects of the 
conflict over EU membership on individual utility in Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden. Secondly, in developing a model for understanding the effect of this conflict on 
the party systems in these four countries.
By exploring the potential for EU-membership to affect utility with regard to a number 
of factors it has been established which factors are likely to be the more important. The 
realistic assumption is made that an arrangement similar to EEA-membership is the 
most likely alternative to EU-membership. This has the effect of reducing, but not 
removing, the importance of several factors, such as prices, taxes, and trading concerns. 
Importantly, EU-membership includes common policies in agriculture and fisheries, 
whilst the EEA-treaty does not.
Among the factors common to people across each country, and to some extent the entire 
region, concerns about national sovereignty, the quality of democracy, and the ability to 
influence EU-legislation are likely to be the most important. The most important among
94 By giving an outlet for internal dissent to the party’s official position.
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group differentiated factors can be arranged into two categories: rural-urban differences 
of interest, and utility derived from the size of the welfare state.
Directly, farming and fisheries employ a small minority of people in the Nordic 
countries. However, many jobs are directly and indirectly dependent upon these 
industries, and in rural areas large sections of the population are dependent upon the 
primary industries. Hence, it would be highly detrimental to the utility of rural people if 
EU-membership had a negative effect on the primary industries, and vice versa. The 
urban population, however, is likely to have no direct, and a very limited indirect, 
interest in the fate of rural areas. The utility of urbanites with respect to the relationship 
between primary industries and EU-membership depends largely upon the effect this is 
likely to have, or has had, on prices of food and drink.
The welfare state benefits some groups of people in the Nordic countries considerably 
more than others. Members of these groups are more likely to oppose membership, 
because it can be argued that it is likely that EU-membership will ultimately reduce the 
Nordic welfare state. Those who support the welfare state for more ideological reasons 
are also more likely to oppose EU-membership.
For most of the political parties, the salience of the EU-conflict makes their situation 
more complicated. The reason for this is that it becomes more complicated for parties to 
reconcile the aims of office maximisation, vote maximisation and party unity.
Some parties have an easier task than others in deciding on the best policy on European 
integration generally and EU-membership in particular, either because some actors and
178
aims are less important to them than they are to other parties, or because there is a high 
degree of correspondence in the views of the different actors, and hence the different 
aims can be easier reconciled.
For the parties who find a high level of conflict between their actors, and therefore have 
difficulties in reconciling their various aims, off-loading the EU-conflict onto other 
arenas than national elections is the most advantageous solution. The referendum is the 
main off-loading mechanism employed, but BP elections also serve as a useful device in 
this regard. This off-loading of the EU-conflict also suits many voters, for who cross­
pressures at national elections are greatly reduced.
The next four chapters utilise the cleavage model outlined in Chapter 2, and the rational 
choice based models developed in this chapter to analyse the effect of the EU-conflict on 
the utility of the population of the Nordic countries, and the effect of this conflict on the 
party-systems of these countries.
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Chapter 4. Denmark. A Nordic nationalist in Europe.
"Within the Six, Germany will occupy an overshadowing position o f dominance. Even if 
time does heal many wounds, it is with Germany that Denmark has had so many great 
troubles throughout its history. We cannot grant to German ministers the right to decide 
the level o f unemployment in this country.
4.1 Introduction.
Denmark joined the then EC in 1973, after a 1972 referendum gave the Folketing a 
popular mandate to do so. However, ever since then, the Danish people and many 
political parties have had a problematic relationship with what is now the EU. So far the 
biggest crisis was the rejection of the TEU in the 1992 referendum, but by 1997 several 
other potential problems loomed ahead^. Two episodes serve to illustrate this problem.
In 1986 the SEA was voted down in the Folketing by 80 votes to 75. This was against 
the policy of the centre-right government headed by Poul Schliiter. Therefore, the 
government decided to hold an ad-hoc, non-binding referendum as a means of 
overturning the parliamentary vote. In the campaign leading up to the referendum.
 ^ Hans Rasmussen, leader of the second largest Danish trade union, at the Social 
Democrats' party conference in 1961. Quoted in Miljan, p. 168. From Politiken, 14 June 
1961, as cited in Nielsson, G. P.: Denmark and European Integration: A small country at 
the crossroads. (University of California, 1966, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. On file 
at University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, p. 532.)
 ^Of which the most important were a constitutional challenge to the legality of signing 
the TEU, how EMU will affect Denmark when it comes into effect, and the May 1998 
referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty. The constitutional challenge was rejected 
unanimously by the Danish high court April 6, 1998. (the Norwegian newspaper 
Aftenposten, 7/4/98, http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/d37412.htm, 24/04/98)
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Schliiter declared the idea of a Political Union as 'stone dead'\ In the referendum, 56.2 
percent of the participating citizens voted 'yes' to Denmark ratifying the SEA, and the 
Folketing duly did so.
In 1992 the Folketing voted 130-25 in support of Denmark signing the TEU. Because 
this is less than a 5/6th majority, the constitution required this decision be confirmed by 
a referendum before Denmark could sign the treaty^. In this campaign, some supporters 
of the TEU, notably Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen, stressed the political content of 
the TEU. In the referendum, 50.7 percent of the participating citizens voted 'no'  ^ to 
Denmark signing the TEU^.
The difference in these results illustrates the general attitude towards European 
integration among the Danish population. As long as integration is seen as 
predominantly economic, not political, the level of support is generally higher than when 
the content of integration is more overtly political.
Denmark both wants and needs trade arrangements with as many other European 
countries as possible. However, most of the population, and many of the political 
parties, have traditionally preferred a co-operation arrangement between independent 
states to supranational integration.
 ^Petersen, 1993, p. 197.
See Appendix 4.1 for details about the use of référendums in Denmark.
 ^Befolkning og valg, 9/1993, p. 7.
 ^These référendums and the 1993 referendum are covered in more detail below.
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The first section of this chapter covers Denmark’s international relations generally, and 
relations with the Community in particular. The second evaluates the factors likely to 
influence an individual’s estimation of the effects of European integration on his 
expected utility. Section three evaluates the effect the conflict over European integration 
has had on the Danish party system, employing both the cleavage model developed in 
Chapter 2, and the rational choice based model developed in Chapter 3.
4.2. A historical review of Denmark’s relations with the EC and the EU.
4.2.1 Denmark’s international relations after World War II.
After 1945 Denmark attempted to re-establish its neutrality, and enthusiastically 
supported the formation of the UN. However, when attempts at forming a Nordic 
defence union failed in 1948-9, Denmark joined NATO with Norway. Thus Denmark’s 
foreign and security policy became tied to the UK and the US .^
In its relations with the rest of Europe after 1945, Denmark has had two main concerns. 
The first has been to ensure the best possible access for its main export markets, 
especially for agricultural products. The second that, if possible, some degree of unity 
and co-operation with the other Nordic countries be maintained.
Trade concerns have usually taken precedence over the attachment to maintaining some 
measure of Nordic unity. In terms of trade, the Nordic markets have been of secondary 
importance to Denmark. In 1958 25.9 percent of Denmark’s exports went to the UK, and
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20.1 percent to West Germany. The other Nordic countries accounted for only 14.1 
percent of Denmark’s exports between them. The other five original members of the EC 
made up a further 8.5 percent of Denmark’s total exports* Thus, concerning trade, it was 
most important for Denmark to secure access to the British and the West German 
markets at this time.
In 1958 Danish industry exported about two thirds of its production, as did Danish 
farmers. Crucially, the EFT A arrangement did not include any agreement on trade in 
agricultural goods, on which almost half of Denmark’s exports depended. Danish 
farmers feared that they would be out-competed in the EC and that a later membership 
would be too late, as Danish agriculture would be in decline before then’.
EFT A membership and trade dependence linked Denmark’s policy towards European 
integration with the British position, which was opposed to far-reaching such 
integration. Thus, when Britain changed its position on membership, Denmark followed 
and applied for EEC-membership in 1961, 1967, and 1970’°.
4.2.2. Denmark and European Integration 1961-1972.
Denmark and the UK formally applied for membership of the EEC on August 10, 1961. 
In January 1963 Charles de Gaulle offered the Danish Prime Minister, Krag, separate 
full membership in the EEC or a form of associate membership. Krag immediately
 ^Sprensen, 1978, pp 34-5.
 ^OECD. Quoted in Wijkman, 1990, p. 93. 
 ^ Sprensen, 1978, chapter 2.
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consulted Macmillan, and declared that this was not an option for Denmark, and that a 
split in EFTA would not happen". The negotiations broke down later that same month.
Throughout the 1960’s there was very little popular opposition to Danish EEC- 
membership. Eleven Gallup polls from 1961 to 1970 showed that, on average, in this 
period only eight percent of the electorate opposed Danish membership, 52 percent 
supported it, and 40 percent were undecided’^ . Only the SF was clearly against Danish 
EEC membership in both 1961 and in 1967.
During 1971 and 1972, opposition to membership surged. Fifteen Gallup polls showed 
that, on average, 41 percent of the Danish population supported membership, 30 percent 
opposed it, and 29 percent were undecided". The DSD won the elections in September 
1971. The new Prime Minister, Krag, decided to hold the referendum on EC 
membership one week after the Norwegian one, on October 2, 1972". The referendum 
resulted in 63.4 percent voting ‘yes’ and 36.6 percent voting ‘no’ to membership, on a 
turnout of 90.1 percent. On January 1, 1973, Denmark joined the EC.
Sandegren (1969), Worre (1987, footnote 4). Also Miljan (1977) and Sprensen (1978) 
for accounts of how Danish applications were tied to the British ones.
"  Miljan, 1977, p. 176.
Worre, 1987, p. 81.
Worre, 1987, p. 81.
Sprensen, 1978, p. 81. Strictly speaking, it might not have heen necessary to have a 
referendum on the matter of Danish membership in the EC. Section 20 of the 1953 
constitution allows "powers vested in the authorities of the realm ... [to be] delegated to 
international authorities...." However, it then goes on to state that "for the passing of a 
Bill dealing with the above, a majority of five-sixth of the Members of the Folketing 
shall be required" and that if this cannot be achieved then the matter shall be decided by 
a referendum. (Miljan, 1977, p. 182, from The Constitution of Denmark, Paragraph 20.) 
However, the Constitution also allows for the submission to a referendum of a Bill 
passed by the Folketing if so demanded by one third of its members. The DSD held 34.6 
percent of the seats, and declared that there should be a referendum on membership of 
the EEC in any case.
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4.2.3 Denmark and European integration 1972-1995.
After the 1972 referendum popular Danish support for EC/EU-membership declined. 
For the rest of the 1970’s, the blocks supporting and opposing membership were of fairly 
even size with 40 percent popular support for each. In the early eighties, opinion polls 
consistently showed majorities against EC-membership^\ However, it would seem that 
the undecided tend to opt for membership when they have to make their minds up.
In 1972 opinion polls had indicated that the two sides were much closer than the final 
result showed. And the result of the ad hoc referendum on the SEA (February 26, 1986) 
also contrasted with the majority of opinion polls of the preceding decade. Also, by 
supporting the SEA, a majority of Danes voted for continued membership in an EC that 
seemed set to increase its powers and integration efforts dramatically^^.
It has been claimed that Danes only agreed to become members of the EC because they 
believed that it was mainly of an economic nature and that the political element was 
negligible. "In 1972 a majority of the population expressed negative attitudes to political 
integration, but proponents managed to convince the voters that the issue was all about 
the economy, and the Danes voted YES according to a so-called ’economic logic. 
Siune repeats this line of argument for the 1986 referendum’*.
Worre, 1987, p. 81. 
Miljan, 1977, p. 184. 
Siune, 1993, p. 94. 
Siune, 1993, p. 94.
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In fact, the EC that Denmark joined in 1973 was largely economic in character, with 
political integration limited to the co-operation needed to carry out the economic 
collaboration. However, as economic integration has increased, many EC member-states 
have increasingly argued that there is a need for political integration to accompany this. 
Of course, political integration has been a distant goal all along, but it only gained 
momentum with the SEA. By 1992 the EC was a much more closely integrated area than 
it had been when Denmark joined in 1973, and the TEU increased this integration 
further. The TEU also stressed political integration more overtly than earlier treaties.
Given Danish opposition to political integration, one could question the wisdom of the 
decision to take the TEU to the people. However, because of the precedence of the 
référendums of 1972 and 1986, the Danes had come to expect référendums over serious 
EC matters. Thus it had become politically impossible to ratify the TEU treaty without a 
referendum. This was held on June 2, 1992, in accordance with paragraph 20 of the 
constitution. Significantly, this makes the result binding on the Folketing, which could 
thus not overrule the referendum result.
On a turnout of 83 percent, a majority of 50.7 percent rejected the TEU. However, this 
result left Denmark in a European limbo. Furthermore, it jeopardised the entire TEU^ .^ 
Consequently, some solution had to be found. It would seem to make sense to give
The TEU had to be ratified by all the member-states to come into effect. Without 
Danish agreement, this would not happen. Theoretically, the other eleven states could 
proceed with a modified TEU that excluded Denmark. However, this would also be 
problematic. Firstly, because the British government had already said that it would not 
ratify the TEU unless Denmark did. Secondly, even if the UK government could be 
persuaded, it would effectively mean Danish withdrawal from the Community. This 
would create negative publicity for the whole integration project. For Denmark the main
186
Denmark certain opt-outs from the Treaty in the areas that appeared to be most 
objectionable to the Danes, and that this might enable Denmark to sign the treaty.
In October 1992 the RV and the DSD were invited by the SF to discuss a possible 
National Compromise’ on the TEU. They agreed on a document labelled Denmark in 
Europe’, and the centre-right government had little choice but to accept the contents of 
this. The central part of the National Compromise consisted of a demand for four 
exemptions in order for Denmark to take part in the EU: "(1) Denmark does not 
participate in the so-called defence policy dimension involving membership of the 
Western European Union and a common defence policy or a common defence; (2) 
Denmark does not participate in the single currency and the economic policy obligations 
linked to the third stage of the EMU; (3) Denmark is not committed in relation to union 
citizenship; and (4) Denmark cannot accept the transfer of sovereignty in the area of 
justice and police affairs."^®
Denmark also demanded that these limitations should be legally binding for all the 
members of the EU for an unlimited period^*. The exact implications of the exemptions 
were somewhat unclear, since they referred to a future contingency (EMU 3^^ phase), 
broad unbinding formulations (defence, police and justice), and symbolic rejection 
(citizenship, Denmark had already indicated it would give EC residents the rights 
involved). In Edinburgh the European Council reached an agreement at its meeting on 
December 11-12, 1992, that largely approved the Danish demands. This allowed for a
problem was uncertainty about what Denmark’s relationship with the EU would be if it 
had to withdraw from this project.
Svensson, 1994, pp 71-72.
Svensson, 1994, pp 71-72.
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new referendum to be held, on this ’Son of Maastricht’. In the referendum on May 18, 
1993, 56.7 percent voted in favour of the Edinburgh Agreement, with a turnout of 86.5 
percent.
4.3 Danish attitudes towards EU membership.
4.3.1 Common economic factors.
Denmark is a net recipient of funds from the EU. In 1995 Denmark received ecu 306 
million more from the EU than it contributed^. Hence, the average Dane sees his utility 
increase as a result of EU-membership based on this factor.
When Denmark joined the EC in 1973 it had a relatively high level of taxation. But 
although Denmark has been a member of the Community for well over two decades 
now, there is no evidence that this has had any substantial effect on the overall tax level. 
(See Table B for data.) The main reason for this is that most matters of taxation remain 
in the national domain. Competitive pressures from the internal market seem to have had 
a minimal effect on tax policies. A large part of the reason for this is probably that the 
average EU tax level has become more similar to that of Denmark. In addition, the 
competitive effects of the internal market are unlikely to have had their full effect yet. 
Nevertheless, low observable changes derived from membership combined with 
uncertainty about the overall effect means that, with regard to this factor, EU 
membership is unlikely to have much effect on individual utility. Effects on taxation
The Economist, 23/11/96.
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were not mentioned by those surveyed by Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard^^ to a 
sufficient extent to warrant specific mention.
Regarding the effects of membership on prices and unemployment, the arguments are 
largely the same as for taxation. Internal market pressures may keep the price-level 
down, but alternatives to EU-membership are likely to have similar effects. The most 
likely exception to this argument concerns food-prices. As a non-EU member Denmark 
would be unlikely to take part in the CAP, and thus in theory be free to set a national 
level of agricultural subsidies and potentially also a price policy different from that of 
the EU. However, there is great uncertainty as to what would happen to Danish food 
prices if Denmark left the EU. Hence, this factor is unlikely to substantially affect 
individual utility. The price level was not mentioned specifically in the 1992-survey by 
Siune et al.
The unemployment level in Denmark has not varied significantly from the EC/EU 
average over the last ten years, as Table C shows^. One might argue that it would differ 
more, for better or for worse, if Denmark was outside the EU. However, a comparison 
with the other Nordic countries shows such variation across the region that a prediction 
of the relationship between EU-membership and unemployment appears futile. On the
1994. Unless otherwise specified, numbers referring to arguments for and against EU- 
membership in this and the next three sub-sections are from this survey. Note that those 
surveyed were permitted to give as many reasons as they wanted to. The average number 
of reasons given was 1.1 for yes-voters and 1.6 for ’no-voters.
Although the development of the unemployment level in Denmark does have some 
interesting correlation with attitudes to Community membership. In 1972 3.6 percent of 
Danes were unemployed. By 1977 this had increased to 11.4 percent, and more Danes 
were hostile to membership, as Table 4.2 shows. By 1986 the unemployment level was 
down to 7.9 percent, and the EU much more favourably viewed. But by 1992 
unemployment was back up to 11.4 percent. (Source: Statistisk tiarsoversikt, 1993)
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other hand, unemployment had been used by the ‘yes’-side as an argument in favour of 
integration in the 1986 referendum campaign. Since then unemployment had increased, 
contrary to assertions made by the pro-integrationists. This may have led to further 
mistrust of what politicians promised in the 1992 campaign^^ But the data in Appendix
4.2 does not support this theory, with the ten percent of those surveyed who mentioned 
employment giving it as a reason for voting 'yes'. Overall, it is unlikely that concern for 
employment has had considerable effect on utility emanating from membership. Overall, 
it is difficult to identify any factor in this category where EU-membership has anything 
more than a marginal effect on a Danes' utility.
4.3.2 Common non-economic factors.
In Chapter 3 it is argued that the transfer of policy-areas and power to the EU per se may 
affect an individual's utility, depending upon the value he assigns to power resting with 
the nation-state and his (dis)approval of the EU-form of European integration. It appears 
that there is a strong nationalist element in the opposition to EU membership in 
Denmark^^. Appendix 4.2 shows that 43 percent of those asked gave 'surrendering of 
sovereignty' as a reason for voting 'no'. Moreover, eleven percent mentioned that 'the EC 
shall not have decision-making powers over Danish legislation'. Hence, effects on 
national self-determination appear to be a very substantial part of the reasoning behind
“ Siune, 1993a, pp. 101-2.
“  Reddy (1993, pp. 130-131) argues Danes feel that their culture is quite distinct from 
Other European cultures, and very proud of it, perhaps because of the ample 
opportunities they have had in comparing themselves with others, such as Germans, the 
English, Jews, Greenlanders and other Scandinavians.
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voting ’no’^ .^ A large number of voters appear to believe that EU-membership per se 
decreases their utility.
This is likely related to the ambitions set out in the TEU. Mouritzen argues that concern 
about the United States of Europe’ trend was the main force behind the Danish ’no’ in
1992. "Common defence, common currency, sovereignty over justice and police matters, 
along with Union citizenship, are all symbolic attributes of statehood - even if only 
perspectives for the future.
In the survey by Siune et al., 26 percent of those asked gave as their reason for voting 
’no’ that they did not want co-operation in a variety of policy-areas, notably defence. 
Similarly, Table 4.1 below shows that the more openly political the European integration 
process becomes, the less Danes are likely to approve of it.
Table 4.1. Areas to be included in EC co-operation. Percent.
May 1992 June 1992 May 1993
Breaking down barriers of trade and customs tariffs 61 69 65
The single market 59 74 71
The economic and monetary union 45 53 42
Levelling economic differences between EC 
countries
42 49 43
Common foreign policy 38 38 37
Common defence policy 37 30 34
Single currency 35 34 23
The social dimension 33 39 41
Establishing the United States of Europe 23 19 21
Common citizenship 15 13 14
Source: Svensson, 1994, p. 79.
Denmark’s historically relationship with Germany (and this country’s prestigious 
position in the EU) is likely to be important in this respect. See, for example, Reddy 
(1993, p. 118).
Mouritzen, 1993, p. 379.
191
If it is assumed that decentralised democracy is an important Danish value, then this is 
challenged by the increase in powers gained by the central EC/EU institutions since the 
mid-1980s. Regarding the democratic qualities of Denmark, Svensson argues it is no 
more democratic than other countries:
"Even if the Danes take high pride in their political system and think of it as 
a ’democracy’, the democratic idea is not realised any more completely in 
this country than elsewhere. Denmark is a small country with five million 
inhabitants and four million voters, but this does not mean that the political 
system is more perfect than in other countries, or that it is more direct than 
representative."^^
Moreover, “the Danish stressing of 'democracy' is actually fairly ambiguous - even some 
might say, 'hypocritical'” ®^. The most straightforward way to reduce the democratic 
deficit is to increase the powers of the EP. However, this would infringe Danish 
autonomy, especially since Danish influence in the EP is very modest. Hence, Denmark 
has always, both before and after June 2 1992, stressed reduction of the deficit through 
subsidiarity and national parliamentary control over the Council. Mouritzen concludes:
"It should appear from this that Denmark supports 'democracy' only in so far 
as it does not come into conflict with national autonomy. The latter is given 
obvious priority over democratic identity. One might perhaps even proceed 
one step further and speculate whether 'democracy' rhetoric is only a fig-leaf 
for national autonomy. But 'democracy' is much better rhetoric than 
'autonomy' at EC level."
Concerns about Nordic solidarity appear to have minimal influence on the utility derived 
from EU membership for Danish voters. That the other Nordic countries were in the 
process of applying for membership around the same time is mentioned as a reason for
Svensson, 1996, p. 33. 
Mouritzen, 1993, p. 381.
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voting yes’ in the 1992 referendum by one percent of yes’-voters and even fewer ’no’- 
voters.
In the survey by Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard^^, issues related to immigration and 
refugees were mentioned by very few people (less than five percent) when they were not 
prompted. However, when the voters were asked for their reaction to the statement "if 
we had said yes to the EC-union, we would have been flooded with refugees and 
immigrants''^^, the response patterns are very different between those who voted yes’ and 
those who voted ’no’. Among all those asked, 30 percent either fully agreed or partly 
agreed with this statement. Of those who fully agreed, there were six percent yes’-voters 
and 31 percent ’no’-voters. Among those who partly agreed the corresponding numbers 
were nine and twelve percent. It appears that of those who considered the TEU likely to 
lead to increases in the numbers of immigration and refugees a majority viewed this 
development as detrimental to their utility '^*.
Attitudes to EU-membership do not seem to be affected by implications of the European 
integration process on prospects for peace in Europe. This could be due, at least partly, 
to a perception of NATO being more important in this respect.
4.3.3 Group differentiated economic factors.
Mouritzen, 1993, p. 381.
1994, p. 91 and p. 93.
Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, 1994, p. 94.
^  Concerns about immigration are not new to Danish politics. For example, Borre 
(1988, p. 78) argues that anti-immigration sentiments were the main reason behind the
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For Denmark agriculture is a major export industry^^, with the majority of this export 
going to other EU-countries. Should this export become less competitive through tariffs 
and other trade barriers, then Danish farmers would see their utility drop. It is very 
unlikely that Danish agricultural goods would be allowed free access to the BU market if 
Denmark left the EU. Concerns over such access has been a major driving force behind 
Danish membership in the Community ever since such membership became a 
possibility^^. Leaving the EU would also negatively affect those employed in food 
processing, as well as those more indirectly dependent upon the agricultural industry. In 
addition to this, many rural areas receive assistance under Objective 5b under the EU’s 
structural funds^^. For these reasons, the utility of the rural population in Denmark is 
more dependent on EU membership than the utility of the population at large.
Those who live in urban areas may calculate that non-membership would lead to higher 
or lower food prices. However, since they do not know what the level of national 
subsidies or European tariffs and other obstacles to trade would be in the event of non­
membership, there is a high level of uncertainty attached to this factor. Thus, this factor 
is likely to have only a minor effect on the utility of the urban population. One factor 
that might affect attitudes to EU-membership in the regions Nordjylland and Storstr0m
success of the DFRP and the populist far-left FK at the 1987 election. See also Piovene 
(1975).
In 1973 export of agricultural products made up 28 percent of total Danish exports. 
By 1982 this had dropped to 24.3 percent, by 1992 to 16.9 percent (Source: Statistisk 
tiarsoversikt, 1984 - 1993). See also Reddy (1993, chapter 3) regarding the importance 
of exports for Danish agriculture.
See, for example, Sprensen (1978).
www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/dnk.htm, 23/03.98.
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is the receipt of regional assistance under Objective 2 of the EU’s structural funds^^. 
However, the funds involved are quite small.
There are substantial differences in attitude to EU-membership between urban and rural 
areas^ .^ In central Copenhagen, 38.3 percent voted 'yes' in the 1992 referendum, 
compared to 49.3 percent nation-wide. Similarly, many of the electoral districts 
containing the largest urban areas outside of Greater Copenhagen also show a lower 
'yes'-vote than the national average. Although these differences are not great (with a few 
exceptions, such as Arhus south and Odense west) when compared to the national 
average, there are considerable differences between rural and urban areas within each 
county"^°. Also, in each of the four référendums the more rural provinces in western and 
southern Jutland (Viborg, Ringk0bing, Ribe and S0ndeijylland) have recorded the four 
highest yes-votes. These counties also make up four out of the top five with respect to 
employees in the primary industries per capita. (See Appendix 4.4)
It is likely that EU-membership affects utility incomes derived from the level of public 
sector expenditure and social transfers. The Danish State provides a relatively high level
www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/dnk.htm, 23/03.98
The most general division of Denmark used here is one that divides the country into 
three parts - Copenhagen (or the 'Metropolitan area'), the Islands, and Jutland. This basic 
division is most commonly used in the literature. Here a more detailed division is also 
applied, dividing the Islands into seven counties, and the Jutland area also into seven 
areas. This provides for a more detailed analysis, and a better understanding of the 
correlation between variations in party support and the correlation of these variations 
with attitudes to European integration. Also, it should be noted that the Metropolitan 
area (Copenhagen-Fredriksberg) when used for this analysis, only has a population of 
about 550,000, although the 'capital area' has a population of over 1.7 million people. 
(As per April 1, 1992, Befolking og Valg, 10/1993).
In particular the ‘no’-vote was higher in Odense in Fyn county, Esbjerg in Ribe 
county, Arhus and Randers in Arhus county, and Alborg in Nordjylland county. For 
data, see Befolkning og Valg, No. 9, 1993, pp. 28-30.
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of social protection compared to most other EU-countries (see Table F for details. In 
terms of final domestic consumption, public consumption was nearly twice as high (191 
percent) as the EU-average in 1993, compared to a private consumption level close to 
average (114 percent)"^\
EU-membership does not explicitly require substantial changes in social spending. In 
fact, Danish expenditure on social spending has changed little as a percentage of GDP. 
In 1981 social spending in Denmark was 38.9 percent of GDP, in 1986, 34.8 percent 
(probably due to an economic boom and lower unemployment) and in 1991, 38.3 
percent"^ .^
The voter cannot know for certain whether EU-membership affects, or will in the future 
affect, the size and character of the Danish welfare state. However, non-membership 
allows for more national control over the development of this institution. Furthermore, 
downward pressures on taxation could result from membership due to the competitive 
pressures of the internal market, and/or by moves towards equalisation of taxation. 
Efforts to meet the criteria for EMU could also be argued to have such effects. In the 
1992 referendum campaign, the SF argued there would be equalisation of taxation, and 
‘inevitable’ cuts in the Danish welfare state as a consequence. The party also claimed 
that ‘we shall have to pay, whenever we get sick, old or unemployed’"^ .^ And the very 
nature of the TEU is such that such developments are certainly not impossible:
Eurostat, 1995b, p. 359. 
Statistisk tiarsoversikt, 1993. 
Worre, 1995, p. 239.
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“The Union opponents [...] asserted that the Union Treaty was the beginning 
of a self-increasing process, a slide which would lead the EC in a federalist 
direction and reduce Denmark to a semi-autonomous status with dwindling 
influence on, for example, welfare and taxes. [...] The complexity of the 
Maastricht Treaty and its many distant objectives offered considerable scope 
for interpretation.”"^
Thus, the Danish voter may conclude that the end result of EU-membership will be a 
reduction of the welfare state. If the voter sees such a development as detrimental to his 
utility, then he is likely to oppose membership based on this factor, and vice versa.
Danish women tend to work disproportionately in the public sector. In 1992, 50 percent 
of women in employment worked in the public sector, compared to only 24 percent of 
men"^ .^ Women’s pay also tends to be lower, on average, than men’s. In 1991 it was 71.7 
percent of the male average"^ .^ Women also benefit disproportionately from various 
schemes established through the welfare state, long and well paid maternity leave (see 
Table G) and a high number of publicly financed childminding facilities'* .^ Hence, a 
reduction of the welfare state would reduce many women's utility.
Chapter 3 explains why public employees and the poorer sections of the population are 
likely to see their utility decline if the welfare state is reduced. The data in Appendix 4.3 
indicates there is evidence that public sector employees are considerably more likely to 
see EU-membership as detrimental to their utility than private sector employees. It is
Worre, 1995, p. 251.
Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 87.
Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 92.
At 48 percent coverage the highest by far in the EC for 0-2 year olds in 1989, and also 
higher than any other Nordic country. Between the ages of three and starting school 
(seven years of age in Denmark) the coverage was then 85 percent, behind only Belgium 
and France. (Friis, 1992, p. 144. Sources: Childminding in the EC 1985-1990.
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also noticeable that skilled workers are much more likely to vote 'yes' than unskilled 
workers. It is quite likely that the latter have a lower income, and are thus more reliant 
upon the welfare state.
Denmark is highly dependent upon trade, as Table A shows. And by 1994, 74 percent of 
both imports and exports went to the EU and the four applicant countries"^ .^ Although an 
arrangement similar to the EEA-treaty would secure access for most products to the EU- 
market, such an arrangement is much easier to cancel, and therefore a riskier option for 
securing trade-interests in the long term. Hence, EU-membership increases the utility of 
those who are dependent upon international trade, including farmers. This factor may 
contribute to the large gap between white collar employees in the public sector 
compared to those in the private sector.
4.3.4 Group differentiated non-economic factors.
Ideological support for the welfare state is likely to be high on the left of the political 
spectrum, and low on the right. Thus, if EU-membership affects people’s utility with 
respect to prospects for the welfare state, then a similar distribution of support for 
membership can be expected. The data in Appendix 4.3 shows this is indeed the pattern. 
The main exception is the supporters of the DFRP on the far right, but their opposition 
to membership is likely to be based much more on concerns about immigration, 
refugees, and national controls than support for the welfare state. Further evidence for 
this is shown in Appendix 4.5. Copenhagen, the stronghold of the Danish far left, was
Supplement to Europas Kvinder, no. 31, 1990; Rita Knudsen: Familieydelser i Norden 
1989. Teknisk rapport fra Nordisk statistisk sekretariat no. 52, Copenhagen 1990.)
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decisively more anti-EU than other areas"^ .^ Conversely, the ‘no’-vote in the equally 
urban area of the county of Copenhagen surrounding the central area of the city, which is 
not a stronghold of the far left, is very close to the national average^®.
By simple comparison, EU-membership may be viewed as a threat to women’s status in 
Denmark because they are more likely to be in employment^* and better represented in 
political institutions^^, compared to women in most other EU countries. Secondly, the 
Catholic influence in the EU may affect liberal legislation on abortion and divorce, if 
these become EU-policies in the future. Together with the economic considerations 
outlined above, these factors add up to EU-membership being relatively more 
detrimental to the utility of women compared to that of men. Appendix 4.3 confirms that 
more women are against European integration than are men.
4.3.5 The 1993 referendum - 'Son of Maastricht'.
Speculation as to what the effect of a new ‘no’-vote would be was running high and 
became an important issue at the 1993 referendum. Among the parties, the ‘no’-side this 
time only included the DFRP and some SF dissenters. The ‘no’-side argued there was 
nothing new in the Edinburgh agreement and that it would not be legally binding. 
Furthermore, they contended that a new ‘no’ would not force a Danish withdrawal, but
'** OECD, 1994b, pp. 64-65.
Similarly for other left-wing strongholds, such as Esbjerg, Odense, Arhus and Alborg
(Befolking og Valg, 1994, No. 11, pp. 25-27).
48.9 percent in 1992 (Befolkning og Valg, 1993, No. 9, p. 28).
73.8 percent of Danish women participated in the labour force in 1994, compared to 
56.7 percent in the EU (OECD, 1996a, p. 197).
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rather the collapse of the TEU. Unsurprisingly, the proponents argued virtually the 
opposite on each of these two issues. They also promised further référendums on any 
future changes to Danish EC/EU policy^l
Appendix 4.3 shows the differences in the results between the 1992 and the 1993 
référendums. Geographically, the patterns of opponents and proponents were still very 
similar to previous référendums, with substantially more opponents in central 
Copenhagen than elsewhere. Women changed their vote to ‘yes’ to a greater extent than 
men did. Supporters of the KF and the DFRP voted ‘no’ in higher numbers this time 
around, but they presumably did so for opposite reasons. It would appear that the 
supporters of the KF disliked the limitations of the Edinburgh Compromise, whilst those 
of the DFRP toed the party line to a greater extent this time^. However, the change from 
no to yes on the left was heavy enough to tilt the balance in favour of yes. In particular, 
many DSD voters changed their mind, with only 50 percent voting ‘no’ this time.
4.4 Party System effects.
In this section the effects of the conflict over European integration on the Danish party 
system are analysed. The starting point is that this conflict has become increasingly 
salient since the SEA in 1986. Yet it appears to have had only minor effects on electoral 
behaviour at national elections, and on the behaviour of the parties. The feature that 
concerns us the most is why so few relevant political parties in Denmark oppose the
As of January 1997, 33 percent of the seats in the Folketing were held by women 
(UNDP, 1997, p. 162). This is considerably above the EU average. Furthermore, as of 
January 1995,7 out of 20 Cabinet ministers were women (Bille, 1996, p. 315).
Svensson, 1994, p. 73.
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deepening of European integration represented by the TEU. This would appear to be an 
advantageous strategy given the substantial opposition to membership in the population. 
The behaviour of the parties is particularly puzzling since disagreement over other issues 
is so limited. Describing the 1990 election, Borre argues that agreement about the issues 
across the board seemed so widespread among the parties that voters wondered what the 
election was about^^ In such a situation, it would appear that opposition to European 
integration could attract a substantial number of voters.
General evidence of the salience of the EU-conflict can be found in the high turnout in 
référendums^^. Also, the fact that over the last 25 years it has become virtually a ’rule’ for 
Danish governments to hold référendums over European integration^’ developments 
shows the importance this conflict has risen to in Denmark.
The salience of the conflict is also demonstrated by the quarter of voters who at EP 
elections vote for protest movements whose aim is to get Denmark out of the EC/EU. 
And many voters vote against the position of the party they vote for in national elections 
both before and after the EP elections^*. Also, Siune has shown the increased salience 
created by the TEU. In May 1992, 34 percent of those surveyed mentioned the EC as the 
most important issue. And in June 1992, after the referendum, 50 percent mentioned the 
EC, the Maastricht Treaty or other EC issues^ .^ Moreover, it is unlikely that Denmark’s
Svensson, 1994, p. 79.
Borre, 1991, pp 135-136.
90.1 percent in 1972, 75.4 percent in 1986, 83.1 percent in 1992, and 86.5 percent in
1993.
With one exception (voting age lowered from 20 to 18 in 1978) this is the only issue 
référendums have been held over in this period.
See, for example, Worre (1981 and 1987).
Siune, 1993a, pp. 101-102.
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relationship with the EU is going to disappear from the Danish political agenda as long 
as such a relationship exists:
“Through the referendum of 1993 Denmark achieved special status in the 
European Union, but this did not settle the European Union question finally. 
It has been followed by continuous debate on the four Danish reservations to 
the TEU. The following year the Liberals suggested a new referendum on 
joining the European Union, in connection with the European elections in 
June. The acceptance by Sweden, Finland and Austria of full Union 
membership, without reservations, has renewed the debate on the viability of 
the Danish exceptions.”^^
The incorporation of the Schengen Treaty into the EU, and the transfer of policy-areas in 
justice and home affairs from Pillar Three to Pillar One also has great potential to create 
political conflict in Denmark. Because of the Danish opt-out in Justice and Home 
Affairs, a protocol in the Amsterdam Treaty sets out a complex procedure for how the 
Folketing is to deal with EU decisions in this area^\ If the Folketing rejects such 
decisions, this could jeopardise the Nordic passport union, as well as reducing the 
freedom of movement for Danish citizens within the EU^ .^
Ever since the early 1970's, there has been a substantial gap between public opinion on 
EC/EU membership and the opinion of the parties and the members of the Danish 
parliament, the 'Folketing'. Most of the time since 1972, around 90 percent of the
“  Worre, 1995, p. 257.
‘Protocol on the Position of Denmark’ in the Amsterdam Treaty. This also deals with 
the other three exceptions set out in the Edinburgh Compromise. There are also further 
provisions in ‘Declaration by Denmark on Article K. 14 of the Treaty on European 
Union’.
Europabevegelsen i Danmark, Sidste Nytt.
(http://www.zapp.dk/wwwebev/snam02c 1 .htm, 2/2/98).
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parties^ represented in the Folketing have supported membership, as have over 80 
percent of individual representatives at most important votes.
On December 16, 1971 the Folketing voted on authorising the Government to sign the 
Treaty of Accession. The votes were 81.5 percent for and 18.5 percent against. As 5/6ths 
is 83.3 percent, it turned out that a referendum would be needed anyway. The 32 
opponents consisted of all the SF members, eleven from DSD, and four RD 
representatives. On the Enabling Act on September 8, 1972 these were joined by one 
more social democrat and the Greenland representative^"^. The 1992 vote in the Folketing 
on the TEU was 135-25 for. This is nearly a 5/6 majority (the requirement for 
transferring authority to a international organisation without a referendum) for the 
Treaty, with only the members for the DFRP, SF and one member of the DKRF voting 
against it^ .^ The 1993 vote on the Edinburgh Compromise was 153-16 for, with all 
DFRP representatives, two SF representatives and one RV representative voting against 
the treaty^^.
The one exception to this pattern of overwhelming parliamentary support for 
membership and further integration came in 1986. The SEA was voted down in the 
Folketing by 80 votes to 75. On this occasion, the DSD and the RV joined forces with 
the anti-EU far left parties. However, the reasons for this were very complicated and not 
all related to these parties’ position on the SEA. Worre argues that the RV essentially
As measured in terms of electoral support.
^"^Miljan, 1977, p. 184.
Nordisk Kontakt, No. 5, 1992, p. 23.
^  Vote on Proposal of law for Denmark’s accession to the Edinburgh-decision and the 
Maastricht Treaty (Folketinget, 1993, L 177).
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voted against the SEA in order to emphasise their special standpoint^^. Many of its 
leaders and members were for the SEA^^, and 82 percent of its voters supported the SEA 
in the referendum^^. At the time when the RV decided to oppose the SEA, however, they 
appear to have believed that the DSD would support it. If that had been the case, their 
stand would have had no effect on the outcome of the vote^^.
However, on January 14, 1986, the DSD parliamentary party decided to oppose the 
treaty. This was partly due to genuine disagreement with certain sections of the SEA, 
partly because of pressure from anti-EU party activists, and partly a tactical vote 
designed to force an election^\ However, the DSD was outmanoeuvred by the centre- 
right government which inunediately announced a consultative referendum. This 
exercise only served to emphasise internal DSD divisions and its disagreement with a 
large section of its voters on European integration. After 1986 DSD policy on the EU 
shifted towards a more pro-EU position, and the party has since supported moves 
towards further integration^^.
Over the period 1972-1992, only 40-60 percent of the Danish people supported 
membership, as table 4.2 shows.
The only element of the SEA the RV appeared to disagree with was the inclusion of 
the EPC treaty, which was a rather insignificant formalisation of current practice. 
(Worre, 1988, pp. 369-370).
“  Worre, 1988, pp. 371-372.
Worre, 1988, p. 380.
™ Worre, 1988, pp. 369-370.
Worre, 1988, pp. 368-369.
See Laursen (1993, pp 121-22) regarding the problems faced by the DSD and the RV 
when integration deepened with the SEA.
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Table 4.2: Position on EC/EU membership among the Danish people. Percent.
mm™
Yes 41 56.2 49.3 5&8
No 40 43.8 50.7 4T2
Undecided 19
Sources: Worre (1987, p. 87), Svensson (1996).
However, when the Danish government decided, in February 1992, to hold a referendum 
on the TEU, only the SF and the DFRP (of the parties with parliamentary 
representation^^) recommended their supporters to vote ho^\ while the DKRF was 
divided, as shown in Table 4.3 below. At the 1993 referendum over the Edinburgh 
Compromise, only the DFRP remained in opposition among the parties with 
representatives in the Folketing^\ It would appear incompatible with rational choice 
theory that more parties do not pursue (potential) voters who oppose European 
integration by representing this opposition themselves.
Table 4.3. Official position on EU-membership by party and support in percent by party 
at last parliamentary election before the 1992 referendum.
SF DSD RV DKRF CD KF DV DFRP
Sup.
37.4
Div.
2.3
Sup.
5.1
Sup.
16
Sup,
tS.8.,
Opp.
6.4
Sup. = support membership as defined by the TEU, Opp. = Oppose, Div. = Divided. 
Sources: on support/opposition to membership: Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard (1994); 
on 1990 election data: Peterson (1994).
The general threshold of representation is two percent, although it is possible to get 
individuals members elected with lower national support if they have concentrated local 
support.
See Petersen (1993, pp 207-208) and Svensson (1996, pp 42-43) for the specific 
reasons why these parties opposed the TEU.
At SF’s extraordinary congress on March 13-14, 1993, over 70 percent (223/300) of 
the delegates voted 'yes' to the Edinburgh Compromise (Nordisk Kontakt, No. 4, 1993,
pp 20-21).
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During the 1972 referendum debate it became increasingly clear where the Danish 
parties stood on the EC-question, and relative positions have not changed much since 
then for most of the parties^^. On the centre-right, the DV, the KF, the CD and the DKRF 
were long "committed and unreserved supporters of the EC and [...] not unfavourable 
towards further integration"^^ However, in 1992 the DKRF leadership was split over 
which position to take on the TEU, and its national conference actually recommended a 
‘no’-vote^^. The CD also appeared to be somewhat divided^^.
On the centre left, the DSD and the RV have in principle supported Danish EC/EU- 
membership, but are generally hesitant about further integration. However, they have 
been arguing this since 1972 and in their party literature frequently agree to further 
integration rejected in previous party literature*®. The DSD was united in supporting the 
TEU, and all the party’s decision-making units had unanimously agreed to support the 
Amsterdam Treaty by August 1997^\ This ‘hesitance’ has affected Danish EU-policy, 
and (except in the period 1986-1993, when it was more pro-integration and aggressive) 
been characterised as 'foot-dragging' by its critics* .^ The 'reluctant' Danish EU-parties 
have been doing this for 25 years. Hence they provide no distinct alternative to the more 
pro-EU parties. Petersen*^ argues that, on EU-policy, there is a consensus coalition
However, because European integration has become so much deeper since 1972, one 
could argue that any party which is not explicitly against EU-membership has become 
more pro-EU since then.
Worre, 1987, pp 81-82. See also Worre (1989, p. 237).
Worre, 1995, p. 238. However, the party leadership and the Folketing representatives 
supported a ‘yes’-vote in the 1993 referendum (DKRF brochure, 1993).
Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, 1994, p. 72.
The Social Democratic Party, 1996; Socialdemokratiet, 1994; Det Radikale Venstre, 
Copenhagen, 1993; Det Radikale Venstre, Copenhagen, 1995.
Europabevegelsen i Danmark, Sidste Nytt, 8/8/97 
(http://www.zapp.dk/wwwebev/sndkl 8c 1 .htm).
Mouritzen, 1993, p. 380. Petersen (1993, p. 196) attributes this expression to 
Elleman-Jensen, the former leader of the DV and former Foreign Minister, in particular. 
^^1993, pp. 193-194.
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consisting of the DSD, the KP, the DV, the RV, the CD and the DKRF - and from 1992 
including the SF.
Since 1992 the SF has no longer advocated withdrawal from the EU. Rather, it 
advocates the Edinburgh Compromise’ as the basis for Danish EU-membership. 
Essentially, this shifts SF’s position to that of the DSD in the past: accepting the status 
quo but opposing ’further integration’. The SF split on the Amsterdam Treaty, with the 
party’s annual meeting in September 1997 resulting in about 2/3rds of delegates 
opposing this Treaty, and the rest, including the party chairman (who resigned as a 
consequence of this vote), supporting it^ "^ .
A variety of small left-wing parties, such as the VS and the DKP, have also opposed 
EU-membership, as has the centre-right RF. The latest far-left party with parliamentary 
representation, the EH, has campaigned actively against EU membership, the Edinburgh 
Compromise and the Amsterdam Treaty. It hopes to utilise the divide in the SF 
especially so as to gain votes, and also to attract votes from anti-EU DSD-supporters^^. 
The DFRP position was similar to that of the DSD and the RV until the TEU, but the 
party has since been opposed to EU-membership, as is the DFP.
As Appendix 4.3 shows, the DV supporters tend to be most heavily for membership, 
whilst the SF voters tend to be most strongly opposed. The supporters of the DKRF, the 
RV, the DFRP, and the DSD tend to be most clearly split on the issue. Based on
^  Europabevegelsen i Danmark, Sidste Nytt, 12/9/97 
(http://www.zapp.dk/wwwebev/sndk25c 1 .htm) 
Nordisk Kontakt, 10/1994, p. 34.
207
contributions to the media in the 1992 debate, politicians representing the RV, the CD 
and the DKRF were most clearly split^ .^
At both the 1990 and the 1994 national elections, European integration issues were 
relatively unimportant^^. In 1990, the EEC was only mentioned by five percent of those 
surveyed as an important issue, "probably because of the high degree of consensus 
among the major p a r t i e s I n  1994 (different survey) only three percent of those polled 
found the EU issue important*^. At the 1998 election eight percent of those surveyed 
mentioned the EU among the most important issues^^.
There is some evidence that a small number of voters changed their preference based on 
changes in party positions on European integration between 1990 and 1994^\ Worre 
argues that most supporters of the EU left the DFRP between 1990 and May 1993, 
whilst the party at the same time increased its support among anti-EU voters. Whilst 45 
percent of the party’s 1990 supporters voted ‘yes’ in the 1993 referendum, that figure 
drops to seventeen percent among those who gave the DFRP as their party preference in 
May 1993^^. Similarly, regarding the period after this, polls show anti-EU voters leave 
the DSD to the advantage of the DFP^ .^
Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, 1993, p. 39.
Worre (1989, p. 238) argues they played only a minor role in national elections before 
then as well. For the most important concerns at the 1988 election, which did not 
include European integration, see Sauerberg (1988).
Borre, 1991, pp. 134-135.
Thomsen, 1995a, pp. 318-319.
Bjugan, 1998, forthcoming. Data from Gallup.
For detailed election results, see Befolkning og Valg (11/1994, pp. 28-30).
Much smaller, but similar moves took place with regard to the SF and the DSD 
(Worre, 1995, p. 246).
Europabevegelsen i Danmark, Sidste Nytt, 14/11/97 
(http://www.zapp.dk/wwwebev/sndk36c 1 .htm).
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Focusing on the SF (from anti-membership to supporting at least a form of restricted 
membership) and the DFRP (from pro- to vehemently anti-EU), there is a distinct 
pattern in their change of support between these two elections. The SF lost a 
disproportionate number of votes in urban areas, where opposition to EU-membership is 
higher than the national average. The newer, anti-EU left-wing party, the EH, increased 
its number of votes disproportionately in the same areas. Interestingly, the DFRP also 
increased its votes by disproportionate numbers in anti-EU areas, and lost votes in the 
more rural, pro-EU areas. However, the changes are relatively small.
At the 1998 national elections, a new anti-EU party. Democratic Renewal (DF) only 
managed to attract 0.3 percent of the votes cast. However, more anti-EU members were 
elected to the Folketing at this election, partly because more anti-EU representatives 
were elected for the SF partly because of a increase in votes and representation for the 
far right anti-EU parties, the DFRP and the DFP^ "^ , combined.
4.4.1 The extent to which the EU-conflict cross-cuts other cleavages.
The left-right cleavage is the dominant political cleavage in Denmark. Most parties can 
be meaningfully separated from each other based upon this cleavage, and it also tends to 
define potential coalition partners. Figure 4.1 shows how the relevant parties align along 
the left-right axis.
Bjugan, 1998, forthcoming.
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Figure 4.1. The left-right cleavage in Denmark.
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Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, pp. 170-171. Scores based on average expert scores of 
party leaders’ attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership (1) vs. cutting 
tax/anti-public ownership (20).
Between 1966 and 1990, the DSD tried to govern with the support of the left, moving 
the RV into co-operation with the parties to its right^^ In 1990 the DSD again looked to 
the centre’^  for support. Hence, coalitions tend to be based on parties that are close to 
each other on this axis.
The secondary cleavage in Danish politics is one between rural and urban interests. It is 
difficult to define the urban-rural cleavage in Denmark beyond Copenhagen vs. the rest 
of Denmark, although Appendix 4.4 shows that some areas outside the capital area are 
more urban than others. Hence, the centre-periphery dimension is very similar to the 
urban-rural cleavage.
Figure 4.2. The urban-rural cleavage in Denmark.
EamC: FK2 vVS 
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DV
18.13
Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, p. 172. Scores basecI on average expert scores of party
leaders’ attitude towards urban interests. (1 = pro, 20 = anti)
In some cases it is debatable if one party is more or less oriented towards urban interests 
than another. The above is only meant as an indication. The small left-wing parties and 
the SF are more distinctly 'urban' than other parties, and vice versa for the DFRP, DKRF 
and the DV, with the DSD, the CD, the KF and the RV closer to the centre of this
95 Borre, 1992, pp. 145-147.
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cleavage. The same holds for territorial differences in support, as shown in Appendix 
4.6. In the end, the territorial dimension(s) do(es) not appear to introduce any serious 
obstacles to co-operation based on the left-right cleavage^\ Evidence for this assertion 
can be found in Table 4.4 below.
With this in mind, the conflict over European integration would need to cross-cut the 
left-right division in order to have maximum impact. As Figure 4.3 shows, this is not the 
case.
Figure 4.3 Position on EU-membership at the 1992 referendum.
Far left DFRP SF DSD RV DKRF CD KF DV
Based on party-programmes, literature and media reports.
The most dramatic difference between this division and the left-right cleavage is the 
very different position of the DFRP compared to the other parties on the centre- 
right/right, who tend to be more pro-EU than the centre-left/left. This conflict has also 
reinforced the division between the DSD and the parties to its left, with the possible 
exception of the SF in the period 1992-1997.
Hence, based on the cleavage model, the EU-conflict does not create any significant 
coalition or co-operation problems between traditional partners. The DFRP is not a 
potential coalition partner for the centre-right, although one attempt has been made at
^  The RV, the DKRF and the CD. See Table 4.4 for a complete list of governments 
since 1972.
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such an alliance. This is, however, unlikely to be repeated^\ As for centre-left 
governments, they have never included the SF, or any other currently existing party to 
the left of the DSD. Such governments do at times rely on ad-hoc support from the SF, 
but disagreement over European integration is unlikely to prevent such co-operation as 
long as support on EU-related issues is easy to find elsewhere. Considering the very 
minor effects of the EU-conflict on the Danish party system and coalition patterns, it 
cannot be described as a cleavage.
However, with the more anti-EU views of large sections of the Danish voting public not 
represented in the Danish parliament, it would appear that one or more of the pro-EU 
parties has (have) an incentive to oppose European integration. Why they remain 
supportive of membership is not possible to explain through the cleavage model.
4.4.2. The potential for vote maximisation based on the conflict over European 
integration.
Among the parties spanning the left-right cleavage from the DSD to the KF, there is not 
much disagreement on a majority of domestic issues. The Schliiter minority 
governments from 1982-1988 were mainly voted down on foreign and defence policy, 
not domestic policies. Hence, it should be possible to attract anti-EU voters from all 
parties in this middle area of the left-right division.
Except, perhaps, that any party wishing to co-operate with the DV should not be
against farming interests.
The alliance formed in 
did not benefit them. Thomsen (1995a, p. 319) calls it a "major mistake".
the summer of 1994 between the KF, the DV and the DFRP
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For three parties, the CD, the DV and the KF, it would not be rational to oppose EU- 
membership, because too many of their voters support membership. But for the DKRF, 
the RV and the DSD, opposition looks likely to be more profitable. About half of the 
RV and the DKRF voters voted ’no’ in the 1992 and 1993 référendums, more than half 
of DSD voters did the same. Being centrist parties, they have the potential to attract ’no’- 
voters from other parties. Yet none of these parties oppose EU-membership.
For the SF, an anti EU-position would appear to be most likely to maximise votes, 
considering the high level of opposition to EU-membership among the party’s own and 
the DSD voters. The same holds for other far-left parties, especially since the SF 
compromised its anti-EU position in 1992/1993. For the DFRP, it is difficult to say 
whether a pro- or anti-EU stance is more likely to be vote-maximising if this analysis is 
based on those who voted for the party at the time of the 1992 and 1993 référendums, 
considering its voters appear to be relatively evenly split. However, as long as all the 
other parties except the far left ones remain pro-EU, an anti-EU position is considerably 
more likely to maximise votes than is a pro-EU position.
4.4.3 Coalition problems and considerations.
Table 4.4 below shows the composition of Danish governments since 1972. As 
Appendix 4.6 shows, no single party has been able to command a simple majority of 
seats in the Folketing in this period. Indeed, no party has even been close to such a 
majority. Therefore, coalition (minority or majority) or single party minority 
governments have been, and are likely to continue to be, the options available.
213
Table 4.4. Government participation in Denmark.
Year Prime Minister Party
1972 J0rgensen, A. DSD
1973 Hartling, P. DV
1975 J0rgensen, A. DSD
1978 J0rgensen, A. DSD DV
1979 J0rgensen, A. DSD
1982 Schliiter, P. DKRF CD DV KF
1988 Schliiter, P. RV DV KF
1990 Schliiter, P. DV KF
1993 Rasmussen, P.N. DSD RV DKRF CD
1994 Rasmussen, P.N. DSD RV CD
1996 Rasmussen, P.N. DSD RV
The Prime Minister's party is in bold type. Sources: 1972-1990: Petersson, 1994, p. 100. 
1993: Thomsen, 1995a. 1994 onwards: the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 19/2/98.
As can be observed from the table, every government in the period of interest here has 
included either the DSD or the DV, and since 1982 any government not including the 
DSD has also included the KF.
However, to achieve a majority in parliament, Danish governments have to include 
several parties, usually including centrist ones. Similarly, minority governments need 
support, usually also from the centrist parties. As long as the mainstream parties remain 
pro-EU^^, they can discount the EU-conflict as a problem for coalition formation. 
Moreover, this removes the problem of the effect of other parties’ reaction to defection 
from the pro-EU position, as explained in Chapter 3. That is, focusing on an anti-EU 
position becomes decreasingly profitable in terms of votes with more parties changing to 
an anti-EU position.
It is an important consideration in this respect that if not enough parties defect to be able 
to form a government (with other anti-EU parties), then the anti-EU party runs the risk
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of having removed itself from consideration from government office. Moreover, a 
simple count of ‘anti-EU seats’ will not suffice to see if a government can be formed, 
since the parties have to agree on other policies as well. The ‘pariah-status’ of the SF 
and the DFRP with respect to government formation makes it considerably more 
difficult to achieve a majority for an anti-EU coalition even if other parties should 
switch to an anti-EU position.
On the centre-right, obstacles to holding an anti-EU position are exacerbated by the need 
for the CD, the KF and the DV to maintain a pro-EU position. In fact, policy sincerity, 
credibility concerns and the position of their voters indicate that they cannot change 
position without dramatic events taking place. These three parties are essentially pre­
committed to support for European integration. Therefore, if either the RV or the DKRF 
(or both) should become anti-EU, a coalition including these parties and the CD, the KF 
or the DV would become more unlikely.
A coalition of the SF, the DSD and the RV; all of which tend to have an anti-EU 
majority among their voters, would in the years 1987-1988 and 1990-onwards have 
commanded a majority of votes in the Folketing. However, on none of these (or any 
other) occasions has the SF been able to join any Danish government. Furthermore, any 
coalition or co-operation project including the SF and the RV tend to have great 
difficulties agreeing on economic policy. For instance, Borre argues that the bourgeois 
four-party government formed by Schliiter in September 1982 resulted from the inability 
of the DSD government under Jprgensen to carry on because it was dependent upon
All the parties that have been in government since 1985 (or even 1972) have been pro- 
EU.
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support from both SF and the RV, who disagreed on practically everything on economic 
policy’®®. Hence, this is not a likely option.
Thus, a DSD or DSD-RV government depends either on ad-hoc parliamentary support, 
or on other parties joining the coalition. An anti-EU position would make this more 
difficult to achieve. Thus, for coalition purposes, it is the most rational option for the 
parties from DSD to the KF to remain in support of membership.
4.4.4 Complications and svnergv between various partv goals.
For the CD, the KF and the DV, a pro-EU position allows a high degree of 
correspondence between most party goals, including vote- and office-maximisation. For 
the centrist DKRF and the RV, the situation is considerably more problematic. Neither a 
pro- or an- anti-EU position is likely to remove the potential for internal splits based on 
this dimension, and it is difficult to say which would maximise votes. However, their 
coalition potential with the parties on the centre-right, and with the DSD, are higher as 
pro-EU parties, as long as the centre-right and the DSD remain pro-EU. In addition, this 
position is also compatible with policy consistency, and with the pro-EU position of 
most party leaders.
For the DSD, it does not appear that its pro-EU position is compatible with vote- 
maximisation aims. However, the party tends to rely on centrist parties for coalition or 
parliamentary support, and an anti-EU position would make such support more difficult
Borre, 1987, p. 345.
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to obtain. In addition, an anti-EU position would be incompatible with policy 
consistency and with the pro-EU position of the vast majority of the party’s leaders.
Moreover, if a party on the centre-left or centre-right becomes anti-EU, then the other 
parties adjacent on the left-right scale are left in a very difficult situation. They might 
feel the need to exclude the defector from coalition considerations, but this would not 
remove the risk of losing votes to him. Alternatively, they can also change to opposition, 
but this could be extremely difficult or dangerous, or both: policy sincerity might lead to 
deep divides or even splits in the party, and it could lose more votes than it will gain.
The same complications apply if a party supports EU-membership but significant 
sections of the party and/or the party's voters oppose membership. However, the pro-EU 
party has some information*®  ^ on the willingness of anti-EU voters to keep supporting 
the party, and on whether or not the party can avoid deep divisions. If it becomes anti- 
EU, then it knows neither how many of the party's pro-EU voters would be willing to do 
the same, nor if the party will be divided or split as a result.
For the parties on the fringes, the DFRP and the SF (and other, smaller, left wing 
parties), the situation is different. Because these parties have never been in government 
in Denmark (and the DFRP and the SF have been around since 1973 and 1960 
respectively), and have little hope of being invited to join coalitions, their priorities can 
be geared towards maximising votes rather than coalition concerns. However, their 
situation is not quite the same, with the SF being in the most awkward position.
In the Danish case, especially from the 1973, 1988, 1994 and 1998 national elections, 
but also from the EP elections.
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Until late 1992 the SF opposed Danish EC-membership. But after the 1992 ’no-vote the 
party changed its policy and initiated the ’National Compromise’ which ensured 
continued Danish membership. This served three main purposes. Firstly, the SF could 
play the role of ’saviour of the nation’. Secondly, it hoped to persuade other EU-members 
to agree to reduce European integration to the level of the National Compromise’^ . 
Thirdly, the party could reasonably expect this action to improve its coalition potential 
vis-a-vis the DSD. However, this policy-change did risk loss of votes to other left-wing 
parties that remain anti-EU. Hence, the SF also profits, post-1992, from off-loading the 
EU-issue to other arenas. For the smaller parties on the left, however, active opposition 
to EU-membership for vote-maximisation purposes appears to be the best option.
For the DFRP and the DFP it is more clear-cut that vote maximisation, not coalition 
potential, should be the first priority. Unless these parties change policies (too populist, 
too libertarian, too anti-foreigner) that are unpalatable to other parties, they are unlikely 
to be offered participation in any coalition. And many of these radical policies are the 
ones that make the DFRP and DFP different and attractive to voters. Therefore, if there 
are votes to be gained by being anti-EU, then this is the best strategy. It helps these 
parties that such a strategy fits in with their more general ideology, such as 
libertarianism and nationalism. However, this anti-EU position does make these parties 
considerably less likely coalition partners than they might otherwise be.
The SF wanted the Danish exemptions to be available to new members of the EC, 
especially the potential Nordic entrants. This was part of the ’national compromise’ 
negotiations, not clearly stated in the final compromise, and completely rejected at
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There are two other considerations that are likely to make the political elites, regardless 
of which party they belong to, more likely to support EU-membership. Firstly, EU- 
membership increases the number of attractive jobs available to Denmark’s politicians. 
The EU also offers an alternative career option for politicians who have fallen out of 
favour in national politics, such as ex-Prime Minister Schliiter, now a Member of the 
European Parliament (MEP). Secondly, consideration of the views and interests of other 
European political leaders and the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU - the vast 
majority of whom are pro-EU - makes opposition more difficult.
Apart from some minor parties on the far left, the DFRP and the DFP are really the only 
parties in whose interest it is to attempt to maximise votes by focusing on an anti-EU 
policy in the national election arena. For the other parties it is a high-risk strategy, 
making it more complicated and difficult to reconcile all their aims. Therefore, off­
loading the EU-conflict to arenas other than national elections benefits a clear majority 
of the parties.
4.4.5 The choices available to the Danish voter.
The so-called 'ambivalent' parties, the DSD and the RV, are in reality pro-EU parties, 
although they sometimes try to hold up Danish support for further integration. However, 
over time they have shifted their views towards supporting more integration. And, 
crucially, they have not at any time advocated withdrawal. The DSD wholeheartedly 
supported the TEU, and was for once not even split over this. Hence, the alternatives for
Edinburgh. The Edinburgh Agreement explicitly stated that the Danish case was sui 
generis and would not create precedence (Mouritzen, 1993, p. 382).
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anti-EU Danes if they want this view reflected at national elections are to vote either for 
the far left or the far right (the DFRP/DFP).
Many voters are therefore left with the option of either not seeing their view on 
European integration reflected in the Folketing or voting for an extremist party which is 
unlikely to represent their views on much else. In addition, cross-pressures require the 
voter to seek more information. This increases the cost of voting and hence makes this 
act less likely. However, non-voting may for many people be an unattractive option as 
well. Hence, many voters have an interest in off-loading the EU-conflict into another 
arena.
4.4.6 Off-loading through référendums.
In May 1971, Per Hækkerup, a DSD leader, suggested an advisory referendum be held 
on Danish EC-membership before the vote on this was held in the Folketing. A few days 
later his party agreed that the referendum should be held according to Article 20, 
regardless of whether or not a bill was passed by 5/6 in the Folketing. This was then 
agreed to by the RV, and hesitantly also agreed to by the KF and the DV*“ .
Petersen and Eklit, 1973, p. 202.
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"This early call for a referendum before it was known whether one would be 
constitutionally necessary reminds us that référendums may serve other 
functions than the obvious ones - in particular, they may serve as a device 
for removing an issue from the political agenda. The Social Democrats - and 
to some degree the Radical Liberals - were in the early 1970s internally 
divided on the EC issue and the proposal to submit this issue to the people 
whatever the size of the parliamentary majority for EC membership indicates 
that the Social Democrats wanted to remove the issue from the forthcoming 
election campaign. By referring the EC issue to a later referendum, the party 
hoped to prevent a loss of voters to the Socialist People’s Party, which 
strongly emphasised the EC issue and was opposed to Danish membership."
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Since then the referendum has been utilised to avoid or minimise splits in parties^^^, 
vote loss, and the break-down of traditional coalition patterns that the EC/EU-conflict 
had -  and has - the potential to cause. It is debatable whether the 1992 and 1993 
référendums were actually constitutionally required (the 1972 one probably was). For 
example, Siune”^  questions if the referendum on the TEU was legally necessary. This 
was debated, with the discussion centred on whether the level of integration was 
unconstitutional. Instead of these référendums being used as additions to the 
parliamentary procedure, they have become (with the EP elections) the arena where 
Danes express their views on European integration.
4.4.7 Off-loading through EP elections.
EP elections in Denmark are seen by many as référendums on EC/EU-membership, and 
as a chance to express their opinion on the EC/EU. Worre argues that differences in 
voting patterns between national and EP elections are mainly due to "the influence of the
Svensson, 1996, p. 41. See also Worre, 1995, p.370.
The DSD is probably the party with the worst such problems. See, for example, 
Worre (1988).
1994, p. 94.
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EC-cleavage: many voters consider Euro-elections as a kind of referendum, and 
opportunity to say yes or no to Danish membership of EC"^°\ These elections are 
contested by at least one anti-EC/EU movement each time, which regularly get(s) 20-25 
percent of the votes. This gives opponents of the EC/EU that normally vote for a pro­
party an opportunity to voice their opposition without altering the party-political balance 
at the national level.
Table 4.5 below shows the Danish results of the direct elections to the EP, and compares 
the results to the preceding and following national elections’®^ This table tells us two 
things. Firstly, that the Danish party system for elections to the EP is markedly different 
from that which results from national elections. Secondly, that many Danes will vote for 
a different party at EP-elections and then revert to their ’normal’ party for national 
elections, even within the same year^ ®^ . EP elections compliment référendums. They 
assist the Danish parties in reconciling their various aims, and in particular in avoiding 
punishment at national elections for having an EU-position that differs from many of 
their voters. And they assist the voter who oppose EU-membership in giving him an 
outlet for his anti-EU views without this having more than a minimal effect on his life, 
and making his voting-decision easier by being able to disregard EU-related issues at 
national elections.
Worre, 1987, p. 94. See also Worre (1981, pp. 73-4; 1989, p. 237) and Thomsen 
(1994, p. 334).
It is important to note that in the 1994 EP-elections, the June Movement (JM) 
focused on retaining the status quo, while the People’s Movement (PM) advocated 
withdrawal from the EU. Hence, by 1994, even at the EP elections, only ten percent of 
voters voted for a party/movement that is against Danish EU-membership.
See Worre (1989).
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Party 1988
Nat.
1989
EP
1990
Nat.
Change
%
88-90
Change
%
89-90
1994
EP
1994
Nat.
Change
%
90-94
Nat.
Change
90-94
EP
DV 11.8 16.6 15.8 -4 +0.8 19.0 23.3 +7.5 +3.2
KF 19.3 13.3 15.8 +3.5 -2.5 17.7 15.0 -0.8 +1.9
CD 4.7 7.9 5.1 -0.4 +2.8 0.9 2.8 -2.3 -4.2
DKR
c
2.0 2.7 2.3 -0.3 +0.4 1.1 1.8 -0.5 -1.2
r
DFRP 9.0 5.3 6.4 +2.6 -1.1 2.9 6.4 0 -3.5
RV 5.6 2.8 3.5 +2.1 -0.7 8.5 4.6 +1.1 +5
DSD 29.8 23.3 37.4 -7.6 -14.1 15.8 34.6 -2.8 -21.6
SF 13.0 9.1 8.3 +4.7 +0.8 8.6 7.3 -1 +0.3
OT 5.0 - 5.2 -0.2 N/A - 4.1 -1.1 N/A
PM - 18.9 - N/A N/A 10.3 - N/A N/A
JM - - - - - 15.2 - N/A N/A
OT = Other. Sources for election data: 1979-1989: Petersson (1994, p. 70). 1994 
European elections: Thomsen (1995b). 1994 Folketing elections: Thomsen (1995a). 
Changes calculated by author.
4.5 Conclusion.
Danish opposition to EU-membership is centred on a defence of Danish sovereignty. 
Many opponents of EU-membership want to limit European co-operation to some form 
of a free trade arrangement. This is partly based on fear of what would happen to the 
welfare state and the position of women if European integration is taken further. 
Consequently, most of those who support the far left and many who support the 
moderate left oppose membership. Because urban areas are the strongholds of the far 
left, this is reflected in, and may even reinforce, the urban-rural divide over membership.
Many Danes appear only to support Danish participation in the EU internal market if 
free movement of people and capital is somewhat curtailed. This is evidenced in the 
hostility of the Danes and the Danish governments to common citizenship, the fear of 
being flooded by refugees and immigrants as a result of the TEU, and the exemption
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demanded from the TEU from allowing foreigners to buy holiday property in Denmark. 
Concerns related to the quality of democracy in the EU seems of little importance to 
Danes, and many of their representatives at the EU-level actively work against any 
increased powers for the EP"®.
Support for membership is based on the need for access to the internal market, 
especially for agricultural goods. Although regional differences are in decline, rural 
areas (and especially those with a high proportion of farmers) show disproportionately 
high support for membership. This is mainly because Danish agriculture is highly 
export-dependent, and non-discriminatory access to the EU-market is crucial to this 
industry. Conversely, this is not a concern for the urban population, who are more likely 
to base their view of EU-membership on other factors than the effects on agriculture.
Party-political opposition to Danish EU-membership is confined to the extreme right 
and the extreme left, usually holding only 10-20 percent of the seats in Parliament with a 
similar share of the vote. Because a much higher number of Danes oppose European 
integration, it would appear rational for more of the parties to do so as well, especially 
those on the centre-left who attract many anti-EU voters in national elections.
Both main theoretical frameworks employed in this thesis offer explanations for the lack 
of impact of the EU-conflict on national elections. According to the cleavage model, the 
EU-conflict has a limited crosscutting effect in Denmark because it follows both the 
primary left-right cleavage and the secondary territorial cleavage(s) relatively closely. 
The rational choice explanation is that including the EU-conflict in the agenda for
See for example Petersen (1993).
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national elections would run the risk of dividing parties and of making normal coalition 
patterns more difficult, if not impossible. It would also make it more difficult for many 
voters to decide how to vote. Thus, it is in the interest of both many voters and most 
political parties to remove the conflict over European integration from the arena of 
national politics. This has the effect of letting parties and voters avoid serious debate 
over European integration most of the time. This off-loading is achieved through two 
devices. The first is holding référendums on important European integration issues. The 
second device is elections to the EP.
The conflict over European integration has altered the political system in Denmark, but 
perhaps not in the expected manner. Decisions and debates over European integration 
are removed from the ’normal’ political procedure of national elections to the more 
exceptional arena of référendums. EP-elections act as a side-show in this off-loading 
exercise. Hence, the EU-conflict has neither created any successful new parties, nor does 
it seem significantly to alter the relative strength of parties at national elections. But the 
overall effect of EU-membership and this off-loading is to remove both policies now 
decided at the EU-level and the decision of the nature of Denmark’s relationship with the 
EU from the national election arena. Hence, the scope of what can be affected through 
national elections has been severely limited.
225
Chapter 5. Finland: the European Nordic.
5.1 Introduction.
Until the end of the Cold War, membership in the EU was a political impossibility for 
Finland and virtually a non-issue in Finnish politics. When Communism collapsed in 
Eastern Europe in 1989 and the SU disintegrated in 1991 the situation changed 
dramatically, and so did the options available to Finland. At the same time, the moves 
towards further integration in the EC made a Finnish reconsideration of its relationship 
with the Community a matter for more urgent consideration.
Although Finland must still consider the view of, and situation in, its great neighbour to 
the east, such considerations have become less pressing. Finland retains its official 
policy of neutrality, but post-1991 this had ceased to be an impediment to a closer 
relationship with, and even membership in, the EC.
Finland formally applied for membership in the EC in March 1992. It was decided to 
hold a referendum on this issued This was held in October 1994. The outcome was a 
solid, but not overwhelming, majority for the 'yes'-side. The referendum result was 
confirmed by a vote in the Finnish parliament, the ‘Eduskunta’. On January 1, 1995, 
Finland joined the EU.
This chapter has two main aims. The first is to evaluate the effects of Finnish 
membership in the EU on the utility of Finnish voters. This is carried out by evaluating a
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number of factors influenced by membership which are argued likely to affect the utility 
income of individuals. The relevance of these factors is established using a variety of 
data from surveys of the 1994 referendum and other sources. This is the topic of section 
two of the chapter.
The other main concern is the effect on the Finnish party system of the conflict over 
European integration. This is dealt with in section three of the chapter. The fact that a 
substantial minority in the population who are hostile to membership have very limited 
representation in parliament and government is highlighted. Some officially pro-EU 
parties are opposed by a considerable minority, and some even by a majority, of their 
voters on this conflict. This is argued to give impetus for some parties and politicians to 
oppose EU-membership for vote-seeking purposes. Conversely, it is also shown why 
these parties have so far remained pro-EU. It is also demonstrated why many voters 
would find it more complicated to decide how to vote if the EU-conflict was a more 
prominent feature at national elections. It is concluded that it is in the interest both of 
many voters and of most parties to off-load this conflict onto other electoral arenas than 
national elections.
Before these two main concerns are addressed, it is necessary to outline Finland’s 
international relations in general, and the details of its relationship with the EC/EU in 
particular.
 ^For the referendum provisions in the Finnish Constitution, see Appendix 5.1.
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5.2. A historical review of Finland s relations with the EC and the EU.
5.2.1. Finland’s international relations after World War n.
For most of the post-war period, Finland’s main concern in international relations and in 
conducting its foreign policy was to retain its status as a independent nation. This was 
the result of having been invaded by and having fought against the SU during World 
War . Between World Wars I and H, in the pursuit of national self-preservation, 
Finland largely pursued a neutral security policy. After World War n, Finland had little 
choice but to continue this pursuit, given its past experiences and as its room for 
manoeuvre had been even more circumscribed. As Tomudd argues:
“The experiences of seeking support in alliances directed against the Soviet 
Union had been mainly unsatisfactory, and this option was in any case 
politically impossible in the post-war situation. On the other hand, Finland 
did not wish to ally herself with the Soviet Union. The only remaining 
option was that of a form of neutrality policy, combined with a sufficient 
deference to Soviet security interests.”^
Similarly, Miljan argues that for Finland neutrality was a necessity in order to preserve 
Finnish sovereignty, “an adaptive response to a single external demand”"^. He goes on to 
argue that Finnish neutrality was therefore more stable than the Swedish form of
 ^ In November 1939 the SU invaded Finland. The ‘Winter War’ ended in March 1940. 
Finland lost, and had to cede 32,000 square miles to the SU. When Germany invaded the 
SU in 1941, Finland started what became known as the ‘Continuation War’ and 
effectively fought on the German side. In 1944 Finland signed an armistice in Moscow, 
ceding even more territory and agreeing to terms of reparation.
 ^ T0mudd, 1996, pp. 39-40. This article describes Finnish trends and traditions in 
security policy since the early 19th century until 1995 in some detail on pages 38-43. 
“ Miljan, 1977, p. 258.
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neutrality, but at the same time coloured by its dependence upon the security perceptions
oftheSU ^
Like many small countries, Finland is heavily dependent upon trade, with exports 
amounting to about a quarter of GDP at the time when Finland was debating whether or 
not to join the EU^. And, as the table below shows, a majority of its trade was (and is) 
with EU-countries or EU-applicants^. The table also shows the collapse in trade with 
Russia. Exports to the SU traditionally made up 20 percent of Finnish exports.
Table 5.1 Finland’s main trading partners in 1993.
Country Exports ( percent) Imports ( percent)
Germany 13.2 16.4
Sweden 11.1 10.2
UK 10.5 8.9
USA 7.8 7.3
Russia 4.5 7.6
EU 46.9 47.2
EFTA 17.0 19.0
Source: Bames, p. 178. (From the Financial Times, 9/11/94, Survey of Finland 9).
Neutrality and the special relationship with the SU has also made Nordic co-operation 
more difficult for Finland, although these factors also provide convenient cover for other 
reasons for rejecting such co-operation. The advent of the Cold War essentially sealed 
the fate of the Nordic Defence Union. Finland was obliged to pull out under pressure
 ^Miljan, 1977, p. 258. The consideration towards the SU also had a formal side. Finland 
was forced by the SU to sign a ‘Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual 
Assistance’ (FCA) in April 1948. This included provisions with the potential of linking 
the defence policies of Finland and the SU. See, for example, Noreen’s (1983) account 
of the 1961 ‘Note Crisis’ (p. 45, and endnote 12, p. 55).
 ^See Table A.
 ^ Considering that the EFT A countries Sweden, Norway and Austria had applied for 
membership, the share of Finnish trade with the EU with these three as members would 
exceed 60 percent. Even without Norway the figure would be about 60 percent.
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from the SU, and signed the FCA Treaty with the SU . Nevertheless, Finland signed up 
to the Nordic Common Labour Market Treaty of 1954, and joined the Nordic Council in 
1956, four years after its creation. This especially assisted Finns in moving to Sweden 
for work. Nordek was finally rejected by Finland in 1970^.
Finland did not join EFTA at its formation. This was partly due to a wish to assuage 
Soviet dislike of ‘imperialist’ EFTA, and partly to safeguard some quantitative import 
restrictions on goods from the SU that were necessary for the continuation of bilateral 
trade with the SU. Instead, a separate free-trade area consisting of the seven EFTA- 
members and Finland - FINEFTA - was created in a treaty signed on March 27, 1961. 
This strengthened Finnish sovereignty by giving Finland all the advantages of EFTA 
membership but without sacrificing its security interests^®. In 1986 Finland became a 
full member of EFTA.
As long as the Cold War ‘bloc’ policy lasted, membership in the EC was not compatible 
with Finnish neutrality^ \  Its special and precarious relationship with the SU reinforced 
this position. The EC was seen as West-bloc oriented, and membership therefore as both 
incompatible with neutrality and an affront to the SU that might jeopardise Finnish 
independence. For Finland, EU membership was only possible because the Cold War 
and the bloc policy ended. Hence, Finland did not apply for membership at any time
Elder, Thomas, and Arter, 1988, pp. 203-4.
 ^Elder, Thomas, and Arter, 1988, pp. 197-200. Also see Arter (1995b, p. 365).
Miljan, 1977, p. 260.
The importance of the neutrality argument during the Cold War is stressed by, for 
example, Bjprklund (1996); Jahn and Storsved (l995a); Laursen (1993), Ludlow (1994), 
Miljan (1977), Mauritzen (1993) and T0mudd (1996).
This argument is made by, for example, Bjprklund (1996, p. 13) and Jahn and 
Storsved (1995a, p. 22). Similarly, T0mudd (1996, p. 41) argues that Finland’s security
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until 1992. Berglund argues that Finland’s 1992 application to join the EC “would have 
been completely unthinkable only a few years earlier”^^ .
5.2.2. Finland and European Integration 1961-1972.
Finland did not react to the first (1961) and second (1967) rounds of applications for 
EC-membership by EFTA countries. But by the time of the third applications in 1970 it 
had become clear that the EC would expand and that Finland had to react. This need for 
reaction stemmed mainly from potential foreign trade problems. Firstly, Britain and 
Denmark were two of Finland’s main trading partners. Secondly, Sweden and Norway 
were two of Finland’s leading competitors in trade with the EC. Of these, three seemed 
about to enter the EC, and Sweden was about to negotiate an arrangement reducing the 
EC tariff walls^ "^ .
After a host of official and unofficial visits by President Kekkonen to the SU and a 
renewal five years before its expiration date of the FCA Treaty in July 1970, Finland 
started negotiations with the EC in November 1971. (There were exploratory talks in the 
beginning of spring 1970.) In July 1972 a free trade agreement between the EC and 
Finland was installed.
situation changed significantly when the SU dissolved at the end of 1992.
Berglund, 1995, p. 361. 
Miljan, 1977, pp. 260-61.
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A variety of political, constitutional and economic difficulties and conflicts then held up 
the treaty for some time*^. In the end, it was signed in Brussels on October 5 1973, and 
ratified in the Eduskunta on November 16, 1973. Only the Communists voted against^^.
5.2.3. Finland and European integration 1972-1995.
Until the late 1980’s, European integration was virtually a non-issue in Finnish politics. 
But then Finland’s entire international environment changed very rapidly. In addition, 
and partly as a result of these changes, Finland’s until then very comfortable economic 
situation deteriorated with a speed similar to that of the collapse of Communism to the 
east and south.
Mouritzen argues that Finland’s relationship with the SU has been the main restraining 
factor on Finnish integration policy. ‘Good neighbourly relations’ with the SU was 
always given priority over the ‘welfare value’ that dominated policies regarding Western 
integration. But with the SU’s disintegration after 1991 the welfare value became the 
number one priority. This was reinforced by the severe economic crisis from about 1990. 
EU membership was seen as part of the solution to the economic crisis. Thus, having 
gained autonomy from the SU collapse, Finland used it to announce its desire to have 
this autonomy limited in a future political union. This was accepted as a partial means to 
safeguard the welfare value. A further reason may have been to emphasise Finland’s 
(Western) European status^^.
For details, see Miljan, 1977, pp. 266-67.
Miljan, 1977, pp. 266-68.
Mouritzen (1993, pp. 389-90). See also Arter (1995b, p. 362). Varynen (1993) argues 
that the effort to emphasise Finland’s European status also played a role in connection
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The breakdown of the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989-90, 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Treaty in 1991, and the political and economic 
collapse of the SU made possible - and necessary - a radical review of Finland’s options 
in its rapidly changing foreign policy environment^^.
Part of Finland’s economic problems were caused by the collapse of the Soviet economy 
and the failure of Russia to introduce a working market economy. Other reasons include 
the world-wide economic slowdown and structural problems such as an export sector 
heavily dependent upon forestry and a subsidy-dependent agricultural sector^^.
Arter describes Finland as “emerging from the deepest recession in its history and the 
worst to affect any OECD member-state since the Second World War”^^ . In the period 
1990-1993 Finland’s economy shrank by fifteen percent. The SU’s collapse coincided 
with the international recession, sending both the Soviet and the Western European 
export outlets into the doldrums. In addition, the economy had been overheating in the 
late 1980s, with a credit boom fuelled by financial deregulation. Then interest rates 
increased rapidly, asset values collapsed, and hundreds of companies went bankrupt. In 
1991 the Finnish mark was devalued by fourteen percent, leading to increased interest 
payments. In 1990 unemployment stood at 3.4 percent; by March 1995 it had risen to 20 
percent. Also, the government, at the same time as unemployment costs increased 
rapidly, bailed out banks that had incurred huge credit losses. Costs related to this took
with Finnish EEA membership.
Berglund, 1995, p. 361.
Berglund, 1995, p. 361.
Arter (1995a, pp. 194-95; 1995b, p. 362).
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the government deep into the red, and by the 1995 election state debt had risen to 70 
percent of GDP^\
The increased pace of integration in the EC - and especially the SEA and the TEU - also 
made a reappraisal of Finland’s relationship with the Community necessary. Finally, the 
increased possibility of Norway, and especially Sweden, moving towards closer ties with 
the EC, and perhaps membership, moved Finland further in a similar direction.
Finland probably would not have applied for EU-membership if Sweden had not done so 
first. Arter sums up the importance of both the Swedish position and the increasing pace 
of European integration: “the Swedish government’s [...] 1990 announcement of its 
intention to seek full membership of the European Community (EC) challenged Finland 
to reconsider her role in a rapidly integrating Europe”^^ . Furthermore, the Finnish 
government did not want to see the Gulf of Bothnia as a border with the EU^ .^
Finland applied to join the EU on March 18, 1992. Negotiations were held between 
February 1, 1993 and March 1, 1994. The referendum was held on October 16, 1994. 
The 'yes’-vote was 56.9 percent. Parliament then approved membership in November, 
and Finland joined the EU on January 1, 1995.
Arter, 1995a, p. 195. 
^  Arter, 1991, p. 174. 
T0mudd, 1996, p. 49.
234
5.3. Finnish attitudes towards EU membership.
5.3.1. Common economic factors.
The Finnish net contribution to the EU budget in 1995 was ECU 165 million. This is 
equivalent to 32 ECU per head, and makes Finland the 7th largest per head contributor 
to the EU budget. In the same year Finland’s GDP per head, based on PPP, was only 93 
percent of the EU average^" .^ Although some Finns would be net recipients of EU funds 
(see below), for the vast majority this factor would have a negative impact on their 
utility.
The taxation level in Finland was about the same as the EU average in 1990. (See Table 
B for details.) Moreover, the taxation level rose at a slower pace in Finland than in the 
EU between 1980 and 1990. Among the four countries studied here, Finland had the 
lowest taxation level, although the increase between 1980 and 1990 was more rapid than 
in Denmark and Norway. Finland’s taxation level was very close to the EU average in 
1990. There is therefore little reason to expect either direct (harmonisation) or indirect 
(competitive pressures) effects on the overall Finnish taxation level as a result of EU- 
membership. Consequently, little effect on people’s utility is expected to derive from 
this factor.
One result of EU-membership compared to EEA-membership is to open up the market 
for food and drink to foreign competition to a much greater extent. Because Finnish
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subsidies to the agriculture sector were considerably higher than the EU-average (see 
Table D), and with increased competitive pressures, prices of such goods would be 
expected to fall as a result of membership. For the average Finn, this would benefit his 
utility. By 1997 food prices had indeed dropped by thirteen percent^^. Heikkilae and 
Myhrmann^^ specifically argue that the drop in food-prices was due to decreased 
producer prices and the competition of the single market.
In 1991, Finnish unemployment stood at 7.6 percent, close to the EU average of 8.8 
percent. However, as Table C shows, by 1993 it was up to an astonishing 17.3 percent 
compared to an EU average of 10.6 percent. Although an increase in unemployment was 
common to most West European countries in this period, the Finnish deterioration in 
employment was much more severe. Although Table C shows there is no observable 
pattern differentiating EU-members from non-EU members with regard to the level of 
unemployment, it is difficult to imagine the Finnish situation getting much worse as a 
result of EU membership.
Hence, it is reasonable that the average Finn would expect his employment prospects, 
and thus his utility, to improve as a result of EU membership. Appendix 5.2.C^^ shows 
that this was indeed the expectation of the average Finnish voter, with a gap of 25 
percent between the optimists among 'yes'-voters and the pessimists among 'no'-voters.
The Economist, 23/11/94.
The Economist, 11/10/97, p. 72. See also Table E.
1996, p. 66.
The survey data used in this and the next three sections is, unless otherwise noted, 
translated from the 1994 book edited by Pesonen. For complete references, see the 
appendices to this chapter.
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The effect of membership on the Finnish economy is the most general argument in this 
category. Considering the difficult economic situation of Finland in the early 1990’s, it 
is not surprising that most Finns viewed membership as a good thing for the Finnish 
economy, as the data in Appendix 5.2 shows. A vast majority of ‘yes’-voters and even a 
majority of 'no’-voters felt EU membership would improve the Finnish economy^^.
5.3.2 Common non-economic factors.
The case for the transfer of policy areas and power per se as potentially affecting the 
utility of an individual was made in Chapter 3. The direction of this effect depends upon 
the value assigned to power resting with the nation-state and (dis)approval of the EU- 
form of European integration.
Appendix 5.2 displays public opinion on a variety of factors related to national control. 
Most directly, Table C in this appendix shows that very few voters felt that Finland’s 
national independence would be greater as a result of membership. A clear majority of 
‘no’-voters believed that Finland’s national independence would be more limited^^, and 
so did a substantial minority of ‘yes’-voters.
Some voters are likely to oppose EU-membership because they disapprove of the form 
of integration represented by the EU. One potential reason for this is that the EU is not
Bjprklund (1996) also argues that a majority of Finns viewed EU-membership as 
equivalent to an improvement to their economy. Several other writers argue that 
prospects for the Finnish economy was an important reason for voting ‘yes’. See for 
example Jahn and Storsved (1995a, pp. 32-34) and Suksi (1996, pp. 58-59).
This argument is common in the literature. See for example Jahn and Storsved 
(1995a, pp. 32-34; Suksi (1996, p. 59) and Pesonen (1994, p. 188).
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international enough. The survey data in Pesonen et al. do not provide any direct data 
that enables us to evaluate this proposition. However, Appendix 5.4 indicates that the 
number of people in this category is rather limited. When asked about identity, those 
who included ‘international’ among their primary or secondary identities were 
substantially more likely to vote ‘yes’ than those whose identities were more local or 
regional.
Similarly, Appendix 5.2.A shows that fear of immigration was a stronger concern 
among ‘no’-voters than among ‘yes’-voters. On the other hand. Appendix 5.2.B 
provides some support for the argument that some Finns voted against membership in 
the EU because it is not international enough. The argument ‘we must become a EU- 
member in order to secure our belonging in the Western world’ was strongly rejected by 
‘no’-voters and supported by ‘yes’-voters. Nevertheless, this was not a particularly 
strong reason for anti-EU sentiment. Rather, an internationalist outlook seems to make 
the average Finn more likely to be a europeanist, or tom between support for nationalist 
control and a positive view of the European integration process.
Another reason for opposing EU-membership on the basis of the nature of the EU form 
of integration is the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU. Unfortunately, no data was 
available that enables direct evaluation of expectations regarding the effect of EU- 
membership on democracy. However, Appendix 5.2.B displays some interesting data 
that relates to this. The argument ‘power in Brussels is so far away that the common 
man loses his influence over public matters if we join the EU’ was seen as a strong 
argument by both a clear majority of ’no’-voters and many ‘yes’-voters.
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On the other hand, reaction to the argument ‘as an EU-member we have more influence 
over our future than if we stay outside’ reveals the other side of this argument. This was 
seen as a strong argument by nearly 2/3rds of ‘yes’ voters and also some ‘no’-voters. 
Hence, arguments related to democracy are inconclusive. It is also indicative of Finnish 
priorities that Pesonen did not even include a category for the effect of EU-membership 
on democracy in the tables displayed in Appendix 5.2^ .^
Concern about the effects of EU-membership on Nordic integration and co-operation 
does not appear to be important among Finnish voters. Among the reasons for voting 
behaviour (listed in Appendix 5.2), this does not warrant a separate category or question. 
There is no evidence to support the idea that this factor was of significant importance for 
Finnish attitudes to membership.
Remarkably, the book edited by Pesonen does not even include any question about the 
effect of EU-membership on Finnish neutrality^\ However, Appendix 5.2 provides us 
with information on how the Finnish people view the effects of EU-membership on 
security. Table A in this appendix shows that ‘security’ was considered to be a good 
reason for voting ‘yes’ but not a particularly good reason for voting ‘no’. Furthermore, 
according to Appendix 5.2.B, a majority of ‘yes’-voters and a quarter of ‘no’-voters
See also Jahn and Storsved (1995a, 1995b); Suksi (1996, pp. 57-59) and Pesonen 
(1994a, p.188).
See T0mudd (1996) for a discussion of the effect on membership on neutrality. 
Several authors mention this factor as a reason for voting ‘no’ (E.g. Tpmudd 1996; 
Suksi, 1996) but there is no evidence that Finnish voters actually considered EU- 
membership to affect their utility in any substantial degree based on this factor.
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considered the argument ‘membership in the EU is positive for Finnish defence’ to be a 
strong argument, while considerably fewer voters considered it to be a weak argument^^.
The importance of this factor is likely to be strongly connected to the geographical and 
historical significance of Finland’s enormous neighbour to the east. It is only 80 years 
since Finland was part of Russia. This and the experiences of the Second World War 
and the Cold War has entrenched the significance and danger represented by Russia in 
Finnish security considerations. Although the end of the Cold War and the disintegration 
of the SU released some pressure in this respect, it far from removed it.
One episode in particular served to emphasise the continued threat from the east. The 
only time the Finnish opponents of EU-membership were in a majority in the opinion 
polls was in December 1993. But that same month the extreme nationalist Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky’s party scored 22.8 percent in the Russian parliamentary elections^^. One of 
his policies was that Finland should again become part of Russia^" .^ BJprklund^^ argues 
that this was the decisive event in turning public opinion firmly towards membership 
again. Similarly, Suksi^^ argues that the strong support for Russian nationalists in these 
elections probably made support for membership more pronounced. Thus, for Finns who 
derive utility from Finnish sovereignty, it does not necessarily make sense to oppose
See also BJprklund (1996); Jahn and Storsved (1995a, 1995b); Suksi (1996, pp. 57- 
59) and Pesonen (1994a, p. 188).
33
34
He had already come third in the 1991 Presidential elections, with six million votes.
Frazer and Lancelle (1994, p. 39) argue that Zhirinovsky’s threats to occupy Finland 
“is a rhetorical flourish and little more than that”. However, they also reproduce some 
Zhirinovsky quotes that were unlikely to calm Finnish nerves: “Keep away from NATO 
and all the other military alliances that are directed against Russia, otherwise Russian 
and German Troops will fight on Finnish territory.” (p. 44, from Izvestiya, 5/4/94); “The 
Finns: they are afraid of me.” (p. 44, from La Stampa, 16/12/93).
1996, p. 17.
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EU-membership, even if the decision is based solely on this factor. If the voter sees EU- 
membership as (a step towards) increasing protection against Russian aggression, then 
such membership increases his utility.
5.3.3 Group differentiated economic factors.
The agricultural sector is the main beneficiary of EU funds. But at the time of Finland's 
membership-negotiations with the EU, Finnish agricultural subsidies were much higher 
than the EU average. Table C shows that subsidies to Finnish agriculture were 
substantially higher than that of the EC. With Finnish EU membership, this figure will 
eventually drop to the EU-level. Hence, the average farmer can be expected to see a 
severe drop in his utility as a result of EU-membership.
The effect of EU-membership on farmers’ income varies according to produce and 
region. However, with the exception of dairy farmers in Northern Finland, all farmers 
will experience substantial income losses both in the five year transition period and 
thereafter^^. Without changes in technology or the number of farms, average farm net 
incomes will decrease by 30 percent by the end of the transition period.^* Niemi and 
Linjakumpu have shown that, in order to retain the same income level as prior to EU- 
membership, the number of farms would have to drop from about 115, 000 in 1994, to 
70, 000 or 49, 000 by 2005, depending on how much national subsidy is allowed. 
Finland agreed a subsidy programme with the Commission in July 1996, and the higher
1996, p. 56.
Kettunen, 1996, pp. 18-19.
Heikkilae and Myhrmann, 1996, p. 63.
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figure is based on this programme being implemented. However, this subsidy will be up 
for review in 1999^ .^
Appendix 5.2.C shows hardly even any ‘yes’-voters expected Finnish agriculture to 
benefit from membership"^^. Also, Appendix 5.2.A shows that concern for primary 
industries was seen as a reason for voting ‘no’ by sixteen percent of those asked. 
Appendix 5.3 shows that only 29 percent of those employed in the farming sector voted 
‘yes’.
From the Accession Treaty, it was clear that most EU regional aid to Finland would go 
to the sparsely populated northern and central areas. Objective 6 covers the provinces of 
Lapland, Kainuu, Pohjois-Kaijala, and Btela-Savo in their entirety, as well as parts of 
Pohjois-Savo, Keski Suomi, Keski Pohjanmaa and Pohjois Pohjanmaa. Objective 5b 
covers many rural areas all over Finland. Objective 2 covers only a few small areas in 
central and southern Finland^^\ and is unlikely to have substantial observable effect on 
utility. The indicative commitment appropriation for Finland was 1,193 Million ECU for 
the period 1995-1999 for Objectives 1 to 5b, and 511 Million ECU for Objective 6^ .^ 
Based on this factor the utility of people living in these areas can be expected to increase 
as a result of EU membership. However, it would not compensate for much of the loss
Niemi and Linjakumpu, 1996, pp. 131-139.
Suksi argues that concern for agriculture was a reason for voting ‘no’ in the 1994 
referendum, (1996, pp. 57-59), as does Pesonen (1994a, p. 188).
Accession Treaty, XVn and Protocol No. 6, (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 355);
www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/fm.htm.
Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6, (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 356.)
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of agricultural subsidies. Furthermore, the future status of these funds, especially 
considering the EU enlargement into Eastern Europe, is very uncertain.
Appendix 5.3 shows that support for Finnish EU-membership varied substantially 
among regions and between rural and urban areas. There was also a distinct north-south 
dimension. Among the counties the ‘yes’-vote at the 1994 referendum varied between 
73.5 percent in the capital Helsinki and 43.7 percent in the second most northern county, 
Oulu. There was a ‘yes’-majority in the five southernmost counties and Ahvenanmaa, 
and a ‘no’-majority in the six northernmost counties.
Even in the ‘no’-counties in the northern and western parts of Finland there were solid 
‘yes’-majorities in the biggest towns. In Rovaniemi in Lappi 63.3 percent voted ‘yes’, 
compared to 47.4 in the county as a whole. In Oulu the corresponding numbers were
60.3 percent (Oulu town) and 43.9 percent, and in Vaasa 65.8 percent (Vaasa town) and
44.4 percent. If EU regional aid had any effect on attitudes to EU-membership in these 
areas, then it has been only in limiting, not eliminating, regional differences. The 
population of rural and more peripheral areas were substantially more opposed to EU- 
membership than urban and central ones"^ .^ Furthermore, a comparison of Appendices
5.3 and 5.5 shows that the four most urban provinces (Uusimaa including Helsinki, 
Turku"^, Hâme and Kymi) also recorded the four highest ‘yes’-votes. Conversely,
See also, for example, Jahn and Storsved (1995a, p. 33), Bj0rklund (1996) and 
Fitmaurize (1995, p. 229) for the importance of the urban-rural cleavage.
A direct and complete comparison is complicated because the data for Turku (and 
Hâme) are split in the referendum results. It is possible that Turku falls slightly behind 
Mikkeli because of the lower ‘yes’-vote in Turku North. However, this is still consistent 
with the urban-rural split, since Turku north is considerably more rural than Turku 
South. Strictly speaking, however, Turku as a whole may not fit the pattern.
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excluding Ahvenanmaa, three of the four lowest ‘yes’-votes by county were recorded in 
the three most rural counties.
There are various possible explanations for these territorial differences. The most 
important one is the effect of EU-membership on Finnish agriculture, as outlined above. 
Differences in political leanings are also likely to be of importance. This is discussed in 
section 5.2.4 below. Also, as Appendix 5.6 shows, there are substantial regional 
discrepancies with respect to state transfers and subsidies. This has two, reinforcing, 
aspects. Firstly, there are differences between provinces, with northern and central ones 
receiving much more state aid per capita than southern ones. In the extreme case, the 
province including Helsinki, Uusimaa, receives half the amount of state aid per capita of 
that received by some central and northern provinces such as Oulu. (See Appendix 5.6.) 
Secondly, state subsidies also vary between urban and rural areas. Overall, the difference 
is over 35 percent. But because of differences between provinces, the overall effect is 
that urban areas in southern provinces receive 60 percent or less in the way of state 
subsidies per capita than the northern and central rural areas. EU membership, through 
competitive pressures and/or legislation, forms a potential threat to such subsidies.
Public social expenditure is relatively high in Finland. As Table F shows, overall social 
protection expenditure has been considerably above the EU-average, and only second to 
Sweden among current EU-members. In terms of final domestic consumption, public 
consumption was considerably higher (150 percent) than the EU-average in 1993, 
compared to a private consumption level close to average (105 percent)"^ .^ EU- 
membership does not necessarily entail any changes in Finnish social spending.
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However, based on simple comparison with EU-countries and expectations about future 
harmonisation and competitive pressures, one could conclude that a reduction in social 
spending would be the end result of membership"^^. Efforts to meet the criteria for EMU 
could also be argued to have such effects. Non-membership allows for more national 
control over such spending. Therefore, if the voter views a reduction in social spending 
as beneficial to his utility, then he is likely to support membership based on this factor, 
and vice versa.
It is explained in Chapter 3 why public employees and poorer sections of the population 
are disproportionately likely to see their utility decline if the welfare state is reduced. 
Thus, members of these groups are more likely to reject EU membership than the 
average person. Appendix 5.3 shows that private sector employees were more likely to 
view EU-membership as beneficial to their utility than were public sector employees. 
However, the differences between income groups were much greater. The relationship is 
close to linear, with a much higher proportion of people in high income groups voting 
‘yes’ than those with a lower income.
Considerably more Finnish women (46 percent of those in employment) than men (24 
percent) worked in the public sector in 1993"^ .^ Women also tend to be somewhat less 
well-paid, at 93.6 percent of male pay in 1991"^ .^ In addition, Finnish women benefit 
disproportionately from a variety of tax-funded schemes, such as long and well paid 
maternity leave, as Table G shows. However, the number of publicly funded
45 Eurostat, 1995b, p. 359.
Suksi (1996, pp. 57-59) argues that fear for reductions in social security was a reason 
for voting ‘no’ in the 1994 referendum, as does Pesonen (1994a, p. 188).
Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 87.
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childminding facilities is only about average"^ .^ A reduction in social spending would 
therefore somewhat reduce the utility of women disproportionately compared to men.
Finland is highly dependent upon trade, as shown in Table A. The West European 
export markets have long been of vital importance, especially for wood and wood 
products. In this context, it is also very important never to be excluded from markets that 
rival Swedish industries have access to^ .^ Although the EEA-Treaty secures access to 
the internal market of the EU, this arrangement is much riskier for securing trade- 
interests than full membership. Hence, EU-membership can be expected to increase the 
utility of those whose income is dependent upon trade. Information that allows direct 
analysis of the importance of this factor is not available. However, this is likely to have 
contributed to the gap in attitude between the public and the private sector.
5.3.4. Group differentiated non-economic factors.
Ideological support for the welfare state is likely to be high on the political left and low 
on the right. If EU-membership affects people’s utility with regard to their attitude to the 
welfare state, then support for membership can be expected to be high on the right and 
low on the left. Looking at party-support, there is some evidence that this is the case. 
Supporters of the VF voted ‘no’ by a margin of two to one, and supporters of the NSP 
voted nine to one in favour. However, opposition appears to have been just as strong
Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 92.
At 22 percent higher than any EU-country for 0-2 year olds in 1989. Between the ages 
of 3 and 6-7 (normal age for starting school in Finland) the coverage was only 52 
percent, which is one of the lowest of any Nordic or EC country. (Friis, 1992, p. 144. 
Sources: Childminding in the EC 1985-1990. Supplement to Europas Kvinder, no. 31, 
1990; Rita Knudsen: Familieydelser i Norden 1989).
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among CF-voters, and especially supporters of the FKF, as it was among VF-voters, and 
FSD-voters were nearly as enthusiastic about membership as NSP-voters. (See 
Appendix 5.3 for details.)
To an extent these differences followed territorial differences in voting patterns. The CF 
and the VF have their strongholds in the northern and central parts of Finland, and the 
CF also in rural areas generally. The NSP and the FSD, conversely, are stronger in the 
more urbanised south. However, the differences in attitudes to EU-membership between 
supporters of different parties were greater than urban-rural differences in attitude to 
membership. This is confirmed by data on left-right self-placement displayed in 
Appendix 5.3. The differences between those on the left and in the centre were minor, 
but support for membership was considerably higher on the right. Hence, there appears 
to be a left-right dimension in attitude to membership. However, overall it is difficult to 
say if this was due to attitudes to the welfare state.
Returning now to differential effects of membership based on gender. In 1994 the 
number of Finnish women in employment was considerably higher than the EU 
average^\ Finnish women are also better represented in political institutions^^. It is also 
possible to argue that Catholic influence in the EU could affect the relatively liberal
Mouritzen, 1993, pp. 389-90.
In 1994, labour force participation in Finland was 70.2 percent for women, compared 
to an EU average of 56.7 percent. (OECD, 1996a).
At the 1995 election, 67 women candidates were elected to the Eduskunta. This is 
down from 77 at the 1991 election, but still substantially higher than any non-Nordic 
European country (Sundberg, 1996, p. 326). The Aho II government had, on January 1 
1995, five female members out of a total of sixteen. The Lipponen Government, as of 31 
December 1995, had seven female members out of eighteen. (Source: Sundberg, 1996, 
pp. 324-25) Early in 1995 the Eduskunta elected Riitta Uosukainen, the Minister of 
Education, as its first female speaker. (Pesonen, 1994c, pp. 264-5)
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Finnish legislation on abortion and divorce, if such policies are ever to be set at the EU- 
level. Added to the more economic considerations above, these factors make EU- 
membership relatively detrimental to the utility of women compared with the utility of 
men.
Appendix 5.3 confirms that substantially more Finnish women voted ‘no’ to EU- 
membership in 1994 than did men. Thus, it appears that comparisons of the conditions 
for women in EU-countries with those in Finland affected voting behaviour^^.
Finland is the only Nordic country with a long-standing and substantial ethnic minority: 
Swedish-speaking Finns. The obvious connection to Sweden means that for Swedish­
speaking Finns EU-membership for both Sweden and Finland would bring them closer 
to Sweden and reduce isolation. This could be argued to increase their utility. The data 
displayed in Appendix 5.3 supports this contention. A disproportionately large number 
of Swedish-speaking Finns supported membership. However, there is a very strong 
geographical split in the Swedish-speaking community. Whilst in Uusimaa and Southern 
Finland 77 percent and 90 percent respectively in this group voted ‘yes’, only 33 percent 
did so in Central Finland^" .^ This is also reflected in that the agrarian wing of the SFF 
was opposed to memberships^. Hence, in rural areas economic concerns appear to 
override linguistic/cultural concerns among the Swedish-speaking minority.
See also Bjdrklund (1996, pp. 26-28); Jahn and Storsved (1995a, p. 31) and 
Fitzmaurice (1995, p. 229).
More specifically, the Swedish-speakers in Ostrobothnia in rural Mid-Western 
Finland were heavily against (Suksi, 1996, p. 59; Tiilikainen, 1996). 
ss Jahn and Storsved (1995, pp. 30-31), Suksi (1996, p. 59).
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5.4 Party System effects.
The main concern of this section is to explain the limited effect of the EU-conflict on the 
national election agenda and results. In particular, an explanation is sought for the 
under-representation of anti-EU public opinion by the political parties.
The most obvious manifestation of the increased salience of European integration in the 
Finnish political landscape was that after three decades of refusal to even contemplate 
full membership in the EC, Finland applied for such membership on 18 March 1992. 
Arter^^argues that one of the two most important issues facing the Aho-govemment after 
its formation in 1991 was whether or not to apply for EC membership.
As table 5.2 below shows, there was substantial opposition to Finnish membership 
throughout the 1990’s, with over 42 percent voting ‘no’ in the 1994 referendum.
Table 5.2: Position on EU membership among the Finnish people.
Yes 
No
Uncertain/don't
know
1987 Autumn 
1990
39
12
49 iï
Spring
1992
56
28
16
43 40
41 40
16 g 19
Autumn 16/10/94 
1993:
20
56.9
43.1
Sources: 1994 referendum: Fitzmaurice (1995), otherwise Ludlow (1994).
The contrast with the position of the parties is quite conspicuous. Among the parties 
represented in the Eduskunta after the 1991 election, only two small parties opposed
56 1991, p. 180.
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EU-membership, as Table 5.3 below illustrates^^. These were supported by about seven 
percent of voters. At this time popular opposition to membership was also low^*. 
However, after Finland actually applied for membership in March 1992 and the debate 
increased, opposition increased rapidly to around 40 percent, a level at which it 
remained for the next couple of years.
On the Accession Treaty vote (November 18, 1994) about 25 percent of Eduskunta 
members voted against. (152 for, 45 against, one blank, and one absent). Ratification 
required a 2/3ds majority^^. However, because the minority was divided between every 
party represented in the Eduskunta except the SFF^°, this does not alter the fact that the 
vast majority of the parties as a whole were pro-EU. More reflection among the parties 
of this higher popular opposition would be expected if parties really are vote 
maximisers.
In the vote over Finland’s EU application (March 1992), the vote was 130-60 in 
favour. Among the opponents were 22 CF members, eight FKF members, and two SFF 
members. These parties were all in government at the time. The other opponents 
consisted of all the members of the VF, four from the GF, and six from the FLP 
(Nordisk Kontakt, 3/1992).
Only fourteen percent in May 1991, according to Ludlow (1994, p. 5). However, 31 
percent answered ‘don’t know’ to the question of whether Finland should join the EU.
Nordisk Kontakt, 11/1994.
The no-voters consisted of 24 from the CF, seven from the VF, six from the FKF, two 
from the FLP, three deserters from the FLP, on from the GF, one from the FSD, and one 
from the SFF. The blank vote came from an independent representative (Nordisk 
Kontakt, 11/1994).
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Table 5.3. Official position on EU-membership by party and support in percent by party 
at last parliamentary election before the 1994 referendum.
NOP
$0.1#
Support
22H
NOP
6.8
Oppose
4.8
Support
24^
Oppose
3
Support 
19.3 '
Support
5.5
Support = support membership as defined by the TEU. NOP = No Official Position.
Sources: 1991 election results: Berglund (1991); EU-position: Party programmes, Jahn 
and Storsved (1995), Bjdrklund (1996).
At the previous two parliamentary elections, in 1987 and 1991, the issue did not feature 
among the most important ones^\ And, looking at flows of votes between the parties at 
the 1991 election, it does not appear that the EU-related issues affected voting patterns. 
There are no distinct movements from anti- to pro-EU parties or vice versa^ .^
There have since, however been some disturbances to the party-system and to 
government make-up due to the EU-conflict. The FKF had a government minister in the 
period 1991-94, Toimi Kankaanniemi (Overseas Development). He resigned over 
opposition to the EU, and the FKF was the most anti-EU of all the parties in the October 
1994 referendum^^. Furthermore, the Free Finland Union (FFU) promotes the single 
issue of leaving the EU^ "^ . However, this party has not been particularly successful, it 
received one percent of the votes and no seats at the 1995 election. At a SFF party 
meeting in June 1994, the party’s leader, Norrback, argued that if the meeting voted 
against the government’s pro-EU position, then the SFF would also have to leave the 
govemment^^.
61
62
Alter (1987, 1991), Berglund (1991). 
Berglund, 1991, p. 258.
In its European policy program from 1996, the FKF at the very least insinuates that, if 
not directly label, the EU as a totalitarian and dangerous form of state (FKF European 
Policy Program, 1996).
64
65
Alter, 1995a, pp. 200-201. 
Nordisk Kontakt, 5/94, p. 43.
251
In the campaign for the 1995 Eduskunta election^^, only the FKF, the FLP^^ and the FFU 
demanded Finland’s withdrawal from the EU^ .^ The FKF and the FLP, the only anti-EU 
parties with representation in the Eduskunta, both lost votes at this election. The FKF 
lost 0.1 percent and an MP, the FLP 3.5 percent and all but one of its MPs. Over 90 
percent of voters supported a pro-membership party. Hence, the number of parties 
opposing membership and their support has declined substantially since the early 
1990’s, in spite of the lack of representation for many of the voters who opposed 
membership. The 1995 election campaign focused on the economy, with European 
integration issues left off the agenda: “The ‘European’ questions - preparations for the 
1996 IGC, possible future membership of EMU, etc. - were not on the agenda, mainly 
because they were not vote winners.”^^  As shall be argued below, however, there are 
reasons for keeping the EU-conflict off the agenda at Finnish national parliamentary 
elections other than an assumption that they are not ‘vote-winners’.
After the 1995 election, Paavo Lipponen of the FSD put together a coalition government 
including the NSP, the SFF, the VF, and the GF^ .^ Thus, this government included two 
parties relatively united in favour of European integration (the FSD and the NSP), two
Due to lack of space the 1994 presidential election will not be considered here. 
However, the campaign and outcome of this election do not alter the argument made 
here. For analysis of this election, see, for example, Anckar (1994) and Pesonen (1994c).
The FLP party congress 18-19/6 1994 categorically rejected membership. A proposal 
even to tolerate EU-supporters in the party was rejected (Nordisk Kontakt, 5/94, p. 45).
Tiilikainen (1996, p. 130) only mentions the FKF.
Alter, 1995a, p. 196.
The Lipponen government program emphasises the importance of joining EMU and 
thus is ready to fulfil the criteria for this. The government will also work for 
enlargement of the EU towards the east. (Sundberg, 1996, p. 327) Clearly, there is no 
room for an anti-EU party in such a government.
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that were severely split on the issue (the SFF and the GF ), and one that took a 
“critical attitude towards membership in the EU”^^  (the VF). However, the VF no longer 
opposes Finland’s membership. It opposes joining the WEU, but by 1996 had become 
pragmatic about Finnish membership in EMU "^ .^ The Lipponen government program 
emphasises the importance of joining EMU and thus is ready to fulfil the criteria for 
this. The government will also work for enlargement of the EU towards the east^^. 
Clearly, there is no room for an anti-EU party in such a government.
Such disparate views among the government parties suggest it would be prudent to keep 
questions related to European integration off the public agenda. And not focusing on 
EU-related issues at the 1995 election is likely to have been related to keeping coalition
At a SFF party meeting (11-12/6/94) it was decided not to take a vote on the party’s 
EU-position directly, but to support the governments position (pro-membership). It was 
argued that the yes-side would have a clear majority, and that a formal vote would 
isolate the 'no’-side (Nordisk Kontakt, 5/94, p. 43).
At a meeting of delegates (8-9/2/1992) the GF voted 15-13 against membership, with 
one blank vote. However, the party had previously at the same meeting decided that a 
2/3 majority was needed in order to arrive at an official position. Therefore, the party 
decided to have no official position. Among the GF members of the Eduskunta, six were 
known to be pro-EU and four against at this time. (Nordisk Kontakt, No. 2, 1992, p. 63) 
The decision to have no official position was confirmed by a GF federation meeting in 
June 1994. (Nordisk Kontakt, 6/1994, p. 44)
Modem Left (The VF’s semi-annual bulletin). No. 1, 1994, p. 2. The more critical 
motion of being totally against membership failed 27-16 at the VF council meeting in 
mid-March. This position meant, contrary to several articles (e.g. Bjprklund 1996; Jahn 
and Storsved, 1995a, Svâsand and Lindstrom, 1997), that the VF did not take a firm 
view for or against EU-membership, and as a party did not recommend its supporters to 
vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The only member of the party leadership that would vote ‘no’ in a 
referendum was the party leader, Claes Anderson. Both vice-chairmen and the party 
secretary intended to vote ‘yes’. (Nordisk Kontakt, 3/1994, pp. 54-55)
Modem Left, No. 1, 1996, Furthermore, “there will be no exhausting discussion inside 
the LWA about the Finnish membership in the Union. The Finnish membership is a fact 
and cannot be changed, unless the Union itself will drift into a crisis” (Modem Left No. 
1, 1996, p. 4).
Sundberg, 1996, p. 327.
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options open as much as because they are not considered to be vote-winners. Because 
Finnish coalitions tend to be broad (and are, if anything, becoming broader), it is 
important for most parties to keep as many coalition-options open as possible. Focusing 
on the EU-issue would make govemment-formation more difficult.
Finnish membership in the EU affects an increasing number of policy-areas and is likely 
to remain important in Finnish politics. EMU membership was one area of friction 
among the government parties. The FSD supports joining EMU, and the NSP and the 
SFF officially decided they wanted to join EMU in 1997^ .^ By early 1998, the GF and 
the VF also agreed to support EMU membership. Had they not done so, they would have 
had to leave the govemment^^. But there are numerous other policies affected by EU- 
membership that have the potential to cause tension. For example, EU-expansions in the 
areas of foreign and defence policy are particularly salient in Finland, and the Schengen 
Treaty and its incorporation into the EU proper also has considerable conflict potential. 
In addition, Finland received numerous exemptions in 1994 that will be removed over 
the next few years. The EU is an evolving project, and with the depth of integration 
already reached there will be a constant stream of issues the parties must position 
themselves on.
Yet, there is very little popular support for anti-EU parties. The voter who wants to 
register his disapproval with EU-membership has a very limited number of options, and
These two parties made this decision at their party congresses in June 1997 (the 
Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 10/6/1997).
The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 10/3/98.
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this is no coincidence: “All the major parties took a conciliatory approach towards EU 
membership and called for a consensus accepting EU-membership.”^^  In this situation, 
the voter who opposes such membership, but does not want to vote for a single-issue 
party, has only one substantial party left to vote for after the 1995 election - the FKF. 
Unless he agrees with the FKF in other areas, such a state of affairs means that an anti- 
EU voter must feel extremely strongly about European integration to vote for this 
party^ .^
5.4.1 The extent to which the EU-conflict cross-cuts other cleavages.
The two most important cleavages in Finland are the left-right cleavage and the 
territorial cleavage, usually operationalised as a rural-urban divide. Chapter 2 considered 
the historical aspects of the Finnish party system and its development. Here its current 
features are the focus of attention.
Most parties can be placed relatively to each other in a meaningful way along a left-right 
scale in the manner of the one below in Figure 5.1. The main importance of this 
cleavage with regard to government formation since 1970 has been to keep the NSP out 
of the cabinet. But it is increasingly of less importance for government formation. 
Recent governments have spanned the left-right division, as Table 5.4 shows.
Tiilikainen, 1996, p. 130.
™ The FKF claims to base its program firmly on the Bible. It is anti-abortion, very 
nationalist, and appears to have little sympathy for any other form of lifestyle than 
marriage and a corresponding core family unit. (Based on its Principle Program, 1997.)
255
Figure 5.1. The left-right cleavage in Finland.
VF FSD GF 8.63 FLP CF 12.32 FKF 14.43 :SFF/.;e NSP
4.93 7.04 11.72 15.25 15.40
Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, pp. 179-180. Scores based on average expert scores of 
party leaders’ attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership (1) vs. cutting 
tax/anti-public ownership (20).
The urban-rural cleavage cuts across the left-right cleavage quite extensively, as 
illustrated by Figure 5.2 below. The most important difference is the much larger gap 
between the CF and the NSP.
Figure 5.2. The urban-rural cleavage in Finland.
FSD 3.21 NSP
6.71
VF 8.29 GF 8.43 SFF
10.50
FKF
11.93
FLP
14.21
CF 17.79
Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, p. 181. Scores based on average expert scores of party 
leaders’ attitude towards urban interests. (1 = pro, 20 = anti)
In terms of electoral support, the GF, the UF, the NSP and the SD are the more distinctly 
urban parties, as Appendix 5.8 illustrates. The CF, the FLP and the VF are the most rural 
parties in this respect.
Considering the above discussion and Table 5.4 below, it is difficult to see how the EU- 
conflict would have much impact on the party-system based on the cleavage model. 
However, since the above cleavages appear to be of little importance for coalition 
formation, a new dimension centred on European integration may have more impact 
than it would in a different party system. There may also be reinforcing effects of the 
EU-conflict on other cleavages and/or policy dimensions.
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Figure 5.3 illustrates how the parties line up on the EU-dimension. The FSD, the SFF 
and the NSP are very close. They all supported membership, and they support Finnish 
membership in EMU. The GF and the VF were divided over membership, and were also 
sceptical to monetary union. The CF was officially for membership but split^ .^ The FKF 
campaigned against membership and is the only substantial (although minor) party that 
advocates withdrawal^*.
Figure 5.3. Party position on EU-membership at the 1994 referendum in Finland.
Based on party-programmes, literature and media reports.
The FKF is the most distinct party based on the EU dimension. The party and its voters 
are extremely anti-EU. The FSD and NSP remain close together, as they were on the 
territorial division. The GF moves away from these two towards a central position. The 
CF remains quite far removed from the NSP. The division on the left, between the FSD 
and the VF, is somewhat deepened by the salience of the EU-conflict.
Based on this division, the pro-EU parties are likely to find it very difficult to form a 
coalition including the FKF, and to a lesser extent also with the VF, the GF and the CF.
The CF launched its 1991 election campaign by reversing its anti-EC stance and 
indicated that it was ready to discuss at least the possibility that Finland might apply for 
full membership in the future. (Arter, 1991, p. 174) The Agricultural Producers’ Union 
(APU), the farmers interest organisation, came out against membership. However, the 
chairman of the APU, Heikki Haavisto, was appointed Finnish Foreign Minister in April 
1993. (Arter, 1995b, p. 376) He made a substantial effort to secure the interests of 
farmers during and after the negotiations, and this was an important part of the reason 
the CF ended up supporting membership. The party also secured generous support for 
farmers from the Finnish budget, in addition to the regional support for Arctic farming 
from the EU. (Bjprklund, 1996, p. 19) At a meeting (29/2/1992) attended by delegates 
from the party and the members of the Eduskunta, the CF voted 121-54 for the motion to 
apply for EU membership. (Nordisk Kontakt, No. 2, 1992, p. 59)
*^ At a meeting 8/2/1992, the FKF voted 39-6 to oppose Finland applying for EU
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From the anti-EU parties’ perspective, the FKF would clearly find it unattractive to join 
a government with a pro-EU profile. The CF could also have problems in this respect. 
After the 1995 election, the FKF and the CF were the only substantial parties not in 
government. The inclusion of the VF and the exclusion of the CF could be due to it 
being easier for the party more in tune with its voters at the time of the referendum to 
join the largely pro-EU government. If the CF joined such a government, the party’s 
voters might suspect that it would represent its official party line rather than its voters.
The EU-conflict appears unlikely to constitute more than a minor political cleavage in 
Finland. The conflict has not had any substantial effects on voting patterns, although 
government formation could be argued to have been affected by this dimension, since 
the EU-ambivalent and split CF and the anti-EU FKF were left out of government after 
the 1994 referendum.
With large sections of the population against membership, and even more opposed to a 
single currency^^, and with these views underrepresented in the Eduskunta, there appears 
to be an incentive for more parties to oppose EU membership and further European 
integration. Yet, in the period when the EU-conflict has been salient in Finland, 
opposition to EU membership among the parties has actually declined. The FKF has 
continued to oppose membership. The VF and the GF have both accepted Finnish 
membership in the EMU. The FLP opposed membership, but no longer exists.
membership (Nordisk Kontakt, 2/1992, p. 62).
59 percent of those surveyed opposed a single currency in 1995 (Tiilkainen, 1996, p.
130).
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5.4.2. The potential for vote-maximisation based on the conflict over European 
integration.
There were substantial differences in the fit between the parties’ policies and their 
voters’ preferences at the time of the 1994 referendum. (See Appendix 5.3 for details.) 
The FKF’s anti-EU stance fits that of their voters, 95 percent of whom appears to have 
voted ‘no’ in the 1994 referendum. Similarly, the pro-EU SFF and NSP had the support 
of 80-90 percent of their voters, and the FSD was supported by around 80 percent of 
theirs. The split in the GF was reflected among their voters, who split down the middle 
at the referendum. Among VF voters, a substantial minority, around 25 percent, voted 
for membership. However, it is the CF who was least in agreement with its voters, two 
thirds of whom appear to have voted ‘no’ and against the party line.
For the SFF and the NSP in particular, but also the FSD, opposing membership would 
not be beneficial. The vast majority of their voters support EU-membership. In addition, 
the NSP is at the extreme of the left-right cleavage and close to the extreme of the 
territorial cleavages. This makes it difficult to attract voters based on position on EU. 
The SFF and the FSD are close to the centre on one dimension each, and not at the 
extreme on any. However, the SFF face the obstacle of having to attract voters outside 
its Swedish-speaking core constituency. For this party it would only make sense to be 
anti-EU if a substantial majority of Swedish-speaking people were so as well. They are 
not, as Appendix 5.3 shows.
For the CF, opposing membership would make a lot more sense. The party is close to 
the centre of the left-right cleavage. It is at the extreme of the territorial cleavages, but it
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is the extreme where ‘no’-voters are concentrated. The party is therefore very well 
placed to oppose membership. The counterpoint to this would be that the CF is already 
so strong in the north and rural areas that there are no more voters to gain. However, 
because these are the areas where EU-opposition is the highest, there is still large 
number of anti-EU voters who do not vote for the CF.
For the VF the main problem is its isolation on the extreme left, but it occupies a centrist 
position on the territorial cleavages. Opposition to membership should enable the party 
to attract anti-EU voters from the FSD, the GF, and the CF. The potential to attract CF 
voters is based on the support for both parties being high in certain provinces with high 
numbers of anti-EU voters^^. The GF could also benefit from opposing membership. 
Because it is small, it would need to attract less anti-EU voters in absolute terms than 
the larger parties in order to profit from such opposition. The FKF is close to the centre 
on all the cleavages, and should therefore be well placed to capitalise on opposition to 
the EU.
5.4.3 Coalition problems and considerations.
Table 5.4 below shows the make-up of Finnish governments since 1970. No single party 
held an overall majority of seats in the Eduskunta in the period. Most governments have 
been coalition (minority or majority) governments, the exceptions being a single-party 
minority government and two caretaker governments.
In particular, Kuopio, Keski-Suomi, Oulu and Lappi.
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Table 5.4. Government participation in Finland.
Year Prime Minister Party
1970 Karjalainen, A. VF FSD CF SFF L
1971 Karjalainen, A. FSD CF SFF L
1971 Aura, T.
1972 Paasio, R. FSD
1972 Sorsa, K. FSD CF SFF L
1975 Liinamaa, K.
1975 Miettunen, M. VF FSD CF SFF L
1976 Miettunen, M. CF SFF L
1977 Sorsa, K. VF FSD CF SFF L
1978 Sorsa, K. VF FSD CF L
1979 Koivisto, M. VF FSD CF SFF
1982 Sorsa, K. VF FSD CF SFF
1982 Sorsa, K. FSD CF SFF
1983 Sorsa, K. FSD CF SFF FLP
1987 Holkeri, H. FSD SFF NSP FLP
1990 Holkeri, H. FSD SFF NSP
1991 Aho, E. CF SFF NSP FKF
1994 Aho, E CF SFF NSP
1995 Lipponen, P VF FSD SFF NSP GF
The Prime Minister’s party is in bold type. Source 1970-91: Petersson (1994, p. 101). 
1994 and 1995 onwards: Arter (1995a). The Aura government was a
caretaker/technocrat government. The Liinamaa government was also a caretaker 
government, but included more ministers from the parties, Liinemaa himself was from 
the SD.
As the table shows, Finnish governments have, in this period, included all the 
substantial parties at some time or another. Until 1987, the NSP was excluded from 
government, but it has been a member of every government since. After the EU-conflict 
surfaced around 1990, the only parties not to take part in government have been the FLP 
and the LF, both of whom were in decline by then, and the UF and EC, both of which 
gained their first representatives at the 1995 election. Thus, every party appears to have 
the potential to be in government, and most governments span the left-right cleavage, 
often the urban-mral cleavage, and nearly always the language cleavage. In this 
environment, exclusion from a particular government is more likely to be based on 
specific policy disagreements and personality issues rather than more general ideological 
differences.
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One such policy disagreement is Finnish EU-membership, and related to this what depth 
of integration Finland should support. Opposing membership could lead to exclusion 
from government. This is an important reason why so few Finnish parties oppose EU- 
membership. Since 1990, only one government party (the FKF) has opposed 
membership, and it left government directly as a result of this. In the 1990’s anti-EU 
parties have become pro-EU, rather than vice versa.
In terms of vote maximisation, this seems like irrational behaviour for some parties. A 
majority of VF- and CF-voters oppose EU-membership, as do approximately half of the 
GF-voters. There also ought to be votes to be gained from anti-EU voters who would 
vote for pro-EU parties without the EU-conflict being salient.
But in terms of office seeking, this behaviour is quite rational. Crucially, it enables the 
parties to remove the EU-conflict from the national election agenda. If none of the major 
parties oppose membership, then they have little to gain by campaigning on this issue. It 
also makes government formation easier, and from a particular party’s point of view it 
keeps it in contention for cabinet positions. Furthermore, it removes the conundrum 
faced by pro-EU parties if one of their main competitors is gaining votes based on an 
anti-EU position, as explained in Chapter 3.
5.4.4 Complications and svnergv between various partv goals.
For the SFF and the NSP, and to a somewhat lesser extent the FSD, there is a relatively 
high degree of correspondence between party aims. The combination of a high
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proportion of their voters supporting EU-membership and policy sincerity concerns 
makes a pro-EU position the only tenable position. Consequently, they would find it 
difficult to take part in a coalition with parties that actively oppose membership. 
Moreover, the extreme pro-EU position taken by these parties makes it more difficult for 
other parties to be anti-EU if they wish to join in a coalition including any of these 
parties.
It should be noted that, since the EU-conflict became salient, there has been no 
combination of parties with a majority of 'no'-voters that would conunand a majority in 
the Eduskunta, even if they all took up anti-EU positions and could agree on forming a 
government. The highest number of seats commanded by such a coalition at the 1991 
election would be 89 (CF4-FKF4-VF+FLP), or 99 including the GF, whose voters split 
down the middle. At the 1995 election these numbers had dropped to 74 and 83 
respectively.
For the CF, the GF and the VF a pro-membership position makes government 
participation more likely. An anti-membership position would not necessarily exclude 
these parties from government, but it adds a complicating factor. And actively 
campaigning for withdrawal would make participating in a government with the pro-EU 
FSD, NSP and SFF very difficult. At the VF annual meeting in March 1994 the party 
made it clear that it was aiming for government participation after the 1995 election. 
This plan succeeded, the VF entered government in 1995. Since then, the party has not 
opposed membership, although it might object to further integration. The GF was and is 
in a similar position. However, for these parties vote- and office-maximisation are not 
compatible, and they are dangerously split internally on this dimension. Hence, it is very
263
much in their interest to remove the EU-conflict from the national election agenda, or at 
least to reduce its importance.
The CF was the leading party in the Finnish government 1991-94, holding the post of 
Prime Minister in Esko Aho. It was the Aho-govemment that applied for full EU- 
membership in March 1992. This committed the CF to support EU-membership, 
assuming acceptable terms could be negotiated. Considering the position of the party’s 
voters, this appears to be a decision driven more by policy sincerity than by vote 
maximising concerns. However, the CF’s main partners in government were the very 
pro-EU SFF and NSP. Hence, one could argue that the CF-support for membership was 
also driven by office-seeking concerns for retaining its position in government.
Post-1995, the now-out-of-govemment CF appears to have a stronger incentive to take 
up an anti-EU position. But it has not, for several reasons. Firstly, it would look 
somewhat cynical, considering the party played an important role in bringing Finland 
into the EU in the first place. Secondly, such a second volte-face would make co­
operation with pro-EU parties more difficult. These reasons also explain, at least partly, 
why the CF did not defect from the pro-EU position to counter the threat to its voters 
represented by the anti-EU FFU and FLP.
The FKF has been in government once, between 1991 and 1994. Considering its 
extreme anti-EU position and the heavy anti-EU vote among its electorate, the party has 
little choice but to aim for vote maximisation on the EU-conflict. So far this has not 
home any results. This could be partly due to its heavily religious nature making the 
party an unpalatable alternative for many anti-EU voters.
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Finally, two other considerations make the Finnish political elites more likely to support 
EU-membership. Firstly, EU-membership increases the number of attractive jobs 
available to Finland’s politicians. Secondly, consideration of the views and interests of 
other European politicians and the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU makes 
opposition more difficult.
Thus, for all parties but the FKF, a combination of consideration for coalition-potential, 
internal splits, credibility, and the risk of losing more votes than are gained keep them 
away from an active anti-EU stance. This holds even though for some parties this 
appears to contradict the aim of vote-maximisation. As long as the relatively united pro­
membership front holds, and off-loading mechanisms exist and are used, the EU-conflict 
can be kept out of (or at least of reduced importance at) the national elections agenda.
5.4.5 The choices available to the Finnish voter.
For pro-EU Finns there is a wide variety of parties to vote for. For anti-EU Finns the 
only options at the 1995 election were the FLP, the FFU and the FKF. The FKF, from 
past performance, appears to represent the views of only a small minority of Finnish 
voters. Nor does the FLP appear to have held much attraction at the 1995 election, and 
the appeal of the FFU is limited by it being a single issue party. In this situation the 
party-political opposition to the EU will be unattractive to most anti-EU voters.
265
In addition, cross-pressures faced by voters who disagree with their party on EU-policy 
requires them to seek further information^"^. This makes it less likely that such people 
will vote because of the increased cost of voting. At the 1995 election, turnout was 
lower in eastern than in western Finland, and particularly low in areas of low EU- 
support, e.g. down to 59.8 percent (compared to the national average of 71.8) in 
Hyrynsalmi^^. But non-voting may also be undesirable. All this gives many voters an 
interest similar to that of the parties: off-loading the EU-conflict into other arenas will 
benefit the utility of many.
5.4.6 Off-loading through référendums.
The strategy of off-loading the EU-conflict through holding a referendum on 
membership in 1994 appears to have succeeded. As table 5.5 below shows, there is no 
discernible pattern of changes in party support due to position on EU-membership. 
European integration not to have played any major role in the outcome of the 1995 
election.
Although the CF suffered the greatest loss of votes in absolute terms, this is more likely 
to be due to it having led the government through Finland’s most severe recession since 
World War n, than to its position on European integration. A similar argument can be 
made for the NSP. The anti-EU FLP suffered the most severe loss in relative terms. It 
went bankrupt and ceased to exist as a result. The anti-EU FKF did not seem to benefit 
from its anti-EU position. And the pro-EU FSD and UF both did well.
This also holds for pro-EU voters who otherwise would support an anti-EU party, 
although there are a lot fewer of them.
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Party 1991 1995 Change 1991-95
NSP 19.3 17.9 -7
CF 24.8 19.9 -20
LF 0.8 0.6 -25
SFF 5.5 5.5 0
FKF 3.1 3.0 -3
FLP 4.8 1.3 -73
FSD 22.1 28.3 +28
VF 10.1 11.2 +11
GF 6.8 6.5 -4
UF - 2.8 N/A
FFU - 1.0 N/A
Others 2.7 4.2 +55
Sources: 1991: Peterson (1994, p. 59); 1995: Arter (1995a, p. 197).
Similarly, Suksi^^ argues that the EU-conflict appeared to have little effect on the 1995 
general election. Only in a few rural areas was there some reaction to the parties’ stand 
on the EU referendum. The CF and perhaps also the SFF suffered some losses in these 
cases, but these did not appear to affect the overall election results for these parties.
Although it lost votes at the 1995 election, the referendum appears to have worked well 
as an off-loading device for the CF. Its 1995 vote was still 2.3 percent above its vote in 
both 1983 and 1987. Suksi argues that for the CF, a referendum was the only way to deal 
with EU membership since a majority of its voters were against memberships^. The 
party does of course have another option: to oppose membership. But it was shown 
above why this is a less attractive option.
Arter, 1995a, pp. 200-201. 
“  1996, p. 63.
*■' Suksi, 1996, p. 56.
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It appears that very few voters considered EU-related issues at the 1991 or the 1995 
parliamentary election. The divided public opinion on this had no discernible substantial 
effect on voting behaviour.
5.4.7 Off-loading through EP-elections.
At first sight, the 1996 elections to the EP do not appear to have functioned as an off­
loading mechanism. There was minimal support (less than ten percent) for the anti-EU 
parties (the AEU, the FFU, the FKF, the FLP and the RF), as Table 7.4 below shows.
Table 5.6. 1995 elections to the Finnish Eduskunta and 1996 EP elections.
Party Eduskunta election 
1995, percent
1996 EP elections, 
percent
Seats in EP Change
1995-96,
percent
CF 19.9 24.4 4 +23 percent
FSD 28.3 21.5 4 -24 percent
NSP 17.9 20.2 4 +13 percent
VF 11.2 10.5 2 -6 percent
GF 6.5 7.6 1 +17 percent
SFF 5.5 5.8 1 +5 percent
UF 2.8 3.0 0 +7 percent
FKF 3.0 2.8 0 -7 percent
AEU - 2.1 0 N/A
RF 1.3 0.7 0 -46 percent
FFU 1.0 0.6 0 -40 percent
Others 3.1 0.8 0 -74 percent
AEU = Alternative to EU, RF = 
were calculated by the author. 
Finland (4th quarter, 1996).
: Real Finns, formerly the FLP. The ratios in colunm five 
Sources: Arter (1995a, p. 197); EIU Country Report on
Nor does there appear to be any consistent pattern of increased support for the parties 
more sceptical to membership (the VF, the GF and the CF) compared to the more pro- 
EU NSP, SFF, FSD and UF.
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However, this perception changes when the individual attitude to membership among 
the candidates is considered. Of the sixteen candidates elected, eleven voted for EU- 
membership in 1994, and five against. Overall, the pro-EU candidates received 62.2 
percent of the votes cast, the anti-EU candidates 37.8 percent. And the two candidates 
who topped the electoral list, Paavo Varynen of the CF and Esko Seppanen of the VF, 
were both opponents^^. But their parties officially remain committed to membership. 
Thus, the 1996 EP-elections illustrate both the off-loading mechanism provided by these 
elections and the continued popular opposition to membership.
5.5 Conclusion.
When Finland applied for EU-membership in 1992 the Finnish economy was in an 
extremely poor state, and the unemployment-rate the second highest in Western Europe 
after Spain. Hence, many Finns appear to have viewed EU-membership as likely to 
improve their utility with regard to these factors. EU-membership was also seen by a 
clear majority of voters as having a positive effect on Finland’s security position. 
Conversely, few Finns seem to have considered the effect of membership on neutrality. 
On the other hand, reduced national independence resulting from membership appears to 
have negatively affected the utility of a majority of Finns. Among other factors, the 
effect on Nordic co-operation, on taxation levels, and on democracy seem to have had 
little influence on perceived utility emanating from membership.
By the time of this election, only four of the elected representatives could be classified 
for certain as opponents. The other two are both MEP’s for the CF (Anckar, 1997, p. 
263).
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There were substantial territorial differences in attitude to EU-membership in Finland. 
In particular, there was a strong urban-rural divide, as well as a somewhat less 
pronounced north-south one. This is very likely to be related to a loss of subsidy for 
rural areas and agriculture resulting from membership, as well as strong support for the 
more EU-critical parties in these areas. Conversely, urban inhabitants can expect to 
benefit from membership in form of lower food prices and paying less subsidies to rural 
areas.
Opposition to membership was considerably higher among those more dependent upon 
the welfare state. Indeed, differences are substantial between male and female voters and 
private and public sector voters. For women it is also likely that a comparison of the 
high level of equality achieved in Finland compared to that in other European countries 
had an effect. Furthermore, concern for the effect of EU-membership on the welfare 
state also contributed to opposition to membership being relatively high on the far left, 
and low on the right.
However, it is when comparing income levels with attitude to membership that the 
biggest differences are found. People with high levels of income were much more likely 
to support membership than those on low levels. This is likely to be based in less 
reliance on the state for income, as well as a higher ability to, and belief in, benefiting 
from the internal market, perhaps especially the free movement of labour. In this respect 
it is also noteworthy that anti-EU voters were considerably more likely to view EU- 
membership as detrimental to their utility based on fears related to increased 
immigration.
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The EU-conflict has had some minor effects on the domestic Finnish party system. The 
FKF left government because it opposes EU-membership, and a small anti-EU party, the 
FFU, was formed. However, after the 1995 election less than ten percent of the seats in 
the Eduskunta were held by anti-EU parties. With a much higher proportion of Finns 
opposing membership and particularly further participation in European integration, it 
would appear to be rational for more parties to oppose membership. In particular, this 
goes for the CF and the VF, two thirds of whose supporters oppose membership, and the 
GF, half of whose do. However, at the 1994 referendum the CF remained pro­
membership, and the GF and the VF had no official position. However, these anomalies 
can be better understood when political parties are viewed as primarily office-seeking 
and the tendency towards broad coalitions is considered.
The framework employed here leads to two explanations for the limited impact of the 
EU-conflict on national election results. Using the cleavage model, this conflict neither 
corresponds very well with the left-right cleavage, or with the territorial cleavages. 
However, in Finland the left-right cleavage is of limited importance for government 
formation, as Table 5.4 above demonstrates. And the government that formed after the 
1995 election takes the ‘rainbow’ tendency of Finnish government formation further 
than ever before.
On the other hand, it could also be argued that other divisions are reinforced by the EU- 
dimension. The effect of this might just make the differences between certain parties too 
big for their taking part in the same government - such as the FKF and maybe the CF on 
one side and the NSP, the FSD and perhaps the SFF on the other. Furthermore, since the 
left-right and territorial cleavages appear to be of little importance for coalition
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formation, a new European dimension may have more impact than it would in a 
different party system.
The model derived from rational choice theory shows that it is in the interest of many 
voters and nearly all the parties to keep European integration issues away from the 
national elections arena. The ensuing off-loading takes place through employing the 
referendum, and through elections to the EP. This is, however, dependent upon the 
parties adhering to a relatively united position, and on the voters not demanding 
attention to EU-issues and representation for opposition to EU-membership and/or 
further integration.
If the EU dimension was to figure more prominently at national elections, both party 
unity and coalition participation could be jeopardised. Also, a strong focus on the EU 
dimension would make it harder for voters who do not agree with their party on this 
issue to decide how to vote. But many voters are likely to wish to express their opinion 
on European integration, and parties need to provide an outlet for this opinion. Hence, 
both parties and voters have an interest in off-loading the EU-conflict to référendums 
and EP-elections.
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Chapter 6. Norway; the Different Country.
"Norwegians cannot forget history, and there is not a single word which has a worse 
ring in Norwegian ears than Union.
6.1. Introduction.
Norway is unique in having rejected membership - twice - in what is now the EU. 
Membership in the EC was rejected in 1972, EU-membership in 1994. On both 
occasions a popular referendum^ was held, and on both occasions the margin of 
rejection was relatively small.
However, Norway has become part of the internal market of the EU through its 
membership in the EEA. This ties the country closely to the EU, and changes in EU 
policy that are connected to the internal market therefore also affect Norway.
The first section of this chapter provides an outline of Norway’s international relations 
since World War II in general, and of its relations with the EC/EU in particular. The 
effect on the utility of Norwegian voters emanating from EU-membership is addressed 
in section two. This is achieved by investigating a number of factors where membership 
can be argued to affect individual utilities. The importance of each factor is then 
assessed by employing data from surveys of the 1994 referendum and other sources.
1 Hambro, C. J.: Nordisk samarbeide eller Nordisk Rad. (Nordisk Kontakt, 2/1957, p. 
2). Quoted in Anderson (1967, p. 12).
2 Regarding the constitutional position and practice of référendums in Norway, see 
Appendix 6.1.
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Section three deals with the effect of the EU-conflict on the Norwegian party system. 
The most important feature of this is that parties previously able to co-operate take 
different - and sometimes opposite - positions on EU-membership. Therefore, coalition 
and co-operation patterns became considerably more complicated with the EU-conflict 
salient.
There are considerable differences in the difficulties faced by the parties with regard to 
the EU-conflict. Some enjoy a very high degree of correspondence in the views of 
various actors such as party members, party leadership, voters, and (potential) coalition 
or co-operation partners. This allows for a high level of synergy between the aims of 
office- and vote-maximisation. For other parties there is little or no correspondence in 
the views of these actors. It is for such parties that the EU-conflict causes the biggest 
problems.
The salience of the EU conflict causes massive problems in coalition formation on the 
centre-right. In particular, it makes it very difficult for the pro-EU H to co-operate with 
the anti-EU centrist parties. It also makes it difficult for the AP (who have, when in 
government, ruled alone since World War II) to find stable co-operation partners. Hence, 
it is in the interest of many of the parties to downgrade or remove the conflict from the 
national election agenda.
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6.2. A historical review of Norway's relations with the EC and the EU.
6.2.1. Norway’s international relations after World War H.
Two concerns have dominated Norway’s international relations since World War n. 
Firstly, security considerations have always been of great importance^. This is partly 
because of the experience of German occupation between 1940 and 1945, and partly 
because of the potential threat from Norway’s large neighbour to the east, the SU. 
Secondly, because Norway is very dependent upon trade with the external world, it is 
very important to ensure market access for Norwegian goods. In 1994, exports amounted 
to 31.6 percent of the Norwegian GDP^. By 1992, 66.4 percent of Norwegian exports 
were to the EU-12, with another 12.4 percent to the other three EU-applicants^. And the 
five most important trading partners are all in the EU, as Table 6.1 below shows.
Country Exports Imports
United Kingdom 20.7 10.4
Germany 12.1 13.9
Netherlands 9.5 4.2
Sweden 9.5 15.0
France 7.9 4.0
Total top five 59.7 47.5
Source: United Nations, 1995, p. 38.
^ Sæter (1993) argues that security interests are pivotal in Norway's considerations of 
regional integration. He also (1996, p. 136) holds that the main priority in Norwegian 
foreign and security policy since WWn has been NATO membership.
4 United Nations, 1995, p. 38.
^ Stortingsmelding nr. 40 (1993-1994, Kortversion, Utenriksdepartmentet) Source for 
data: Statistisk Sentralbyra.
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Parallel to the above concerns, external influences also affect Norwegian foreign policy. 
Like most small states, Norway has been forced to adapt its foreign policy to external 
conditions, rather than being in a position to influence the external environment in 
accordance with internal demands. Sæter^ expresses the view that Norway has always 
been a follower, rather than a leader, in matters of regional integration.
After World War II, Norwegian neutrality was regarded as unrealistic. A Scandinavian 
defence union was discussed in 1948, but this failed to materialise. This was partly 
because Denmark and Norway wanted such a union to have a Western military 
guarantee, and this was not acceptable to Sweden because of its neutrality^. But it was 
also a matter of Norwegian reluctance to be dependent upon Swedish military hardware 
for its defence. And there was still lingering resentment towards the past domination 
exercised by Sweden and Denmark^. Hence, in 1949 Norway joined NATO. This 
limited the scope of Nordic co-operation, and subordinated Norway's policy on Nordic 
integration to its NATO memberships.
Norway's options in trade policy were partly curtailed by the same concerns as those that 
applied to its security policy. Deeper Nordic co-operation was resisted, and in particular 
any proposal involving supranational elements. One important consideration was fear of 
Swedish domination of the Norwegian economy^®. It was this Norwegian political fear
6 1993, p. 21.
7 Sæter, 1993 pp. 21-22.
8 Anderson, 1967, p. 12.
9Sæter 1993, pp. 21-22.
Elder, Arter and Thomas, 1988, p. 2; Miljan, 1977, pp. 195-196; Straath, 1980, pp. 
109-110.
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of competition and supranational institutions that eventually caused the Nordic 
Economic Community, and the Nordek proposals ten years later (1968), to founder^ h
Although there were political reasons for not wanting a Nordic union or common 
market, economic reasons also weighed heavily on Norwegian minds. A Nordic 
conunon market would not have solved matters for Norway. A market of 20 million 
people is not a feasible alternative to one of 250 million. Hence, it was expected that 
Norway would follow the UK and Denmark into the EEC, if only on purely economic 
g r o u n d s N o r w a y ’s trade has traditionally been especially dependent upon Britain^^.
6.2.2. Norwav and European Integration 1961-1985.
Because of its trade dependence, Norway needed to secure access to the market 
represented by the EEC. In the 1960’s and early 1970’s important parts of the 
Norwegian economy - fisheries, manufacturing and shipping -  were more dependent 
upon the outside world than in any other Nordic country. Norway's policy on Europe has 
always focused on reducing trade barriers so as to increase access for these three
Miljan (1977 pp. 195-196) and Allen (1979, chapter 3).
12 Miljan, 1977, pp. 195-196. On Norwegian dependence upon the British position, see 
Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977, p. 21-23), Nelsen (1993, p. 46) and Sæther (1993, p. 22- 
23X
1  ^ In the period 1947-70 between fifteen and 23 percent of Norwegian exports were to 
Britain. Hence, Norway has followed Britain's applications for EC-membership. Also 
strong political and personal ties since World War II have been important, and it has 
been conunon practice to let Denmark decide before Norway (Gleditsch and Hellevik, 
1977, pp. 21-22). Miljan (1977), Udgaard and Nilsson (1993), and Nelson (1993) also 
observe that it has been common Norwegian practice to follow Britain in foreign policy 
questions.
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s e c to r s ^ 4  British and Danish intentions of joining the common market made this access 
even more important. Hence, after Britain and Denmark applied for membership in the 
EEC in 1961, Norway applied to join the next year.
The EEC debate in Norway began when Britain applied to join the organisation in July 
1961. Norway faced several obstacles to membership. Firstly, a constitutional 
amendment was needed to transfer powers to an international organisation. Secondly, 
Storting approval was needed for the application. Thirdly, the political parties had 
promised a referendum if Norway applied to join the EEC. Finally, EEC acceptance of 
the application was required.
The constitutional amendment, for which a 2/3ds majority is needed for a p p r o v a l w a s  
passed by 115 votes to 35 on March 8, 1962. The new paragraph 93 of the Norwegian 
Constitution requires a 3/4rs majority for the Storting to cede power to an international 
authority. Later that same year. Storting approval for the Norwegian application for EEC 
membership was secured by a majority of 113 votes to 27. The referendum did not take 
place at this time, however, as de Gaulle rejected British entry into the EC* .^
Britain again formally applied for full membership in May 1967. The Norwegian Borten 
government recommended to the Storting that Norway do the same. In July 1967 the 
Storting passed the membership proposal by 136 votes to 13. Again, the application was
14 Miljan, 1977, pp. 193-194.
1  ^Paragraph 112, The Constitution (‘Grunnlov’) of Norway.
1^ Nelson (1993, p. 46), Miljan (1977, pp. 200-206). On the vote over the full 
membership application, the parties voted as follows: the H 29-0 for, the NV 12-2 for, 
the AP 63-11 for, the NKRF 8-7 for, the SP 15-1 against, and the SV 2-0 against. This
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halted by France’s opposition to British membership, but this time Norway did not 
withdraw its application. Hence, when membership again became a possibility after the 
December 1969 Hague Summit, Norway was ready to negotiate. The Storting reaffirmed 
this on June 25, 1970, by a vote of 132 to seventeen^'^.
On January 22, 1972, Norway signed the Treaty of Accession with the existing EC 
members. In the advisory referendum on September 25 the turnout was 79.2 percent,
53.5 percent of whom voted ’no’ to membership in the EC.
In the aftermath of the referendum, the AP government resigned, as it had promised to 
do if membership was rejected. It was replaced by a minority coalition government 
consisting of the NV, the SP, and the NKRF, which negotiated a free trade agreement 
with the EC. This was signed in April 1973. There were other, and in the long term more 
serious, political repercussions from the referendum outcome. One of the most 
important was the split in, and decline of, NV. Arguably this had been a long-term trend, 
but the conflict over membership in the EC led to a split that would eventually take the 
party out of parliament altogether in 1985. The conflict also caused a split in AP, with a 
leftist minority joining the Socialist Electoral Alliance (SVF)^^ that later developed into 
the SV^ .^ The ensuing political turbulence also helped launch the NFRP^o.
vote was to be indicative of the battle lines of the future.
17 Nelsen (1993, pp. 48-49), Miljan (1977, pp. 209-210).
1  ^ The SVF consisted of the Socialist People’s Party (SF, later SV), Communists, AP 
defectors, and other assorted leftists.
See also Sogner and Archer (1995, pp. 391-394) regarding the party system effects of 
the conflict over EC-membership.
Madeley, 1994, p. 197.
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With a trade agreement with the EC and the developments in the North Sea, Norway 
seemed to function well without EC membership^*. The EC-issue was effectively buried 
for the next fifteen years. The issue had little or no effect on the political system in this 
period^z.
6.2.3. Norwav and European Integration 1985-1994.
When European integration resurfaced on the Norwegian political agenda, it was 
predictably again because of developments outside Norway. From the latter half of the 
1980’s onwards, adaptation to the single market became the official Norwegian 
government policy, insofar as this was permitted by the domestic political situation. 
However, it was stressed that co-operation with the EC should take place largely through 
EFT A, not bilaterally.
Since the early 1970’s, the range of options had narrowed considerably for Norway with 
regard to European co-operation. With Denmark an EC-member, and EFT A reduced to 
an extension of the EC through the EEA^^, Sæter^^ argues that alternative constellations 
and an exclusively unilateral approach had become unrealistic.
Sæter, 1993, p. 25.
22 The EC-issue was not seen as important for the outcome of the Storting elections 
held in 1977 or in 1981. (Valen and Aardal, 1983) In the 1985 election the issue was so 
unimportant that Valen and Aardal (1989) did not even mention it in their account of 
that election.
23 For Norway, the EEA also represented a convenient way of side-stepping the issue of 
full membership (Sæter, 1993, pp. 28-29).
24 1993, pp. 29-30.
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What eventually forced Norway’s hand and led to its 1993 application to join the EU 
were the membership applications of Austria (1989), Sweden (1992) and Finland 
(1992)25. If these three countries did Join the EU, EFT A would be reduced to an even 
smaller appendage to the EU, with a similar decline in status. Such a development also 
meant that three of the five Nordic countries would be EU-members.
The AP government (in power since 1990) promised to hold a referendum over EU 
membership once the negotiations were completed. This was duly held on November 
30, 1994. For a second time, the Norwegian people rejected membership, by a margin of 
52.2 percent to 47.8 percent, on an 89 percent turnout. This time there was no need to 
negotiate a trade agreement, since the EEA-Treaty already covered this. The government 
did not resign, and no parties formally split. But the conflict does appear to have led to 
changes in electoral support for individual parties. And it has had important effects on 
the government alternatives that exist in Norway. These issues will be discussed below.
6.3. Norwegian attitudes to European integration.
6.3.1. Common economic factors.
Norway’s net contribution to the EU budget would have been N.kr. 2.6 Bn. in 1995, 
increasing to 6.5Bn. by year 200026. Hence, this factor would have had a negative effect
Sogner and Archer (1995, p. 396) argue that the Finnish and Swedish applications, 
combined with the TEU and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
forced Norway to apply.
Stortingsmelding nr. 40 (1993-1994) Kortversion.
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on the average Norwegian’s utility. However, from the survey data analysed by 
Ringdap7 this argument ranked only as number eighteen among reasons to vote ‘no’.
The general taxation level has long been higher in Norway than the EU average. (See 
Table B.) However, the tax level has increased much faster in many EU member-states. 
Whilst the Norwegian tax level actually dropped by 0.8 percent between 1980 and 1990, 
the average tax level in the EC increased by nine percent over the same period.
With EEA membership exerting most of the same competitive pressures combined with 
this narrowing gap, the effect of EU membership on taxation would have been likely to 
be limited. However, because subsidies to agriculture are higher in Norway than they are 
in the EU, the reduction in this expense required by membership could lead to lower 
taxes. On the other hand, the ‘membership fee’ may have led to increased taxes. Overall, 
it was difficult for an individual to assess how his utility might have been affected in this 
respect. Thus effects on the tax level are likely to be a relatively unimportant factor for 
Norwegian attitudes to European integration. However, overall this factor might 
contribute to the left-right divide over EU-membership.
Although EEA membership should, in theory, have much the same effect as EU 
membership on the price level, agricultural subsidies would have had to be cut if 
Norway joined the EU. In theory this should lower the price level on food towards EU 
levels. Food prices were about twice as high in Norway as in the EU-member states
1995. Unless otherwise specified, numbers referring to arguments for and against 
EU-membership in this and the next three sub-sections are from this survey. The number 
given is in percent of the numbers of answers. With each person giving, on average, 2.2 
answers, the number of people using each argument will be correspondingly higher.
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around the time of the membership application^^. Import restrictions exist for all 
agricultural produce except sugar and tropical fruits^^. Table D shows the implicit tax 
levelled on the consumer due to agricultural subsidies in 1993. There was a substantial 
gap between the 60 percent tax in Norway and the 39 percent EC average. One effect of 
membership would have been that this tax would have dropped towards the EU-level.
Hence, for the average Norwegian, it was likely that his utility would have increased 
somewhat with respect to the price level. Cheaper food and alcohol ranks as the eleventh 
most important argument for joining the EU. Thus, these concerns appear to be of some, 
but limited importance.
In 1993 the Norwegian rate of unemployment was only just over half that of the EU 
average. (See Table C.) Risk aversion implies that for the average Norwegian this factor 
was likely to lower the utility of membership. Appendix 6.2 shows that of the arguments 
against membership ‘employment’ was the second most frequently mentioned argument. 
The same argument was ranked tenth as an argument for membership. However, in 
terms of the number of opponents and proponents of membership mentioning this as a 
reason for their voting behaviour in the referendum, the difference was quite small. This 
indicates uncertainty with regard to the effect of EU-membership on employment, but 
supports the idea that more people felt their utility would decline based on this factor, 
than increase.
Bulletin of the European Communities, 2/93, p. 15. 
29 Ingebritsen, 1995, p. 351 and note 3 p. 362.
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In Norway oil and gas are extremely important national resources. Oil and gas- 
production represents approximately l/7th of GNP, and 1/3 of export^o, and Norway is 
the second largest oil exporter in the world. An EU directive (EC/94/22) adopted in May 
1994, and accepted by the Storting in June 1994, for the first time confirmed member 
states’ sovereign rights concerning petroleum resources, and permits state determination 
of the pace of extraction^ f  Furthermore, Protocol 4 of the Accession Treaty, in addition 
to guaranteeing Norwegian jurisdiction over its petroleum resources, also recognised the 
right of state participation in the management of these r e s o u r c e s ^ ^
The same directive also introduced full competition into the Norwegian petroleum 
sector. Hence, the Norwegian State owned oil company, Statoil, and other Norwegian oil 
companies have thereafter faced competition for shares of licences for oil and gas 
extraction. Increased foreign involvement could lead to reduced activity in industry and 
activities related to this very important sector of the Norwegian economy, as products 
and services for the industry to a greater degree could be produced, and profits earned, 
outside the country. After this directive came into force, only about half of all goods- 
and service contracts related to the petroleum-industry have been awarded to Norwegian 
companies^^.
EEA-membership is likely to have the same effect as EU-membership in this respect, 
and so this directive should not have affected attitudes to EU-membership. However, the
Stortingsmelding nr. 40 (1993-1994), Kortversion.
31 Economist Intelligence Unit (4/1993, p. 10), CMA European Briefing note (June 
1995).
32 Stortingsmelding nr. 40, 1993-1994, pp. 186-187.
33 Olje- og energidepartmentet, http://odin.dep.no/oeed/publ/pfakta97/kap-0006.htm,
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timing of the directive in the run-up to the referendum is likely to have increased 
opposition to membership. Furthermore, for many people a vote against EU- 
membership was also a vote against EEA-membership, without which EU-directives 
would not apply to Norway. Considering the crucial importance of this industry for the 
Norwegian economy, many people are likely to view EU-membership as detrimental to 
their utility based on this factor.
This oil-wealth also gives Norwegians considerably more room to pursue high-spending 
policies such as massive agricultural subsidies, other subsidies, and a substantial welfare 
state, and still maintain very healthy state finances. “Oil and gas have been the basis for 
Norwegian economic wealth over the past 20 years, being a main reason why Norway 
has been able to pursue an independent economic p o l i c y . ” ^  ^ Similarly, Svâsand and 
Lindstrom^^ argue that the petroleum resources “was a sedative to Norway’s public 
debate about the fundamental consequences of a global economy”.
There is also a connection between the oil- and gas-industry and (un)employment. In 
1993, over 78,000 people were employed directly as a result of this industry^^. In all 
likelihood considerably more jobs, in sectors such as services and trade, are indirectly 
dependent upon the oil- and gas-industry. Hence, unemployment would most likely be 
considerably higher in Norway without this industry. Consequently, state finances would 
be less advantageous, and less money would be available for state spending. This again
28/1/98.
Sogner and Archer, 1995, p. 390.
35 1997, p. 208.
36 Olje- og Energidepartementet, Odin, Petro95. 6 Fastlandsaktiviteter or 
petroleumsforskning. (http://odin.dep.no/oed/publ/pfakta97/kap-0006.htm, 28/01/98/ p.
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puts Norway in a comparatively advantageous economic situation, and allows voters to 
consider other factors than economic ones when deciding on their opinion on EU- 
membership.
6.3.2. Common non-economic factors.
EU membership implies the transfer of power and decision-making from the national to 
the EU level in many policy-areas. The effect on individual utility emanating from this 
transfer per se, rather than of changes in policy resulting from this transfer, will vary 
according to a combination of two factors. Firstly, the value the individual assigns to 
which level legal authority and political power is vested. Secondly, whether and to 
which extent he (dis)approves of the specific form of European integration established 
by the EU. Unfortunately, the data collected by Jenssen and Valen et al. is organised so 
that arguments related to self-determination are grouped with arguments related to 
democracy (see Appendix 6.2). Nevertheless, because one in two 'no'-voters mention 
such arguments^^, it appears that a desire to retain power at the national level was an 
important argument against EU-membership. Norway’s history of domination by others 
is most likely an important reason for this.
For over 400 years (1375-1814) Norway was ruled from Denmark, and then for another 
91 (1814-1905) from Sweden. German occupation between 1940 and 1945 also forms 
part of this history of foreign domination. This history is likely to fuel resistance to 
voluntarily transferring power from the nation-state.
2 )
Ringdal, 1995, p. 51.
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Furthermore, the arguments related to ‘open’ government ‘close to the people’ outlined 
in Chapter 1 should not be underestimated as reasons for opposition to EU- 
membership38. Concerns about a likely detrimental effect on the quality of democracy 
were prevalent among opponents of EU-membership. As mentioned above, about half of 
these mentioned an argument linked to features of Norwegian democracy and self- 
government.
Conversely, one could argue that EU-membership increases influence and hence 
strengthens democracy. Indeed, the argument that ‘membership gives influence’ 
(together with ‘important to co-operate’) was the most frequently given argument for 
voting ‘yes’ (see Appendix 6.2 for data). This provides some support for the hypothesis 
set out in Chapter 1 that the effect of EU-membership is somewhat Janus-faced in this 
respect.
A remarkable degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity until recently set Norway apart 
from many European countries. If an individual takes the view that a more 
heterogeneous society would benefit his utility, then he might support EU-membership 
based on this factor, and vice versa.
It is of course difficult to assess how important these reasons are for attitudes towards 
European integration. However, fears of ‘losing our distinctive character’ ranked as the 
fifth most important reason for voting ‘no’ in the 1994 referendum. Furthermore, a
See, for example, leaflets published by Norwegian anti-EU organisations: Frihet - i 
en liten ume (Ungdom mot EU, Leaflet, 1994, Oslo); Norge og EU - Virkninger av
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category of argument including immigration and border controls ranked eight among 
such reasons. Conversely, ‘cultural fellowship’ (with other Europeans) ranked ninth 
among arguments for membership.
Security and peace concerns turn out to be among the most important arguments for 
membership. Security policy ranks second, and the EU’s ability to secure peace 
(together with conflict-resolution) eight. Norwegian EU-membership can only have a 
marginal effect in these areas. Therefore, it would seem that a morally driven desire to 
partake in the perceived security- and peace-promoting aspect of European integration is 
the reason for the prominence of these arguments. This may also have a background in 
history. When Germany invaded Norway in 1940, Norway had tried to establish itself as 
a neutral state, with very limited military resources. It then had to rely on other 
countries’ military forces to defeat the Nazi Empire in order to regain its freedom. 
Although preserving self-determination is a main reason for opposing EU-membership, 
the prevention of war in Europe and the effects of that on self-determination forms the 
other side of this argument.
Feelings of Nordic solidarity may affect Norwegian utility incomes in relation to EU 
membership. However, the significance of this factor has changed. The failure of Nordic 
integration, Denmark's EC-membership in 1973, and Swedish and Finnish membership 
in 1994 have shown that Nordic solidarity is somewhat limited. Appendix 6.2 shows 
that 99.6 percent of the 10.3 percent that mentioned Nordic unity as an important issue 
voted ‘yes’ in the 1994 referendum.
medlemskap i Den europeiske union (Nei til EU, Oslo, 1994).
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6.3.3. Group differentiated economic factors.
Subsidies to the agricultural sector would be dramatically affected by Norwegian EU- 
membership. At the time of the 1994 referendum, Norwegian agriculture was the most 
heavily subsidised in the world^^. At the same time, it employed 5.5 percent of the 
labour force, or about 110,000 people. Of these, agriculture was the primary source of 
income for 40 percent. Importantly, in one of every four municipalities agriculture 
constituted more than 50 percent of available e m p lo y m e n f ^ o  The Norwegian 
Agricultural Research Institute has estimated that EU-membership would reduce 
employment in farming from 70, 000 man-years to 15-30, 000, and that agricultural 
activity in peripheral areas might be reduced by 90-95 percent'^h
The CAP is much more market oriented than Norway’s very protectionist agricultural 
p o l i c i e s ^2 Thus, because agricultural subsidies would eventually be reduced in the event 
of EU-membership, such membership would have a negative effect on the utility of 
farmers generally^^. Appendix 6.3 provides ample evidence that this was indeed the 
view taken by most farmers. Nine out of ten farmers voted ‘no’ in the 1994 referendum
The Economist, 21/8/1993 (source: OECD). At close to US$ 1000 per head of 
population, agricultural subsidy per capita was then more than twice as high in Norway 
compared to the EC and OECD averages.
Http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~oskar/norway/nor_eu.html, 14/10/97, p. 3.
41 Nersten, N. K.: The impact of a new agricultural policy (Norwegian Agricultural 
Research Institute, Oslo, 1993). From Ingebritsen, 1995, p. 360.
42 Ingebritsen, 1995, pp. 351-352.
43 In a leaflet issued in May 1994, the Norwegian Farmers’ Organisation argues that 
various types of farmers will all have their incomes dramatically reduced if Norway 
joins the EU. According to their calculations, this is entirely due to direct subsidies and 
artificially high price levels in Norway compared to the EU. (Norges Bondelag, 1994)
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(see Appendix 6.3.). In fact, there was probably not another substantial group of people 
that was as partisan with regard to this question.
But these adverse effects of EU-membership affect more than those directly employed in 
agriculture. Rural Norway is so heavily subsidised by the State that the reduction in 
subsidies demanded by EU-membership would most likely lead to the collapse of a large 
number of rural communities. Indeed, Norwegian agricultural policy specifically aims 
for the facilitation of a dispersed settlement pattern by supporting the viability of rural 
areas^.
Four and a half percent of the labour force, about 90,000 people, have full employment 
in farming related industries such as food processing, dairy, and forest industries'^^. A 
decline in Norwegian agriculture would also lead to a decline for such industries. With 
lower employment, lower incomes and most likely population decline; people living in 
areas where farming and related industries are important would generally see their utility 
income drop as a result of membership. The very distinct attitude of farmers is also 
likely to influence that of the people around them. Thus, considerably higher opposition 
to membership would be expected in rural areas compared to the country at large.
Urban areas provide the clearest contrast with farming areas. The vast majority of the 
urban population is unlikely to be directly negatively affected by detrimental effects on 
primary industries. Furthermore, it is quite likely that EU membership, by opening up
Ingebritsen, 1995, p. 351.
Http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~oskar/norway/nor_eu.html, 14/10/97, p. 3.
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for imports and forcing Norwegian farmers to become competitive or perish, would lead 
to lower prices for food. This would increase the utility of most urban dwellers.
The Accession Treaty stipulated that in the Norwegian case, the regions covered by 
Objective 6 were the four northernmost counties: Nord-Tr0ndelag, Nordland, Troms and 
Finmark^^. Norway would also have received funds from Objectives 2 and 5b, but it was 
not entirely clear which areas these would cover. The indicative commitment 
appropriation for Norway was 769 Million ECU for the period 1995-1999 for Objectives 
1 to 5b, and 368 Million ECU for Objective 6^ '^ . Based on this factor the utility of people 
living in northern and rural areas can be expected to increase as a result of membership.
However, these funds would not compensate for much of the loss of agricultural 
subsidies. Furthermore, the future status of these funds, especially considering the EU 
enlargement into Eastern Europe, is very uncertain. Moreover, rural counties also 
receive considerable higher transfers from central government than do most urban areas, 
as shown in Appendix 6.4. Competitive pressures resulting from the internal market, EU 
competition policy and future EU legislation and regulation are all potential threats to 
such transfers.
Territorial conflicts are of both historical and current importance in Norwegian 
politics^^. Many authors argue that urban-rural and centre-periphery conflicts offer the
46 Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6, (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 355.)
47 Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6, (Official Journal of the European 
Conununities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 356.)
48 See for example Bj0rklund (1988), Valen and Martinussen (1972), Valen and Aardal
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best explanation of the differences in attitudes to EU membership among the Norwegian 
populations^. However, most of these authors do not attempt to explain why these 
conflicts appear to exist, beyond referring to historical factors and observed 
geographical differences in voting patterns. In contrast, the above arguments 
demonstrate that such differences are likely to exist largely because of the effects of 
European integration on narrow economic self-interest.
Appendix 6.3 shows there are substantial differences in attitudes to EU-membership 
between rural and urban areas, and also between the central area around Oslo and the 
rest of Norway county-wise. The general trend is for opposition to Norwegian EU 
membership to increase the further away from Oslo a county is situated. Overall in the 
1994 referendum, only just over 30 percent of the rural population voted 'yes'.
Even in most of the ’no’ counties (see Appendix 6.3) there were clear ’yes’ majorities in 
urban areas. For example, in Stavanger in Rogaland the 'yes’-vote was 57.6 percent, in 
Hamar in Hedmark 60.3 percent, in Kristiansund in M0re og Romsdal 56.7 percent, and 
in Trondheim in Spr-Trpndelag 53.8 percent^^.
(1983), Valen (1981, 1986) and Valen, Aardal and Vogt (1990).
See for example Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977), Miljan (1977), Nelsen, (1993), 
Aardal (1994a). In fact, it was impressions from the debate about Norwegian 
membership in 1962-63 that inspired Rokkan's original contribution (Rokkan and Valen, 
1964) to the cleavage model. (Jenssen, Listhaug and Pettersen, 1995, p. 144)
Source: referendum results in the Norwegian newspaper Klassekampen November 
30, 1994.
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In Northern Norway^ ^ and two other counties these effects are reinforced by the 
importance of the fisheries industry. Because EU membership would include 
participation in the common European Fisheries Policy (EFF), one could argue that this 
could be detrimental to the interest of Norwegians dependent upon this industry for 
employment and income. The reason for this is that they might be required to share more 
of this resource with people from other EU countries. Although EU membership would 
only lead to a minor loss of fish quotas, Norway would lose national control over 
fisheries policies, and the requirement of Norwegian citizenship for the ownership of a 
Norwegian fishing vessel would only be retained for a three and a half years transitional 
period. Hence, the fishermen’s organisations rejected the deal^^
In all but five counties, the fishery industry employs less than 0.6 percent of the 
population. But in Sogn og Fjordane and Mpre og Romsdal counties in Western 
Norway, and in Northern Norway, the fishery industry employed between 2.5 and over 
six percent of the population in 1993 (see Appendix 6.4). These counties are also five of 
the six with the lowest ‘yes’ vote in the 1994 referendum. For Sogn and Fjordane, this is 
in addition to this county having more farms per capita than any other county. Large 
sections of the population of counties dependent upon primary industries had good 
reasons to object to EU-membership because they are dependent upon public subsidies 
and national control over resources for their income. The data in Appendices 6.4 and 6.3 
provides substantial evidence for this conclusion.
Nordland, Troms and Finmark.
Sogner and Archer, 1995, pp. 397-399.
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The Norwegian welfare state’s social expenditure has been relatively high compared to 
the EU average, as Table F shows. Protection of the welfare state has been argued to 
have been an important argument against m e m b e r s h ip s ^  Much of the campaign 
literature from the 'no' side in the referendum campaign also focused strongly on this 
issueS4.
Membership in the EU would not necessarily entail a reduction in Norwegian welfare 
state provisions. However, based on comparison, one might conclude that because the 
level of public sector social spending is lower in the EU, membership would lead to 
pressure for a reduction in Norwegian public spending. Moreover, the logic of European 
integration and future developments in social policy could also lead to changes or 
reductions in the Norwegian welfare state provisions. Also, it could be argued that in 
order to remain competitive in the internal market, taxation and hence public 
expenditure levels would have to fall. For these reasons, it is likely that those who 
benefit disproportionately financially from an extensive welfare state would have their 
utility reduced if Norway were to join the EU, and vice versa.
Chapter 3 explains why public employees and the poorer sections of the population have 
a particular interest in maintaining an extensive welfare state. The data displayed in 
Appendix 6.3 shows that those employed in the public sector were considerably less 
inclined to support membership than those employed in the private sector. The same 
appendix also shows that the wealthier sections of the population were dramatically 
more likely to vote ‘yes’ to EU-membership than the poorer sections.
Ringdal, 1995.
E.g. Bj0m0y (1994), 'Frihet i en liten ume', 'Ja til folkestyre', 'Farvelvelferd'.
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The Norwegian welfare state benefits women disproportionately, both as recipients and 
as employees^^. The welfare state is the biggest employer of women in Norway^^. 
Overall, 44 percent of women worked in the public sector in Norway by 1992, compared 
to only 22 percent of men^ "^ . Women also tend to be less well paid than men, at 63.4 
percent of male pay in 1991^ .^ Norwegian women also benefit from long and well-paid 
maternity leave, as Table G shows. “The future of the welfare state loomed large in the 
campaign, mobilising women employees to its perceived defence.”^^  Compared to the 
situation for men, women’s income, employment and career prospects were all more 
likely to be adversely affected by EU membership.
The effects of cuts in state spending would be reinforced in Northern Norway. The 
population of the northern part of Troms and all of Finmark (the two northernmost 
counties) has since 1990 enjoyed considerable subsidies not available to other 
Norwegians, totalling about N.Kr. IBn in 1997^ ®. Student loans are reduced by ten 
percent for each year of residence^\ income taxes are lower, employers are exempted 
from social security contributions, child benefits are higher, and electricity duty is 
r e d u c e d ^ ^  jn addition, 50 percent of employment in inner Finmark is in the public
Bj0m0y, 1994.
The Norwegian Newspaper Dagbladet, 28/9/95. In 1994, women working for the 
public sector in Norway made up more than 20 percent of the workforce. (The British 
newspaper The Independent, 27/11/94).
Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 87.
Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 92.
59 Wyller, 1996, p. 147.
The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 1/4/97.
Aftenposten, 21/8/95.
Aftenposten, 1/4/97.
295
sector, in outer Finmark it is 36 percent^^, both considerably higher than the countrywide 
average. These two counties recorded the two highest ‘no’-votes at the 1994 referendum 
in percentage terms.
Norway has long been a trading nation and is still very dependent upon trade. As 
documented above, much of this is with EU-members. Thus, it is crucial for Norway to 
secure access to the market represented by the EU and to avoid restrictions such as 
duties and other trade barriers. Because EEA-membership is a less stable way to ensure 
such access, EU- membership can be expected to increase the utility of those whose 
income is dependent upon international trade. After the rejection of EU-membership, the 
large industrial group Norsk Hydro abandoned a Nkr. nine Billion plan to expand and 
modernise its four Norwegian aluminium smelting plants^. This factor probably 
contributed to the gap in attitude towards EU-membership between the public and the 
private sector.
There is no comprehensive direct data available that enables analysis of the attitude of 
people dependent upon exports compared to those who are not. However, the most 
spectacular result of the whole 1994 referendum was probably that in the town of Ârdal 
in Sogn og Fjordane county. This is a very rural and strongly anti-membership county, 
yet in Ârdal the 'yes'-vote was 69.7^^ percent. This town is extremely dependent upon 
metal-exports from its heavy industry. The denizens therefore had a strong incentive to 
vote 'yes' in order to secure market access for these products.
Aftenposten, 1/4/97.
Thomas, 1996, p. 23.
The Norwegian newspaper Klassekampen, 30/11/94.
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6.3.4. Group differentiated non-economic factors.
It is argued in Chapter 3 that ideological support for the welfare state is likely to be 
higher on the political left than on the right. Thus, if EU-membership is seen as leading 
to reductions in welfare state provisions, then this is likely to reduce support for 
membership on the political left. The data in Appendix 6.3 provides some support for 
this idea. Support for membership in the 1994 referendum was low among SV voters, 
high among H voters, and above average among NFRP voters. Based on individual data, 
Aardal has shown that those who identify themselves as on the left show a strong 
tendency to be against EU-membership, and that this tendency remains strong in a 
multivariate analysis^^.
Furthermore, this factor is likely to form part of the explanation for the territorial 
differences in attitude to EU-membership. Appendix 6.5 shows that where the far left 
was strong at the previous parliamentary election (Northern Norway, inland Eastern 
Norway), so was the anti-EU vote. Generally, however, there is no consistent 
geographical pattern between voting for the parties of the left and attitude to EU- 
membership. This is partly due to the centre parties representing many of those who 
oppose EU-membership for more materialistic reasons, and related factors such as 
belonging to the counter-cultures (see below).
66 Aardal, 1995.
297
In 1994, women were very well represented at the top level of Norwegian politics, with 
the Prime Minister and six other ministers (out of seventeen) being female^^, and over 
forty percent of the Storting representatives also women. This is very visible, and an 
obvious contrast to most other (non-Nordic) European countries. This situation is, at 
least partly, due to conscious policies promoting women to such positions, including 
discrimination against men in political nomination processes and in higher education. 
Such discrimination would most likely not be allowed if Norway were to join the EU. 
Another factor is the Catholic influence in the EU which may adversely affect liberal 
legislation on abortion and divorce, if these become EU-level decisions in the future.
Together with the economic factors mentioned above, this makes it likely that more 
women than men would view EU-membership as negative for their utility. The data 
displayed in Appendix 6.3 shows that considerably more women than men voted ‘no’ in 
the 1994 referendum.
The three counter-cultures were a manifestation of cultural and religious resistance to 
the dominance of the central national elites. They were directed against the standards 
and practices seen to be spreading from the central areas and the cities. They symbolise 
the defence of rural values against the centralising forces triggered by economic 
development and the strengthening of governmental agencies. Importantly, they have all 
been given a disproportionately high support in the South and the West since the 
emergence of mass politics.
67 Heidar, 1994, pp. 389-390.
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Opposition to EU-membership is arguably another manifestation of ’counter-culture’ 
politics. And at least two of the counter-cultures could be negatively affected by BU- 
membership. It is highly likely that EU membership would eventually lead to a 
relaxation of the restrictive Norwegian alcohol legislation. And the Catholic influence in 
the EU is likely to be an argument against membership among orthodox Lutherans 
associated with the revivalist organisations.
As Appendix 6.3 shows, few people who belong to the language and abstinence counter­
cultures appear to have supported EU membership. However, only just over ten percent 
of the population are neo-Norwegian speakers, and the non-drinkers make up a small 
minority of the population. As for the orthodox Lutherans, they appear to have a similar 
attitude to membership as the population at large. They also make up a very small part 
of the population. Thus, the importance of the traditional counter-cultures should not be 
exaggerated. However, the anti-EU attitude prevalent in the counter-cultures is likely to 
have reinforced other divisions between rural and urban areas, and to have increased the 
‘no’-vote in the Southwest.
6.4. Party system effects.
The conflict over European integration in Norway has two important implications for 
the political system. Firstly, its effect on voting behaviour has led to substantial 
fluctuations in the levels of support enjoyed by certain political parties. Secondly, the 
division over European integration has affected the potential for co-operation and 
coalitions between the parties.
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The salience of the EU-conflict began to increase in the mid-1980s, when it was 
becoming clear that the government was re-considering its relationship with the EC. The 
debate over the EEA-Treaty increased the salience of this conflict. Valen^^ argues that 
the EU question resurfaced on the political agenda in 1989. It has dominated Norwegian 
politics since 1990, even at the level of local elections in 1991. Election results and the 
changes in (potential) coalition alternatives provide the clearest evidence of the 
increased salience of the EU-conflict since then (see below).
One might have expected the referendum in 1994 to have removed the EU-conflict from 
the Norwegian political agenda. There are several reasons for why this has not 
happened. Most importantly, Norway remains a member of the EEA. As such it has to 
abide by all internal market legislation issued by the EU. Hence, any controversial EU 
internal market legislation is likely to cause conflict, since the parties disagree on how to 
deal with the EEA-membership as well (see below). Other potential problems include 
how to deal with EMU.
The Schengen Treaty, aiming at the realisation of free movement within the EU, is 
another likely conflict area. The Nordic countries already practice open borders among 
themselves. Because Denmark, Finland and Sweden are all EU-members, the 
implementation of the Schengen Treaty threatened to reintroduce passport-controls on 
the Norwegian border. The AP government managed to negotiate a special arrangement 
for Norway.
68 1994.
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Norway signed up to join the Schengen Group in June 1997. Only the H and the NFRP 
supported AP in this. This is likely to become more controversial after the EU agreed, in 
Amsterdam later the same month, to bring the Schengen Treaty into the EU proper. “The 
discussion on EU-adaptation and full membership seems to have become a normal part 
of the Norwegian political process.”^^
As Table 6.3 below shows, there has never been any sustained period of popular 
majority support for Norwegian EU membership.
Table 6.2: Position on EU membership among the Norwegian people.
Yes 18.2 3 ia  ; 34.2 25J 24 47.8
No 67.9 46.6 * 40.9 50 52.3 5 2 j
Undecided 13.9 2E8 24.9 24.3 23.7
Sources: 1981, 1989 and 1991: Election studies. Nov-92, Sep-93, Dec-93, Jun-94: 
average of monthly opinion polls by MMl, Opinion, and Norsk Gallup; all referred to in 
Jenssen and Valen (1995).
There is also considerable opposition to membership among the members and leaders of 
the Norwegian political parties. However, this is notably lower than the popular 
opposition. As can be seen from Table 6.3 below, the anti-EU parties combined (among 
those with parliamentary representation) received 37.7 percent of the vote, and a similar 
share of seats (35.7 percent) in the 1993 national elections. In the vote (November 19, 
1992) on whether or not to apply for membership in the EU, 104 members of the 
Storting voted ‘yes’, and 54 ‘no’^ o There is thus a considerable gap between public
Sæter, 1996, p. 134. See also Madeley (1994, p. 201).
One member of the AP voted ‘no’ by mistake, six others who were absent would all 
have voted ‘yes’. All the representatives of the SV and the SP voted ‘no’, as did the 
majority of the NKRF representatives and fifteen members of the AP. The ‘yes’- 
majority consisted of the rest of the AP, two representatives of the NKRF, and all of the
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opinion and the (official) opinion of the parties and individual members of the Storting. 
Similarly, on the vote in the ‘Odelsting’, comprising 2/3ds of the Storting members, on 
whether there should be a referendum over membership, the result was 67-32 for^h The 
minority voted against in the knowledge that they could block membership in a 
parliamentary vote. The voting patterns were similar in the vote ratifying the EEA- 
Treaty?-, although this anangement has consistently enjoyed considerably higher 
popular support than EU-membership.
The final negotiation result was debated in the Storting on April 26-27, 1994, but not put 
to the vote because it had already been decided to put the matter to a referendum?^. 
Thus, the best guide to the parliamentary opinion remains the official party positions 
combined with the vote on the application. Both of these show under-representation of 
opponents of membership.
Table 6.3. Official position on EU-membership by party and support in percent by party 
at last parliamentary election before the 1994 referendum.
Oppose Oppose
7.9
Support
36.9
Oppose
16.7
Oppose
7.9 e
Oppose
3.6
Support
17X)
Support
6.3
Support = support membership as defined by the TEU. Sources: 1993 election: 
Petersson (1993). EU-position: Party Programmes, Jahn and Storsved (1995a, 1995b).
representatives for the H and the NFRP. (Nordisk Kontakt, 11/1992, pp. 87-88)
Law Number 69, 1994, on referendum over the question of whether Norway should 
become a member of the EU. This was voted over 15/6/94. All members for the SP and 
SV voted against, as did six out of seven NKRF representatives. (Personal 
correspondence with Ms. Lotte Grepp Knutsen of the Storting Archive, February 1998)
The vote was held 16/10/92. The overall vote was 131 for and 34 against. The 
majority was made up of 61 AP, all 36 H, 21 NFRP, the one FFF, and eleven NKRF 
representatives. The minority consisted of all eleven SP, all seventeen SV, three NKRF, 
one NFRP, and two AP representatives. (Personal correspondence with Ms. Lotte Grepp 
Knutsen of the Storting Archive, February 1998.)
Personal correspondence with Ms. Lotte Grepp Knutsen of the Storting Archive, 
February 1998.
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There is also a sub-dimension arising from EEA-membership. The NV, the NKRF, the 
AP, the H, and the NFRP support this, the other parties oppose it. A similar division 
exists with regard to the propensity for using the veto on EEA-legislation. This sub­
dimension has the potential to create additional co-operation problems on the centre- 
right.
In an election survey of the 1989 parliamentary election, Valen”^  ^ found that Norway’s 
relationship with the EC was mentioned as an important issue by 52 percent of SP voters 
and fourteen percent of H voters. This represented important issue number one and 
number five for the two parties’ voters respectively. Overall, this issue was mentioned 
by ten percent of voters. However, it did not seem to affect the election result to any 
substantial degree'^ .^ A transition matrix based on a survey of the election^^ shows no 
evidence of the EU-issue having influenced anything more than a very small number of 
individual vote transfers between the parties. Aardal^^ argues that the EU-issue did not 
return to the agenda until the 1993 election.
By the 1993 parliamentary election, the question of EU membership had become the 
most important issue. "Above all, the political debate [preceding the election] had been 
dominated by the question of Norway's entry into the European Union (EU)."'^  ^ It was
74 1990, p .  284
75 The AP official platform at this election remained the result of the 1972 referendum, 
as it would otherwise risk losing votes to the SV (Sæter, 1996, p. 141).
Aardal, 1990, p. 156.
77 1994a.
78 Valen, 1994, p. 169. See also Wyller (1996, p. 141, 143).
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selected by 65 percent of voters as their most important concem'^^. Large numbers of 
voters switched parties at the 1993 election based on their position on EU- 
membership^o. A transition matrix based on a survey of the election^! showed that half 
of the pro-EU SV-voters switched to the AP, and that a quarter of anti-EU AP-voters 
switched to anti-EU parties, as did a third of anti-EU H-voters. Furthermore, some anti- 
EU NV- and NKRF-supporters switched to the more anti-EU SP and SV. The most anti- 
EU party, the SP, increased its share of the vote from 6.5 percent in 1989 to 16.7 percent 
in 1993.
At the 1993 election there was no credible alternative to an AP government, due to the 
salience of the EU-dimension^^. "The non-socialist (bourgeois) parties [...] were hardly 
on speaking terms in this e l e c t i o n . I n  1993 the previous coalition partners the H and 
the SP were clearly opposing each other over the issue of Norwegian EU m e m b e r s h ip s ^
Other effects of the EU-conflict included de-selection of candidates based on their 
position on EU-membership in the nomination process before the 1993 election. This 
included the sitting pro-EU Storting member for Aust-Agder and the NKRF, Helga 
Haugenss. There were also high-level defections based on the EU-dimension. In mid-
Aardal, 1994a, pp. 176-177. When divided by party, the figures were 81 percent for 
SV-voters, with the corresponding numbers 55 for the AP, 65 for the NV, 58 for the 
NKRF, 89 for the SP, 60 for the H, and 42 for the NFRP.
See Valen (1994) and Aardal (1994a) for detailed explorations of this.
81 Valen, 1994, p. 177.
82 For a similar example from Ireland, see Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 2-6).
83 Aardal, 1994a, p. 175.
84 Aardal, 1994a, p. 175.
85 Nordisk Kontakt, 12/1992, p. 77.
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December 1992, Inge Staldvik, Storting-representative for the AP in Nord-Tr0ndelag, 
joined the SV-group in the Storting^^.
At the 1997 Storting election, the EU-conflict again prevented the old allies on the 
centre-right from forming a coalition. The NV, the NKRF and the SP formed an 
alliance, the Centre Alternative (CA), excluding the H, which went on to form the 
governments^. There were also massive changes in voting patterns at this election, with 
the SP-vote halved, continuing decline for the H, the NKRF-vote nearly doubling, and 
the NFRP more than doubling its share of the voters. This disruption to voting pattern is 
likely to be connected to disruptions to voter loyalty caused by the FU-conflict. So far, 
the 1994 rejection of FU-membership has not removed the FU-conflict from the 
Norwegian political agenda.
6.4.1 The extent to which the FU-conflict crosscuts other cleavages.
The left-right cleavage is normally dominant in Norwegian politics. A party’s position 
on this axis tends to define its coalition partners, and often also which parties a minority 
government will seek parliamentary support from. Figure 6.1 indicates how the relevant 
parties place on the left-right dimension.
Figure 6.1. The left-right cleavage in Norway.
I NKRF ISP c . i N V  11.20 B
86 Nordisk Kontakt, 12/1992, pp. 77-78.
87 The effects of the EU-conflict on government formation and coalition-alternatives are 
covered in more detail below.
For the importance of the FU-dimension at this election, see Bjugan (1998).
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Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, pp. 277-278. Scores based on average expert scores of 
party leaders’ attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership (1) vs. cutting 
tax/anti-public ownership (20). The RVA was not part of this exercise, and its placement 
is based on its party program. The NV score is based on the average of the scores for the 
NV and the DLF before the reunification.
Territorial dimensions are normally secondary in the Norwegian party system. These can 
be operationalised in a variety of ways. The urban-rural dimension is probably the most 
important one, and the one that most obviously can be described as a cleavage. 
Crucially, it crosscuts the left-right cleavage, as Figure 6.2 shows.
Figure 6.2. The urban-rural cleavage in Norway.
m n n
RVA NFRP AP 7.72 SV NV NKRF 14.72 SP 18.61
4.25 5.39" 11.06 11.47
Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, p. 279. Scores based on average expert scores of party 
leaders’ attitude towards urban interests. (1 = pro, 20 = anti).
The SP and the NKRF are the most obviously rural parties, the RVA and the H the most 
urban. This dimension dramatically crosscuts the left-right cleavage. The distance 
between the H and the centre parties on this dimension illustrates the potential for co­
operation problems between these parties. The centre parties remain the defenders of the 
interests of rural Norway, just as ‘Venstre’ was at the turn of the century. Conversely, 
the H is predominately the defender of urban and business interests. In terms of electoral 
support, operationalised as a centre/periphery ratio, the parties place in a very similar 
manner, as shown in Appendix 6.6.
Of other territorial differences, the most important one is the consistently and 
disproportionately high support for the centre parties in Western and Southern Norway,
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and a corresponding weakness for these parties in the capital area. The H remains 
considerably stronger in the capital area compared to the rest of the country^^.
The conflict over European integration also crosscuts the left-right cleavage. Figure 6.3 
below indicates party positions on European integration.
Figure 6.3 Party position on EU-membership at the 1994 referendum in Norway.
Pro-EU Anti-EU
@AP
Figure based on party positions. Sources: Party programmes and Jahn and Storsved 
(1995, p. 27).
This dimension has very little in common with the left-right dimension. It also appears 
to crosscut the urban-rural cleavage, albeit to a lesser extent. However, all the parties 
including and to the right (figuratively) of NV are against EU-membership. The NV and 
the NKRF are in a central position on this dimension because they are for EEA- 
membership, the SV^o, the RVA and the SP are against this^f Thus, in terms of attitude
In the four counties of Western Norway the three parties of the CA combined polled 
about 37 percent on average at the 1997 election, with the left (Labour, the SPP and the 
REA) trailing with around 35 percent. In the South these two ‘blocks’ are about equal in 
strength. But in the capital area (Oslo plus the surrounding county of Akershus) the left 
out-polled the CA by three to one (44 percent to 15 percent). The H-vote in Oslo was 
about 50 percent above its national average. (Source: 1997 election results in 
Aftenposten, http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/valg97/backup/land.htm, 18/9/97.) 
Author’s calculations.
As of July 1996, all SV representatives in the Storting had voted against EEA- and 
EU-membership at all relevant votes. (Personal correspondence with Rolf A. Vestvik, 
political adviser for the SV.)
Furthermore, the SP stated that its representatives in the Storting would vote against 
membership even if the 1994 referendum result was a ‘yes’ majority. The SV qualified 
its stance with the assertion that there had to be a ‘yes’-vote in a majority of counties for 
its Storting representatives to support membership. The other parties stated that they 
would respect the referendum outcome. Also, before the 1993 election the RVA, the SV 
and the SP wanted Norway to withdraw its EC-application. After the election the NKRF 
joined this position (Nordisk Kontakt, 10/1993, p. 64).
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towards EU-membership, all the ‘rural’ parties are against, with a more mixed picture 
among the ‘urban’ parties. The latter parties are divided on the EU-question similarly to 
where their position is on the left-right cleavage.
The EU-conflict creates immense coalition and co-operation problems between parties 
that were previously able to co-operate. In particular, the division over European 
integration on the centre-right has rendered any coalition including both the SP and the 
H virtually impossible. Any government including both centre parties and the H would 
find it very difficult to remain in government whenever any EU-related issue is on the 
agenda. In addition, the division between the far left (RVA and SV) and the centre-left 
(AP) is reinforced by this conflict.
The EU-conflict constitutes a political cleavage in Norway. In section two of this 
chapter it was established that the EU-conflict creates an observable conflict of interest 
between those whose utility is increased through EU-membership and those for whom it 
declines. It has also been demonstrated that substantial numbers of people appear to 
perceive this conflict of interest as important. Finally, the conflict has had substantial 
effects on the Norwegian party system, affecting both relative distributions of votes 
between the parties and coalition patterns.
6.4.2 The potential for vote-maximisation based on the conflict over European 
integration.
The H is unlikely to profit in terms of votes from making a shift to an anti-EU position. 80 
percent of the party’s voters supported EU-membership at the 1994 referendum. However,
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anti-EU voters who would otherwise vote for the H can switch their vote with relative ease 
to the centrist anti-EU parties without thereby supporting other policies they disagree 
fundamentally with. This makes the salience of the EU-conflict problematic for the H in 
vote maximisation terms.
About 1/3 of the AP’s voters rejected EU-membership in the 1994 referendum. Their 
potential voters can also easily find anti-EU alternatives both to the left and to the right. 
Hence, vote-maximisation on this issue is problematic for AP, although it would appear 
that more votes would be at risk with an anti-EU stance.
For the NKRF and the SP, the pursuit of anti-EU voters is the most rational option. The 
vast majority of their voters objected to membership in 1994. In addition, their core­
voters (farmers and rural people in general) are largely anti-EU. This situation makes a 
pro-EU position virtually impossible, no matter what other concerns these parties have.
For the NV, the position is somewhat more complicated, with its voters divided down 
the middle.
At the 1993 election, the SP benefited greatly from its anti-EU stance. "The gains of the 
Centre Party can only be explained in terms of the strong anti-EU sentiments among 
Norwegian voters. The main factor behind this remarkable surge was the increased 
salience of the EU (European Union) i s s u e .  "92
For the SV, an anti-EU position is easily the more attractive option. In the 1994 
referendum, about 80 percent of its voters voted ‘no’. The party should also be well
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positioned to gain anti-EU voters from AP. However, it appears that the SV has not been 
able to capitalise on its anti-EU position in terms of votes.
A potential reason for why the SP benefited more from being a ‘no’ party than the SV is 
that the former "carried on the most uncompromising battle against the EU"^^. That is, 
the party was completely unambiguous on this issue, it was very clear what its position 
was. Hence, a vote for the SP could virtually be said to be a vote against EU 
membership.
However, the SP did not appear to benefit from its strong anti-EU stance at the 1997 
election. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, off-loading the issue of membership to 
the referendum-arena succeeded in lowering the salience of the EU-issue among voters 
(although not at the political elite level). Secondly, the SP’s primary aim at this election 
was to gain office. Therefore, it could not focus strongly on its anti-EU position, since 
this would put it in an untenable position if office was achieved. The party would then 
be obliged to follow this up in government. Such a position would make the coalition 
with the less anti-EU NV and NKRF and co-operation with other parties more difficult. 
Furthermore, any Norwegian government needs to co-operate and negotiate with the EU, 
and this would be more difficult with a publicly very intransigent and hostile position 
towards European integration.
For the NFRP positioning on this issue for vote-maximisation purposes is very 
complicated. In the 1994 referendum, about 60 percent of its voters supported EU
Aardal, 1994a, pp. 177-178.
93 See Valen (1994, p. 177).
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membership. The party tends to trade voters with most of the other parties, but mainly 
with the H and, to a lesser extent, the AP^ .^ Therefore, its vote-maximising position 
would depend upon the stances of these two parties and the position of their voters in 
particular. However, although they are both pro-EU, the number of anti-EU voters in the 
H is low, and the centre-parties are probably better placed to pick up anti-EU voters 
from both the H and the AP. Furthermore, other issues (crime, health, immigration) are 
probably better vote-winners for the NFRP. In addition, NFRP voters appear to be the 
least concerned about the EU of all voters^^. Thus, on the EU-dimension, other concerns 
than vote-maximisation are likely to be more important for this party.
Overall, the Norwegian parties’ positions on the EU-dimension appear to be rational 
based on vote-maximisation concerns. With pro- and anti-EU parties both on the left 
and in the centre, and the lower popular and no party opposition to membership on the 
right, there seems to be few votes to be gained for any party by changing position.
6.4.3 Coalition problems and considerations.
Table 6.4 below shows the make-up of Norwegian governments since 1971. As 
Appendix 6.6 demonstrates, no single party has held a majority in the Storting since 
then. Hence, all governments have either been coalition (minority or majority) or single 
party minority government.
Aardal (1990, p. 156), Aardal (1994a, p. 174) and Valen (1994, p. 177). 
95 Aardal, 1994a, p. 177.
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Table 6.4. Government participation in Norway.
Year Prime Minister Party
1971 Bratteli, T. AP
1972 Korvald, L. NV SP NKRF
1973 Bratteli, T. AP
1976 Nordli, O. AP
1981 Brundtland, G. H. AP
1981 Willoch, K. H
1983 Willoch, K. SP NKRF H
1986 Brundtland, G.H. AP
1989 Syse, J.P. SP NKRF H
1990 Brundtland, G.H. AP
1996 Jagland, T. AP
1997 Bondevik. K.M. NV SP NKRF
The Prime Minister’s party is in bold type. Sources: 1971-1993: Petersson (1994, p. 
102); 1996: Heidar (1996 p. 464); 1997: Bjugan (1998).
All but one of the governments in the period have been either AP single party 
governments, or a centre-right coalition government including both the SP and the 
NKRF. The table also illustrates the very important point that the H has only been 
excluded from centre-right governments in the aftermath of the two EU référendums. A 
salient EU-dimension tends to keep the H out of office. However, the importance of this 
division also makes the centre-parties’ hold on power more tenuous than it would be 
likely to be with the H included in the coalition. In 1972 their government only lasted 
until the next election a year later.
After the 1989 Storting election the H, the SP and the NKRF formed a centre-right 
minority coalition government. However, the Syse government fell in November 1990, 
"due to increasing tension over the EU issue"^^. The AP then formed a single-party 
minority government.
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The AP remained in government between 1990 and 1997, despite being far from 
securing a majority of seats in the Storting^”^. Valen^^ argues that the EU-issue was 
crucial for the survival of the AP government after the 1993 election. "The EU issue 
[was] decisive in the sense that it [created] barriers between parties that have formerly 
been friends and allies."
6.4.4 Complications and svnergv between various partv goals.
For the centre parties many party goals correspond relatively well even with the EU- 
dimension salient. Since majority-govemment seems to be a thing of the past in Norway, 
a centre-minority government appears to be as realistic as any other alternative. The 
centre parties are in a central position on the left-right cleavage, and close together at the 
rural end of the urban-rural cleavage. In addition, they all took an anti-EEC position in 
the early 1970's^^, and hence policy-consistency could be argued. Also, the vast majority 
of their members and leaders are against membership, internal splits are limited^^. Yet, 
for coalition purposes it remains a problem that the NKRF and the NV are for the EEA, 
while the SP are against this agreement.
Valen, 1994, p. 170. This development was predicted by Madeley (1990, p. 291) 
After the 1993 election, it held 67 of 165 seats, sixteen short of a majority.
98 1994, p. 170.
99 Although the pro-EU faction of the NV split and formed a new party. Wyller (1996, 
pp. 144-145) argues the NV has, because it realised the split this issue caused in the 
party, been the foremost supporter of the referendum device since 1961.
At the annual meeting of NV in 1991, 25 percent of the delegates supported 
membership. However, by the annual meeting in March 1994, there was no suggestion 
that Norway should join the EU. A motion was proposed that the party should 
reconsider EU-membership if Sweden and Finland joined. This was rejected by 109 
votes to 26. No supporters of EU-membership were elected to the central or to the 
national committee, and two EEA-opponents were elected to the former (Nordisk 
Kontakt, 3/1994, p. 85).
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Furthermore, the lack of a majority in parliament is an obvious problem for the anti-EU 
centre parties. If the EU-conflict could be removed from the national political agenda 
co-operation with the H would be more likely. It would also make the split in the NV 
less dangerous, and tone down the differences over EEA-membership between the SP 
and the other two. However, it might also cause a loss of votes. At the 1997 election, 
EU-membership as such was not on the agenda, and the SP lost nearly as large a share of 
its vote as it had gained in 1993. (Although this was nearly off-set by a massive gain for 
the NKRF at the 1997 election.) Hence, vote-maximisation based on the EU-dimension 
is difficult to reconcile with office-maximisation even for these parties, at least when 
considered individually.
For the H the situation is considerably more complicated. An anti-EU position would 
make it much easier for this party to join a coalition with the centre parties. Hence, the 
aim of vote-maximisation conflicts with the aim of office-maximisation. Furthermore, 
the party has always been pro-EC/EU, as are virtually all its leaders^^h Thus, credibility 
and policy-sincerity makes an anti-EU stance very difficult. Removing the EU-conflict 
from the national election arena would therefore be of great benefit to the H.
The EU-conflict also creates problems for the AP. The party is internally split^ )^^ , and the 
salience of the EU-conflict also makes it more difficult for the AP to get ad-hoc support 
from the anti-EU parties. However, the AP has always been officially pro-EU, and its
At the party’s annual meeting in April 1994 the vote was 225 to seven for 
membership. (Nordisk Kontakt, 3/1994, p. 60)
At the AP annual meeting on November 8, 1992, 182 delegates supported the 
motion that Norway should apply for EU-membership, 106 opposed it (Nordisk
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leadership even more so. In both 1972 and 1994, it was AP governments that proposed 
to join. Thus, policy-sincerity and credibility concerns prevent an anti-EU stance. 
Overall, it is in the interest of the AP to reduce the importance of this conflict in the 
national election arena.
The SV and the NFRP have never been invited to join any government. To obtain office, 
both parties either have to change their policies so as to become more congenial to other 
parties, or increase their share of the vote to where they can no longer be excluded. It is 
possible that the EU-conflict could lead to a realignment so dramatic that the ‘right’ EU- 
position could get these parties into government. However, because they are both on the 
extremes of the left-right cleavage, it is likely that they would also have to make 
considerable changes to other policies to achieve office. This is highly risky, since it 
could reduce the attraction of these parties to the voters. Therefore, on the EU-conflict, a 
strong emphasis on vote-maximisation appears to be the best option for these parties.
For the SV, an anti-EU position gives a high degree of synergy between party aims. The 
vast majority of SV party members and leadership are opponents of membership. An 
anti-EU position also corresponds with looking for new partners, based on an anti-EU 
constellation with the centre parties. Although this position also is likely to alienate the 
party closest to the SV on the left-right cleavage, the AP, this is of minor importance. 
The AP has never invited the SV to join in government, and a pro-EU SV is unlikely to 
change this.
Kontakt, 11/1992, p. 86).
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For the NFRP the situation is more difficult. The party is split over the EU-issue 
internally, and in the 1994 referendum its voters split 60-40 for membership. It is 
therefore unclear which policy would be vote maximising and which would keep the 
party more united. There appears to be little to be gained for the NFRP on this conflict 
either way. Not surprisingly, the party tries to downplay and defuse the EU-conflict. At 
the 1993 election, the party’s policy was ‘yes to EC-membership, no to EC-union’^^  ^
Off-loading is therefore a very good option for this party, so that the political debate can 
focus on policies more likely to be vote-winners for the NFRP.
Two elite considerations make all the parties more likely to be pro-EU, or at least to tone 
down anti-EU sentiments. Firstly, EU-membership would increase the number of 
attractive jobs available to Norway’s elite in general and politicians in particular. 
Secondly, consideration of the views and interests of other European politicians and the 
politicians and bureaucrats of the EU makes opposition more difficult. This forms part 
of the explanation for why many party leaders and members of the Storting tend to be 
more pro-EU than the population and the party rank-and-file. Any party with office- 
ambitions have to consider these factors, although they are unlikely to be sufficient to 
overturn the anti-EU position of a party for which an anti-EU position is the most 
beneficial for vote-, policy- or office-maximisation, or to keep the party united.
6.4.5 The choices available to Norwegian voters.
Both pro- and anti-EU voters have several parties to choose from, although the centrist 
‘yes’-voter and the right-wing ‘no’-voter would have to travel further along the left-right
103 Nordisk Kontakt, 9/1993, p. 71.
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axis to find a suitable party based on this dimension. However, many voters have found 
themselves in disagreement with their ‘normal’ party’s position, especially supporters of 
the AP, the NFRP and the NV, as Appendix 6.3 shows. These voters face cross­
pressures which would require them to seek further information in order to make a 
decision. This increases the cost and decreases the likelihood of voting.
It would appear that many people’s voting decision at national elections would be less 
complicated if the EU-issues could be off-loaded to other electoral arenas. V a l e n  
argues that at the 1993 election, the salience of the HU issue may have contributed to the 
decline in voter turnout.
6.4.6 Off-loading through référendums.
In the 1993 Storting election the promised 1994 referendum appears to have worked 
well as an off-loading device for the AP^^  ^ and the NV in terms of votes. Both parties 
were split on this issue, but neither lost votes overall. But the massive increase in votes 
for the SP at the 1993 election indicates the limited efficacy of this device while the 
issue of membership was still undecided. However, once the decision not to join had 
been made, EU-issues seem to have faded from public concern. On the other hand, it is 
likely that the turbulence caused by the EU-conflict at the 1993 election was an 
important reason for the considerable volatility at the 1997 election.
104 1994, p. 178.
105 In the election campaign, the AP stressed that the upcoming referendum should be 
binding, and hence voters should be able to vote for the party without compromising 
their position on EU-membership. (Madeley, 1994, p. 200)
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The referendum off-loading mechanism appears to have worked insofar as only limited 
high-level defections and no party splits have resulted from the EU-conflict in the 
1990’s. However, at least as late as 1997, the off-loading technique did not mend 
divisions between potential coalition partners. The salience of the EU-conflict at the 
political elite level persists. There are two main causes for this. Firstly, the continued 
Norwegian EEA-membership ensures that EU-related issues will continue to cause splits 
between potential coalition partners. Secondly, the very extent of the power and 
influence of a widening and deepening EU over European politics, trade and economics 
makes it virtually impossible to avoid EU-related issues in a small, open European 
economy like Norway.
6.5 Conclusion.
The clearest differences in expected utility from membership that emerge in the 
Norwegian case are between those dependent upon the agricultural sector and the rest of 
the population. These differences are particularly strong because EU membership would 
lead to certain cuts in the very high public sector subsidies to this sector. Also, in 
Northern Norway, the dominance of the fisheries industry combined with massive public 
sector subsidies to this region make people less likely to support membership.
Those dependent upon the welfare state economically, or in support of it ideologically, 
are also disproportionately likely to oppose membership. Thus, women and public sector 
employees tend to oppose membership, as do those on the political left.
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One of the most important results of this conflict is that it has increased the importance 
of certain divisions. Most strikingly, it has shown how different the self-interest of the 
farmers and their rural dependants is from that of other Norwegians. Related to this, the 
EU conflict has sharpened the conflict between urban and rural Norway. In the 
Southwest, this effect is reinforced by the presence of the counter-cultures.
The EU-conflict has had a profound effect on the Norwegian party system. In terms of 
the cleavage model, this is because it crosscuts the normally dominant left-right 
cleavage at the same time as it strengthens the normally secondary territorial cleavages. 
In Norway the EU-conflict has developed into a political cleavage. In terms of the 
rational choice model, it is because it was in the interest, for both vote-maximisation and 
internal conflict avoidance purposes, of several of the centrist parties to oppose 
membership. At the same time, this was a virtually impossible position for the H to take. 
Furthermore, the Norwegian anti-EU-parties could reasonably hope to be able to be able 
to form a government.
Although the EU-conflict has not yet led to the creation of any new parties in Norway, it 
has led to large swings in support for certain parties. Furthermore, the conflict does 
increase the divide between certain parties. In particular, co-operation between the H 
and the SP, but also with the NKRF and the NV, has become much more difficult than it 
was in the past. To a lesser extent, this is also true for the relationship between the SP 
and the other two centrist parties. The most serious effect of the EU-conflict on the party 
system so far is the deep division it has caused on the centre-right of Norwegian politics.
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Off-loading the EU-conflict away from the national election arena through employing 
the referendum device has only been moderately successful. It has made it easier for 
certain parties, especially the AP and the NV, to avoid internal splits. However, the off­
loading technique has not avoided inter-party divisions on the centre-right from 
precluding a government including both the SP and the H. The government potential of 
these two parties has been reduced as a result of the salience of this conflict and the fact 
that a complete off-loading has not been possible. Finally, off-loading devices may not 
be in the (vote-maximising) interest of certain parties, such as the SV and the SP. On the 
other hand, the SV does not appear capable of benefiting in terms of votes from this 
conflict, and the SP risks reducing its government potential if it focuses its national 
election campaigns on an anti-EU position.
EEA-membership; Danish, Finnish and Swedish EU-membership; and the increasing 
importance of the EU in European politics and economics makes it virtually impossible 
to completely off-load the Norwegian conflict over European integration away from 
national elections. And for several Norwegian political parties, the SP, the NKRF and 
the H in particular, there is very little choice on which position to take on this issue. This 
new (or revived) cleavage cross-cuts the usually dominant left-right cleavage. This 
complicates otherwise normal co-operation patterns to the point where they can no 
longer function.
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Chapter 7. Sweden; Neutrality Lost.
"The conceptualisation o f Sweden as the committed neutral also reflects domestic 
sentiments. To many Swedes, neutrality is a dogma as embedded in the national 
character as democracy. To question its utility as a security strategy would be political 
suicide fo r  any aspiring leader. Like the sacrosanct welfare system, this notion offers 
protection for a people that have been characterised as obsessed with individual 
security.
7.1 Introduction.
Ever since the inception of the European integration project until the late 1980’s, one 
issue dominated the Swedish debate over membership in the various incarnations of this 
project: concern for neutrality. Although Sweden has been an eager participant in 
international co-operation, it was never willing, during the Cold War era, to participate 
in a European integration, as opposed to co-operation, project. And especially not one 
which included, albeit nominally only for most of its existence, defence and foreign 
policy co-operation.
When Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union disintegrated in 
the late 1980’s, this dramatically changed the basis for Swedish neutrality, and also the 
extent to which EC-membership would put this policy at risk. Sweden could no longer 
locate itself between the western and the eastern bloc - the dichotomy no longer existed. 
Joining the EC no longer seemed to symbolise choosing sides.
1 Sundelius, 1989, p. 12.
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In 1991 the Swedish government formally applied for membership in the EC, and after 
some debate it was decided to hold a referendum on membership^. The outcome of the 
referendum, held in late 1994, was a narrow ‘yes’-vote. This was confirmed by a vote in 
the Swedish parliament, the ‘Riksdag’. On January 1, 1995, Sweden joined the EU.
Section two of this chapter investigates how Swedish membership of the EU could be 
expected to affect the utility of Swedish voters. This is carried out by evaluating a 
number of factors where membership can be argued to affect individual utilities. The 
validity of each factor is assessed using a variety of data from surveys of the referendum 
and other sources.
Section three evaluates the effect this conflict has on the Swedish party system. The 
considerable gap between the many voters who are critical or hostile to EU-membership 
and the political leadership, which is largely positive to such membership, is 
emphasised. Several parties are at odds with a majority of their voters on this dimension. 
This appears to give impetus for more parties to change their pro-EU stance for vote 
maximisation purposes. But for many parties there are also strong reasons for not 
wanting to change their stance. Ultimately however, it is in the interest of most parties 
and many voters to try to reduce the importance of this conflict in the national election 
arena.
Before the above main concerns are considered, it is necessary to survey Sweden’s 
international relations in general, and its relations with the EC/EU in particular.
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7.2. A historical review of Sweden’s relations with the EC and the EU.
7.2.1. Sweden’s international relations after World War n.
An over-riding concern for neutrality has been at the centre of Swedish foreign policy 
throughout this period^. However, this has not prevented the country from pursuing an 
active foreign policy. In the late 1940s Sweden joined the UN, the Marshall Aid project, 
the OEEC and the European Council. However, when co-operation turns towards 
integration Swedish enthusiasm tends to decline.
Hadenius argues that the main problem for Sweden with regard to European integration 
has been concerns created by trade dependence versus concerns for neutrality. Sweden is 
highly dependent upon trade. And by 1994, 69 percent of imports were from, and 67 
percent of exports to, the EU and the other applicant countries^.
The formation of the EEC in 1957 - a large, and in some measure protectionist, trade 
block in the middle of Europe - posed a problem for Sweden. However, since Britain 
was Sweden's largest trading partner, this problem did not become acute until the UK 
applied for membership. Complicating the problem was the potential for a situation 
where some Nordic countries joined the EC and some did not. This could create a new
2 For the referendum provisions in the Swedish Constitution, see Appendix 7.1.
^ Âstrôm (1989, p. 4) states that "the classic definition of the Swedish foreign policy 
doctrine is 'freedom from alliances in peace aiming for neutrality in war'." He also 
stresses that Swedish neutrality is neither guaranteed by other states or organisations, nor 
is it enshrined in the Swedish constitution. (Âstrôm, 1989, p. 16)
323
tariff barrier in the middle of the Nordic area. Hence, economic reality formed a 
compelling argument for joining^.
However, Sweden did not join the EC in 1972 because the Treaty of Rome was seen as 
incompatible with neutrality^. Miljan argues that Swedish foreign policy at that time was 
defined by security policy, and this was subsumed under Swedish neutrality. Neutrality 
became a "sacred cow" and a central part of "Swedishness”'^ .
Bergquist highlights that even in the 1960’s, although the EEC was not a military 
alliance, it was not simply an economic one either. It formed a very important step 
towards political integration of Western Europe. Other Swedish concerns have included 
the NATO membership of most EC members* and the mechanisms for majoritarian 
decisions to be introduced at a later stage. There were also concerns that membership 
might impede Sweden's ability to trade with and give aid to other countries^.
Interestingly, Nordic integration was viewed as compatible with Swedish neutrality. 
Astrom admits that the suggestion of a Nordic military defence union (proposed by
4 Source for data: OECD, 1996a, pp 94-95. Author’s calculations.
^ Bergqvist, 1969, p. 2-3.
^ Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander, 1991, p. 339. Also see Ludlow, 1994; Ross, 1991. 
Wallensteen (1977) argues that the effect of rejecting EC membership was to widen the 
notion of neutrality to keeping Sweden outside economic alliances.
^ Miljan, 1977, p. 233. However, Miljan also highlights the limits of this neutrality. He 
argues that a main problem for Sweden was that de facto its economy had become 
integrated with other Western European economies, with the militarily sensitive 
advanced engineering and electrical sectors particularly involved. This is the price to pay 
for a small country if it wants to keep its weapons and control systems up to the same 
standard as greater powers. (Miljan, 1977, pp. 237-9) See also Astrom (1989).
^ Ross, 1991, p. 121.
^ Bergquist, 1969, pp. 3-4. For an extensive moral defence of Swedish neutrality, see
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Sweden in 1948) was a departure from Sweden’s traditional policy. Its implication was 
that Sweden would go to war if Norway was attacked at the North Cape or if Denmark 
was attacked in South Jutland. However, it was also implied that outwardly this defence 
union would pursue a common neutrality pol icy^For  Sweden it was a primary concern 
that the Nordic defence union should be independent of the great powers - neutrality had 
to be preserved. Such independence was not acceptable to the Norwegian government^ k 
But this would still have been a serious derogation from absolute neutrality - a member 
of a 'neutral defence union' of more than one nation-state cannot claim to remain neutral 
in the traditional sense. Although this attempt at a Nordic defence union failed, it sent an 
early signal that Swedish neutrality might not run as deep as the official line would 
indicate.
Rejecting the European integration project and having its proposals for deeper Nordic 
integration rejected by others, Sweden joined EFTA as a founding member in 1960. One 
could argue that Sweden’s fear of being dominated by others kept it out of Europe, and 
that the other Nordic countries’ fear of being dominated by Sweden kept the Nordic 
countries apart.
7.2.2. Sweden and European Integration 1961-1972.
Sweden attempted to open negotiations aiming at some form of closer co-operation with 
the EU in 1961, 1967 and 1970. In December 1961 Sweden applied for associate
Sundelius, 1989. Astrom (1989) sets out the necessary aspects for a credible neutrality. 
Astrom, 1989, p. 23.
11 See, for example Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander, 1991, for an account of the
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membership in the EEC. This was seen as a good way of obtaining close economic co­
operation and at the same time maintain a certain political d i s t a n c e * ^
Miljan argues that in 1967 the Swedish position moved somewhat closer to full 
membership with escape clauses, the main one of which was to retain neutrality. This 
development was influenced by an argument put forward by the FP and the MP, that the 
EEC was less likely to move towards further political integration than it was in 1961-2. 
This argument was largely based on de Gaulle’s opposition to such a move^^ This 
application fell for the same reason as the first one, namely de Gaulle’s veto of the 
British application.
The 1970 attempt to reopen negotiations was the most far-reaching one. Sweden 
continued to insist that sovereignty and neutrality could somehow be separated from 
participating in the trade, free market, and social policies of the EC. This insistence 
continued after Sweden officially rejected full membership on March 18, 1971. The 
rejection of full membership was largely based on the content of the Davignon Report 
and the Werner Report (the latter adopted by the Council of Ministers on 8-9 February 
1971). "Swedish participation in the foreign policy co-operation drawn up on the basis 
of the so-called Davignon Report’ is not compatible with a firm Swedish policy of 
neutrality. [...] Swedish participation in an economic and monetary union, which implies
failure of the Nordic defence union.
Bergquist, 1969, p. 7.
13 Miljan (1977, p. 251), Bergquist (1969, p. 8), Astrom (1989, p. 24).
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an abandonment of the national right of decision-making in important fields, is not 
compatible with a Swedish policy of neutrality.
Sweden finally settled for a free-trade agreement with the EC, largely similar to that of 
other EFTA states, and largely dictated by the EC. This agreement consisted of a plan to 
mutually reduce, and eventually eliminate, tariffs on most industrial goods^^. However, 
this agreement covered neither agricultural products nor fish; nor social, labour, capital, 
or transport policy. On the other hand, Sweden avoided binding itself to any political 
commitments^®. The treaty on a customs union between the EEC and Sweden was 
signed in Brussels on July 22, 1972. It came into force on January 1, 1973. Both 
Sweden and the EEC retained the right "to take unilateral steps, regardless of other 
sections of the Treaty, to safeguard its security during war or 'serious international 
tension'"
7.2.3. Sweden and European integration 1972-1995.
For most of the 1970's and the 1980's the EC was a virtual non-issue in Swedish politics. 
The few polls taken in the early 1980's showed 35-40 percent of Swedes believing 
membership would be more disadvantageous than advantageous, 20-25 percent held the 
contrary opinion, and 35-40 percent had no clear opinion. But, as Berg argues, the EU 
issue was not seriously discussed. Furthermore, the "doctrine of neutrality" was still
14 Swedish Government Memorandum. (Co-operation and Conflict, Vol. 7, 1972, p. 
346) Also, see Astrom (1989, pp. 24-5).
1  ^Phinnemore, 1996, p. 43.
1^ Ross, 1991, pp. 118-19. See also Widfeldt (1996a, pp. 101-102) regarding Swedish 
EC policy in this early period.
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accepted by a large majority of the population, and regarded as incompatible with EC 
m e m b e r s h ip s ^  At a speech to the Commission in Brussels in February 1983, the then 
Swedish Prime minister, Olof Palme, argued that the reasons for Sweden not applying 
for full membership in 1972 were still valid. Sweden’s neutrality policy continued to 
exclude it from co-operation projects that aim for a co-ordination of foreign policyS^.
In the latter half of the 1980's, three factors in particular changed this situation: the 
geopolitical importance of the end of the Cold War and the related changes in Eastern 
and Central Europe, the success of the EC in this period, and a deterioration in the 
domestic Swedish economy.
Ross argues that because of Sweden's stance on neutrality and related policies, the end 
of the Cold War was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Sweden's change in 
attitude towards the EC. Particularly helpful was the fact that this development rid the 
Community of the image of being bloc-based. "At a stroke, the European Conununity 
itself was no longer regarded as a Western European contribution to the division of the 
continent, but as a potential pan-European institution promoting European security in 
the broadest sense, Pederson labels this new role of the EC as a "political stabiliser"2i.
Miljan (p. 256, from the Treaty on Customs Union, p. 14, Article 21).
Berg, 1994, p. 87.
Palme (1984, p. 42, from a speech to the European Commission February 24, 1983). 
As late as May 1988, Prime Minister Carlsson insisted that neutrality remained the 
prime obstacle for full Swedish membership (Ross, 1991, p. 21).
20 Ross, 1991, p. 122.
21 Pedersen, 1990, p. 97.
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Related to this, the economic security element of neutrality has become increasingly 
compromised because of trade dependency. Since the late 1960s Swedish neutrality has 
been considered also in economic terms^^. By the mid 1980s, 52 percent of Swedish 
exports and 56 percent of imports were to/from the EC, and 20 percent and seventeen 
percent respectively to/from EFTA. This trade dependency has led to the idea of 
economic neutrality becoming increasingly questioned. This tendency has been 
intensified by aggressive acquisition and expansion abroad by Swedish firms. In terms 
of both volume and value, Sweden’s expansion in Europe has been much greater than 
Japan’s. In the first half of 1990, Sweden outpaced all other countries with US$ 1 IBn in 
cross-border European acquisitions^^. As Astrom puts it;
"Our economic dependence on the rest of the world is constantly growing. 
The difficulties of securing necessary supplies in the event of war or 
blockade will increase. We may be confronted with new and trying problems 
of striking a balance between economic benefits and firm adherence to our 
traditional foreign policy. Holding our defence forces at top-level 
technological standards demands not only the unfailing willingness of the 
Swedish people to make sacrifices, but probably also intensified 
international co-operation for military research and development.”^^
The progress made towards completion of the internal market during the 1980’s made a 
re-evaluation of Sweden’s relationship with the EC essential. In particular, the SEA of 
1986 made adjustment necessary. Together with the other EFTA countries, Sweden 
moved towards closer co-operation with the EC. It signed the EEA-agreement in May 
1992. The EE A Treaty was ratified by the Riksdag in December 1993.
Dohlman, 1989.
23 Ross, 1991, pp. 122-23. See also Svasand and Lindstrom (1997, p. 208).
24 Astrom, 1989, p. 29.
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By the third quarter of 1990, the growth in Swedish real GDP had become negative, 
industrial production was lower than it had been in 1985, unemployment was increasing 
dramatically, the current account deficit grew rapidly to reach 2.5 percent of GDP, and 
inflation was close to eleven percent against an OECD average of just over six percent^^. 
Ross argues that negative economic developments led to a rude awakening in Sweden, 
and that the ‘Swedish Model’ has been severely blemished. The humiliating free-fall of 
the Swedish Krona in 1990 and the accompanying rise in interest rates to seventeen 
percent were seen as symptomatic of increased international scepticism about Sweden's 
likely future economic performance^^.
By the beginning of the 1990’s the main obstacles to Swedish membership - the 
divisions of the Cold War and the perception of incompatibility of EC-membership with 
neutrality - were disappearing. In addition, the EU was progressing towards further 
integration both politically and economically, at the same time as Sweden was in crisis 
in the same areas. Among the Swedish elite (and, for a while, the people) EC- 
membership became increasingly popular. The situation in the early 1990’s has been 
described as ‘europhoria’^ .^ In July 1991 the Carlsson government submitted the 
application for full memberships^. In the referendum held on November 13, 1994, 52.2 
percent voted ‘yes’ to Swedish membership in the EU, and the ‘Riksdag’ duly ratified 
membership. Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995.
25 Ludlow, 1994, pp. 19-20.
26 Ross, 1991, pp. 123-24. 
22 Ludlow, 1994.
28 Berg, 1994.
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7.3. Swedish attitudes towards European integration.
7.3.1. Common economic factors.
Sweden’s net contribution to the EU budget for 1995 was 937 million ecu. This 
represents 106 ecu per head, making Sweden the fifth largest contributor to the EU 
budget per head^^. However, Sweden’s GDP per head the same year, based on 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), was only 95 percent of the EU average^^. Hence, the 
average Swede could expect his utility to decline as a result of membership based simply 
on the ‘membership fee’. Considering the fact that the average Swede had, by 1994, 
become poorer than many citizens in countries that are net recipients of funds, this is 
unlikely to have impressed many Swedish voters. At the time of the 1994 referendum, 
the debate over the size and shape of the Swedish contribution to the EU-budget was 
very intense^ k
Sweden has long had one of the highest tax levels in the world, as Table B shows. 
Moreover, it has increased significantly over the last 20 years, and the gap to many other 
countries has also increased over time. By 1990, Sweden’s tax level was nearly eighteen 
percent higher than the EC average.
Sweden’s contribution to the EU will be at a reduced level until 1999. 
The Economist, 23/11/96.
31 Widfeldt, 1996a, p. 108.
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The evidence from Denmark suggests low effects on the tax level from membership. 
However, this may not be an accurate guide for Sweden. Firstly, Sweden joined the EU 
in a period when economic policy generally and even taxation specifically were (and 
still are) considered brought in under the EU umbrella. Hence, EU-membership was 
likely to have greater effect on national tax levels after the TEU than in the earlier days 
of the EC. Secondly, the competitive pressures of the internal market were more likely 
to affect Swedish tax levels than Danish ones. This is because Swedish tax levels were 
substantially more out of line with the EU average than Danish ones. Hence, it could be 
argued that Swedish taxation was likely to be reduced overall as a result of EU
memberships^
Unfortunately, there are no individual data available that refers directly to taxation with 
regard to Swedish attitudes to EU membership. However, this factor is likely to have 
contributed strongly to the left-right difference in attitude to EU-membership.
EEA membership is likely to have very similar effects to EU-membership with respect 
to the overall Swedish price level. Swedish agricultural subsidies were close to the level 
of the EU (see Table D), and hence the effect on food-prices is also likely to be limited. 
Thus, this factor is not expected to have had any significant effect on individual utility 
derived from EU-membership.
Until the early 1990’s the unemployment level in Sweden was extremely low. As late as 
1991, it was less than 1/3^  ^ of the EU average. However, by 1993 Swedish 
unemployment was much closer to the EU average, as Table C shows. This increase in
Expectations of lower taxation were put forward as a pro-EU argument. (Berg, 1994)
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unemployment was common to all western European countries, and more likely to result 
from the world-wide recession of the late 1980's and the early 1990’s than whether or 
not a country was an EU member. However, Sweden, together with Finland, saw a much 
steeper increase in unemployment in this period than most other countries.
According to data collected around the time of the 1994 referendum, ‘employment’ was 
an important factor influencing peoples' attitude to EU-membership. As Appendix 7.2 
shows, it ranked fourth among reasons given for people’s voting behaviour in the 
referendum. In particular, those who voted ‘yes’ gave this as an important reason^^. The 
appendix also shows that ‘general economic issues’ was the most important category 
overall. This probably includes reasons connected to taxation and price levels, but also a 
whole range of other factors. Overall, common economic factors appear to have been 
important for Swedish attitudes to European integration. More people expected their 
utility to improve due to EU membership with regard to general economic issues and 
employment than expected it to decline^^.
Unless otherwise specified, numbers referring to arguments for and against EU- 
membership in this and the next three sub-sections are from the survey-data analysed by 
Oscarsson (1996). The interview subjects were given the opportunity to give as many 
reasons as they wanted for their attitude towards the EU. These were then put into more 
generalised categories by the researchers. In interviews before the referendum the 
average number of reasons given was 1.97, afterwards the number increased to 2.14 
(Oscarsson, 1996).
Economists disagree on the general economic benefits (or disadvantages) EU- 
membership would bring. For example, Kekko (1994) argues that the long-term 
economic effects are highly uncertain and difficult to estimate. Sapir (1994), on the 
other hand, argues that there is a definite economic benefit to be had in form of higher 
growth and more investment in Sweden.
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7.3.2 Common non-economic factors.
In Chapter 3 it was argued that the transfer of policy-areas and power to the EU per se 
may affect an individual’s utility. How his utility is affected depends upon the value he 
assigns to power resting with the nation-state and his (dis)approval of the EU-form of 
European integration. In the survey analysed by Oscarsson, ‘national independence’ 
ranks twelfth among reasons for voting behaviour in the 1994 referendum, with only six 
percent of those surveyed mentioning reasons in this category. Among ‘no’-voters this 
ranks as the sixth most important category (among the specific categories) with fourteen 
percent. Considering the nature of the decision, this is rather underwhelming. On the 
other hand. Table 7.1 below shows that the more openly political the European 
integration process becomes, the less likely most Swedes were to approve of the 
integration format.
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Table 7.1. Attitudes towards Sweden’s future relationship with the EU among ‘yes’- and 
‘no’-voters in the 1994 referendum. Percent.
Suggestion Yes-
voters
No­
voters
Blank Non­
voters
All
Sweden should not remain an EU- 
member, and the EEA-treaty should be 
cancelled
0 10 2 5 5
Sweden should not remain an EU- 
member, but should keep the EEA-treaty
1 66 26 14 30
Sweden should remain a EU-member, but 
should abstain from e.g. defence co­
operation and EMU
29 5 10 11 17
Sweden should remain an EU-member 
but membership should be limited to the 
current negotiated treaty
41 1 2 10 21
Sweden should remain an EU-member 
and in the longer term work towards a 
united states of Europe
16 0 0 7 8
No definite opinion/don’t know. 13 18 60 53 19
Sum percent 100 100 100 100 100
N 2061 1794 53 326 4263
Source: Holmberg, 1996b, p. 270.
One might also argue that the EU is not international enough. This argument is closely 
connected to Sweden’s involvement in international projects of a more global or non- 
European nature. These include a keen involvement in UN organisations and financial 
and other support for developing countries^^. However, Appendix 7.4 shows that if there 
was any systematic effect of an internationalist attitude on opinion on EU-membership, 
it was that those of an internationalist bent were more - not less - likely to vote for EU 
membership. Also, Oscarsson^^ shows that the more tolerant a Swede was towards
For example, Berg (1994) stresses that fear of EU-membership being damaging to 
international solidarity and relations with Eastern Europe and the third world are part of 
Swedish opposition to EU-membership. This is a long-standing argument, see for 
example Bergquist (1969, pp. 3-4).
36 1996, p p .  262-263.
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foreign aid, immigrants and refugees, the more likely he was to have voted ‘yes’ in the 
referendum.
The internally open borders implied by the common market and the Schengen agreement 
reduces national control. Appendix 7.2 shows that the category ‘open borders’ ranked as 
the eighth most important overall reason for voting behaviour in the 1994 referendum, 
among ‘no’-voters it was the fourth most important. However, the previously all- 
important issue of neutrality appears to have had rather limited influence over voting 
behaviour at the referendum. The ‘neutrality’ category ranked as number ten, and even 
among ‘no’-voters only as equal seventh.
Some more obscure arguments related to national character have also been put forward 
to explain Swedish opposition to EU-membership, for example the rumour that the EU 
would ban snuff (‘snus’) tobacco. Berg even sees the snuff outrage as a turning point in 
public opinion. A more substantial fear was that the right of access to public land 
(‘ Allemansratten’) would be compromised if the Swedes had to share it with 330 million 
Europeans^^.
Berg argues that it would appear the Swedes have little understanding of the EU's 
historical aspects in keeping the peace between France and Germany, and that neutrality 
is seen as having kept Sweden out of two world wars^^. However, from Oscarsson’s 
research (see Appendix 7.2) it appears that ‘peace’ was one of the most important
Berg, 1994, pp. 89-90. 
Berg, 1994, p. 90.
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arguments for voting ‘yes’ in the 1994 referendum, and that few people considered 
Swedish neutrality as a good enough reason to stay out of the EU.
It is commonly argued that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit, and that Nordic 
democracy is more open and accessible than in European countries and the EU. (See 
Chapter 1 for an elaboration of these arguments.) Reflecting such sentiments. Appendix
7.2 shows that considerably more voters viewed EU-membership as having a 
detrimental rather than positive effect on democracy.
Nordic solidarity appears to have had very little influence on Swedish attitudes to 
European integration. In the survey by Oscarsson it does not even warrant a separate 
category among the top 25, as shown in Appendix 7.2. Neither do issues directly 
concerned with immigration and/or refugees. However, the ‘open borders’ category of 
reason is most likely related to such concerns. This category is specifically concerned 
with the free movement of people inside the EU. It could conceivably include concerns 
with drug and other smuggling, but desires to keep foreigners out of Sweden are rather 
more likely. Berg^^ highlights concern for increased immigration as a reason for 
opposition to EU-membership.
7.3.3 Group differentiated economic factors.
The agricultural sector is the main beneficiary of EU funds. However, by the time 
Sweden joined the EU, its agricultural subsidies were already similar to those of the
39 1994.
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EU^o. Hence, on average, the utility of farmers could be expected to be relatively 
unaffected by EU membership. Lindahl shows that the voters expected a very small 
negative effect on agriculture because of EU-membership"^^. Appendix 7.3 shows that a 
small majority of farmers voted ‘yes’ in the 1994 referendum, and that there was no 
significant relationship between the number of primary industry employees in an area 
and the ‘no’-vote in that area.
Most of the EU regional aid goes to the sparsely populated areas of northern and central 
Sweden. Objective 6 covers the province of Jamtland in its entirety, Norrbotten and 
Vasterbotten with the exception of some small coastal areas, as well as parts of 
Vastemorrland, Gavleborg, Kopparberg and Varmland. Objective 5b covers many rural 
areas all over Sweden. Objective 2 covers only a small number of areas all over 
Sweden"^ ,^ and is unlikely to have substantial observable effects on utility. The indicative 
commitment appropriation for Sweden was 1,190 Million ECU for the period 1995- 
1999 for Objectives 1 to 5b, and 230 Million ECU for Objective 6^ .^ Based on this 
factor the utility of people living in many mral, especially northern, and some urban 
areas could be expected to increase as a result of membership. However, the future 
status of these funds, especially considering the EU enlargement into Eastern Europe, 
was, and is, very uncertain.
40 The Economist, 21/8/1993 (source: OECD).
41 Subtracting those who believed EU membership would result in a great or some 
deterioration from those believing in a great or some improvement on various factors, 
the number arrived at for the agricultural sector was -5. (Lindahl, 1996, p. 151)
42 Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6 (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 355-356); 
www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/sve.htm.
43 Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6 (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 356).
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Appendix 7.3 shows that there were substantial differences in attitude to EU- 
membership between urban and rural areas, as well as between regions. While only 41 
percent of those who lived in rural areas voted ‘yes’, 64 percent of those residing in one 
of the three largest cities - Stockholm, Goteborg and Malmo - did so^. And among the 
counties the ‘yes’ vote varied from a low of 27.7 percent in the north-western county of 
Jamtland to 66.5 percent in the city of Malmo. More generally, there was a distinct 
north-south divide. The six northernmost counties recorded the six lowest ‘yes’-votes, 
the highest of these being 41.7 percent in Vastemorrland^^. Regional aid from the EU 
seems to have had little effect on voting behaviour, although it might have limited the 
regional differences in voting. The most likely reason for these regional discrepancies is 
differences in attitudes towards the welfare state and other issues linked to the left-right 
cleavage. This is returned to in section 6.3.4 below.
The Swedish state provides a relatively high level of welfare state social expenditure 
compared with the majority of EU countries, as Table F shows. By 1992 public spending 
as a percentage of GDP had reached 65 percent^^. In terms of final domestic 
consumption, public consumption was more than twice as high (224 percent) as the EU- 
average in 1993, compared to a private consumption level close to average (110 
percent)47.
44 Gilljam, 1996, p. 197.
45 Gilljam, 1996, p. 199.
46 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country profile of Sweden 1993/94.
47 Eurostat, 1995b, p. 359.
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Membership in the EU does not necessarily require any changes in Swedish social 
spending. However, the voter may, through simple comparison with EU countries, 
conclude that membership implies a reduction in social spending, or a move away from 
the Swedish universal benefit system. Also, the logic of European integration could lead 
to future harmonisation of social policy. Furthermore, one might argue that in order for 
Sweden to remain competitive in the internal market, taxation and thus social 
expenditure and the welfare state will have to be reduced. Efforts to meet the criteria for 
EMU could also be argued to have such effects. Non-membership is likely to allow for 
more national control over welfare state spending. If the voter sees a reduction in social 
expenditure as beneficial to his utility, then he is likely to support membership based on 
this factor, and vice versa.
Swedish women work disproportionately in the public sector. In 1992, 58 percent of 
Swedish women in employment worked in the public sector, compared with 25 percent 
of men^8. Women also tend to be paid less than men are, at 66.1 percent of the average 
male income in 199U^. They also tend to benefit from various tax-funded schemes, such 
as long and well-paid maternity leave (see Table G) and a high number of publicly 
funded childminding facilities'^. For these reasons, a reduction in the welfare state is 
likely to reduce the utility of more Swedish women than men.
48 Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 87.
49 Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 92.
At 31 percent higher than any EC country for 0-2 year olds in 1989, and second only 
to Denmark among the Nordic countries. Between the ages of 3 and 7 (the normal age 
for starting school in Sweden) the coverage was 79 percent, the fifth highest of the EC
and Nordic countries. (Friis, 1992, p. 154. Sources: Childminding in the EC 1985-1990.
Supplement to Europas Kvinder, no. 31, 1990; Rita Knudsen: Familieydelser i Norden
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In Chapter 3 it is explained why public employees and the poorer sections of the 
population are groups that are likely to see their utility decline if the welfare state is 
reduced. Thus, more members of these groups would be expected to vote ‘no’ in the 
1994 referendum than other groups.
Appendix 7.3 shows public sector employees were more likely to view EU membership 
as detrimental to their utility than are private sector employees. Regarding income direct 
data are missing, but ‘occupational group’ provides a useful substitute. Appendix 7.4 
shows that workers and the lower ranks of white-collar workers were much more likely 
to vote ‘no’ than were middle and higher ranks of white-collar workers. It is likely that 
the former occupational groups are lower paid than the latter, and therefore more 
dependent upon the welfare state.
Sweden was, and is, highly dependent upon trade^^ (see Table A). The higher security of 
access to the EU-market provided by EU-membership compared to EEA-membership is 
likely to increase the utility of those whose income and welfare is dependent upon trade. 
This factor is likely to have contributed to the gap in attitude to EU-membership 
between the public and the private sector, since public sector employees have little direct 
interest in the prospects for Swedish exports. It is also likely to be part of the reason for 
the gap between attitudes towards EU-membership in urban and rural areas.
1989. Teknisk rapport fra Nordisk statistisk sekretariat no. 52, Copenhagen 1990.)
Several authors stress trade and export arguments related to EC/EU membership. See 
for example Bergquist (1969), Miljan (1977), Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander (1991, 
pp. 329-30) and Kekko (1994). Miles (1997, pp. 35-39 especially) stresses trade and 
competitiveness concerns as an impetus to apply for membership, and the significance 
of the high number of Swedish export-driven multinationals. However, he fails to
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7.3.4. Group-differentiated non-economic factors.
Ideological support for the welfare state is likely to be high on the political left and low 
on the right. Hence, if EU-membership is seen as leading to reductions in welfare state 
spending, then support for membership can be expected to be low on the left and high 
on the right. Appendix 7.3 shows that this was the general pattern in Sweden in 1994, 
the only significant deviation being more anti-EU voters in the GP than expected from 
this hypothesis.
Individual data based on survey research also showed a very strong relationship between 
voters’ self-placement on the left-right dimension and attitude to the EU, with those on 
the left more likely to oppose m e m b e r s h ip s ^  jh is  relationship remains strong also when 
controlled for a variety of other ideological and social structure variables^s. Furthermore, 
Appendix 7.5. shows that areas where the more left-wing parties are strong also showed 
much less support for EU membership. This is perhaps the most important reason for the 
regional differences in attitude to EU membership in Sweden.
For several reasons, simple comparison with other European countries can yield the 
conclusion that EU membership is a threat to women’s position in Sweden. Firstly, more 
Swedish women are in employment than elsewhere in the EU^ "^ . Secondly, women are
account for the significance of the EEA-Treaty in this respect.
Oscarsson, 1996.
Oscarsson, 1996, pp. 264-265.
72.4 percent in 1994, compared to an EU average of 56.7 percent. (OECD, 1996a, p. 
197).
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better represented in political institutions^^. Thirdly, the Catholic influence in the EU 
may affect the relatively liberal Swedish legislation on abortion and divorce, should 
such policies be decided at the EU-level in the future. Added to the more economic 
considerations discussed above, these factors make EU-membership appear more 
negative for the utility of women than that of men.
Appendix 7.3 shows that considerably more Swedish women than men opposed EU- 
membership in 1994. The difference in the ‘yes’-vote was thirteen percent. Given the 
variety of factors that may influence a person’s attitude to EU-membership, this is a 
large difference.
7.4 Party System effects.
Swedish EU-membership had only been considered a possibility by a small, if 
influential, minority until the late 1980’s^ .^ With Swedish membership firmly on the 
political agenda, conflict over this development also intensified. Hadenius argues that 
during 1990 the EC-question became the focus for the party-political debate^^. Similarly, 
Ruin states that “the EU question became central in Swedish politics in the early 
1990s”5^ . Madeley holds that both the GP and the VP profited from their opposition to
For example, as of 1/1/95, the Swedish Cabinet consisted of seven men and nine 
women, the latter including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and the Minister of Justice. (EJPR, Vol. 30, 1996, p. 464) After the 1994 elections, 40 
percent of the members of the Riksdag were women 
(http://www.riksdagen.se/arbetar/siffror/kvinman.htm, 1/1 ).
Reports on national elections prior to 1994 tend not to mention European integration 
as a relevant election issue (Micheletti, 1988; Widfeldt, 1992).
Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander, 1991, p. 330.
Ruin, 1996, p. 177.
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Swedish EU-membership at the 1994 elections^^. And in 1994 Swedish politics was 
mainly about the forthcoming referendum on membership.
As table 7.2 below shows, from the late 1980's to the 1994 referendum there has been 
no sustained period of popular majority support for Swedish membership, with the 
exception of a short period in 1991. From late 1991 to 1994 opposition to membership 
was running at close to half the population.
Table 7.2. Position on EU-membership among the Swedish people.
Uncertain/don't know
38
13
49
41
19
40
24
48
27
32 ' J
47
21 ^
30
43
27
: 52.346.8
0.9 blank
Sources: 1970 and 1988: election studies; the rest: Sifo-data published in the Swedish 
newspaper Goteborgs-Posten, all in Gilljam and Oscarsson (1996).
In the Riksdag however, opposition to EU-membership has been much more limited in 
this period. In the vote over the EU-application on December 12, 1990, 90 percent of the 
Riksdag voted for the motion to apply for full membership. The 28 opponents were all 
from the GP and the VP(K)^^ According to Miles, the number of opponents of EU- 
membership in the Riksdag increased from 20 to between 60 and 65 after the 1994 
election, mainly because of an increase in the vote for the VP and the GP, and the return 
to the Riksdag of the latter. However, seventeen SSD-members were also among the 
opponents, including two ministers, Margareta Winberg (agriculture) and Marita 
Ulvskog (interior)^'.
Madeley, 1995.
60 Miles, 1996, p. 184.
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There was no vote on EU-membership in the Riksdag until after the 1994 referendum. 
By then, all the members had committed themselves to following the result of the 
referendum. Hence, in the vote on December 14, 1994, those who were (previously) 
against EU-membership either abstained or voted ‘yes’^  ^ to membership. For this 
reason, it is difficult to know how many members actually would have voted against 
membership in a freer vote, or, more generally, how many of them opposed EU-
membership63
Both the SSD and the CP were internally split on EU membership, and it can therefore 
be expected that some of their representatives would have voted against EU-membership 
had the decision been taken exclusively in parliament. However, it is not certain that the 
personal opinion of all anti-EU Riksdag-members would be reflected in a vote. For 
instance, party discipline is likely to reduce dissent from the official party line. Lacking 
the information a pre-referendum Riksdag vote on full EU-membership would have 
provided, it is more reliable to focus on official party positions.
Of the parties, only the VP and the GP have consistently opposed EU-membership^. As 
can be observed from table 7.3 below, these two parties combined commanded only
11.1 percent of the vote at the 1994 election. Put another way, in the 1994 general
61 Miles, 1997, p. 245.
62 Ruin, 1996, p. 182.
63 In the vote over EEA membership on 18 November 1992, only 13 members of the 
Riksdag voted against (Nordisk Kontakt, 11/1992, pp. 105-106).
For early accounts of party positions on EC-membership, see Bergquist (1969, pp. 5- 
6), Miljan (1977, especially pp. 241-253) and Wallensteen (1977, pp. 99-101). For 
positions when the issue re-emerged in 1990 and later, see Hadenius, Molin and 
Wieslander (1991, p. 330), Ross (1991, pp. 124-5), Berg (1994, pp. 87-89), Pierre and 
Widfeldt (1992, pp. 523-24) and Ruin (1996, pp. 177-92).
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elections at least 87.7 percent of Swedish voters voted for a pro-EU party^ .^ Hence, there 
is a large gap between public opinion and that of the parties in this respect.
Table 7.3: Official position on EU-membership by party and support in percent by party 
at last parliamentary election before the 1994 referendum in Sweden.
VP SSD GP KD CP MP FP
upport
145.4 5
^ Support 
4.1 7.7
Support
22.2
w :  
.^1 "
Support
1.2
Support = support membership as defined by the TEU. Sources: 1994 elections: 
Madeley, 1995; EU-position: Jahn and Storsved, 1995; Bjprklund, 1996.
Since the EU-conflict re-entered Swedish politics the parties have had to make their 
official positions clear. On the centre-right the FP and the MP^  ^ both came out as 
strongly pro-membership. The KD was somewhat against EU-membership until 1990, 
but then it was not really a relevant question before then. After the referendum, there 
was 100 percent support for membership in the parliamentary group. At the party 
congress, some 20 percent were against memberships^. The far-right ND was also for 
membership, but has since the 1994 election become irrelevant in Swedish politics. 
Therefore, this party will be largely ignored in the rest of this chapter.
On the centre-left, the CP and the SSD have both been - and remain - split on this 
question. At its last party conferences before the 1994 referendum, about one third of the 
delegates at each conference voted against memberships*. The GP has been strongly
1.2 percent did not vote for the parties represented in Table 7.3.
The MP allowed no dissent against its pro-EU position. The one anti-EU MP 
Riksdag-representative, Bjom von der Esch, was deselected from the party list in 
Sormland before the 1994 election (Nordisk Kontakt, 4/1994, p. 75).
Letter from the KD’s international secretary^ Goran Holmstrom (3/2/1997).
The CP voted 184 to 92 for membership at a extraordinary party conference on 
8/5/1994 (Nordisk Kontakt, 5/1994, p. 70); and the SSD 232 to 103 for membership at 
their party conference on 19/6/1994 (Nordisk Kontakt, 6/1994, p. 80).
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opposed to Swedish EU-membership all along^^. After Sweden became a member, the 
party has advocated withdrawal as soon as possible'^o.
On the left, the VP stated in its 1988 program that it was against “both hidden and open” 
membership in the EC^ .^ It opposed EEA membership as well as EU memberships^. 
However, the party’s representatives in the Riksdag voted for membership in the 
parliamentary vote after the referendum, on grounds of respecting the decision made in 
the referendum. It has also decided to work towards its goals inside the EU, instead of 
simply aiming for withdrawal. Although the party still remains convinced “that Sweden 
ought not be a member of the EU”S^ , the VP is not as anti-EU as the GP.
The effect of the conflict over EU-membership on national election results appears to be 
limited. Appendix 7.6 lists election results and seat allocation in the ‘Riksdag’ since 
1970. At the 1991 election both anti-EU parties, the VP and the GP, lost votes. 
However, the EU-conflict was still at a low intensity level at that stage. Between the 
1991 and the 1994 election, these two parties both increased their share of the vote, the 
VP from 4.5 percent to 6.2 percent, and the GP from 3.4 percent to 5.0 percent. One 
could argue that this increase is hardly dramatic, especially considering that the elections 
were held only two months before the referendum on membership. The split but
Bennulf and Holmberg, 1990, pp. 167-68. According to Worlund (1989, p. 79) One 
of the main demands of the GP at the 1988 election was ‘no’ to the EEC.
Miljopartiet de Grona: Mot EU. GP party literature for the 1995 EP election in 
Sweden.
The party was then called ‘Vansterpartiet Kommunistema (VPK)’ - the Left Party 
Communists (VPK election manifesto, 1988).
Europe-resolution supported by the VP’s congress 1993 (VP, 1993a).
Vansterpartiet: More democracy less union. The EU programme of the Left Party of 
Sweden (VP).
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officially pro-EU SSD increased its share from 37.6 percent to 45.4 percent - although 
this is more likely to have been a vote against the government and general economic 
misery rather than for the SSD policies on the EU'^  ^ Nevertheless, Widfeldt argues that 
their opposition to EU-membership was important for the success of the VP and the 
G?75:
“The successful results for the Left and Green parties were conspicuous and 
surprising. The Left Party recorded its best Riksdag election result since 
1948, while the Green Party is the first ever Swedish party to regain Riksdag 
status after having lost it. One reason behind the success of both parties is 
that they were able to capitalise on Euro-scepticism; their firm opposition 
against Swedish entry to the European Union made them unique among the 
eight major parties.”'^ ^
Further to this argument, based on survey results of the 1994 referendum Holmberg^^ 
found that eight percent of voters had changed the party they sympathised with because 
they disagreed with their old party’s position on EU-membership. Based on the same 
survey, the anti-EU parties, the VP and the GP, both appeared to have increased their 
share of the vote substantially between the Riksdag election and the r e fe r e n d u m ^ ^  The 
VP and the GP would probably be better placed to capitalise on their opposition to EU- 
membership if their policies and image were less radical and left wing. In particular, 
many anti-EU voters may find it difficult to vote for the VP - which used to be a
74 Widfeldt, 1995 and 1996a.
75 Madeley, (1995, p. 426), and Widfeldt (1996a, pp. 107, 114, 115) make similar 
arguments.
76 Widfeldt, 1995, p. 211.
77 1996a, pp. 230-232.
78 Holmberg, 1996a, p. 234.
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communist party^^ _ unless opposition to EU-membership is an absolutely paramount 
concem.
7.4.1 The extent to which the EU-conflict crosscuts other cleavages.
The dominant political cleavage in Sweden is the left-right cleavage^®. Most parties can 
be placed relatively to each other along a left-right axis in a meaningful way. A party’s 
position on this axis also tends to define coalition partners. Figure 7.1 shows how the 
relevant parties are aligned along the left-right axis.
Figure 7.1. The left-right cleavage in Sweden.
R i g h t
Ivp 3.77 ISD 8.53 |GP9.27 |CP 12.03 |KD 13.03 |FP 14.55 |MP 17.221
Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, pp. 304-305. Scores based on average expert scores of 
party leaders’ attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership (1) vs. cutting 
tax/anti-public ownership (20).
The secondary cleavage in Sweden is an urban-rural one. This does to some extent 
crosscut the left-right cleavage, as Figure 7.2 shows.
Figure 7.2. The urban-rural cleavage in Sweden.
Urban Rural
IVP6.11 |SSD6.11|FP6.95 |MP7.00 |KD 12.53 |GP 13.88 |CP 16.4^
Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, p. 306. Scores based on average expert scores of party 
leaders’ attitude towards urban interests. (1 = pro, 20 = anti)
They dropped the ‘communist’ label in 1990. The official Swedish name changed 
from ‘Vansterpartiet Kommunistema’ (VPK) to ‘Vansterpartiet’ (VP).
See, for example. Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988, chapters 1 and 2); Gilljam and 
Oscaisson, (1996). Brantgaide (1989) also gives a detailed account of this cleavage, as 
well as class, sectorial, territorial, age, educational, and private/public divisions. 
Oskarson (1992) also analyses the left-right cleavage, as well as class, religion, sectorial, 
territorial, gender, age, educational, and green dimensions.
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In terms of patterns of electoral support, it is the MP and the GP that are the most urban 
parties (See Appendix 7.6). At the other end of the scale, the CP is the only party with a 
truly rural support profile. For the other parties the pattern is less clear, although the 
SSD is weaker in the big cities and metropolises than elsewhere^k The support for the 
FP and the VP is somewhat erratic based on urbanity, but both parties have strongholds 
in the big cities, as well as in the most rural areas.
There is only a weak (geographical) centre-periphery dimension (measured in terms of 
pattern of electoral support) in Sweden, with the MP being disproportionately strong and 
the SSD correspondingly weak in the capital area. In terms of a north-south divide (see 
Appendix 7.6), it is the MP which has the most distinct profile. It receives substantially 
more support in the south. On the opposite end of the scale, the VP is the most 
‘northern’ party, with particularly high levels of support in the northernmost county, 
Norrbotten. The SSD has a similar, but less distinct, profile. For the other parties the 
north-south divide is less important. However, the KD has a very distinct stronghold in 
Jonkoping in central south Sweden, where it exceeds its national voting average by more 
than double.
The urban-rural cleavage does not appear to make co-operation based on the left-right 
cleavage particularly difficult. The only problem is that the CP and the MP are far apart 
on the urban-rural scale. The weaker north-south dimension is even less of a problem. 
The general weakness and decline of these dimensions make them relatively 
unimportant for coalition considerations. In fact, single issues appear to be more
Source: Brantgarde (1989, especially page 257). See also Worre (1980, pp. 307-10) 
regarding the rural basis of support for the CP.
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important. In the 1970’s the debate over nuclear energy made co-operation difficult 
between the CP and the other parties on the centre-right. In the end it broke their 
coalition, and the first non-socialist government for 44 years resigned on October 5, 
197882.
Considering the above discussion, it is clear that for the conflict over European 
integration to have maximum impact, it must crosscut the left-right cleavage. As figure
7.3 below shows, it does so only to a limited extent. The most significant deviation from 
the left-right divide is the extreme anti-EU position of the GP.
Figure 7.3. Party position on EU-membership at the 1994 referendum in Sweden.
Anti-EU Pro-EU
Ig p  ' Iv p  |c p  Is s d  |n d  |k d  |f p  Im p  |
Based on party positions. Sources: Party programmes and Jahn and Storsved (1995, p. 
27).
Thus, based on party position, the EU-conflict does not create any significant coalition 
problems between traditional partners. The VP and the GP are unlikely coalition 
partners for the other parties. No government has ever included either. However, the 
EU-conflict increases differences between these two parties and the party closest to them 
on the left-right dimension, the SSD.
So far, the EU-conflict arguably constitutes a minor political cleavage in Sweden. In 
section two of this chapter it was established that the EU-conflict creates an observable 
conflict of interest between those whose utility is increased through EU-membership and
For an account of this episode, see for example Lewin (1988, chapter 8).
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those for whom it declines. It has also been demonstrated that substantial numbers of 
people appear to perceive this conflict of interest as important. However, the effect on 
the national party system has so far been limited, with increases in support for the anti- 
EU GP and VP possibly attributable to this conflict. However, because the SSD has 
ruled alone since the 1994 EU-referendum, it remains to be seen to what extent this 
conflict affects coalition formation.
With the anti-EU views of large sections of the Swedish electorate not represented in the 
Swedish parliament - and particularly not by the parties’ official policies - it would 
appear that there is an incentive for one or more of the pro-EU parties to oppose 
European integration for vote maximisation purposes.
7.4.2. The potential for vote maximisation based on the conflict over European 
integration.
The parties from the SSD to the KD, and even the MP, are not that far apart on the 
dominant left-right scale in the view of the Swedish voter^^ Therefore, they are all likely 
to be able to attract anti-EU votes from all the parties to the right of the VP - and 
perhaps even some from that party.
However, for the FP and the MP it is unlikely to be beneficial to oppose EU- 
membership. A vast majority of their voters supported membership at the 1994 
referendum. For the SSD, the KD and the CP, on the other hand, opposition to EU- 
membership looks more likely to be a profitable vote-seeking exercise. Approximately
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half their voters opposed membership at the referendum. They all have the potential to 
attract ‘no’ voters from other parties, since they operate close to the centre of Swedish 
politics. Yet none of them oppose membership.
For the GP and the VP, opposition to EU-membership is much more likely to lead to an 
increase in votes than is support for membership. The vast majority of those who tend to 
vote for these parties are opposed to membership. Furthermore, there are numerous 
centre-left (SSD) and centrist (CP, KD) anti-EU voters whose view is not represented 
by their pro-EU party. Many of these can be considered as potential voters by the GP 
and the VP. At the two (excluding local) elections held in the period when the EU- 
dimension has been salient in Sweden (the 1994 election to the Riksdag and the 1996 
election to the EP), these two parties have increased their votes substantially compared 
to previous elections.
7.4.3 Coalition problems and considerations.
Table 7.4 below shows the make-up of Swedish governments since 1970. As Appendix
7.6 shows, no single party has held an overall majority of seats in the Riksdag since 
then. Hence, all governments have been either coalition (minority or majority), or single 
party minority governments.
See Gilljam and Oscarsson (1996).
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Table 7.4. Government participation in Sweden.
Year Prime Minister Party
1970 Palme, 0 . SSD
1976 Falldin, T. CP FP MP
1978 Ullsten, 0 . FP
1979 Falldin, T. CP FP MP
1981 Falldin, T. CP FP
1982 Palme, O. SSD
1986 Carlsson, I. SSD
1991 Bildt, C. CP FP MP KD
1994 Carlsson, I. SSD
1996 Persson, G. SSD
The Prime Minister’s party is in bold type. Source 1970-91: Petersson (1994, p. 103). 
1994; Widfeldt (1995). 1996: Nordisk Kontakt (5/1996, p. 84).
As the table shows, every government in this period has been either a SSD single party 
government, or it has included the FP. That is, governments are based either on the 
centre-right or the centre-left, and, as the data in Appendix 7.6 show, all possible 
government combination need formal or informal co-operation from several parties to 
achieve a majority in parliament. Coalition considerations are very important for why 
the SSD, the KD and the CP do not oppose EU-membership. Since 1990, when the EC- 
membership became a serious consideration, no government party has opposed EU 
memberships"^ .
On the centre-right, both the FP, and especially the MP, are very pro-EU. As an added 
incentive to the pro-EU position of most of their voters, these two parties are also 
prevented by policy sincerity and credibility considerations from changing position on 
EU-membership. Without dramatic events interfering, they are basically pre-committed 
to support such membership. Hence, if either the KD or the CP (or both) should become 
anti-EU, then a coalition that includes either of these parties together with the FP or the
84 The CP was against membership until 1990 (Widfeldt, 1996a, p. 112).
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MP would be considerably more unlikely. Moreover, there are few opponents to 
membership among the Riksdag-members representing these four parties.
There are several centre-left combinations of parties with a ‘no’-majority among their 
voters which would command a majority in the Riksdag, both in 1991-94 (SSD + VP + 
CP), and especially since 1994 (SSD + either VP, GP or CP). But no Swedish 
government has ever incorporated the VP or the GP.
The CP is a different matter. It has been in government with the SSD before (albeit a 
long time ago, in the periods 1939-1936 and 1951-1957), and has often, especially since 
1994, provided minority SSD governments with parliamentary support. Since 1994, 
these two parties together command a majority of seats in the Riksdag, and would 
therefore not need support from any other parties to be able to form a majority 
government. However, this also provides motivation to stay pro-EU. As long as they 
both do so, they will be able to co-operate closely in this area, and both retain the 
possibility for government participation. If one defects, then the other would have a 
strong incentive to do so as well, both for vote- and office-seeking purposes.
However, if both the SSD and the CP became anti-EU, they would face the risk of 
losing ‘yes’-voters to other parties, such as the KD and the FP. Furthermore, since 1994 
the SSD has shown that it can govern in a minority. Whether it could do so as an anti- 
EU party has not been put to the test. And the CP runs the risk of becoming less 
influential as well as having a smaller government potential (in both directions on the 
left-right scale unless there are further defections) if it becomes anti-EU. Risk aversion 
indicates these parties should remain pro-EU. Hence, the most rational option for
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coalition purposes for all parties except the VP and the GP is to continue their pro-EU 
stance. This conclusion also makes it useful for all parties except the VP and the GP to 
remove the most basic BU-related questions (membership and further integration) from 
the national election arena.
7.4.4. Complications and synergy between various party aims.
Among party members there are considerable differences in support for the official party 
policy on EU-membership. According to a poll carried out in April to May 1992* ,^ 71 
percent of VP- and GP- members opposed EU-membership, as did 47 percent of SSD- 
members, 61 percent of CP-members, and 46 percent of KD-members. A majority of the 
members of the FP (58 percent) MP (72 percent) and ND (52 percent) were for 
membership. Thus it would appear that only the VP, the GP and the MP have 
considerable support for their position on EU-membership among their members. And 
only the VP and the GP are in a position of being able to pursue an anti-EU position 
which has the support of a majority of their voters, members, and party-leaders.
For the FP and the MP, a pro-EU position is considerably more likely to fulfil the aims 
of vote maximisation and retaining party unity than an anti-EU position. This is also 
more likely to maximise government potential for each party as long as the other centre- 
right parties remain pro-EU. For the SSD, the CP and the KD, the situation is 
considerably more complicated. It is unclear which position would maximise votes, and 
also which would be more likely to keep these parties united.
Carried out by the Temo Institute and the newspaper Dagens Nyheter. The overall 
numbers showed 38 percent in opposition to full membership, 39 percent in favour, and
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If these three parties aim for vote maximisation, then an anti-EU position seems to be 
the most advantageous. About half of the SSD-, CP-, and KD- voters oppose EU- 
membership, and there ought to be votes to be gained from other parties for a party 
willing to oppose EU-membership. However, if any of these parties defect from the pro- 
EU position, then the other pro-EU parties are left with some difficult options. They can 
exclude the defector from government, but this leaves the problem of the defector 
gaining votes from them. Alternatively, they can also change position. However, this 
could be extremely difficult or dangerous, or both. Firstly, the party might lose more 
votes than it will gain. Secondly, it could lead to deep divisions and even splits in the 
party.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, defecting from the common pro-EU position is 
only potentially profitable as long as the other pro-EU parties do not defect. But if the 
CP becomes anti-EU and starts to gain votes (some of which will be from the SSD and 
the KD), then these parties will find it difficult to remain pro-EU. And if all three 
change their position then they would be chasing a small number of anti-EU voters in 
the FP and the MP. In addition, they would be in competition for anti-EU votes with the 
VP and the GP, as well as each other. They would also be vulnerable to losing pro-EU 
voters.
There are also further disincentives to defection related to the office-seeking nature of 
parties. If not enough parties defect from the pro-EU position, then the defector might 
find that it has excluded itself from government participation. And a simple majority of
21 percent undecided (Miles, 1997, pp. 203-204).
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seats for anti-EU parties does not necessarily amount to a government basis. The parties 
will have to agree on other policies as well. For this reason, parties such as the VP and 
the GP are unlikely to be able to take part in an anti-EU government with more centrist 
and mainstream parties.
The KD has a further incentive to pursue a pro-EU policy. The party is aiming to model 
itself on the continental Christian Democrat parties and to move away from its earlier 
‘confessional’ character. Commitment to European integration is a cornerstone of the 
Christian Democrat movement, and hence a natural part of this transformation into a 
Christian Democratic party. As for the SSD, the vast majority of its leaders and Riksdag- 
members are pro-EU, and it would appear that an anti-EU position is more likely to split 
the party than a pro-EU position is.
The VP and the GP have never been in government, and have little hope of joining 
coalitions. If they want to gain office, they have to become stronger in terms of votes or 
move their policies closer to other parties. But shifting policies risks alienating voters 
who support them precisely because they are different. In addition, they both (and the 
GP in particular) owe some of their support and appeal to their ‘anti-system’ character. 
Hence, increasing their share of the vote appears to be the better option for these parties 
if they want to get into government. Therefore, it is in the interest of these two parties to 
keep the EU-conflict in the national election arena. In contrast, for the other parties 
focus on this conflict would risk internal splits, loss of votes and/or the destruction of 
traditional coalition patterns.
Not as in ‘anti-democratic’, rather against the politics represented by the older and 
‘mainstream’ Swedish parties.
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Finally, there are two factors which make members of the political elite more likely to 
be pro-EU. Firstly, EU-membership increases the numbers of high-powered, highly paid 
jobs available to politicians. Secondly, Swedish politicians have to consider the interests 
and views of other European politicians and of the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU, 
and these are overwhelmingly pro-EU.
7.4.5 The choices available to the Swedish voters.
Most pro-EU Swedes have a wide variety of pro-EU parties to choose from. But the 
anti-EU Swedes are left with the choice of voting either for the far-left VP or the anti­
system GP. These parties are unlikely to represent the views of many anti-EU Swedes on 
most other issues. Furthermore, the cross-pressures faced by many voters in this 
situation require them to seek further information. This makes voting less likely because 
of the increased cost. But non-voting may also be undesirable. All this makes off­
loading the EU-conflict away from national elections attractive to many voters.
7.4.6 Off-loading through référendums.
The 1994 referendum served well as an off-loading device, especially for the SSD. It 
increased its vote dramatically in the 1994 general election, and returned to power. The 
other pro-EU parties suffered limited losses, and the anti-EU parties enjoyed equally 
limited gains. (See Appendix 7.6) Since the MP, the FP, the KD and the CP had been 
partners in a government residing over the biggest recession to hit Sweden since the 
1930’s, it is unlikely that these losses were closely related to these parties’ pro-EU 
position.
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As for the voters, it appears that most Swedes prefer to express their position on 
European integration at référendums and EP elections. The deeply divided public 
opinion on EU-membership did not appear to change the voting patterns dramatically at 
the 1991 or the 1994 elections.
7.4.7 Off-loading through EP-elections.
Although the turnout was a low 41 percent (compared to 80 percent and above at 
national elections), the results of the 1995 EP election in Sweden were still quite 
remarkable. Table 7.5 below compares the 1994 parliamentary election results with 
those of the 1995 EP election.
The anti-EU VP and GP were the clear winners, taking nearly 30 percent of the vote 
between them. This represented close to a tripling of the combined vote these parties 
received in the 1994 parliamentary elections. Conversely, the SSD was the clear loser, 
along with the FP. The most pro-EU party, the MP, increased its vote somewhat from 
1994. Many opponents of Swedish EU-membership used the EP-election to show their 
opposition to EU-membership. In contrast, they did not do the same in the 1994 national 
elections. Hence, EP-elections also appear to function as an off-loading mechanism in 
Sweden.
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Table 7.5. The results of the 1994 elections to the Swedish ‘Riksdag’ and 1995 EP 
elections.
Party Riksdag election 1994, % 1995 EP elections, % Seats in EP Change 1994-95, %
VP 6.2 12.9 3 +108
SSD 45.4 28.1 7 -38
GP 5.0 17.2 4 +244
CP 7.7 7.2 2 -6
FP 7.2 4.8 1 -33
KD 4.1 3.9 0 -5
MP 22.4 23.2 5 +4
Sources: 1994 election results: Madeley, 1995, p. 425. 1995 election results: Widfeldt, 
1996b. The percentages in column five were calculated by the author.
It could be argued, of course, that the increase in support in polls and the EP elections 
represent popular concem for other issues. In particular, displeasure with Sweden’s 
disastrous economic development in the early and mid 1990’s might lead people to vote 
for the ‘anti-system’ GP and VP. And some of their increased support probably is linked 
to this and other issues. However, Sweden’s economic problems were serious long 
before the 1995 elections, with only minor increases in support for these parties. 
Massive increase in support for the anti-EU parties in a period with strong public 
concerns about EU-membership is simply too much of a coincidence.
7.5 Conclusion.
Many Swedes appear to have expected their utility increase in connection with EU 
membership through anticipating a positive effect on the Swedish economy, the chance 
to influence the EU, and prospects for peace in Europe. Conversely, many Swedish 
people seem to have viewed the effects of EU membership on factors related to national 
control and the nature of EU integration as detrimental to their utility. This is quite
361
rational, since these are areas where EU-membership has the most obvious effect. 
Neutrality seems to have been of only minor importance for attitudes to membership.
There were substantial territorial differences in attitudes towards EU membership in 
Sweden. This appears to be mainly due to variances in ideological support for the 
welfare state. There were also substantial differences between the attitudes of men and 
women, and those employed by the public or private sector. This is likely to have been 
related to the high levels of equality and benefits for women, and a highly developed and 
universal welfare state in Sweden compared to many other European countries.
Based on comparison with (other) EU-countries and the assumption that membership 
would lead to an eventual reduction of the welfare state, membership could be argued to 
lower the utility levels of many women and public employees. The data confirms that a 
disproportionate number of members of these groups opposed membership. The same 
argument can be put in terms of ideological support for the extensive welfare state, and 
left-wing opposition to membership is likely to be linked to this. Of the two seemingly 
sacrosanct features of Sweden mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, it would 
seem that the welfare state is substantially more venerated than neutrality.
The EU-conflict has so far had a limited impact on the domestic Swedish party system. 
Only minor differences in party support appear to be related to this dimension. In terms 
of the cleavage model this is because the EU-conflict crosscuts the dominant left-right 
cleavage only to a limited degree. The GP moves from the centre of the left-right 
cleavage to the extreme on the EU-dimension, and the CP shifts somewhat away from 
its traditional coalition partners. Since it is unlikely the GP would be a potential
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coalition partner for the centre-right anyway, this is of minor importance. The CP, with 
its voters and members split on this dimension, might find it more difficult to co-operate 
with the FP and the MP. The same goes for the KD, but to a lesser degree, since its party 
leadership is heavily pro-EU, even if a lot of its voters are not.
In terms of the rational choice model, it is in the interest both of many voters and the 
majority of the parties to off-load the EU-conflict to référendums and EP-elections. The 
only parties who oppose EU-membership have an anti-system character and some 
relatively extreme policies, and are therefore not palatable options for many anti-EU 
voters. These parties tend to hold only about ten percent of the seats in the Riksdag. 
Because a much higher number of Swedes oppose EU-membership, it would appear 
rational for more of the parties to do so as well, in particular the SSD, the CP and the 
KD, since around half of their voters oppose EU-membership. However, these parties 
have remained pro-EU.
If the EU-conflict was to play a more prominent role in national elections, internal party 
divisions would become more likely, especially in the SSD, the KD and the CP. And if 
more parties took an anti-EU position, this would risk both party-splits and make normal 
coalition patterns more difficult - and maybe impossible. A strong focus on the EU- 
conflict at national elections would also make it more difficult for voters who disagree 
with their ‘normal’ party on this issue to decide how to vote. Therefore, both the 
majority of political parties and many voters have an interest in off-loading the EU- 
conflict away from the national election agenda. This off-loading is based on two main 
devices. The first is the use of the referendum to decide the question of EU-membership 
as well as future important decisions related to European integration. The second device
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is EP elections. It appears that these are likely to take on a certain ‘Danish flavour’ by 
functioning at least partly as ‘mini-referendums’ on European integration.
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Chapter 8. Nordic Contrasts. Comparative analysis and conclusions.
In this chapter it is demonstrated to which extent the populations of the Nordic countries 
have different interests with regard to European integration. In chapters four to seven, 
the effects of EU membership on individual utility was separated into a variety of factors 
where membership had been argued to make a difference in Chapter 3. The importance 
of some of these factors varies considerably between the four countries, while the 
importance of other factors is much more similar. Furthermore, for .&eîOë%factors the 
effects of EU membership affects attitudes to membership in opposite directions in 
different countries. ^
- Vrc/
This chapter also demonstrates that the position of parties in the same ‘family’  ^ varies 
considerably in the four countries. The cleavage model illustrates the resulting 
crosscutting effect. It is also demonstrated how the degree of correspondence between 
the parties’ aims strongly influences how the conflict over European integration affects 
the party systems in the region. The reasons for off-loading the EU-conflict and the 
usefulness of this strategy are also discussed. The final sections of this chapter consist of 
theoretical conclusions, overall conclusions, and proposals for a future research agenda.
8.1. The effects of EU-membership on individual utility.
This section is organised according to two principles. Firstly, a distinction is made 
between factors which appear to have a similar effect on individual utility across 
countries, and those where there are marked differences. Secondly, a further distinction
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is made between factors which have a considerable or clearly identifiable effect on 
utility and those that either appear to be unimportant or where the effect on utility is 
unclear.
It is argued here that people are more likely to base their opinions on obvious effects on 
factors close to their personal life, and in particular on economic factors, than factors 
which have a more obscure effect on their utility. The more obscure concerns can, 
however, be important for people who have little or no stake in the factors where EU- 
membership has a more direct effect. The uncertainty of how some factors are actually 
affected by EU-membership also renders some factors of less importance. Rational 
people will discount or even ignore factors where uncertainty is substantial. This is 
reflected in the structure of this section.
8.1.1 Substantive factors with similar effects on utilitv across countries.
Material benefits derived from The Welfare State.
By comparison with the EU-12 average, the Nordic countries have more extensive 
welfare states. From the EU-Treaties, one would be hard pressed to see direct effects on 
the welfare state emanating from EU-membership. However, it is possible that more 
social and welfare policies will be brought in under the EU-umbrella in the future. 
Furthermore, competitive pressures and/or harmonisation could be argued to lead to less 
comprehensive welfare states in Scandinavia. Although this would affect all the 
inhabitants of this area, those employed in the public sector, the poor, and women (see
 ^ See von Beyme, 1985.
366
below) would be more adversely affected by such a reduction than the average citizen 
would. Hence, for people who fit one or more of these characteristics, risk aversion 
makes them more likely to oppose EU-membership. The significance of this factor is 
likely to also contain opposition to EEA-membership, since this is likely to have much 
the same effect as EU-membership in this regard.
As Table 8.1 below shows, in all four countries those employed by the public sector 
were more likely to oppose EU membership than those in private sector employment 
were. Similarly, those with a higher income were more likely to be pro-EU compared to 
those with lower income. These differences vary, but they have the same direction in 
each country. The considerably higher public/private sector gap in Denmark is partly due 
to the inverse position of farmers there compared to the other countries. Conversely, the 
smaller differential in the Finnish and Norwegian cases is partly due to the vast majority 
of farmers (especially in Norway), who are nearly all in the private sector, opposing 
membership. The position of Swedish voters is somewhere in-between, reflecting the 
limited effect of EU membership on Swedish agriculture. It is also likely that the 
difference in opinion between public and private sector employees in Sweden is 
increased, relatively to the other three countries, by the Swedish welfare state being the 
most extensive.
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Table 8.1^. Income and private/public sector divides and yes-vote in référendums. 
Percent.
Denmark^ Finland"^ Norway Sweden
Sector
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public 42 61 47.3 46
Private
Income^
63 68 52.1 58
Low N/A 51 21.9 49
Low medium N/A 57 25.1 59
High medium N/A 61 -
High N/A 74 40.4 76
Data sources: see Appendices 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3.
Similarly, the country chapters on Finland and Norway demonstrate that the areas with 
disproportionately high numbers of opponents of membership also receive a 
disproportionately high share of state spending, both in the form of agricultural subsidies 
(see below) and other forms of public funds.
Gender Differences.
As Table 8.2 shows, women consistently voted against membership more frequently 
than men did across the region. Disproportional dependence upon the welfare state, 
public employment and the highly egalitarian nature of the Nordic countries relatively to 
most (other) EU countries all make EU-membership less attractive to women than to
 ^Unless otherwise stated, all data in tables in this chapter refer to surveys of the 1994 
référendums for Finland, Norway and Sweden. For Denmark, the 1992 referendum over 
the TEU is the standard.
 ^For Denmark, the public/private data includes only white-collar employees.
 ^For Finland the public/private data only includes the service sector.
 ^ For Finland there are four categories: <60k Fmk. per year, 61-120k, 121-200k, and 
above 201k. For Norway there are three categories: <149k NKr. per year, 150-299k, and 
above 300k. The Norwegian data is based on the 1993 election study, when opposition 
to membership was considerably higher than at the referendum in 1994. However, trends 
and differences are likely to be similar. For Sweden there is no direct data for income, 
and the categories used are low, medium and high white collar from Appendix 7.3.
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men. The fact that the gender gap was larger in Sweden corresponds well with the fact 
that many welfare provisions, and in particular those for women on maternity leave, 
were considerably more generous in Sweden than elsewhere in the Nordic countries.
Table 8.2. Gender and yes-vote in EU-référendums
Gender Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Male 53 65 44 59
Female 46 57 52 46
Gender 7 8 8 13
difference
Data sources: See appendices 4.3, 5.3, 6.3, 7.3.
Trade considerations.
Nordic countries trade widely, and are dependent upon trade for a large portion of their 
GDP, as Table A shows. Because so much of this trade is with EU countries (see 
country chapters for evidence), access to their markets is pivotal. Hence participation in 
the EU makes sense from a pure trade perspective for all these countries.
It could be argued that the EEA-Treaty secures trade interests. However, because this 
Treaty can be cancelled at one year’s notice, this is a less secure option for optimal trade 
access to the EU-market than full EU-membership. In addition, for Denmark access to 
the EU-market for agricultural products is extremely important, and agriculture is 
largely excluded from the EEA-Treaty.
Those who can clearly relate their utility to effects of EU-membership on trade are likely 
to be affected by this in their opinion of EU-membership. Hence, people employed in 
export industries are likely to be more pro-EU than the average citizen due to the
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positive effect on their utility of secure access to the EU-markets. Conversely, those 
individuals employed in non-competitive industries dependent upon public subsidies or 
protection from competition are likely to view EU-membership as detrimental to their 
utility. Farmers in Norway and Finland are good examples of such individuals.
As appendices 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2 show, arguments related to trade and general 
economic welfare arguments are among the most prominent pro-EU arguments in all 
four countries. The town of Ardal in western Norway is the best specific example of the 
effect of this factor. In addition, this is very likely to be part of the reason for the 
differences in attitude to membership between public and private sectors and urban and 
rural areas, with the inverse urban-rural divide in Denmark related to the importance of 
farm exports and a more left-wing urban population (see below). Related to this, it is 
likely that those who support parties on the right are more likely to support free trade 
than those who support parties on the left are. This factor is therefore most likely part of 
the reason for the left-right divide on EU-membership.
Peace and security.
With regard to peace and security in Europe, EU-membership appears to have had a 
positive effect on utility for many voters in at least three of the countries, and a negative 
effect for very few. In the Danish case (Appendix 4.1) there is no clear survey answer 
category that covers peace and security. In Finland, (Appendix 5.2) ‘security’ was the 
fourth most frequently given reason for voting ‘yes’, with very few people arguing the 
opposite. In Norway (Appendix 6.1) security-policy was viewed as the second most 
important argument for membership, again with very few people mentioning this as a
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reason to oppose membership. In Sweden (Appendix 7.1) ‘peace’ was the third most 
important reason given for having voted ‘yes’ in the referendum.
This factor also forms part of the explanation for the centre-right voters generally being 
more positive to EU-membership than those on the left. Support for internationally 
binding co-operation in the field of security policy tends to be considerably higher on the 
centre-right than on the left, with the far left particularly opposed to participation in 
military alliances^. The formation of the Danish SF and the Norwegian SV was initially 
largely based on opposition to NATO-membership. In the Swedish case, Rutger 
Lindahf demonstrates that ‘military security’ was a reason for voting behaviour 
(overwhelmingly in the form of support for membership) in the 1994 referendum by a 
considerably higher number of voters on the centre-right than on the left. Furthermore, 
supporters of the FP and the MP were much more likely to view FU-membership as an 
improvement to Sweden’s military security than were supporters of the other parties.
For reasons given in Chapter 5, it was expected that these factors would be more 
important for the Finnish than for the inhabitants of the other countries. From the 
available data, this does not appear to be the case. With the possible exception of 
Denmark, there is cross-regional support for the notion that with regard to peace and 
security; FU-membership increases utility for overwhelmingly more people than it 
reduces it for.
With the exception for some far-left parties, in the past, of alliances with Communist 
countries.
’ 1996.
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Interestingly, utility-effects of membership based on material benefits derived from the 
welfare state, trade considerations, and peace and security are all likely to be related to 
an individual’s position on the left-right cleavage. And they are likely to reinforce each 
other in this respect, with all three factors making it more likely that a person on the 
right supports membership and a person on the left opposes it. This reinforcing effect of 
these three substantial factors (as independent variables) forms a substantial part of the 
reason for the left-right divide (as a dependent variable) over European integration. 
Related to this, the left-right divide (as an independent variable) is an important 
contributing factor to the observed regional differences in attitude to EU-membership. 
This feature is considered below.
8.1.2 Lesser factors (and those where information is severelv limited) with similar 
effects on utilitv across countries.
Democracy versus influence.
The effect of EU-membership on ‘democracy’ is debatable. In reality there is a trade-off 
between small distance to legislators who have little say and control over a variety of 
policy-areas, where the EU influences ‘associated’ (EEA) members-states as well as 
member-states, and longer distance to legislators who have at least some -  and 
potentially substantial - influence over decisions. This is demonstrated by the data in 
Appendices 4.2, 5.2, 6.2, and 7.2. Whilst opponents of membership tend to mention 
detrimental effects on democracy as a reason for their voting behaviour, proponents tend 
to include arguments related to influencing decisions relevant to the citizens of the 
Nordic countries. The Danish case is somewhat different, with virtually no mention of
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the effect of EU-membership on democracy, although desire for influence appears to be 
an important reason for supporting membership.
The Nordic dimension.
Nordic solidarity, Nordic co-operation and common interests and values are important 
aspects of politics in Scandinavia. However, this thesis shows that such feelings and 
policies linked to them are only important up to a point. The moment national interest, 
or narrow economic self-interest, comes into conflict with Nordic co-operation, the latter 
loses out. Formal Nordic integration projects such as Nordek have failed, although more 
informal co-operation, with decisions based on unanimity, has been more successful. 
Denmark joined the EC in 1972 with little concem for any effects on Nordic co­
operation. In the référendums in the 1990’s, very few voters appear to have considered 
the Nordic aspect. And Finland and Sweden joined the EU despite Norway and Iceland 
remaining outside. Conversely, the Norwegians were not persuaded to join the EU so 
that Nordic co-operation could take place within the EU framework, neither were the 
Icelanders.
Factors where the effect o f membership is highly uncertain.
Regarding some factors, such as crime and drug-smuggling and -use, it is very difficult 
to evaluate the effect - if any - of EU-membership on individual utility. Such effects 
depend on whether the individual views international co-operation across open borders 
as a better solution to these problems than closed borders.
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Aid to poor countries is another factor where the effect of EU-membership is highly 
uncertain. The Nordic countries are among the world’s most generous donors to poorer 
countries as a percentage of GDP. However, it is difficult to assess if EU-membership 
will have any effect on these policies. Arguably, the same reasoning applies here as to 
the welfare state. That is, if tax income is reduced, then the possibility that foreign aid 
will be reduced as well increases. And again this is likely to make those on the right 
more likely to support membership and those on the left less likely to do so. However, 
any factor where uncertainty of the effect of membership is high is unlikely to affect 
people’s utility calculations.
8.1.3 Substantive factors with different effect on individual utilitv across countries. 
Agriculture and urban/rural differences o f interest.
The effect of EÜ-membership on the primary sector, and the rural economy generally, 
are the main reasons behind territorial differences in attitude to membership in at least 
three of the countries; the possible exception being Sweden.
Subsidies for agriculture in Norway and Finland were among the highest in the world 
and considerably above the EU-average in 1994. In Denmark subsidies were obviously 
adjusted to EU-rules. In Sweden they were becoming similar, Sweden having started an 
adjustment to the EU-level of agricultural support. In Sweden, in contrast to Norway, the 
government substantially reformed its agricultural policies in 1989, changing from
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producer- to consumer-oriented policies . It should also be stressed that Denmark’s 
exports are very agriculture-dependent. For Denmark it is crucial to have competitive 
access to the EU market for agricultural products, for which EU-membership is 
necessary. Table 8.3 shows referendum voting patterns among those employed in 
agriculture compared to the country average, as well as urban-rural and centre-periphery 
(capital area vs. country as a whole) patterns of voting in the relevant référendums.
Table 8.3. Yes-vote in EU -référendums among farmers and by territorial differences.
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Farmers No data 29 10 53
Country Average 61 52 53
Farmers-country -32 -42 0
Urban 43.8* 70.8* 53.6 57.2
Rural 55.7* 51.8* 30.6 46.2
Urban-rural -11.9 +19.0 +23.0 +11
Capital 38.3 73.5 65.6 61.5
Country Average 49.3 56.9 47.8 52.3
Capital-country -11.0 +16.6 +17.8 +9.2
North N/A 45.5^ 28.1'w 35.0"
South N/A 55.7 50.2 55.0
North-South N/A -10.2 -22.1 -20.0
Sources: See Appendices 4.4, 5.3, 6.3, 7.3.
* There are no urban/rural data as such available in the Danish case. As a surrogate, the 
‘urban’ figure for Denmark was arrived at by calculating the average score of the most 
urban part of Greater Copenhagen, amalgamating the first two areas listed in Appendix 
4.4. Conversely, the ‘rural’ figure is for the rest of Denmark. Similarly, for Finland the 
‘urban’ figure is the average ‘yes’-vote in Uusimaa and Helsinki.
This voting pattern among farmers and between rural and urban areas, combined with 
knowledge of the amount of subsidies received by this sector, and the importance of
Ingebritsen, 1995, pp. 352-353.
The average ‘yes’ vote in Oulu and Lappi combined. 
 ^Nordland, Troms, Finnmark.
 ^Vastmanland, Jamtland, Vasterbotten, Norrbotten
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exports for Danish farmers, provides strong evidence that narrow economic self-interest 
is a core factor behind the territorial differences. In addition to the farmers, many 
inhabitants of rural areas who are not employed directly in farming are employed in 
farming-related industries such as food processing. Furthermore, many of the other 
inhabitants of rural areas are dependent upon the existence of farming and farming- 
related industries for employment (shops, services, the public sector) when there are few 
other private enterprises. Without the farming-sector, large parts of the rural economy 
are likely to collapse. Also, other public subsidies are disproportionately high in many 
rural areas of Finland and Norway, reinforcing the dependency of such areas on 
agricultural subsidies.
Hence, the rural attitude towards EU-membership is very dependent upon the interests 
of the farming-sector. This is the main reason for the dramatic differences in rural voting 
patterns between pro-EU rural Denmark and anti-EU rural Finland and Norway, with 
Sweden in an intermediate position. Although agricultural subsidies there have been cut 
back towards EU-levels, it is not nearly so dependent upon agricultural exports as is 
Denmark. That its farmers and rural population take an intermediate position compared 
to the other countries is therefore to be expected.
In the Norwegian case, the importance of fishing, and the concentration of this industry 
in certain rural and peripheral counties, contributes to the urban-rural and centre- 
periphery differences. This is likely to be related to Norwegian fishermen wanting 
neither to risk having to share these resources with others, nor to allow foreigners to buy 
Norwegian-owned boats. Furthermore, it could also be argued that Norway’s fisheries
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policies are more responsible than those of the EU are, and more likely to preserve fish 
stocks in the long run^ .^
Nationalism.
Nationalist arguments, such as the protection of sovereignty, are frequently mentioned as 
arguments against membership in all four countries, particularly in Denmark. However, 
concerns for sovereignty appear to be secondary, taken into account more when other 
factors do not affect utility to any great extent. The clearest evidence of this is provided 
by the contrast of the regional differences in voting patterns, as described above. 
Regional differences in voting patterns are considerably more likely to be a result of 
economic effects on individual utility than of regional differences in concern for 
sovereignty.
The left-right ideological divide.
Support for the welfare state and state subsidies and control need not be based on 
deriving personal economic benefit from such policies. Utility is derived at least partly 
from an ideological perspective, a wide rather than a narrow self-interest. It is assumed 
here that ideological support for the welfare state and a large state sector is higher on the 
political left than on the right. The arguments for why BU-membership is likely to be 
viewed as detrimental to the Nordic welfare model are outlined in section 8.1.1 above 
and in Chapter 3. It is also quite possible that this factor contains people’s position on 
EEA-membership, as well as developments such as globalisation and increasingly open
See, for example. The Economist, 19/10, 1996.
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world markets, with the European single market advanced by the EU viewed as 
symbolic of such developments.
Opposition to EU-membership among those who vote for the far left is consistently high 
across the region, as Table 8.4 below shows. However, among SD-voters there is less 
consistency. Whilst opposition to EU membership (as expressed at the 1992 and 1994 
référendums) was disproportionately high among Social Democrat voters in Sweden and 
Denmark, it was considerably below average in Norway and Finland.
There are several reasons for this. In Norway, the 1993 election was dominated by the 
EU-conflict. Hence, the off-loading exercise did not succeed at this election, although 
the promise of a referendum on EU-membership almost certainly limited the effects of 
the EU-conflict. The AP gained pro-EU voters from the SV and other parties, and lost 
considerable numbers of anti-EU voters to the centre parties and the SV^ .^ Therefore, the 
proportion of anti-EU AP-voters declined substantially at this election, and vice versa 
for the SV and some other parties. In Sweden the off-loading exercise appears to have 
succeeded relatively well at the 1994 parliamentary election, despite, or perhaps 
because, being very close to the referendum. In Finland, the last general election before 
the 1994 referendum was in 1991, when the debate over EU-membership had only just 
started. Although there was a general election in Denmark in 1990, this was well before 
the TEU. Furthermore, in Denmark the off-loading mechanisms had been in use for 
nearly 20 years by the early 1990s.
" Valen, 1994.
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In Finland, Southern Finland and the capital area are the FSD strongholds, where the 
pro-EU side also has its strongholds. Also, in Finland the welfare state is less directly 
connected only with the Social Democrats compared to the other three countries. 
Furthermore, Finland traditionally has a much larger far-left party, as well as a 
considerably larger farmers/rural party (the CF) than do the other three countries. Hence, 
whilst the Finnish party is urban and has only limited support from voters who tend to 
be anti-EU, the other Social Democratic parties appeal to a wider segment of the 
population and are therefore liable to be in conflict with more of their voters on the EU- 
issue.
Table 8.4. Left-voting and yes-vote in EU-référendums.
Party Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Far-left 8 36 19 13
SD 36 75 64 46
Left 27 60 55 40
Country 50 62 48 53
average
Left-country -23 +2 +7 -13
‘Far-left’ includes only the largest party on the far left. ‘Party’ refers to party at last 
election. Sources: appendices 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3.
This is also part of the explanation for regional differences in attitudes towards EU 
membership. Support for different political parties varies heavily by region across 
Scandinavia. If the EU-conflict is viewed in light of the left-right cleavage, then it can 
be detected that regional variations in anti-EU sentiments are positively correlated to 
differences in support for far-left parties in all countries, and the broad left in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. However, as Table 8.5 shows, the correlations are only significant 
for the far and broad left in Denmark and Sweden, and for the far left in Norway.
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Table 8.5 Pearson Correlations between left-voting by county and ‘no’-vote in 
referendum.
Party/ies Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Far left
SD
Far
left+SD
0.859*
0.654*
0.931*
0.351
-0.417
-0.166
0.673*
-0.109
0.201
0.636*
0.681*
0.722*
0 signifies no correlation, 1 complete correlation.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). Authors calculations. Data 
sources: appendices 4.5, 5.7, 6.5 and 7.5. If the RVA is included in the Norwegian case, 
then the correlation drops to 0.490 (significant at the 0.05 level) for the far left and to 
0.134 for the left.
Capital attitudes.
A related explanation applies to the most obvious cross-country difference that cannot 
be explained through the above exposition about territorially differentiated economic 
interests. Three of the capital areas are the strongholds of the ‘yes’-side in their 
respective countries. Yet, in Denmark, Copenhagen is the main stronghold of the ‘no’- 
side. Because the vast majority of analyses of attitudes to European integration in the 
Nordic countries are of single countries only, this difference has not been addressed in 
depth. But, if the attitude to EU-membership in the capital areas is juxtaposed with the 
far-left vote in these areas, then an explanation for these differences surfaces.
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Table 8.6 Yes-vote in EU-référendums and far-left vote in capital areas.
Copenhagen
1990/92
Helsinki 1994/5 Oslo 1993/4 Stockhol 
m 1994/4
‘Yes’-vote capital 38.3 73.5 65.6 61.5
‘Yes’-vote country 49.3 56.9 47.8 52.3
Capital-country -11.0 +17 +14 +10
Far-left vote 
capital
23.9 8.9 12.3 6.7
Far-left vote 
country
11.8 10.1 9.0 6.2
Capital-country +12.1 -1.2 +3.3 +0.5
Far-left vote in the last election prior to the référendums. Parties: Denmark: SF, FK, EH; 
Finland: VF; Norway: SV, RVA; Sweden: VP. Sources: Appendices 4.5, 5.7, 6.5, 7.5.
From Table 8.6 it can be observed that the population in the Danish capital is 
considerably more likely to vote for a far-left party than are the inhabitants of the other 
three capitals. From what is argued above, this provides a plausible explanation for a 
considerable amount of the difference between Copenhagen and the other three capitals.
The national economic situation.
The economic situation and prospects in the early to mid 1990’s were very important for 
attitudes towards European integration^" .^ Unemployment rates were significantly lower 
than the EU average in Norway, somewhat lower in Sweden, about average in Denmark, 
and significantly higher in Finland. Based on this factor, incentives for agreeing to EU- 
membership and (further) European integration should be lowest in Norway and highest 
in Finland. A similar - and related - situation existed for state finances and individual 
income development. For Norway, the income from oil and gas resources provided the
Aardal (1983, pp. 31-32) makes a similar argument in a comparison of the 1972 
référendums in Denmark and Norway.
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Norwegian economy and state with a much better situation. Furthermore, many 
Norwegians wanted to protect the national ownership of these resources. These 
petroleum-industry-related factors give the average Norwegian additional incentives to 
oppose membership.
8.1.4 Lesser factors (and those where information is severelv limited) with different 
effect on individual utilitv across countries.
For Sweden, staying out of alliances and protecting neutrality were long priorities for the 
Swedish elite and for many other Swedes. However, the importance of neutrality 
appears to have been reduced in the after-math of the cold war, and this factor mattered 
very little for Swedish attitudes to EU-membership. For the Finns, there is no evidence 
that concern about neutrality had any effect on the 1994 referendum outcome. Both 
Denmark and Norway were - and are - members of NATO. Hence, neutrality is unlikely 
to have been a decisive factor for attitude to EU-membership in these two countries.
EEA-membership should have very similar effects to EU membership on the overall 
price level. Furthermore, for many goods (e.g. transport, housing) price elasticity will be 
relatively unaffected by competitive pressures from abroad. Hence, the effect of EU- 
membership on the general price level is very uncertain, and is likely to have had a 
limited effect on utility.
The one exception to this argument is food-prices. Because of the high agricultural 
subsidies in Norway and Finland, one could reasonably expect food-prices to drop as a 
result of EU-membership in these countries. The resulting effect is associated with the
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difference in attitude to EU-membership between rural and urban populations. The rural 
population has an interest in maintaining subsidies and high food prices, for the urban 
population lower food prices would increase utility. With regard to Sweden, food 
subsidies were already close to the EU-level by the time Sweden joined the EU, and so 
the effects on food-prices will be limited. This is likely to be part of the reason for why 
the urban-rural difference in attitudes to EU-membership was smaller in Sweden than in 
Norway and Finland. If Denmark left the EU it is highly uncertain what the effect on 
agricultural subsidies and food-prices would be. Hence, this factor is unlikely to have 
been part of the utility-consideration of most Danish voters. Therefore, prospects for 
lower food-prices are unlikely to form part of the pro-EU argument in Denmark. This 
removes one reason for support for membership from the urban population.
Regarding taxation, the effects of EU-membership are difficult to assess, as explained in 
Chapter 3 and in the country chapters. There has also been a convergence in taxation 
level between most of the Nordic countries and the EU-average over time. However, in 
Sweden the taxation level remained so much higher than the EU-average even by the 
early 1990’s, that one could expect some tax reduction in that country as a result of 
membership. This is likely to contribute to the left-right divide over membership in 
Sweden. Conversely, this factor was probably least important in Finland, since that 
county’s tax level was the lowest in the region.
The approach used in section three of each country chapter (utility changes derived from 
membership) allows us to stress how different factors might re-enforce each other. In all 
the countries various factors connected to the left-right cleavage are likely to reinforce 
each other, as argued above, making those with right-leaning political inclinations
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considerably more likely to see improvements to their utility emanating from 
membership compared to those on the political left. In Western Norway, in particular in 
rural areas, counter-cultures and agricultural subsidies reinforce each other. In Northern 
Norway concern for national control over fish resources, disproportionate support for the 
left wing parties, and massive state subsidies intended to keep the population from 
moving south do the same. In central and northern Finland, agricultural subsidies, 
disproportionately high state spending and relatively high support for the far left 
(‘backwoods communism’) also reinforce each other. The far left also has 
disproportionately high support in central and northern Sweden. These are all areas 
where opposition to EU-membership was considerably above the national average.
8.2. The EU-conflict and the party system.
The EU-conflict has affected electoral behaviour and the Nordic party systems to a 
certain extent. However, the effects vary considerably among the four countries analysed 
here. The next sections provide a comparative analysis of how the party systems have 
been affected by the EU-conflict. The first comparison is carried out in terms of the 
cleavage model; the second follows the rational choice model.
8.2.1 The cleavage model.
In terms of the cleavage model, the effect of the EU-conflict on the party system 
depends on the extent to which it crosscuts other important cleavages. In all four 
countries examined here, the left-right cleavage has long been the dominant cleavage. It
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is also important whether and to what extent the EU-conflict aligns with other cleavages, 
as these might be accentuated if there is close correspondence.
Chapters four to seven show that the EU-conflict changes the relative strengths of the 
more important cleavages. In particular, it appears to have the potential to increase the 
importance of territorial cleavages relatively to the left-right cleavage. However, the 
significance of the EU-conflict varies greatly between the four countries, both with 
regard to the extent it crosscuts other cleavages and with regard to the political 
consequences.
In Denmark the EU-conflict does crosscut the left-right cleavage, but to a very limited 
extent. It aligns more closely with the territorial cleavage, but territorial differences are 
muted. And territorial dimensions do not appear to significantly affect coalition 
formation in Denmark. No significant new parties have developed on the basis of the EU 
dimension at the level of national elections, and no party appears to have gained or lost 
significant numbers of votes as a result of this conflict. Nor have coalition patterns 
changed as a result of the conflict. However, the EU-dimension deepens differences 
between the DFRP/DFP and the other parties on the right, and has also increased the 
magnitude of differences between the DSD and the parties to its left. Moreover, if the 
DFRP/DFP and the far left continue to focus on anti-EU positions, whilst (in the case of 
the DFRP/DFP) linking this to an anti-immigration sentiment, then the EU-conflict 
could develop into a cleavage in Danish politics.
In Finland, there is a greater amount of crosscutting between the EU-conflict and the 
left-right cleavage. The conflict contains stronger territorial elements in Finland than in
385
Denmark. However, coalition formation in Finland, in particular over the last decade, 
has crosscut the left-right and the territorial cleavages, as well as the foreign policy 
cleavage over the relationship with the SU/Russia. (The latter has, of course, declined in 
importance.) Therefore, although the EU-conflict has a medium crosscutting effect in 
Finland, this has limited influence on co-operation patterns and coalition formation.
However, because a considerable majority of the voters who support the CF and the VF 
are anti-EU, and as these parties (and the GF) are hesitant towards further European 
integration, there is ample scope for the EU-conflict causing deeper divisions in the 
future. It is already conspicuous that the CF and the small and vehemently anti-EU FKF 
are the only substantial parties (with the exception of the relatively newly formed UF) 
that have been excluded from government after Finland joined the EU. A new anti-EU 
party, the FEU, participated in the 1995 national election, but failed to make much 
impact. However, the EU-conflict led directly to the departure of the FKF from 
government in 1994, and as such the EU-conflict has caused a, so far, minor cleavage in 
the Finnish party system.
In Sweden the EU-conflict has a medium crosscutting potential similar in magnitude to 
that in Finland. However, because the two anti-EU parties (the GP and the VP) have 
never been in government, the effect on coalition formation is limited. On the other 
hand, the CP in Sweden has similar problems to its sister-party in Finland, and opposes 
further European integration. This makes a repeat of the CP’s previous government 
participation with the other centre-right parties (often difficult anyway) considerably 
more complicated. Although no new parties have been formed based on the EU-conflict, 
the GP (in particular) and the VP have both focused strongly, and tried to capitalise on,
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their anti-EU stance. On the evidence of the EP-election of 1995, and perhaps also the 
1994 national election, the anti-EU parties have been able to capitalise on this 
opposition. If this can be sustained in national elections, the EU-conflict will have a 
considerable effect on the Swedish party system. Arguably, the EU-conflict already 
constitutes a minor political cleavage in Sweden.
The Norwegian case stands out as the one in which the EU-conflict has had the most 
dramatic effect on the party system. Importantly, it significantly deepens the territorial 
cleavages. At the 1993 election there was substantial electoral volatility due to the 
salience of the EU-conflict, with the anti-EU SP nearly tripling its vote and becoming 
the second largest party in the Storting. The party system was unsettled by this conflict, 
and there was more volatility at the 1997 election, when the NKRF and the NFRP were 
the big winners. The big loser over this period has been the most pro-EU party, the H. 
Although the 1997 election-outcome was not a direct result of the EU-conflict, the large 
amount of floating voters at the last two elections is at least partly due to this conflict.
An equally important effect of the EU-conflict in Norway, and one that is more directly 
a result of this conflict, is the coalition problems experienced on the centre-right. 
Without the EU-conflict salient, the NV, the SP, the NKRF and the H have, over the 
past 30 years, largely been able to agree on a coalition agreement. However, since 1990, 
when the EU-conflict became salient, they have been unable to do so. In particular, the 
SP and the H have not been willing to join the same coalition. This considerably 
narrows the base for any centre-right government. At least for the period 1990-1997, the 
EU-conflict constitutes a political cleavage in Norway.
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8.2.2 The EU-conflict and the cohesion of party aims.
As demonstrated in chapters four to seven, there is considerable under-representation of 
the anti-EU voters among the political parties, and in all four national parliaments, 
although less so in Norway. In theory, this should make it tempting for more parties to 
take up an anti-EU position and pursue voters who oppose EU-membership. However, 
in the same chapters it was also shown that the decision of which position to take on 
EU-membership is more complicated than simply to aim for vote-maximisation. This 
section compares the difficulties and complications faced by the political parties with 
regard to the pursuit of various party aims in the face of a salient EU-conflict. The 
comparative analysis is organised by party-family.
From the late 1980’s onwards, European integration became an increasingly salient 
dimension in Nordic politics. The question of EU-membership and how to deal with 
European integration generally added, or greatly increased the importance of, a 
European dimension in the political systems in the region. With this development, the 
political parties in Finland, Norway and Sweden had to decide - and communicate to the 
public and other political actors - which position they would take on EU-membership, 
and what kind of European integration, if any, they wanted to support. In Denmark, the 
political parties had to decide if they wished to support the deeper and more explicitly 
political integration envisaged in the TEU.
A salient new (or revived) dimension makes life more complicated for established 
political parties. They risk alienating voters who would otherwise support them, 
disruptions in coalition and co-operation patterns, internal party splits, and
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complications in relations with political actors outside the national arena. The most 
advantageous position for a party exists when all its ‘relevant actors’, as described in 
Chapter 3, align close to the same position. Unfortunately for most of the parties studied 
here, this is hardly ever the case. As the matrix in Table 8.7 below illustrates, the 
majority of parties face considerable lack of cohesion between party aims with regard to 
position on EU-membership.
Table 8.7 Cohesion of party aims with regard to position on EU membership. 1 is low, 5 
high, except for with regard to government potential, where 1 is very detrimental and 5 
no discernible effect.
Party Party
Unity
Voter support for 
position*
Effect on 
Government 
potential of EU 
conflict being 
salient
Sum Average
Denmark
Far left 5 No data 1
SF 4 5 2(4)# 11/1
3
3.67/4.33
DSD 2 2 4 8 2.67
RV 2 3 4 9 3
DKRF 2 3 4 9 3
CD 4 4 4 12 4
KF 4 5 4 13 4.33
DV 5 5 4 14 4.67
DFRP/DFP 3 3 1 7 2.33
Finland
LF 2 N/A 3(4)#
FSD 4 4 4 12 4
GF 1 N/A 3(4)#
CF 2 2 2 6 2
FLP 5 No data 1
FKF 5 5 1 11 3.67
SFF 3 5 4 12 4
NSP 5 5 4 14 4.67
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Norway
RVA 5 No data 1
SV 4 5 1 10 3.33
AP 3 4 3 10 3.33
SP 5 5 3 13 4.33
NKRF 4 5 4 13 4.33
NV 3 3 4 10 3.33
H 4 5 2 11 3.67
NFRP 3 3 2 8 2.67
Sweden
VP(K) 4 5 1 10 3.33
SSD 2 3 4 9 3
GP 5 5 1 11 3.67
CP 2 3 2 7 2.33
KD 4 3 4 11 3.67
FP 4 5 4 13 4.33
MP 5 5 4 14 4.67
ND No data 3 1
* 80 percent or more voted in agreement with party position = 5, 60-79 = 4, 40-59 = 3, 
20-39 = 2, 0-19 = 1. The VF and the GF in Finland had no official position. Based on 
party voted for at election before 1994 référendums, 1992 referendum in Denmark.
# The Danish SF and the Finnish GF and VF all changed their policy to considerably 
more pro-EU positions after the respective référendums.
Sources: Party Programmes, communication with parties, Jahn and Storsved (1995a, 
1995b), Bj0rklund (1996) and Siune (1993).
In addition, there would be substantial coalition and EU-level co-operation problems if 
governments of EU-member states (and also an EEA-member such as Norway) contain 
strong anti-EU elements, in particular if this is the official position of a party (or parties) 
in government. Essentially, EU-membership would become impossible if such a party 
tried to exercise its opposition. It would have to attempt the blockage of some, if not all 
(depending on the level of pragmatism), EU legislation being implemented nationally. 
Also, it would presumably veto any legislation it could when its minister(s) attend 
Council meetings and votes. Ceteris Paribus, this consideration makes it less attractive 
for any Nordic political party to oppose European integration, unless they aim for
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complete disassociation with the EU and not to enter into coalition with any pro-EU 
party.
As can be deduced from Table 8.7 above, the problems faced by a Nordic political party 
due to the salience of the EU-conflict vary considerably, both between parties in 
different countries but belonging to the same ‘family’ and between parties in one 
country. The numbers given in the final column of Table 8.7 provides a measure of the 
problems faced by the parties. The lower this number is, the worse the problem.
There is little cohesion across party families in the region in this regard. On the far left 
party unity tends to be high, as does voter support for the position taken. In Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, none of the far-left parties have ever been invited to join a 
government. Hence, these parties can aim for vote maximisation on the EU-conflict, 
giving only secondary consideration to office-maximisation. Although these parties 
often are involved in supporting minority Social Democrat governments, taking a 
position at variance with the Social Democratic parties or other potential co-operation 
partners should not impede this.
For the far-left parties in these three countries the position of their voters would make a 
pro-EU position very problematic. The vast majority of voters who supported the three 
larger such parties (the SF, the SV and the VP) at the last election before the 
référendums opposed membership. Also, substantial numbers of voters in the Social 
Democratic parties in each of these countries oppose membership, in particular in 
Denmark. Based on the assumption that voters are more likely to switch to parties close 
to their previously preferred party on the left-right scale, there is considerable potential
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for attracting anti-EU voters who would otherwise (the EU-conflict not being salient) 
have voted for a Social Democratic party. However, the potential for attracting Social 
Democratic voters depends on the position taken by other parties close to these parties 
on the left-right scale, that is, the centrist parties. The Norwegian centrist parties differ 
from the ones in Denmark and Sweden in that they have taken an anti-EU stance. Hence, 
the potential for vote-maximisation is higher for the Swedish and Danish far-left parties 
than for the Norwegian one(s).
However, the Swedish situation is complicated by the position of the GP. This party 
places on the centre-left of the left-right cleavage and at the anti-EU extreme of the EU- 
dimension. Therefore, the potential of the VP to attract anti-EU voters from the SD is 
compromised by the similar potential of the GP. Furthermore, the GP’s central-left 
position on the left-right axis could also make this party more attractive than the VP to 
centrist anti-EU voters. Although the GP’s environmentalist focus may not be overtly 
attractive to many such voters, they should be able to attract some voters who would 
otherwise support the CP. The CP has long profiled itself partially as an 
environmentalist party, and the GP and the CP have opposition to Swedish nuclear 
power in common.
In the Danish case, the SF campaigned against the TEU in the 1992 referendum, but 
then instigated the ‘National Compromise’ which allowed Denmark to sign up to the 
TEU with certain exemptions in 1993. The SF then campaigned for Denmark’s 
continued participation in the EU on these terms, but the party was not supported in its 
new stance by considerably more voters than the number that opposed it when it
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campaigned against the TEU. Hence, the SF appears to have reduced its vote- 
maximising potential based on the EU-conflict through these actions.
However, four other factors should also be taken into account to explain the SF position. 
Firstly, a qualified pro-EU position brings the SF closer to the position of the SD and the 
RV. Hence, the party appears to have switched its focus from vote- to office- 
maximisation on the EU-conflict. Secondly, the SF appears to have had a genuine hope 
that the Danish position could be adopted by the EU as a whole, and that the integration- 
tendencies prevalent in the TEU could be halted. This would make the EU more 
palatable to the Danish position, and contribute to the vote-maximisation aim. Thirdly, 
as part of the National Compromise, it was stipulated that all further EU Treaty changes 
would be put to a referendum in Denmark. This off-loading reduces the risk of vote-loss 
for SF as well as other parties, and therefore allows for a change towards aiming for 
office-maximisation. Fourth, in its programmes'^ the SF makes it abundantly clear that it 
still believes the EU in its current form should be radically reformed or abolished, and 
the party officially opposes the Amsterdam Treaty. Hence, the SF policy switch appears 
to be fuelled by a realistic approach to limit the EU integration project as much as 
possible whilst maximising the party’s office-potential and minimising the risk of vote- 
loss.
The situation in Finland is somewhat different. In this country there is a tradition (partly 
because of past requirements that certain legislation be passed by a super-majority) for 
excess majorities that span the left-right and territorial dimensions. All parties 
represented in parliament with more than two seats since 1990 have been members of a
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government in this same decade, including the far-left amalgamation now known as the 
VF, which in the past included strong communist elements. This puts the VF in a 
somewhat different situation from other far-left parties in the region. The very realistic 
potential to gain office is likely to have reduced the otherwise obvious temptation to 
pursue an anti-EU policy. The party did not have an official anti-EU policy at the time of 
the 1994 referendum, and after the referendum the VF decided not to pursue a policy of 
withdrawal. This moderation is likely to have made it considerably easier for the VF to 
be able to join the pro-EU five-party government formed after the 1995 election.
The centre-left Social Democratic parties face considerable problems due to the EU- 
conflict in three of the countries, Finland being the exception. In Norway the party is 
badly split, but has received considerable support from its voters for its position. Also, 
the problems faced by the centre-right in Norway benefits the AP with regard to its 
government potential. Although the SV and the SP are both anti-EU, ad-hoc support for 
EU-related matters can be found elsewhere. The Danish and Swedish parties are both 
split and in disagreement with at least half their voters on the EU-conflict. But their 
government potential does not appear to have been adversely affected, partly because the 
parties on the centre-right are also pro-EU and therefore remain potential coalition and 
co-operation partners. However, without the off-loading mechanisms, it is unlikely that 
party unity and voter loyalty could be retained.
The centre parties in Finland and Sweden are badly split on the EU-question and in 
conflict with the opinion of about 2/3ds of their voters. The Norwegian SP achieves a 
high average score in Table 8.7, but this is due to the extreme party unity on European
15 For example, ‘Et Europa i Flere Rum’, ‘R0d-gr0n politik i Europa’, SF & EF’.
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integration and the party’s position as the standard bearer for the anti-EU side in 
Norway. The party does not benefit from the EU-conflict with regard to office 
maximisation, since this conflict splits the centre-right in Norway, and in particular 
separates the H from the SP. On the other hand, with the party and its voters so united 
against membership, it is not very difficult for the SP to decide on a position. In 
addition, in Norway - as opposed to all the other three countries - there is actually a 
realistic chance of a government made up exclusively of anti-EU parties to get into 
office. This is because Norway is unique in that a substantial number of parties and the 
vast majority of voters in the centre of the left-right cleavage oppose membership.
This is not the case in the other three countries. In particular, the other ‘traditional’ 
liberal parties take a much more pro-EU position, as do considerably more of their 
voters. The Swedish FP and the Danish DV are among the most pro-EU parties in the 
Nordic area. In Finland the SFF are also very pro-EU, although a substantial and distinct 
section of its voters (the rural, mainly farming, population in Ostrobothnia) disagrees 
with this position. And the new, ultra-liberal UF party is perhaps the most pro-EU 
political party in Finland, although it is too soon to establish which parties this party 
might try to, or be able to, enter into coalitions with. In contrast, the NV is opposed to 
EU-membership, although about half its voters disagree with this position.
Among the Christian parties the Norwegian NKRF and the Finnish FKF oppose EU 
membership. Because the latter party is small and the only centrist party in Finland to 
oppose membership, and because Finnish governments straddle the left-right divide, this 
is of minor importance for government formation. In Denmark the DKRF is deeply split 
over EU membership. It opposed the TEU in 1992, but supported the ‘Edinburgh
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Compromise’ in 1993. In Sweden the KD is pro-membership, although a considerable 
number of its voters are not.
The Norwegian SP is the only substantial rural/farmers party that officially opposes EU- 
membership. In Finland (CF) and in Sweden (CP) the main centre parties are sceptical to 
membership, and a majority of their voters opposed membership at the 1994 
référendums. However, as opposed to the situation in Norway, these parties have no 
other substantial^^ parties that are anti-EU to align themselves with in the centre of the 
left-right cleavage.
In Denmark there is no rural based centre party as such. Rather, the DV and the RV 
combine as right-leaning (DV) and left-leaning (RV) liberal parties, with the DV in 
particular representing rural and farming interests. Because the vast majority of DV 
voters are pro-EU, this party would need very good reasons to take up an anti-EU 
position. Although the majority of RV voters have tended to be anti-EU, this party also 
lacks anti-EU coalition partners, since no other centrist party in Denmark is anti-EU. 
The last centrist party in Denmark, the CD, is also pro-EU. Hence, whilst there is 
potential for an anti-EU centrist coalition in Norway, such a potential does not exist in 
the other countries. Therefore, whilst an anti-EU position would be in conflict with the 
aim of office-maximisation for centre parties in three of the countries, the situation in 
Norway is more ambivalent. On the one hand, the salience of the EU-conflict makes 
coalitions between the Norwegian centre-parties and the H very difficult, on the other, 
the centrist parties can realistically form a government on their own. They did so after
Arguably, the tiny FKF is an exception to this.
396
the September 1997 Storting election. However, such a government must either be very 
pragmatic to retain enough parliamentary support, or it will be short-lived.
In all four countries the leadership, voters and core-support groups of the centre-right 
mainstream Conservative parties (business-interests, supporters of a more market- 
oriented economy, urbanites) are largely pro-EU. However, whilst in Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden most of these parties’ normal and potential coalition partners are all pro- 
EU, this is not the case in Norway. Therefore, while the EU-conflict does little damage 
to the office-maximising potential of the Conservative parties in Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden, it makes government participation very unlikely for the Norwegian H. In 
addition, this party also risks losing votes due to the salience of the EU-conflict, since 
voters can move to anti-EU parties in the centre, whose other policies (in particular 
economic ones) are not that dissimilar from those of the H.
The far-right parties in the region have never been in government in any of the four 
countries. By 1994, the Swedish party (the ND), which had only existed since 1990, 
appeared set for oblivion, receiving only 1.2 percent of the vote at the 1994 general 
election. In Finland there is no significant far-right party, although the FLP might be 
considered as one because of its populist and sometimes xenophobic policies. However, 
by 1994 this party was also heading for oblivion, and after the 1995 election it went 
bankrupt.
In Denmark and Norway, however, the far right has had a considerable presence since 
the early 1970’s in the ‘sister-parties’, the DFRP and the NFRP. With government 
potential seemingly limited (without increased blackmail potential through increased
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size), vote-maximisation appears to be the best option for these parties. And, since it is 
the anti-EU voters who appear to lack representation, an anti-EU position would appear 
to be the most advantageous. However, two factors complicate their decision regarding 
which position might be more appropriate to this aim. Firstly, their voters are quite split 
on this issue^^. Secondly, the voters who support parties close to the Progress Parties on 
the left-right scale are largely pro-EU, particularly in Denmark. Hence, the vote- 
maximising potential appears to be limited. But the populist profile of these parties 
tends to enable them to gain votes from parties further away on the left-right scale^*. It is 
therefore unclear which policy would be vote-maximising for the Progress Parties.
However, an anti-EU position removes the Progress Parties further from office in that it 
distances them from the pro-EU Conservative parties, and, in the Danish case, from the 
DV. Hence, it appears that a pro-EU position would be more in accordance with an 
office-maximising strategy, at least in Denmark. In Norway the situation is much more 
complicated, since a pro-EU position would correspond with the position of the H, but 
an anti-EU position would agree with the position of the centrist parties. However, it is 
questionable if a ‘coalition-friendly’ position on European integration would make the 
Progress Parties more acceptable as coalition partners in any case. Overall, these parties 
do not stand to benefit from an increased salience of the EU-conflict, in particular 
because such a situation detracts from other issues they are more likely to benefit from.
Svâsand and Lindstrom (1997, pp. 213-214) suggest that this is connected to these 
parties containing several streams of supporters. The liberal faction see EU-membership 
as perfectly natural, the populist faction object to membership for xenophobic reasons, 
and the libertarians reject membership due to opposition to adding another layer of 
government.
See, for example, Thomsen (1995a, p. 321) regarding Denmark, Aardal (1990, p. 156) 
and Valen (1994, p. 177) regarding Norway.
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Their actual positions (very anti-EU in Denmark, vaguely pro-EU in Norway) on the 
EU-conflict is unlikely to increase either votes or office potential.
Ultimately, seeking votes based on positioning on European integration is a highly risky 
affair. Individual opinion on European integration is likely to be made up of a complex 
set of utility-functions, as chapters four to seven show. In addition, it is difficult for 
parties to ascertain whether people actually will base their vote on their position on 
European integration.
In certain circumstances, focusing on opposition to European integration may benefit 
certain parties in terms of vote maximisation. This can be seen in the 1993 election in 
Norway and in the 1994 national and 1995 EP elections in Sweden. But in the long run, 
focusing on position on the EU is not likely to benefit any Nordic political party in terms 
of office-seeking. Even though certain parties may benefit in vote-seeking terms from 
focusing on anti-EU sentiments, these parties are, at the same time, further distancing 
themselves from office.
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8.3 A party-driven solution: off-loading the EU-conflict away from the national 
election agenda.
Because of the complications a salient EU-conflict cause for the majority of political 
parties with regard to national elections and national government formation, off-loading 
this conflict onto other electoral arenas offers a good solution to the majority of political 
parties in the region. The main off-loading mechanism is référendums, but elections to 
the EP are also useful in this respect. Danish anti-EU voters appear to use this as an 
opportunity to voice their opinion on European integration, whilst reverting to their 
‘normal’, largely pro-EU parties at national elections. From the one EP-election in 
Sweden and Finland so far, there are indications that this pattern is developing in these 
countries as well, but it is too early to draw any firm conclusions.
Some parties stand to benefit substantially more from such off-loading exercises than 
others do. Table 8.7 and the discussion above indicates which parties face more 
difficulties uniting their main aims due to the salience of the EU-conflict, and which 
ones face more limited problems. For the parties that are split and/or in disagreement 
with considerable numbers of their voters on the EU-conflict, off-loading is of 
paramount importance. The alternative, to focus on these matters in national elections, 
could lead to formal splits in parties and/or massive vote loss.
In the 1990s off-loading the EU-issue from national elections has been particularly 
important for the Social Democratic parties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden; the 
Centre parties in Sweden and Finland; the Christian parties in Denmark and Sweden; the 
RV in Denmark, the NV in Norway, the DFRP and the NFRP, and the GP and the LA in
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Finland. These parties are all in disagreement with substantial numbers of their voters on 
the issue of EU-membership, as well as suffering from deep internal divisions on this
issue.
But even for parties that themselves face only limited problems with respect to internal 
unity and support from voters due to the salience of the EU-conflict, problems faced by 
their (potential) coalition partners are likely to make them favour off-loading. 
Furthermore, several parties see their coalition potential reduced as a result of the 
salience of the EU-conflict, and for these off-loading is also attractive. Thus, many 
parties that are united, and whose voters are relatively unified in their opinion on 
European integration, have to decide if they wish to aim for vote-maximisation by 
focusing on the EU-issue at national elections, or aim for office-maximisation and 
therefore off-load the EU-issue to other arenas.
These latter considerations are relatively unimportant in Denmark, but could possibly be 
of some consequence for the KF and the DV. In Finland the FSD, SFF and the NSP 
might wish to aim for off-loading in order to broaden the choice of coalition partners to 
include the CF, the GF and the VF. As for the FKF, this party is extremely anti-EU, and 
virtually all its voters opposed EU-membership. However all its potential coalition 
partners are pro-EU, and so this party’s coalition potential is very limited regardless of 
whether or not the EU-conflict is off-loaded. In the Norwegian case, the H, the NKRF 
and the SP are all in a situation where they have to decide whether to give priority to 
vote- or office-maximisation. At the 1993 election SP chose to maximise votes, in 1997 
office-potential. The party succeeded both times, but only at the cost of failure to 
achieve the other aim on each occasion. In Sweden the FP and the MP can broaden their
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coalition-basis by off-loading the EU-issue, to make matters easier for the KD and the 
CP.
Conversely, some parties may view their office potential as minimal unless they increase 
their share of the vote dramatically, and for such parties the EU-conflict might be worth 
focusing on in national elections. This is arguably the case for the SF and the DFRP in 
Denmark, the SV and the NFRP in Norway, and the VP and the GP in Sweden. 
However, the voters who tend to support the Progress Parties are split fairly evenly into 
opponents and proponents of EU-membership, and hence off-loading is an attractive 
option for these parties as well. Similarly, the SF’s official position has, in the period 
1992-1997 at least, been in contradiction with that of the vast majority of its voters, and 
hence off-loading is a good option for this party as well. Even the remaining three 
parties (the VP, the GP and the SV) have to consider how focusing on the EU-conflict 
affects their coalition-potential, but they are the parties most likely to benefit from a 
failure or lack of off-loading.
8.3.1 Whv off-loading is an incomplete solution.
The nature of the EU integration project makes it virtually impossible to off-load the 
EU-conflict completely from the Nordic national election arenas. When a country has 
joined the EU, the constant evolution and increasing influence of this organisation 
necessitates debate and action in national parliaments more or less constantly. 
Legislation and regulations are issued by the EU to be incorporated into national law, 
the ECJ makes rulings that have to be accepted by one or several member-states, draft 
resolutions and Treaty changes have to be debated, and policies agreed upon for Council
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and European Council meetings. Much of this also applies to association agreements 
such as the EEA.
It is not possible to refer all these matters to référendums, and nor can it be expected that 
people will voice their opinion on EU-related decisions made by their national 
government and parliament only at EP-elections. The parties can reduce the effect of the 
EU-conflict by presenting a united front on European integration, and thus give the 
voters little choice, or they can attempt to keep EU-issues out of the national election 
arena. However, it is obvious that if one party decides to focus on EU-issues in the 
national election arena, then the off-loading solution is at risk. So far the most obvious 
of such ‘breaches’ were made by the SP in Norway at the 1993 election, and by the GP 
and the VP at the 1994 Swedish election. But, as argued above, for most of the parties 
there are very good reasons for making the off-loading exercise as complete as possible.
Off-loading is perhaps more difficult for a ‘nearly EU-member’ such as Norway. While 
political parties in the other countries can attempt to ‘bypass’ the conflict over 
substantial EU developments through référendums (and, to a lesser extent, EP elections) 
the Norwegian domestic political system has to cope with these questions internally to a 
greater extent. Therefore, European integration is likely to be of greater importance for 
the Norwegian party system than in the other three countries. While Danish, Finnish and 
Swedish politicians can promise référendums on every ‘major’ development in the EU, 
their Norwegian colleagues have to deal with such developments within the confines of 
the national parliament and the national elections arena.
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In Denmark - and, so far, in Sweden - people vote for ‘anti-EU’ parties at EP elections 
and then return to the fold at national elections. In Finland the party vote changed 
considerably less at the EP election. However, this appears to be because many Finnish 
voters support candidates based on their individual position on EU-membership to a 
much greater extent than in Denmark. Hence, in all three countries the elections to the 
EP appear to reflect position on European integration to a considerable extent, and much 
more so than voting patterns at national elections do.
Considering how little of the political power at the EU level is vested in the EP, this 
makes for poor representation of the anti-EU position held by many voters in these three 
countries. It is at the national level that the representatives for the powerful positions at 
EU level are selected. Hence, by reverting to more pro-EU parties at national elections, 
those who oppose European integration are limiting the effect of their opposition quite 
dramatically. This leaves the pro-EU parties with a mandate to pursue, or agree to, a 
higher level of European integration than many of their voters appear to support.
8.4 The divided Nordics.
With regard to the traditional idea of Nordic unity, the EU conflict has highlighted two 
problems. Firstly, the disparate interests of the four countries. Secondly, and partly 
resulting from the first point, the limits of Nordic solidarity. Denmark needs access to 
non-Nordic markets for its massive agricultural sector; the other three could manage 
without. Indeed, most of the farmers in Finland and Norway would be far happier to 
retain their higher national subsidies than having to submit to the EU system with its 
lower subsidies.
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The timing of the revival of the EU-conflict also highlighted differences of interest 
between these four countries. Both Finland and Sweden had severe economic problems 
when EU-membership entered the political agenda around 1990. In Finland 
unemployment surged above twenty percent, in Sweden to around ten - both levels 
unheard of since World War H. In addition, Sweden’s public finances were deteriorating 
severely. Joining the EU could be viewed as a way out of these problems, a way of 
reviving their economies. Their situation could hardly get worse. In addition, Finland 
needs to firmly assert its belonging with Western Europe, and not with Russia. For this 
country, EU membership is a way of achieving this, and Nordic integration does not 
appear to be an acceptable substitute.
Denmark was in a relatively comfortable economic position around the same time. 
Although the European recession affected it as well, it did so in a less severe manner 
than elsewhere, and especially compared with Sweden and Finland. But for Denmark 
leaving the EU would risk severe effects on the agricultural industry. Norway was 
probably less affected by the recession than any other European country. Its substantial 
revenues from oil- and gas-production in the North Sea allowed it to pump money into 
subsidies and public employment so as to limit the effect of the recession. Alone among 
the four countries, EU membership seems to hold little economic benefit for the country 
as a whole. The wealth from the North Sea, NATO membership and the lack of an 
export-driven agricultural sector allows for a much freer position compared to the other 
three.
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The main obstacles to previous attempts at Nordic integration were covered in the 
introduction. European integration and the differing approaches of the four countries add 
to the previous problems. Varying interests with regard to EU membership between 
individuals and groups in the different countries as well as between the countries when 
viewed as whole entities makes EU-membership much more attractive for some actors 
than for others. Nordic solidarity is not strong enough to override these interests. 
Consideration for Nordic unity did not prevent Denmark - or the majority of the Danish 
population - from joining the EU in 1973, nor did it prevent the Norwegian government, 
elites, and nearly half the voters from trying to do the same. And in the 1990’s there was 
minimal consideration in any of the countries as to how EU-membership would affect 
Nordic co-operation, with the possible exception of Norway joining the Schengen 
arrangement. As three Nordics pursue their varying interests within the EU and two stay 
outside, Nordic disparity seems more likely than unity.
8.5 Theoretical conclusions.
8.5.1 The cleavage model.
The cleavage model, as employed in this thesis, contributes to answering the research 
questions addressed in two ways. Firstly, as a device for understanding the development 
and character of the party systems of the Nordic countries. Secondly, the cleavage 
system helps us understand the complexity of the appeal of the political parties in the 
party system, and the limitations this complexity implies for the impact on the party 
system of a new dimension such as European integration. Combined, these two
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contributions of the cleavage model help us to compare the effect of the EU-conflict on 
the party system between countries.
With regard to the party system, the cleavage model helps us to understand what 
separates the parties in the party system, and in particular whether they are also 
separated mainly by occupying different points on a scale based on one cleavage, or 
whether they are separated by one or more cross-cutting cleavages. The main Social 
Democratic and Conservative parties, as well as the far-right and far-left parties, are 
mainly competing on the left-right scale. But other parties, such as the Christian parties 
and the Centre and Liberal parties, and the SFF, are differentiated not so much by their 
position on the dominant left-right scale as by their position based on other cleavages 
that cross-cut the left-right cleavage.
This party-system framework derived from the cleavage model is valuable when 
evaluating the impact of the EU-conflict. The degree of correspondence between the 
existing cleavages and the EU-conflict informs the judgement of how strong an 
influence this new or resurgent dimension will have on the party system. Furthermore, 
the cleavage model also provides a means of evaluating which parties are likely to be 
separated, and which are likely to be brought closer together, as a result of a salient EU- 
conflict.
Off-loading and the cleavage model.
Attempts made by party elites to off-load the EU-conflict have had the effect of 
moderating the impact of the EU-conflict as a potential cleavage. The extent to which
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this off-loading is successful thus correlates with the cleavage potential of the EU- 
conflict. If the issues related to European integration are excluded from the national 
elections debate, or at least reduced in importance, then the cleavage potential of the 
EU-conflict is likely to be reduced as well.
It would appear that EU-membership is conducive to removal from the national election 
arena because it can readily be reduced to a yes/no decision suitable for référendums. 
Other dimensions, such as the left-right divide and territorial conflicts of interest appear 
to be both more complicated and more chronic, and therefore more likely to retain an 
influence on the party system over time. However, the EU-dimension has taken on a 
more permanent nature over time, and it is increasingly unlikely that it can be off-loaded 
completely through référendums and/or elections to the EP. Large numbers of people see 
their utility affected by whether decisions are made by national institutions or EU 
institutions. This has two main aspects. Firstly, the nationalist/europeanist dichotomy as 
to whether, as such, authority should rest with the nation-state or with the EU. Secondly, 
on a variety of other, mostly less philosophical factors, people’s utility is also affected 
by whether or not their state is an EU-member. EU-membership affects, for example, 
income from subsidies, taxation, control over national resources, the ability of the 
national government to lead a right-leaning or left-leaning economic policy, and 
immigration.
It could be argued that if a country decides to stay out of the EU, then the conflict 
potential of the EU-dimension is reduced. However, this would require those who wish 
to be EU-members to refrain from seeking a closer association with the EU. Similarly, 
as in the case of Norway, EEA-membership and related arrangements such as the
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Schengen Treaty keeps the EU-dimension on the agenda. As long as EU-legislation is 
applicable there will be conflicts of interest over EEA-membership similar to those there 
are over EU-membership.
Overall, while the EU-conflict may not have developed into a cleavage in all four 
countries, it continues to disturb the party system. Due to the pervasive and extensive 
nature of the EU, EU- and EEA-membership affects so much of peoples’ lives that 
référendums cannot off-load the entire debate over European integration away from the 
national elections agenda. Thus, the cleavage potential of the EU-conflict remains 
strong, and the off-loading strategy can only be partially successful. However, it does 
reduce the cleavage-potential of the EU-conflict.
8.5.2 Rational choice theorv.
The utility o f rational choice theory for this thesis.
Rational Choice is the dominant theoretical framework employed in this thesis. The 
view taken here is that, at the very least, rational choice employed as a heuristic device 
can make a considerable contribution to the analysis of politics. This contribution is in 
two main areas. Firstly, a rational choice approach may lead the researcher to ask 
questions in a different manner, to question established truths, or even to ask completely 
new questions. Secondly, rational choice lends itself well to building framework models 
for further analysis.
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In this thesis, an important question asked is why so few parties oppose EU membership 
given the apparent size of the opposition to such membership in the population. Asking 
such questions can yield valuable insights that may otherwise not have surfaced. If one 
focuses on parties as vote maximisers, then it would seem rational for more parties to be 
anti-EU. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, other concerns, such as office- 
maximisation, retaining party-cohesion and the ability to co-operate with the EU, make 
an anti-EU policy, and in particular the campaigning on an anti-EU platform at national 
elections, very difficult.
Once it has been established that the EU-conflict complicates tactics and strategy for 
many political parties, the question for the parties is how to reduce or remove these 
complications. One solution is to off-load the EU-conflict from the national election 
arena to référendums and elections to the EP. This allows European integration matters 
to be largely avoided in the arena of elections to the national parliament. This reduces 
complications for many parties and voters. This then raises the question as to what the 
purpose of popular référendums is. No doubt the idea that the referendum is a means of 
giving the population of an otherwise representative democracy a direct say in a question 
of supposedly great importance has some validity. But it is not the whole story. The 
referendum employed as a tactical device to remove a thorny question from the national 
elections arena is also part of the equation.
One frequent criticism of rational choice theory is that it makes too many assumptions, 
and/or ignores relevant factors. For example, it could be argued that this thesis does not 
sufficiently account for how the leaders of political parties come to hold their personal 
views, regardless of tactical considerations such as vote- and office-maximisation, of
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European integration and EU-membership. But this is a limit of political science, not of 
the rational choice approach. We cannot know exactly how each politician makes up his 
mind about EU-membership, nor can we separate this opinion-formation from his 
tactical concerns, and indeed personal development, as a politician.
Just like any other citizen, the politician can be analysed according to the model 
developed in section 3.3 (in Chapter 3) and the relevant country-chapter sections based 
on this model. But, just as the farmers’ opinion of EU-membership is affected by the 
effect it has on the farming industry, so the politicians’ opinion is affected by how the 
EU-conflict affects him as a politician, including the effect on his party, its prospects for 
maximising its number of votes, and its potential for government participation.
Making explicit assumptions about, for example, the aims of political parties or actors 
has two important advantages. Firstly, it allows the researcher to frame his research 
question in an unambiguous form. Secondly, through stripping away other 
considerations, the researcher can focus on one or a few factors, and thus hopefully 
generate valuable insights about these particular variables, and their interactions with 
other variables. Moreover, explicitly stating which assumptions have been made is more 
straightforward than making assumptions without clarifying what they are. For example, 
most analyses of parties and party systems implicitly assume that parties are trying to 
maximise one or more aims, most commonly votes or office. Rational choice models 
make these aims and the (potential) conflict between them more explicit.
On the other hand, narrow, or strict, rational choice models can simplify politics to such 
an extent that the value of the analysis becomes questionable. For example, focusing on
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one party aim such as office maximisation, or arguing that policy-maximisation is the 
ultimate aim of a political party may be useful in certain circumstances. But to ignore 
the existence and potential conflict of different party aims can make the resulting 
analysis inadequate. In this thesis, the overall aim of a political party is argued to be 
office-maximisation, but other aims are also considered. In particular, it is stressed that 
it becomes more difficult to pursue different party aims simultaneously when the EU- 
conflict is salient.
It appears that rational choice is better suited for explaining a situation where the 
number of relevant actors is relatively small, and, based on reasonable assumptions, 
where their aims can be argued to be relatively few. In the context of this thesis, this 
means that a rational choice model provides a more powerful explanation of the 
behaviour of political parties, and a more limited contribution to the explanation for the 
attitudes towards EU-membership in the population at large.
It is reasonable to limit the number of general aims of political parties in a manner 
similar to that argued in Chapter 3 of this thesis. However, it is considerably more 
difficult to generalise about how the utility of an individual citizen is affected by 
something as complicated and wide-ranging as membership in the EU. For a political 
party gaining office is, seen in isolation, presumably beneficial to it. However, it is much 
more difficult to arrive at one or a few general aims that each person pursues.
Chapter 3, section one, lists factors where EU-membership might materially affect 
individual utility in a general manner, the country chapters specify and evaluate the 
importance of these factors in each country. It is possible to operationalise the effect of
412
EU-membership on a variety of factors, and to evaluate how people’s utility is likely to 
be affected by these developments. However, in order to evaluate which factors affect 
individual utility more, it is necessary to make assumptions about which aims 
individuals have, which factors make how much contribution to his utility. If each 
individual’s aim could be argued to be to maximise his financial prosperity, then his 
support or opposition to membership would depend upon his view of how EU- 
membership affects his financial prosperity. But because EU-membership affects so 
many factors, and it is not possible to know how much each factor contributes to each 
individual utility calculation, it is necessary to make some assumptions in order to arrive 
at a meaningful analysis. The result is that the rational choice analysis is considerably 
more powerful with regard to some factors - where general aims can be reasonably 
assumed - than to others. Unfortunately, it is not necessarily the case that the former 
category is more important for individual utility than the latter.
First, however, it is necessary to address the general problem of people’s lack of 
information on which to base rational decisions, and to specify such problems with 
regard to the effect of EU-membership on individual utility. As argued in Chapter 3, the 
rational course of action if the effect of EU-membership on all relevant factors is 100 
percent uncertain would be to abstain in EU-related référendums, and to discount EU- 
related issues completely when voting in other elections. Moreover, if there is a high, 
but not 100 percent level of uncertainty, then abstention becomes a likely option if the 
cost of information is substantial. For many of the factors mentioned and evaluated in 
chapters three through eight the effect of EU-membership is highly uncertain, or they 
contradict each other. This is partly due to EEA-membership being the most likely 
alternative to EU-membership.
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Because EEA-membership also extends the internal market to the Nordic countries, 
many effects of EU-membership that would otherwise be quite important, become rather 
less so. Examples include taxation, the general price-level, access for exports, and the 
Norwegian petroleum industry. Although EU-membership does affect these factors, the 
effect tends to be minimal in the short term, and whilst future effects could potentially 
be substantial, they are at present uncertain. As such, it is to be expected that the 
individual discounts the effect of such factors on his utility emanating from EU- 
membership.
Another decision-making problem is related to countervailing influences on utility. 
Some factors, whilst evaluated in isolation, might seem to clearly point the individual 
towards or away from EU-membership. For example, the decision-making mechanisms 
of the EU are very complex, indirect, and move the decision-making institutions further 
from the people, both physically and culturally. Hence, ‘democracy’ appears to suffer 
when a country joins the EU. On the other hand, membership in the EU, especially if 
seen as an alternative to the EEA, affords a country and its people influence over 
decisions that either indirectly (e.g. EMU, foreign policy, environmental policy) or 
directly (EEA-regulations) affect it whether or not it is a member of the EU. In this 
respect, then, EU-membership is positive for ‘democracy’. As a consequence, it is 
argued in this thesis that the ‘democracy-factor’ is of only minor importance for the 
effect of EU-membership on individual utility.
The factors where EU-membership makes an easily observable difference are thus 
reduced to a few. Firstly, for many people EU-membership affects utility in a narrow,
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economic sense. Secondly, EU-membership transfers power from the nation-state to the 
EU. Hence, for those who view this as positive or negative, utility is affected. Thirdly, 
the welfare state and the level of state spending are likely to be affected by EU- 
membership. Fourth, EU-membership makes free trade with the EU member-states 
much more secure than EEA-membership. Thus, from a rational choice point of view, 
these are the major factors people take into account when deciding how EU-membership 
affects their utility. Although they might consider other factors as well, they are likely to 
assign only minor importance to them.
However, three problems arise from this argument. Firstly, even within this framework 
it is very difficult to evaluate how these factors affect individual utility relatively to each 
other. Secondly, with respect to the last three factors, it is difficult to assign a reasonable 
general aim. For example, is free trade positive or negative for individual utility? 
Thirdly, due to incomplete information, or a skewed evaluation of countervailing 
factors, people might assign considerably more weight to factors this model assumes 
they will ignore or at least heavily discount.
Because of these concerns, the rational choice model works best if limited to 
considering narrow economic effects of EU-membership on individual utility. This is 
not to say that it is impossible to use a rational choice model as a general framework 
model for the analysis of the effect of EU-membership on individual utility. Indeed, this 
has been the approach used in this thesis. However, rational choice theory provides a 
more powerful explanatory tool when applied to the more economic aspects of this type 
of problem. This is because it is possible to make a general assumption in this area: 
people will view EU-membership as beneficial to their utility if their monetary income
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increases or becomes more secure as a result. Hence, farmers in Finland and Norway; 
fishermen in Norway; women, public sector employees, and others disproportionately 
dependent upon a large welfare state tend to oppose membership; while farmers in 
Denmark; private sector employees; and those dependent upon secure access to export 
markets tend to support membership.
However, it is unlikely that people base their attitude to membership only on such 
economic considerations. For some people, their income or security of income will 
hardly be affected by EU-membership in any clearly observable manner. For others, 
other concerns may override these economic concerns. Thus, in this respect the rational 
choice model can only make a limited contribution. Nevertheless, it works well as a 
heuristic device for which to build a model for consideration of all the factors involved 
in such a complex decision as whether or not to support EU-membership.
In particular, the rational choice model used in this thesis allows consideration of a wide 
variety of factors in a comparative analysis. Used in combination with the comparative 
method, the rational choice approach can add to our understanding of popular attitudes 
to EU-membership. The addition of comparison allows a more viable evaluation of 
factors where it is difficult to ascertain which general aims people are likely to pursue, 
as well as of factors where the effect of EU-membership is difficult to ascertain if the 
analysis is limited to one country.
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8.6 Overall Conclusions.
It is an important part of the approach used in this thesis that factors where EU- 
membership either has little effect on utility, or where uncertainty of the effect is high, 
are discounted as influences on attitudes to EU membership. The factors identified as 
important through this method can be divided into three broad groups: effects on 
personal economic utility, left-right ideological position, and nationalism.
The most obvious effects from EU-membership on personal economic utility are 
connected to the primary industries. Because the EEA is the most likely alternative to 
EU-membership, the effect on the primary industries is the most important economic 
effect of full EU-membership. Because the Danish agricultural sector is competitive and 
export-dependent and those in Finland and Norway are not, the utility of the rural 
primary sector population is increased through EU-membership in Denmark, and 
reduced in the other two countries. The Swedish situation is somewhere in between.
The utility of those employed in industries related to the primary sector and the utility of 
rural people generally is also likely to be affected in the same manner as those directly 
employed in the primary industries. Conversely, the inhabitants of urban areas have an 
interest in reduced food prices, making them more likely to be pro-EU in Finland and 
Norway. These economic factors make up a large part of what can be observed as 
substantial territorial differences in attitudes to EU-membership.
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Similarly, but to a lesser extent, EU-membership tends to be viewed negatively by more 
people in the public sector compared to the private sector, and by more women than 
men. The argument put forward here is that this is at least partially due to public sector 
employees and women (partly as public sector employees) are disproportionally 
dependent upon the welfare state for their income, combined with a fear that EU- 
membership will lead to a reduced welfare state. With regard to women, this effect is 
reinforced by fears of women’s social status being negatively affected by joining in an 
integration project with countries that are seen as less egalitarian with respect to gender.
The other important element manifesting itself in territorial differences is the left-right 
divide over EU-membership. This division incorporates EU-membership favouring 
many aims of the right, such as the right’s view of military security, free trade, more 
competition, and potentially lower taxes. These are aims that are either not particularly 
important, or even counter to the aims of parties and voters on the left. In particular, the 
far-left parties and their supporters would be unlikely to support EU-membership if they 
perceive that membership would promote such policies. Based on comparison and plans 
for co-ordination of economic policy and taxation, as well as the competitive pressures 
of the internal market, EU-membership can be viewed as a potential threat to the welfare 
state and higher state spending. This further increases the gap in attitudes to EU- 
membership between the left and the right, and is particularly likely to turn the far left 
against membership. This makes up the other main element of the territorial differences 
in attitudes to EU-membership: where the far left-vote is generally high, so is anti-EU 
sentiment.
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The nationalist element in opposition to membership is likely to be connected to, and 
difficult to separate from, the factors above. EU membership can be viewed as a tool for 
promoting ideas and values of the right, nationalism as a tool to defend and/or promote 
ideas and values of the left. Hence, opposition to membership can be viewed partially as 
a ‘nationalism of the left’. However, nationalism can also be a reason for voting against 
EU-membership not connected to such factors, and a belief in a united Europe can be a 
reason for favouring such membership. However, the regional patterns of voting indicate 
that these factors were given secondary consideration when other factors, in particular 
those affecting individual economic utility, were of importance.
In all four countries, the anti-EU voters are under-represented among the parties and in 
the parliaments, although less so in Norway than in the other countries. However, for 
virtually all the parties in the region, including the EU-conflict in the national election 
arena and surrounding debates is detrimental to the achievement of at least one, and 
often more, of their aims of party unity, vote maximisation policy maximisation, and 
office maximisation.
For many parties a salient EU-conflict at national elections constitutes a major threat by 
making formal splits and/or considerable loss of votes likely. However, an anti-EU 
position is likely to jeopardise coalition -  and therefore office -  potential for many of 
the same parties. For such parties, the need to off-load the EU-conflict to arenas other 
than the national election one becomes paramount. But even united parties with 
overwhelming support for their position on EU-membership are liable to see their 
office-potential reduced by a salient EU-conflict if their ‘normal’ or potential coalition 
partners are split or lose votes due to this conflict.
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For virtually every Nordic political party a salient EU-conflict in the national elections 
arena makes it harder to reconcile vote- and office-maximisation while retaining party 
unity. Therefore, removing the EU-conflict from the national election arena is beneficial 
to the vast majority of these parties. The most efficient off-loading mechanism is the 
referendum, but EP-elections also serve a useful purpose as a vent for people’s opinions 
on European integration.
Unfortunately for the political parties, they cannot completely avoid EU-related issues 
affecting the national election arena. EU-membership simply affects too many policy 
areas too deeply and too frequently to be able to persuade the voters to only consider 
such issues in infrequent référendums and EP-elections. However, as long as the parties 
present a reasonably united pro-EU front, the anti-EU voters have relatively little choice 
but to abstain, vote for a party whose EU-position they disagree with, or vote for an anti- 
EU party many of whose other policies they are likely to disagree with. So far they have 
tended to opt for the second option. But the 1993 election in Norway showed what can 
happen if European integration is turned into a prominent campaign issue at national 
elections.
The off-loading strategy appears to have functioned relatively well in terms of avoiding 
vote loss and party splits. It remains to be seen if this will be possible in the future, as 
European integration seems set to deepen and take in more members. However, the 
parties have not been as successful at avoiding the EU-conflict affecting (potential) 
coalition patterns. Again, the effect is strongest in Norway, but there are also problems 
in Sweden, where it makes the GP and VP less likely partners for the SSD, and the CP
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becomes a more problematic partner for the other centre-right parties. In Finland the 
FKF had to leave government because of the EU-conflict, and the CF also appears to be 
a less likely coalition partner than before the EU-conflict became salient. In addition the 
VF and the GF have also become more problematic coalition partners for the more 
strongly pro-EU Finnish parties. Danish coalition patterns are probably those least 
affected by the EU-conflict. It does, however, make the DFRP and the DFP) less likely 
coalition partners for the DV and the KF.
In terms of Hypothesis 1 stated in the introduction to this thesis, analysing attitudes to 
EU-membership in terms of effects on individual utility leads to a strong emphasis on 
certain factors, and to a de-emphasis of others. The rational choice based explanation 
works best for factors where the effect of EU membership on individual utility is 
relatively clear-cut, and in particular with economic factors. For other factors, such as 
the effect of nationalism on attitudes to EU-membership, this approach is less effective. 
However, with the aid of the comparative method the approach employed here provides 
a good explanation for differences in attitudes between people with different 
characteristics, both within and between countries.
Hypothesis 2 asserted that political parties will react to the increased salience of EU- 
membership as a political dimension so as to maximise their potential for holding 
political office. In terms of the rational choice model, a salient EU-conflict leads to a 
decline in synergy between the various aims of most Nordic political parties, such as 
vote-, policy-, and office-maximisation, and also tend to decrease party unity. In terms 
of the political cleavage model, the result is a cross-cutting cleavage that, although it 
varies in strength between the four countries discussed here, leads to relative changes in
421
party support as well as increases in problems of coalition formation. For these reasons, 
it is in the interest of most political parties, as well as many voters, to reduce or 
eliminate the importance of issues related to European integration at national elections. 
The means by which this is achieved is through off-loading the EU-conflict to the arenas 
of référendums and EP elections. In this manner, the parties seek to maximise the 
synergy between their various aims, and thus their potential for holding office.
8.7 Future research agenda.
8.7.1 Extension of the analvsis to other European countries.
Parts of the analysis carried out in this thesis could be replicated for other European 
countries. It would be particularly interesting to evaluate the extent to which the 
question of EU-membership, or aspects of European integration such as EMU, the 
Schengen Treaty or the Amsterdam Treaty have affected, or are likely to affect, the 
party systems and/or party competition in other European countries. This would of 
course be a very much bigger project than the current one if all relevant European 
countries were to be included.
However, it is also possible to carry out such analysis of other groups of countries, rather 
than all EU-countries and prospective entrants, and so limit the size of the project. 
Alternatively, a broader study could concentrate on certain aspects of the model, such as 
the effects of European integration on coalition formation.
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8.7.2 Off-loading and democracy.
A second area of study that could be usefully pursued further in the light of this thesis is 
related to the relationship between off-loading the EU-conflict to electoral arenas other 
than national elections, and the nature of democracy and representation.
With increased European integration, the off-loading solution becomes increasingly 
untenable. The voters have rightly observed that the EP lacks power and therefore many 
are indifferent to EP elections. However, the corollary to this is that it is through 
national elections that those who actually set and influence EU policies are elected. The 
Commission is made up of men and women nominated by the national governments. 
Participants at Council meetings are even more directly results of national elections: 
they are all government ministers.
The effect of this is often more insidious than obvious. Because the politicians 
representing these countries at the European level (excluding the EP) are nearly all pro- 
EU, they are unlikely to object to developments of further integration. At times this 
integration may lead to steps where it is decided to have a referendum on whether to 
participate in this further integration. But by this stage it is usually difficult to conceive 
of a ‘compromise solution’ whereby the country in question can remain at a lower level 
of integration whilst other countries proceed. The choice is more likely to be stark: 
either we remain part of the EU or we withdraw. This creates a high-risk situation. 
Withdrawal from the EU is likely to lead to a situation where the alternative is not very 
clear - or where it may appear to be similar to membership without voting rights (e.g. the
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EE A). The situations in Denmark in 1992-1993 and in Norway post-1972 and post-1994 
are good examples of what happens if a referendum result goes against further European 
integration.
The lack of representation is not, strictly, in general policy areas. If a party represents the 
same policies at the European level as at the national level, then people’s votes and 
policy preferences are as well represented there as at the national level. (But note the 
size of democratic unit argument as well as the problem of public opinion in one country 
differing hugely from that of others or opinion prevalent in the EU. These are, however, 
compatible with an argument that the division is largely nationalist/europeanist.) 
However, it is the level of European integration wanted (and this is related to the 
arguments in brackets above) by the anti-EU voters which is under-represented. With no 
anti-EU parties in government there is no representation at the EU-level (except in the 
EP) for those who do not want a high level of integration.
As long as the separation of European integration from the national level of politics 
remains, many voters will effectively contradict themselves in their voting patterns 
between référendums, EP elections and national elections. Of course, this is nothing 
new: people do that frequently between national and local or regional elections. But the 
problem here is deeper. By voting for pro-EU parties, anti-EU voters are giving a 
mandate to these parties to continue a process of European integration that these voters 
oppose. The effects of this development on democracy, both nationally and at the 
European level, are surely worthy of further research.
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Table A. Exports and Imports as percentage of GDP.
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
1988 1993 1988 1993 1988 1993 1988 1992
Exports 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.23
Imports 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.20
Authors calculations. Source for GDP and trade data: UN Economic Commission for 
Europe: Trends in Europe and North America, 1995. GDP data was not available for 
Sweden for 1993.
Table B. Taxation as a percentage of GNP in market prices.
1971 1980 1990 1994
Denmark 43.5 45.5 48.6
Finland 33.6 33.0 38.0
Norway 42.4 47.1 46.3
Sweden 41.4 49.4 56.9 50
France 35.0 41.7 43.7
UK 35.2 35.5 36.7
EC no data 30.2 39.0
OECD no data 28.5 37.2
Sources: Sweden 1994: Widfeldt, 1995, p. 207. The remainder: Statistisk tiârsoversikt 1984 
and 1993.
Table C. Unemployment, (%), EU and selected countries.
EU12 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden France UK
1991 8.8 8.9 7.6 5.5 2.7 9.5 8.9
1993 10.6 10.3 17.3 6.2 7.7 10.8 10.4
Source: Eurostat, 1995, Table 3.22, p. 154 
Table D. Subsidies To Agriculture in 1993. Percent.
EU-12 Finland Sweden Norway
Assistance to producers (producer subsidy 
equivalent)
48 67 52 76
Implicit tax on consumers (consumer subsidy 
equivalent)
39 66 45 60
Barnes, 1996, Table 14.4, p 225. Note: Producer subsidy is the net total of agricultural 
support given to farmers. Consumer subsidy equivalent is the implicit tax that has to be 
bom by the consumer as a result of artificially high food prices. Source: OECD 1994.
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Table E. General price level and food prices.
Comparative price level February 1994. US=100. Ratio of Purchasing Power Parity to 
Exchange rates. The higher the ratio, the higher the price level.
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Germany Netherlands Spain UK
140 122 138 120 109 86 90
Source: OECD, February 1994, pp. 204-205.
EU12 Denmark Finland Sweden
1992 134.7 114 120 131
1994 140 117 119 134
1996 Jan 146.1* 121 108 126
Eurostat: Eurostatistics. Data for short- term economic analysis. (7, 1996, p. 155, 
Luxembourg-Brussels)
Table F.
Social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP at market prices, 1993. Including 
expenditure on sickness, disability, unemployment, various pensions, maternity and family.
Sweden 40.3
Finland 35.2
Netherlands 33.4
Denmark 33.3
Germany 31
France 30.9
Norway 30.8
UK 27.8
Belgium 26.9
Italy 25.7
Luxembourg 24.6
Spain 24.5
Ireland 21.5
Portugal 18.5
Greece 15.8
EU 11 average 25.5
Nordic 4 average 34.9
Sources: Sweden: Nordic Council of Ministers, 1996a. All other figures: Eurostat, 1997a
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Table G
Maternity leave and pay. Denmark 1994, Finland, Norway and Sweden 1993, the rest 1992.
Weeks Pay in percent 
of wage
Sweden 64 90^
Norway 42/52 100/80
Finland 44 66
Denmark 28 2
Italy 20 80
UK 6+12 90+flat rate
Luxembourg 16 100
Netherlands 16 100
France 16 84
Spain 16 75
Belgium 15 82/75
Greece 15 50
Germany 14 100^
Ireland 14 70
Portugal 13 100
EU 11 average 16
Nordic 4 average 47
Sources: Nordic Council of Ministers (1994a, p. 39), Eurostat (1995a, p. 86).
' For 51 weeks, then 13 with guranteed minimum amount.
 ^A minimum guaranteed amount and/or wage compensation (depends upon employer). Friis (1992, p. 55) 
reports that in 1989 the compensation was 90-100 percent.
 ^Benefit expressed as a percentage of net income.
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Appendix 4.1. Legislation and practice regarding référendums in Denmark.
The current Danish Constitution offers five possibilities for holding référendums. The 
first four of these are explicitly mentioned in the constitution and the results of these are 
binding.
1. A mandatory referendum on constitutional amendments (Article 88). Approval 
requires a majority of participating voters, and 40 percent of the whole electorate.
2. An optional rejective law referendum (Article 42). This can be demanded by 1/3 of 
the members of the Folketing. Rejection requires a negative majority comprising at least 
30 percent of the electorate.
3. A mandatory law referendum on the voting age (Article 29).
4. A mandatory law referendum on the delegation of constitutional powers to 
international authorities (Article 20). This is only necessary if a bill is not approved with 
a 5/6th majority in the Folketing. Rejection requires a negative majority comprising at 
least 30 percent of the electorate.
5. It is possible to call ad hoc référendums that legally are only advisory\
By 1997, Denmark had experienced seventeen référendums, fourteen of which have 
been held since 1953. However, four of these were held at the same date in June 1963 
(land-reforms) and two at the same time in May 1953 (constitutional amendment and 
lowering voting age)^.
 ^ Svensson, 1996, pp. 34-38. The final referendum possibility is from Sdrensen (1969, 
pp. 178) onwards.
 ^Svensson, 1996, p 38.
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The 1986 ad hoc referendum was an example of using this device to break a 
parliamentary deadlock. After the yes-vote on a turnout of 75 percent the Folketing 
approved the SEA. However, there was no provision in the Danish Constitution for prior 
consultative référendums. Special legislation was required for this, and a bill to this 
effect was passed before the referendum^. The 1972 referendum was held according to 
Article 20, as were both the 1992 and the 1993 référendums on the TEU and the 
Edinburgh Agreement.
 ^Worre (1988, footnote 5, p. 370).
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Appendix 4.2. Reasons for attitudes to Danish EU membership at 1992 referendum.
Reasons for voting ‘yes’. Percent.
We are members after all, and would like to remain so 13
We cannot manage outside the EC 44
Employment 10
Other economic advantages 19
Desire for influence 9
Environmental co-operation 4
Other specific policy-areas 4
A stronger Europe 9
Re-negotiation is not possible 0
The other Nordic countries are applying for membership 1
Don’t know 26
Would not answer 1
Total 138
Authors translation. Source: Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard (1992, p. 93).
Reasons for voting ‘no’. Percent.
Surrender of sovereignty 43
The EC shall not decide over Danish legislation 11
Do not want co-operation over foreign policy 3
Do not want co-operation over defence policy 13
Do not want co-operation (other specific areas mentioned) 10
The moves towards union 14
Danish identity 11
Want re-negotiation 0
Uncertainty over what there is - don’t know enough 12
The politicians don’t know enough 1
No confidence in politicians 3
It will cost us 2
Don’t believe in economic advantages 1
Other 32
Don’t know 2
Would not answer 0
Total 154
Authors translation. Source: Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard (1992, p. 93).
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Appendix 4.3. Group membership and vote in the 1992 and 1993 référendums in 
Denmark. Percentage voting ‘no’.
1992 N 1993 N
All 50 699 42 905
Men 47 376 39 444
Women 54 323 44 461
Basic School 52 286 41 348
Grammar School/O-levels 47 240 42 329
High School/A-levels 52 171 42 226
Unskilled workers 65 84 51 85
Skilled workers 46 88 48 131
Public white collar without high school 60 70 48 87
Public white collar with high school 54 48 47 57
Private white collar without high school 36 74 25 109
Private white collar with high school 39 37 20 51
Self-employed 34 48 27 64
SF 92 79 81 100
DSD 64 207 50 263
Centre Parties 38 33 37 78
KF 13 68 18 156
DV 18 144 12 161
DFRP 55 24 69 38
The ‘Centre Parties’ comprise the RV, the CD, and the DKRF. Source: Svensson (1994, 
p. 78). Based on a survey by the AIM institute using a questionnaire developed by K. 
Siune, P. Svensson and O. Tonsgaard at Aarhus University.
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Appendix 4.4 Urbanisation, primary industry employment and vote in EC/EU 
référendums.
County Urbanisation Primary ind. Yes- Yes- Yes- Yes-
(%) empl. div. by vote vote vote vote
_____________________________population_______ 1972 1986 1992 1993
Copenhagen 99.88 0.02 58.2 49.8 48.9 55.4
Copenhagen and 99.57 0.14 47.5 36.3 38.3 44.7
Fredriksberg
Fredriksborg 90.14 0.50 64.1 58 53.5 59.5
Roskilde 89.28 1.29 63.9 55.1 51.6 59
Arhus 84.78 2.32 62.1 53.5 48.7 57.4
Vejle 81.70 2.77 68.3 62.5 51.9 60.8
Vestsjælland 73.06 2.93 67 56.9 48.6 55.4
Storstr0ms 70.74 3.36 68.9 56.1 48.4 55
Fyn 80.62 3.43 67.5 57.6 48.1 56.2
Nordjylland 80.29 3.79 66.3 59.5 48.7 55.9
Spndeijylland 77.04 4.03 75.1 68.3 54.1 61.5
Bornholm 72.77 4.36 62.6 57.3 49.3 53
Ribe 79.72 4.53 70.9 68.1 53.7 61.3
Ringk0bing 77.49 5.29 75.3 73.7 57.5 66.4
Viborg___________70.01______ S^56____________ 74.6 67.7 53.6 62.8
Source: Statistisk Ârbog (1993, p. 54; 1995, p. 168 and p. 172); Befolkning og Valg 
(No. 9, 1993, p. 7). Population and area are as by 1/1/93, urban population as by 1/1/92. 
Primary industries include agriculture, fisheries and raw material extraction.
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Appendix 4.5. Vote for left-wing parties at 1990 election compared to no-vote in 1992 
EU-referendum.
County SD SF FK EH Broad 
Left
Far left No-vote 
1992
Ringkpbing 28.8 4.8 1.1 0.4 35.1 6.3 42.5
Spnderjylland 35.3 4.4 1.3 0.6 41.6 6.3 45.9
Ribe 32.6 5.3 1.6 0.7 40.2 7.6 46.3
Viborg 33.8 5 1.1 0.6 40.5 6.7 46.4
Fredriksborg 31.4 8.3 1.6 2.1 43.4 12 46.5
Vejle 36.5 7.3 1.3 0.8 45.9 9.4 48.1
Roskilde 35.4 8.5 1.7 1.7 47.3 11.9 48.4
Bornholm 43.8 4.8 2 0.9 51.5 7.7 50.7
Copenhagen 36.4 9.4 2.5 2 50.3 13.9 51.1
Arhus 37.9 9.5 0.9 1.8 50.1 12.2 51.3
Nordjylland 42.2 5.8 1.4 0.8 50.2 8 51.3
Vestsjælland 39 8.5 2.1 1.2 50.8 11.8 51.4
Storstrpms 45.2 7.1 1.9 1.1 55.3 10.1 51.6
Fyn 40.4 8.2 1.2 1.4 51.2 10.8 51.9
Copenhagen and 39.5 
Fredriksberg
15.2 3.9 4.8 63.4 23.9 61.7
Source for data: Statistisk Ârbog (1994, pp. 81-83). 
Far-left = SV + FK + EH, Left = SV + FK + EH + DSD
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Appendix 4.6. Election results (percent) to and seat allocation in the Danish parliament 
(‘Folketing’), 1971-1998.
Election results.
Party 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998
KF 16.7 9.2 5.5 8.5 12.5 14.5 23.4 20.8 19.3 16.0 15.0 8.9
DV 15.6 12.3 23.3 12.0 12.5 11.3 12.1 10.5 11.8 15.8 23.3 24.0
RV 14.3 11.2 7.1 3.6 5.4 5.1 5.5 6.2 5.6 3.5 4.6 3.9
DKRF 2.0 4.0 5.3 3.4 2.6 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.5
DFRP - 15.9 13.6 14.6 11.0 8.9 3.6 4.8 9.0 6.4 6.4 2.4
CD - 7.8 2.2 6.4 3.2 8.3 4.6 4.8 4.7 5.1 2.8 4.3
DSD 37.3 25.6 29.9 37.0 38.2 32.9 31.6 29.3 29.8 37.4 34.6 36.0
SF 9.1 6.0 5.0 3.9 5.9 11.3 11.5 14.6 13.0 8.3 7.3 7.5
VS 1.6 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.7 2.6 2.7 1.4 0.6 - - -
KOM 1.4 3.6 4.2 3.7 1.9 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.8 - - -
RF 1.7 2.9 1.8 3.3 2.6 1.4 1.5 0.5 - 0.5 - -
SP 0.2 - - - - - - - - - - -
FK - - - - - - - 2.2 1.9 1.8 - -
GP - - - - - - - 1.3 1.4 0.9 - -
EH - - - - - - - - - 1.7 3.1 2.7
DFP - - - - - - - - - - - 7.4
DF - - - - - - - - - - - 0.3
OT 0.1 0 0 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.1
TO 87.2 88.7 88.2 88.0 85.6 83.2 88.4 86.7 85.7 82.8 83.4
Sources: Petersen (1994), Borre (1991, p. 137), Thomsen (1995, p. 350), Bjugan (1998, 
forthcoming). KF = Conservative Party, DV = Liberal Party, RV = Radical Liberals, 
DKRF = Christian People’s Party, DFRP = Progress Party; CD = Centre Democrats, 
DSD = Social Democrats, SF = Socialist People’s Party, VS = Left Socialists, KOM = 
Communist Party, RF = Justice Party, SP = Schlesvig Party, FK = Common Course, GP 
= Green Party, EH = Left Alliance, DFP = Danish People’s Party, DF = Democratic 
Renewal, OT = Other Parties, TO = Turnout. OT in 1994 includes Jacob Haugaard, an 
independent candidate elected in Arhus with 0.7% of the national vote.
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Seats in Parliament.
Party 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998
KF 31 16 10 15 22 26 42 38 35 30 27 16
DV 30 22 42 21 22 21 22 19 22 29 42 42
RV 27 20 13 6 10 9 10 11 10 7 8 7
DKRF 0 7 9 6 5 4 5 4 4 4 0 4
DFRP - 28 24 26 20 16 6 9 16 12 11 4
CD - 13 3 10 6 15 8 9 9 9 5 8
DSD 70 46 53 65 68 59 56 54 55 69 62 63
SF 17 11 9 7 11 20 21 27 24 15 13 13
VS 0 0 4 5 6 5 5 0 0 - - -
KOM 0 6 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 - - -
RF 0 5 0 6 5 0 0 0 - - - -
SP 0 1 1 1 - - - - - - - -
FK - - - - - - - 4 0 0 - -
GP - - - - - - - 0 0 0 - -
EH - - - - - - - - - - 6 5
DFP - - - - - - - - - - - 13
DF - - - - - - - - - - - -
F0 2 2 2 2 2 222 2 2 2 2 2 2
GL 2 2 2 2 2 210 2 2 2 2 2 2
OT - - - - - - - - - - 1 -
Additional key: F 0  = Representatives from the Fær0e Islands, GL = Representatives 
from Greenland. Sources as above.
Urban-rural voting differences. Based on 1990 general election result ratio between
DFRP DKRF DV CD KP DSD RV Other SF FK EH
Jylland 8.2 3.4 19.3 4.5 14.5 36.4 3.2 1.7 6.6 1.2 1.0
Central 3.1 1.3 7.7 3.8 14.9 39.5 3.7 2.1 15.2 3.9 4.8
Copenhagen
Urban/rural 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 2.3 3.3 4.8
ratio
Source for data: Statistisk Ârbog (1994, pp. 81-83).
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Appendix 5.1. Legislation and practice regarding référendums in Finland.
Only two référendums have been held in Finland, both were consultative only. The first 
was held December 29-30,1931 on repeal of the Prohibition Act, and 70.6 percent voted 
‘yes’ to repeal on a turnout of 43.6 percent. The second was on membership on the EU, 
held 16.10.1994, and 56.9 percent voted ‘yes’ to membership on a turnout of 70.8 
percent^
During the 1930’s the Committee on the Constitution of the Finnish Parliament made a 
authoritative interpretation of the constitution. Note that Finland neither has a 
constitutional court, nor any provision for judicial review of legislation^.
The Committee’s interpretation was that:
parliament could, on an ad hoc basis, organise a consultative referendum by means of 
ordinary legislation - in this way, the institution of the referendum would not become a 
permanent constitutional feature and an organic outgrowth of the constitution that would 
facilitate a careless use of popular votes;
- the matter should be of such character that it could be submitted to the people, that is, 
the questions should pertain to topics and issues on which the people have knowledge 
and experience;
- the referendum could be resorted to only on the basis of exceptional and compelling 
reasons.”^
 ^Suksi, 1996, pp 52-53. 
 ^Suksi, 1996, p 53.
 ^Suksi, 1993, p. 223.
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Article 22a of the Form of Government (Constitution) Act (1987) “provides for a 
referendum that can be characterised as a consultative, pre-regulated, and optional 
referendum, is not initiated by ordinary citizens, requires the enactment of implementing 
legislation, and makes provisions for certain connected elements"/ “Its main provision 
is that the organising of each consultative referendum shall be determined by means of 
an act of parliament, which is to specify the alternatives to be submitted to the voters, 
and it also prescribes that the state shall inform the voters of the alternatives and support 
the dissemination of information concerning them. This should, however, be viewed 
mainly as a codification of practice; it did not purport to alter the decision-making 
mechanisms.”^
The only requirement for organising a referendum is a majority in parliament. Article 
22a allows for multiple choice référendums. The Act on Procedure in Consultative 
Référendums stipulates that the voter must have the option of indicating that he does not 
support any of the options presented^.
“ Suksi, 1993, p. 228. 
’ Suksi, 1993, p. 225. 
* Suksi, 1996, p. 55.
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Appendix 5.2. Reasons for attitudes to Finnish EU-membership.
A. Reasons for voting ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in the 1994 referendum. Percent.
Argument Yes-
voters
Un­
certain
No­
voters
All Yes-
voters
Un­
certain
No­
voters
All
Influence 40 13 7 22 22 29 54 33
Security 22 11 6 14 3 3 7 5
Environment 0 0 1 1 2 4 7 4
Primary
industry
3 2 1 2 16 14 19 16
Economic
Activity
52 49 20 42 7 20 29 17
Social
security
4 3 1 3 4 9 11 7
Culture 30 18 11 21 3 3 5 4
Immigration 0 - 0 0 5 10 11 8
Mood/feeling 8 4 1 5 6 10 24 12
No reason 7 30 62 30 50 28 6 30
All 166 130 110 14
0
118 130 173 13
6
Columns add up to more than 100 because people could give more than one reason. 
Source: Pesonen (1994a, p. 87).
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B. Assessment of arguments. Percent
Vote in 
1994
referendum
Very
strong
Strong Neither 
strong nor 
weak
Weak Very
weak
EU-membership 
weakens our ability
Yes 4 22 25 40 9
To control our 
economy
No 29 38 15 13 5
Activity toward 
equality among men
Yes 2 9 25 47 18
And women if EU- 
member
No 8 24 36 26 5
Business community 
wants membership
Yes 5 26 37 26 5
To get rid of political 
controls
No 11 24 41 18 5
Membership in the EU 
means giving up
Yes 4 13 21 44 19
National sovereignty No 27 31 22 14 6
Environmental 
problems can only
Yes 13 44 23 17 3
be solved with help 
from the EU
No 5 20 27 36 12
Membership in the EU 
is positive
Yes 16 42 30 10 2
for Finnish defence No 4 22 31 31 12
We must become a 
EU-member in order
Yes 28 38 21 11 2
to secure our 
belonging in the 
Western world
No 2 15 26 37 19
Power in Brussels is 
so far away that the 
common man looses
Yes 6 20 29 35 10
his influence over 
public matters if EU- 
member
No 38 32 14 10 6
As EU-member we 
have more influence
Yes 12 51 27 9 1
over our future than if 
we stay outside
No 3 9 35 35 18
Membership in the EU 
will be bad for
Yes 15 42 29 12 2
Finland, but staying 
outside would be even 
worse
No 2 9 43 34 11
Opposing membership 
is useless
Yes 10 22 27 29 11
Because Finland will 
join anyway
No 6 13 24 31 26
N = 652 ‘yes’ voters, 423 ‘no’ voters. Source: Sankiaho and Saynassalo (1994a, p. 98).
440
Vote
1994
Improve 
a lot
Improve
some­
what
No
diffe­
rence
Worsen
some­
what
Worsen 
a lot
Environment Yes 10 49 36 5 0
No 3 23 47 21 6
Economy Yes 27 58 11 3 1
No 4 32 36 22 6
Employment Yes 7 56 30 6 1
No 1 17 43 27 11
Agriculture Yes 2 9 29 49 10
No 2 4 15 41 38
Social Yes 1 4 64 27 4
security No 0 2 25 49 25
Equality Yes 1 9 77 11 2
No 0 4 56 31 8
Military Yes 13 47 35 4 1
security No 2 23 48 18 8
National Yes 2 7 64 23 5
independence No 0 1 19 42 37
Possibility to 
influence
Yes 10 63 23 4 1
EU
developments
No 2 28 42 14 14
Finnish living Yes 5 51 35 8 1
conditions
overall
No 0 7 41 38 14
N = 652 ‘yes’ voters, 423 ‘no’ voters. Source: Sankiaho and Saynassalo (1994a, p. 102).
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Appendix 5.3. Group membership and vote in 1994 referendum in Finland. Percent.
All
voters
Male Female Southern
Finland
Uusimaa Central
Finland
North­
ern
Finland
All voters 61 65 57 63 74 54 45
Gender
Male 65 65 68 75 56 54
Female 57 57 57 72 52 36
Education
Primary 47 46 49 60 62 38 29
Upper 51 56 45 51 71 49 42
Grammar 61 63 59 69 68 57 26
School
Technical 64 72 58 67 68 62 51
College
Universit 82 88 76 71 91 75 88
y
Income
<60k 51 57 46 50 56 50 46
61-120k 57 62 54 85 76 43 44
121k- 61 65 57 59 74 83 42
200k
201k+ 74 74 73 73 84 63 61
Language
Finnish 60 65 56 61 74 65 45
Swedish 71 63 84 90 77 33 -
Income is in Finnish Markka per year. Source: Sankiaho (1994, p. 65).
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Yes-vote by occupation, sector and social class. Percent
All Men Women Uusimaa South Central North
All
Occupation
61 65 57 74 63 54 45
Wage earner 64 67 61 74 66 60 46
Entrepreneur 53 64 31 88 55 41 40
Unemployed 53 50 56 52 51 67 42
Student 69 78 62 74 73 65 53
Old Age 
Pensioner
62 65 59 81 59 53 44
Disability
benefit
57 70 42 79 64 25 54
Self-
employed
Sector
62 7 62 69 73 40 50
Agriculture 29 37 18 63 18 26 33
Industry 62 63 60 73 64 56 43
Private
service
68 74 61 70 75 72 47
Public
service
61 64 59 80 59 51 49
Other
Social Group
66 72 60 73 58 80 46
Upper white 
collar
75 77 70 81 75 63 70
Lower white 
collar
58 65 55 68 58 62 39
Worker 55 55 53 74 55 49 43
Farmer
Familv
background
21 30 11 (50) 9 25 21
Working
class
60 62 58 68 63 52 44
White collar 79 78 80 83 78 74 72
Farmer 45 54 38 60 50 44 33
Entrepreneur 69 78 62 81 62 73 50
Categories with less than 20 cases in brackets. Source: Sankiaho (1994, p. 67).
 ^Data missing.
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Voting intention in September 1994, and voting in the EU referendum in October 1994,
Voting intention 
(September)
Yes No Yes No DK DK Total Total
%
N
Voted Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No
(October)
CF 18 51 2 6 12 10 36 63 99 158
PSD 48 15 2 2 25 9 75 26 101 265
NSP 78 9 1 1 10 1 89 11 100 173
VF 15 51 - 2 7 26 24 77 101 55
GF 38 33 - 2 15 13 55 46 101 101
SFF 68 12 - - 17 2 85 14 99 41
FKF 4 76 8 - - 12 4 96 100 25
Total 44 27 1 2 16 9 62 37 99 860
Source: Suksi (1996, Table 4.3).
Yes-vote in 1994 referendum by left-right dimension. Percent
All Men Women Uusimaa South Central North
All 61 65 57 74 63 54 45
Left 58 60 57 64 57 63 47
Centre 60 64 56 74 65 48 41
Right 71 79 62 87 65 66 62
Source: Sankiaho (1994, p. 72).
County Yes No
Urban^ 70.8 29.2
Rural 51.8 48.2
Helsinki 73.5 26.5
Uusimaa 68.0 32.0
Kymi 65.2 34.8
Hame south 60.1 39.9
Turku south 56.7 43.3
Hame north 55.6 44.4
Mikkeli 54.3 45.7
Ahvenanmaa 52.2 47.8
Turku north 50.1 49.9
Kuopio 48.3 51.7
Pohjois-Kaijalan 48.0 52.0
Keski-Suomen 47.6 52.4
Lappi 47.3 52.7
Vaasa 44.3 55.7
Oulu 43.7 56.3
Source: Pesonen (1994, p. 61).
There is no urban/rural data as such available in the Finnish case. As a surrogate, the 
‘urban’ figure was arrived at by calculating the average score of the most urban part of 
Finland, that is Helsinki and Uusimaa. Conversely, the ‘rural’ figure is for the rest of 
Finland.
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Appendix 5.4. Vote in 1994 referendum according to internationalisation and identity. 
Yes-vote by internationalisation and identity by gender and region.
All Male Female Uusimaa South Centra
1
North
Identity
Parochial 44 52 36 61 49 44 29
Nationalist 55 58 51 59 60 48 44
Internationalist 69 74 63 82 67 61 55
Cosmopolitan 74 74 75 77 78 66 68
Regional Identity 
(primary + secondary) 
Local/region 52 57 46 58 63 46 39
Region/Finland 60 65 55 79 62 49 35
Finland/region 56 63 49 62 57 63 38
Region + 66 65 68 72 66 (59) (63)
Finland/North 
Region + 80 78 82 84 77 (87) (64)
Finland/international 
International/region + 66 65 67 82 68 35 (80)
Finland
International 72 81 59 80 (56) (80) (63)
Numbers in brackets are based on less than 20 cases. Source: Saynassalo (1994, p. 119).
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Appendix 5.5.Finland’s population, urbanity and population density by province, 1994.
Province Population in Urbanity Population
lOOO’s (percent) density
Uusimaa 1309,6 82.6 132.3
Turku 700,7 66.5 35.1
Haeme 727,4 63.5 37.8
Kymi 333,4 68.2 30.9
Mikkeli 206,7 44.0 12.7
Pohjois- 177,9 55.1 10.0
Kaijalan
Kuopio 258,8 58.8 15.7
Keski-Suomen 257,7 53.3 15.9
Vaasa 449,4 52.6 17.0
Oulu 449,7 49.6 7.9
Lappi 202,3 47.0 2.2
Ahvenanmaa 25,2 41.5 16.5
Finland 5098,8 64.3 16.7
Population density is measured in inhabitants per square kilometre. Source: Statistical 
Yearbook of Finland (1995, pp. 50-51).
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Appendix 5.6. State subsidies and transfers by province and urbanity. 
State transfers per capita, 1992. Does not include agriculture.
Province Total Grants to 
provinces
Grants to 
industries
Colunm 3+4
Uusimaa 17.516 6.275 1.462 7.737
Turku ja Pori 18.647 7.897 3.387 11.284
Hame 18.011 7.839 2.196 10.035
Kymi 17.460 7.623 2.394 10.017
Mikkeli 21.647 9.547 3.612 13.159
Pohjois-Karjala 24.466 10.609 4.548 15.157
Kuopio 22.830 10.381 4.122 14.503
Keski-Suomi 20.585 9.263 2.737 12.000
Vaasa 22.864 9.663 5.331 14.994
Oulu 23.902 10.962 4.095 15.057
Lappi 25.218 11.785 3.635 15.420
Ahvenanmaa 33.749 26.671 3.589 30.260
Finland 20.013 8.498 2.974 11.472
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Finland (1995, pp. 290-291). Column five calculated by 
author.
State subsidies per province divided by urban/rural municipality. Does not include 
agriculture.
Province Urban Rural
Uusimaa 5,294 6,519
Turku ja  Pori 7,031 8,414
Haeme 6,710 7,886
Kymi 7,126 8,019
Mikkeli 7,730 9,953
Pohjois-Kaijala 9,296 11,728
Kuopio 8,874 10,777
Keski-Suomi 8,161 10,004
Vaasa 8,578 10,311
Oulu 8,803 11,840
Lappi 10,187 12,959
Ahvenanmaa 3,637 3,750
Finland 6,957 9,445
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Finland. (1995, pp. 298-316)
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Appendix 5.7. No-vote and left/centre-party voting in Finland at 1995 Eduskunta 
elections.
County No FSD CF LF FSD+LF CF+LF
Helsinki 26.5 26.8 3.7 8.9 35.7 12.6
Uusimaa 32 31.4 7.7 9.3 40.7 17
Kymi 34.8 38.9 18.9 6.6 45.5 25.5
Hame south 39.9 34.2 14.4 9.4 43.6 23.8
Turku south 43.3 27.6 15 13.3 40.9 28.3
Hame north 44.4 30.5 13.2 14.1 44.6 27.3
Mikkeli 45.7 34.6 27 3.9 38.5 30.9
Turku north 49.9 33.2 20.9 14.6 47.8 35.5
Kuopio 51.7 24.7 32.1 16 40.7 48.1
Pohjois-Kaijalan 52 39.4 27 5.4 44.8 32.4
Keski-Suomen 52.4 31.3 25.6 12.8 44.1 38.4
Lappi 52.7 18.9 39.1 25.6 44.5 64.7
Vaasa 55.7 17.9 33 5.9 23.8 38.9
Oulu 56.3 16.5 38.8 16.4 32.9 55.2
Excluding Ahvenanmaa. Sources for data: Pesonen (1994, p. 61), Statistical Yearbook 
of Finland (1997, p. 505).
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Appendix 5.8. Election results (percent) and seat allocation in the Finnish parliament 
(‘Eduskunta’), 1970-1995.
Parliamentary election results since 1970. Percent.
1970 1972 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995
NSP 18.0 17.6 18.4 21.7 22.1 23.1 19.3 17.9
CF 17.1 16.4 17.6 17.3 17.6 17.6 24.8 19.9
LF 5.9 5.2 4.3 3.7 * 1.0 0.8 0.6
SFF 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.9 5.6 5.5 5.5
FKF 1.1 2.5 3.3 4.8 3.0 2.6 3.1 3.0
CO - - 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 -
FLP 10.5 9.2 3.6 4.6 9.7 6.3 4.8 1.3
FSD 23.4 25.8 24.9 23.9 26.7 24.1 22.1 28.3
LF 16.6 17.0 18.9 17.9 14.0 9.4 10.1 11.2
DA - - - - - 4.2 - -
GF - - - - 1.4 4.0 6.8 6.5
UF - - - - - - - 2.8
FFU - - - - - - - 1.0
Ecology - - - - - - 0.1 0.3
Women’s - - - - - - - 0.3
Other 1.7 0.9 2.4 0.3 0.2 1.9 2.4 1.4
Turnout 82.2 81.4 73.8 75.3 75.7 72.1 68.4 71.8
* In 1983 the LP had an electoral pact with the CP. Key: CO = Constitutional Party; UF 
= Young Finns; FFU = Free Finland Union; EC = Ecology; WP = Women’s; DA = 
Democratic Alternative. Sources: 1970-1991: Peterson (1994, p. 59), 1995: Arter (1995, 
p. 197).
Distribution of seats in the Eduskunta.
1970 1972 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995
NSP 37 34 35 47 44 53 40 39
CF 37 35 39 36 38 40 55 44
LF 8 7 9 4 0 0 1 0
SFF 12 10 10 10 11 13 12 12
FKF 1 4 9 9 3 5 8 7
CO - - 1 0 1 0 0 0
FLP 18 18 2 7 17 9 7 1
FSD 51 55 54 52 57 56 48 63
LF 36 37 40 35 27 16 19 22
DA - - - - - 4 - -
GF - - - - 2 4 10 9
UF - - - - - - - 2
FFU - - - - - - - -
Ecology - - - - - - - 1
Women’s - - - - - - - -
Total 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Sources: as above.
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1995 parliamentary elections by constituency. Percent
FSD CF NSP LF GF SFF FKF FLP LF U
F
EP OP OT
He 26.8 3.7 23.9 8.9 14.2 10.0 1.9 0.5 0.2 6.0 0.1 3.7 0.2
Uu 31.4 7.7 19.5 9.3 8.1 12.3 1.8 0.4 0.4 5.2 0.1 2.7 1.2
Ts 27.6 15.0 23.3 13.3 5.8 4.5 1.9 1.1 0.2 4.3 0.1 1.7 1.4
Tn 33.2 20.9 18.9 14.6 3.1 - 3.4 2.2 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.9 1.2
Hs 34.2 14.4 26.6 9.4 5.9 - 4.3 0.6 0.3 1.9 0.0 2.4 -
Hn 30.5 13.2 20.4 14.1 6.8 - 2.6 1.4 1.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 1.4
Ky 38.9 18.9 21.6 6.6 6.7 - 3.2 0.4 0.6 1.3 0.0 1.2 0.7
Mi 34.6 27.0 16.8 3.9 5.3 - 4.6 4.4 0.1 1.2 0.1 2.0 -
PK 39.4 27.0 12.5 5.4 4.4 - 6.6 2.0 0.2 0.8 - 1.4 0.2
Ku 24.7 32.1 12.5 16.0 5.6 - 3.3 2.2 0.2 1.9 - 1.6 -
KS 31.3 25.6 13.2 12.8 6.0 - 7.0 0.7 0.3 1.6 0.0 1.5 -
Va 17.9 33.0 11.4 5.9 2.6 19.9 3.8 3.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 1.1 0.0
Ou 16.5 38.8 9.7 16.4 5.7 - 1.6 1.2 2.4 2.2 0.0 2.6 2.8
La
A K
18.9 39.1 9.0 25.6 2.4 - 1.4 0.9 0.3 1.1 - 0.8 0.6
A J l
All 28.3 19.8 17.9 11.2 6.5 5.1 3.0 1.3 0.6 2.8 0.3 2.1 1.2
Urb 31.1 12.5 20.2 11.7 7.8 5.3 2.8 1.0 0.5 3.3 0.3 2.3 1.1
Rur 23.2 33.2 13.7 10.2 4.1 4.7 3.3 1.9 0.7 1.8 0.2 1.8 1.3
Key constituencies: He = Helsinki; Uu = Uusimaa; Ts = Turku ja  Pori south, Tn = Turku 
ja Pori north; Hs = Harne south; Hn = Hame North; Ky = Kymi; Mi = Mikkeli; PK = 
Pohjois-Karala; Ku = Kuopio; KS = Keski-Suomi; Va = Vaasa; Ou = Oulu; La = Lappi; 
Ah = Ahvenanmaa. Parties: YF = Young Finns; BP = Ecology Party; OP = Other 
Parties; OT = Others; TO = Total. Source for data: Statistical Yearbook of Finland 
(1997, p. 505).
1994 election by urban/rural support. High rural support on the left, urban on the right
CF FLP LF OT FKF SFF LF OP FSD NSP EP UF GP
Urb 12.5 1 0.5 1.1 2.8 5.3 11.7 2.3 31.1 20.2 0.3 3.3 7.8
Rur 33.2 1.9 0.7 1.3 3.3 4.7 10.2 1.8 23.2 13.7 0.2 1.8 4.1
Difference -20.7 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 0.6 1.5 0.5 7.9 6.5 0.1 1.5 3.7
Urb/Rur 0.38 0.53 0.71 0.85 0.85 1.13 1.15 1.28 1.34 1.47 1.50 1.83 1.90
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North-south divide based on comparing support in the south with that of the north and
CF FLP FKF LF FSD GF NSP Total
South 202,655 14,187 42,018 180,944 530,344 133,108 371,281 1,701,071
Central 217,209 18,191 35,071 63,461 196,696 32,296 94,120 730,194
North 132,137 3,807 5,222 65,935 58,597 15,795 32,223 339,751
Ratio s/n 1.53 3.73 8.05 2.74 9.05 8.43 11.52 5.01
South % 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.22
Central % 0.30 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.27 0.04 0.13
North % 0.39 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.05 0.09
N+C% 0.33 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.04 0.12
% s/n+c 0.37 0.49 0.53 0.91 1.30 1.78 1.86
South = Helsinki, Uusimaa, Turku ja  Pori, Hâme and Kymi. Central: Mikkeli, Pohjois- 
Karala, Kuopio, Keski-Suomi,Vaasa; North = Oulu and Lappi. There is no data for the 
SPP because this party only fields candidates in four constituencies, none of which are 
Oulu or Lappi.
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Appendix 6.1. Legislation and practice regarding référendums in Norway.
There is no written provision for référendums in the Norwegian Constitution. Attempts 
have been made to include such provisions, most lately during the EU campaign in 
1994. They have all been defeated. However, interpretations and practice has opened up 
the possibility of holding ad hoc and consultative référendums. The control of 
référendums is completely in the hands of the Storting. In strict constitutional terms the 
Storting also decides whether or not to accept the advice of the voters\ “The Storting is 
empowered, by simple majority, to consult the voters at any time and on any issue. But it 
is not authorised to delegate to them the final decision on any topic.”^
On the other hand, it could be argued that it has, in practice, become mandatory to hold 
référendums on membership in what is currently the EU:
“From the use of the [referendum] device twice, it follows that the EU issue 
cannot be put on the agenda again without asking the people’s advice anew. 
This means -  in systemic terms -  the introduction of a mandatory 
referendum variant, albeit limited to the EU issue. From the outcomes it 
follows, secondly, that membership cannot be accepted if the electorate 
repeats it’s refusal. This means the introduction of a binding referendum 
variant, again limited to this issue an also to the electorate’s right of veto. 
This follows because no precedent exists as to the effect of a voters’ 
majority supporting a government’s proposal for membership.”^
‘ Wyller, 1996, p. 139. 
^Wyller, 1996, p. 139. 
 ^Wyller, 1996, p. 149.
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There have been six référendums in Norway, all since 1905. In 1905 on separation from 
Sweden, and on the approval of monarchy, in 1919 to approve prohibition, in 1926 to 
repeal prohibition, in 1972 to join the EC, and in 1994 to join the EU. The first four 
were approved, but with a smaller majority in each consecutive one. The last two were 
rejected, and with very narrow majorities'^.
‘‘ Wyller, 1996, p. 140.
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Appendix 6.2. Reasons for attitudes to Norwegian EU-membership in 1994.
Arguments for EU-membership. Percent.
Rank Argument(s)
1 Important to co-operate, membership gives influence 18.8
2 Security-policy, need to enter the WEU 11.7
3 Membership provides market access to the EU 9.6
4 Norway becomes isolated outside the EU 9.1
5 Economy, economic growth 6.9
6 Environment, resource management 5.8
7 The four freedoms, more market, currency co-operation 5.6
8 EU secures the peace, conflict resolution 5.6
9 Cultural fellowship 4.7
10 (Un)employment 4.6
11 Cheaper food and alcohol 3.6
12 Norway, Sweden and Finland together in the EU 3.5
13 Reduce borders (the united states of Europe) 1.8
14 Education 1.8
15 Agriculture, fisheries, regional policy 1.7
16 Secure the welfare state, prevent social problems 1.2
Other ‘yes’-arguments 3.9
Source: Ringdal (1995, p. 49).
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Arguments against EU-membership. Percent.
Rank Argument(s)
1 Self-government/sovereignty, secure ‘rule of the 
people’/democracy and local democracy
22.5
2 (Un)employment 7.0
3 Agriculture 6.9
4 Against the Union and the Maastricht Treaty 5.9
5 Loose our distinctive character, counter-culture arguments 5.8
6 Against economic growth, against capitalism 5.8
7 Control over fish resources, law of the sea 5.2
8 Border controls, narcotics, crime, immigration 4.7
9 Environment, resource management 3.9
10 Retain dispersed population pattern 3.5
11 We know what we have got, but... 3.5
12 Welfare state, weakening of public pension provision, 
social problems
3.3
13 Quality of food and medicine, treatment of domestic 
animals
3.2
14 Norway will be powerless in the EU 3.2
15 Negative for business 2.9
16 We will manage, the EEA-agreement is sufficient 2.1
17 EU is a bloc against other countries 2.1
18 The membership fee is to high 1.9
19 EU weakens peace 0.6
Other ‘no’-arguments 6.0
Source: Ringdal, 1995, p. 51.
Note: The people surveyed were given the opportunity to give as many 
reasons/arguments as they wished. However, in ‘practice’, only three answers were 
written down by the interviewers. 94 percent of voters gave at least one argument. The 
average was 2.2 reasons, both for arguments for and arguments against membership 
(Ringdal, 1995, pp. 48-49).
Issue Yes No Share of sample
Democracy, influence 16.0 40.2 28.3
Defence, security 18.5 2.3 10.2
Economy, employment 23.1 19.8 21.4
Nordic unity 21.2 0.1 10.3
Confidence in 12.3 0.2 6.0
Brundtland
Confidence in Lahnstein 0.2 12.0 6.2
Other 8.7 25.4 17.5
Total 48.4 51.2 100.0
N = 2,351. Source: NSD/MMI Election Day study.
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Appendix 6.3. Group membership and vote in 1994 referendum in Norway.
Attitude to EU-membership 1993/1994. Percent._______________________
Yes No Number of 
interviewees
Notes
Gender 4015
Women 43.7 56.3
Men 52.0 48.0
Income (Nkr. ‘000) 1642
0-149 21.9 78.1
150-299 25.1 74.9
300+ 40.4 59.6
Occupation/class 4015
Blue collar 44.5 55.5
Managerial, white collar 64.4 35.6
White collar, other 54.0 46.0
Pensioner + disabled 44.8 55.2
Other 42.3 57.7
Occupational sector 1 2529
Public sector 47.3 52.7
Private sector 52.1 47.9
Occupational sector 2^ 2553
Primary 10.3 89.7
Primarily Public 48.2 51.8
Mixed 54.3 45.7
Primarily Private 55.3 44.7
Education 4015
Non-university level 43.9 56.1
University level 57.6 42.4
1993 election 
study
 ^ ‘Primarily public’ includes healthcare, education, research and public administration; 
ixed sectors transport and ‘other’ occupations; private sector tradde and industry, 
commodity trade, shopworkers, banking, insurance, services and ‘no occupation’.
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Language 1801
Neo-norwegian, active 11.3 88.7
Neo-norwegian, passive 8.8 91.2
Standard Norwegian, active 29.9 70.1
Standard Norwegian, 33.3 66.7
passive
Abstinence movement 1809
Abstinence, active 13.4 86.6
Abstinence, passive 13.9 86.1
Non-abstinence, active 22.9 77.1
Non-abstinence, passive 44.5 55.5
Religious activitv 1 1810
Passive 32.7 67.3
Low 29.4 70.6
Medium 19.7 80.3
Member 16.8 83.2
Religious activitv 2 1819
Non-conformist 33.3 66.7
State Church 29.0 71.0
Other 29.1 70.9
1993 election 
study
1993 election 
study
1993 election 
study
1993 election 
study
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Vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.
Yes No Number of 
interviewees
Urban-rural residence 4015
Rural areas 30.6 69.4
Towns and cities 53.6 46.4
Centre Periphery 1 4015
Oslofjord area 63.0 37.0
Rest of Norway 40.1 59.9
Centre Periphery 2 4015
Oslo, Akershus 67.1 32.9
Rest of Norway 42.6 57.4
Centre Periphery 3 4015
Oslo, Akershus, Buskerud, 65.0 35.0
Vestfold
Rest of Norway 40.1 59.9
County^ Actual result
0stfold 53.5 46.5
Akershus 63.8 36.2
Oslo 66.6 33.4
Hedmark 42.7 57.3
Oppland 44.1 55.9
Buskerud 57.2 42.8
Vestfold 57.0 43
Telemark 42.2 57.8
Aust-Agder 44.4 55.6
Vest-Agder 45.6 54.4
Rogaland 45.3 54.7
Hordaland 43.7 56.3
Sogn og Fjordane 31.8 68.2
M0re og Romsdal 38.4 61.6
S0r-Tr0ndelag 45.0 55
Nord-Tr0ndelag 36.0 64
Nordland 28.6 71.4
Troms 28.5 71.5
Finnmark 25.5 74.5
Region
South 50.2 49.8
North 28.1 71.9
Sources for data: NSD/MMI Election Day study, unless otherwise stated. Source 1993 
election study: NSD. Authors calculations. All survey data calculations excludes the 
categories ‘don’t know’ and answers other than the categories listed.
Source: Statistisk Ârbok (1995).
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Vote in the 1994 referendum
Party voted for in 1993 Yes No Number of interviewees
SV 19 81 346
A? 64 36 1454
NY 45 55 117
SP 5 95 565
NKRF 14 86 249
H 81 19 778
NFRP 59 41 175
Source: NSD/MMI referendum day survey.
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Appendix 6.4. The importance of primary industries and central government transfers by 
county.
County Inhabitants per farm Yes-vote in Referendum (%)
Sogn og Fjordane 17 32
Oppland 23 44.2
Nord-Tr0ndelag 24 36
Hedmark 26 42.5
M0re og Romsdal 40 38
Buskerud 45 57
Telemark 45 42.2
S0r-Tr0ndelag 48 44.9
Rogaland 51 45.4
0stfold 56 53
Vest-Agder 58 44.8
Aust-Agder 62 43.8
Hordaland 65 43.8
Vestfold 70 57.1
Akershus 226 63.2
Oslo 226 65.6
The table excludes the three northernmost counties because their climate allows only 
very limited agricultural activities. In these areas, fishing is a much more important 
primary economic activity. Sources: Landbrukssamvirkets Felleskontor (1996).
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County Fishermen 1993 Percent of 
population
Employees in 
fish
processing*
Population 
in fish 
industry
0stfold 270 0.11
Akershus 34 0.01
Oslo 47 0.01
Hedmark - -
Oppland - -
Buskerud 22 0.01
Vestfold 157 0.08
Telemark 104 0.06
Aust-Agder 187 0.19
Vest-Agder 625 0.42 405**
Rogaland 1061 0.30 584 0.46
Hordaland 1483 0.35 915 0.57
Sogn og 1521 1.41 1237 2.56
Fjordane
M0re og 5648 2.35 1765 3.09
Romsdal
S0r-Tr0ndelag 1040 0.41 510 0.60
Nord-Tr0ndelag 663 0.52 86 0.59
Nordland 5623 2.33 1530 2.96
Troms 4356 2.89 1323 3.77
Finnmark 2555 3.34 2152 6.15
* Data only includes large (over 10 employees) firms.
** Figure includes all the above counties. The maximum figure this could lead to would 
be 0.59 percent in Aust-Agder. Source: Fishery Statistics (1996, pp. 17, 83-84).
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Table 6.4.C. The relationship between transfers from the central government and vote in 
1994 referendum.
County Central government 
transfers per capita*
No-vote in 1994 referendum
Akershus 2419 36.2
Rogaland 3702 54.7
Buskerud 3934 42.8
Vestfold 3983 43
Vest-Agder 4571 54.4
0stfold 4799 46.5
Hordaland 4834 56.3
Telemark 5229 57.8
S0r-Tr0ndelag 5295 55
Oppland 6158 55.9
Oslo 6196 33.4
Aust-Agder 6296 55.6
M0re og Romsdal 6540 61.6
Hedmark 6615 57.3
Sogn og Fjordane 7238 68.2
Nord-Tr0ndelag 7746 64
Nordland 8675 71.4
Troms 9267 71.5
Finnmark 13497 74.5
* Not including agriculture or fisheries. Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrâ 
(Httpiwww.ssb.no/www-open/statistikk_et...00generelt/0000oversikt/000020regionale/, 
28/1/98).
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Appendix 6.5.The relationship between left-voting and vote in the referendum.
SV SV+RVA AP SV-kAP RVA-k No-vote 
SV+AP
Vest-Agder 4.8 5.1 27.8 32.6 32.9 54.4
M0re og Romsdal 5.9 6.2 30.5 36.4 36.7 61.6
Rogaland 6.2 6.4 29.3 35.5 35.7 54.7
Buskerud 6.6 7 42.7 49.3 49.7 42.8
Vestfold 6.5 7.1 35.4 41.9 42.5 43
0stfold 6.7 7.2 42.4 49.1 49.6 46.5
Aust-Agder 7 7.2 33.1 40.1 40.3 55.6
Akershus 6.6 7.4 37.8 44.4 45.2 36.2
Oppland 7.6 7.9 47.1 54.7 55 55.9
Hordaland 7.4 8.1 32.8 40.2 40.9 56.3
Sogn og Fjordane 7.9 8.2 32.5 40.4 40.7 68.2
S0r-Tr0ndlag 8.9 9.9 39.5 48.4 49.4 55
Nord-Tr0ndelag 9.8 10.3 38.4 48.2 48.7 64
Telemark 10 10.6 38.7 48.7 49.3 57.8
Hedmark 10.5 10.8 48.8 59.3 59.6 57.3
Oslo 7.2 12.3 36.6 43.8 48.9 33.4
Nordland 12.3 12.9 36.7 49 49.6 71.4
Troms 12.7 14 35.8 48.5 49.8 71.5
Finnmark 17.5 18 39.6 57.1 57.6 74.5
Source for data: Statistisk Ârbok (1995, p. 33). Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 6.6. Election results and seat allocation in the Norwegian parliament 
(‘Storting’), 1969-1997.
Election results. Percent.
Party 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
H 19.5 17.4 24.8 31.7 30.4 22.2 17.0 14.3
SP 10.5 11.0 8.6 6.7 6.6 6.5 16.7 7.9
jsfV** 9.4 3.5 3.2 3.9 3.1 3.2 3.6 4.5
DLF** - 3.4 1.4 0.5 0.5 - - -
NKRF 9.4 12.3 12.4 8.9 8.3 8.5 7.9 13.7
NFRP - 5.0 1.9 4.5 3.7 13.0 6.3 15.3
AP 46.5 35.3 42.3 37.2 40.8 34.3 36.9 35.0
SF/SVF/SV
*
3.4 11.2 4.2 4.9 5.5 10.1 7.9 6.0
NKP/RVA 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.7
FEE - - - - - 0.3 - -
NG - - - - - 0.4 0.1
Other 0.3 0.9 0.8 1.4 0.3 0.7 2.5 1.6
Turnout 83.8 80.2 82.9 82.0 84.4 83.2 75.8
SF = Socialist People’s Party, SVF = Socialist Electoral Alliance, FEE = Future for 
Finnmark, NG = Norwegian Green Party.
* This party participated in elections until 1973 as SF. At the 1973 elections the SF, the 
NKP, left-wing AP and various other left-wingers combined into the SVF. From the 
1977 elections onwards, this party (although not strictly the same as the SF) has 
participated in elections as SV, although many elements of the SVF did not part-take in 
this party.
** The V and the DLF split in 1972 and reunited in 1988, although a rump-DLF still 
exists. Data sources: 1969-1993: Petersson, (1994, p 60); 1997: Bjugan (1998a).
Seats in the Storting.
Party 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
H 29 29 41 54 50 37 28 23
SP 20 21 12 11 12 11 32 11
NV 13 2 2 2 0 0 1 6
DLF - 1 0 0 0 - - -
NKRF 14 20 22 15 16 14 13 25
NFRP - 4 0 4 2 22 10 25
AP 74 62 76 65 71 63 67 65
SF/SVF/SV 0 16 2 4 6 17 13 9
NKP/RVA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
FFF - - - - - 1 - -
NG - - - - - 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 150 155 155 155 157 165 165 165
Data sources: 1969-1993: Petersson, (1994, p 60), 1997: Bjugan (1998a).
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SP NKRF SV NV AP Others NFRP H RVA
Centre 9.40 4.90 6.77 3.20 36.60 2.57 8.70 25.70 2.17
Periphery 21.76 9.54 9.45 3.80 39.71 2.37 5.48 14.02 0.53
Ratio
centre-
periphery
0.43 0.51 0.72 0.84 0.92 1.08 1.59 1.83 4.06
The centre is the average vote in Oslo, Akershus and Vestfold, the periphery the rest of 
the country. Source for data: Statistisk Ârbok (1995, p. 33). Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 7.1. Legislation and practice regarding référendums in Sweden\
The Swedish Constitution (the 1974 Instrument of Government) includes two provisions 
for référendums: a consultative referendum (Ch. 8, paragraph 4) and a decisive 
referendum (Ch. 8, paragraph 15).
The consultative referendum clause is very wide, and allows the Riksdag to decide if a 
referendum is to be held, when, and the question(s). A simple majority of the Riksdag is 
needed for a decision. So far all five Swedish référendums have formally been 
consultative.
The rules for the decisive referendum are more complicated. A pending constitutional 
amendment must be referred to a referendum if requested 10 percent of the members of 
the Riksdag and supported by 1/3 of its members. This rejective referendum must take 
place simultaneously with a general election. Rejection requires a ‘no’-vote from a 
majority which also has to exceed half of the number of voters who voted at the 
simultaneous general election.
* Source: Ruin (1996, pp. 171-172).
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Appendix 7.2. Reasons for attitudes to Swedish EU membership. Percent.
Before the referendum After the Referendum
Argument Pro-
EU
Anti-
EU
All Voted
‘yes’
Voted
‘no’
All
Economy, general 44 20 32 38 22 30
Sweden will be isolated 36 2 19 30 2 17
Influence the EU 20 7 13 22 11 16
Employment 19 9 14 20 9 15
Democracy 2 15 8 8 21 14
Peace 14 1 7 27 1 14
Environmental- and 
energy-questions
6 9 7 12 13 12
Open borders 5 17 11 3 17 9
EU-organisation 1 17 9 0 18 8
Neutrality. 4 9 6 3 13 7
Consumer questions 2 20 11 1 15 7
National independence 0 12 6 0 14 6
Social safety/welfare 1 5 3 2 5 3
Equality 0 6 3 0 5 3
EU’s relations with the 
rest of the world
1 4 2 10 6 3
International exchanges 4 3 3 4 3 3
Farming/forestry 2 3 2 1 3 2
Development 4 1 2 2 0 1
Business 1 1 1 0 1
Regional questions 0 1 1 0 3 1
Health 0 1 1 0 1 0
Ideological reasons 0 1 0 0 2 1
T rust/distrust/influence 1 2 3 2 3
Uncertainty 1 10 5 2 11 9
Other reasons 10 11 10 12 15 13
Other 1 2 1 2 2 2
Number of reasons 
(mean)
1.87 2.08 1.97 2,03 2,33 2,14
Percent of interviewees 
who mentioned one or 
more reasons
96 91 94 94 93 89
Number of interviewees 794 766 1569 867 748 1715
Source: Oskarson (1996, p. 127).
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Appendix 7.3. Group membership and vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.
Yes No Blank Number of Number of
interviewees non-voters
Gender
Women 46 52 2 1884 16
Men 59 40 1 2024 17
Occupational status 
Old age pensioner 61 38 1 605 18
In employment 54 45 1 2365 16
Student 51 47 2 304 17
Early retired 49 51 0 145 20
Working at 44 56 0 55 20
home/housewife
Unemployed^ 37 59 4 317 21
Occupation^ 
Industrial worker 41 57 2 434 20
Other workers 37 61 2 813 20
Low white collar 49 49 2 403 16
Medium white collar 59 40 1 854 14
High white collar 76 24 0 545 11
Small businessmen 63 36 1 255 18
Farmers 53 45 2 104 20
Students 51 47 2 292 17
Occupational cateeorv"  ^
Health care, education 45 54 1 778 15
and culture 
Farming 47 52 1 166 19
Trade and transport 53 45 2 878 19
Industry 55 44 1 863 17
Administration/services 66 33 1 495 13
Occupational sector 
Public 46 52 2 1424 15
- local authority 42 57 1 976 15
- state 56 43 1 448 14
Private 58 41 1 2144 18
Education 
Basic schooling 43 56 1 931 20
Additional schooling^ 49 50 1 1344 18
3 year high school 59 40 1 586 16
University 64 34 2 927 12
' Includes labour market training and youth work experience.2
 ^Pensioners are included in their previous occupation.
 ^Pensioners are included in their previous occupation.
 ^ This includes occupational schools, ‘peoples high schools’, high school/gymnasium, 
and older forms of these.
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Urban-rural residence
Rural area 41 58 1 661 18
Small town 50 48 2 904 15
City or large town 55 44 1 1732 18
Sthlm, Gbg, Malmo 64 34 2 536 17
Rural (rural + sm. 46.2 53.8
Town)
Urban (city + SGM) 57.2 42.8
Countv
Malmo 66.5 32.7 0.8
Malmohus south 66.4 32.6 1.0
Stockholm 61.5 37.6 0.9
Stockholm county 61.4 37.7 0.9
Malmohus north 61.3 37.9 0.8
Halland 57.8 41.1 1.1
Kristi anstad 56.7 42.4 0.9
Goteborg 56.3 42.8 0.9
Vastmanland 54.3 44.8 0.9
Ôstergôtland 53.9 45 1.1
Sodermanland 53.8 45.3 1.0
Uppsala 53.4 45.5 1.1
Kronoberg 51.4 47.6 1.0
Bohuslan 51.1 48.1 0.9
Àlvsborg south 51 48 1.0
Gotland 50.9 48.1 1.0
Skaraborg 49.5 49.4 1.1
Jonkoping 48.5 50.7 0.8
Kalmar 48.3 50.8 0.9
Varmland 47.1 52.1 0.8
Orebro 47 52 1.0
Blekinge 46.5 52.6 0.9
Àlvsborg north 46.5 52.6 0.9
Vastemorrland 41.7 57.6 0.7
Gavleborg 41.3 57.8 0.9
Kopparberg 38.7 60.4 0.8
Vasterbotten 37 62.3 0.7
Norrbotten 34.8 64.6 0.6
Jamtland 27.7 71.5 0.7
Sweden 52.3 46.8 0.9
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Region^
Southern Sweden 65 33 2 478 16
Stockholm 65 34 1 660 17
Western Sweden 56 43 1 665 17
Eastern central Sweden 52 47 1 567 15
South-east Sweden 49 50 1 456 15
Western central 43 55 2 641 17
Sweden
Northern Sweden 35 64 1 441 17
All except Northern 
Sweden
55 44 1
Sources: Gilljam and Holmberg (1996; Tables 10.2, 10.4, 10.7, 10.9, 10.12, 10.14, 
10.18, 10.24, 10.26, 10.27, 10.29, 10.30; pp. 172-200).
Vote in the 1994 referendum and party supported in 1994 general election.
Party voted 
for in 1994
Yes No Blank Number of 
interviewee 
s
Number 
of non­
voters
VP 13 85 2 235 5
SSD 46 53 1 1596 7
GP 20 79 1 192 6
CP 44 54 2 297 4
KD 54 44 2 145 4
FP 79 20 1 268 3
MP 86 13 1 767 4
Others 38 62 0 50 4
Blank 38 59 3 73 5
Non-voters 44 55 1 171 41
Source: Holmberg (1996, p. 226).
Southern Sweden consists of Malmo, Malmohus north and Malmohus south. 
Stockholm consists of Stockholm and Stockholm county. Western Sweden consists of 
Halland, Goteborg, Bohuslan, Àlvsborg south and Skaraborg. Eastern central Sweden 
consists of Uppsala, Sodermanland, Ostergoetland and Vastmanland. Sout-east Sweden 
consists of Jonkoping, Kronoberg, Kalmar, Gotland and Blekinge. Western central 
Sweden consists of Àlvsborg north, Varmland, Orbro, Kopparberg and Gavleborg. 
Northern Sweden consists of Vastemorrland, Jamtland, Vasterbotten and Norrbotten.
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Relationship between primary industry employees in the area and no-vote in the 1994 
referendum.
County Primary industry employees No-vote in 
per capita**
1994 referendum
Stockholm county * 0.4 37.1
Goteborg * 0.7 45.5
Vastmanland 2.3 44.8
Norrbotten 2.3 64.6
Malmohus * 2.4 34.4
Orebro 2.4 52
Àlvsborg * 2.6 50.3
Jonkoping 2.8 50.7
Varmland 2.8 52.1
Blekinge 2.8 52.6
Vastemorrland 2.8 57.6
Ôstergôtland 2.9 45
Uppsala 3.1 45.5
Gavleborg 3.1 57.8
Kronoberg 3.2 47.6
Sodermanland 3.3 45.3
Kopparberg 3.3 60.4
Vasterbotten 3.3 62.3
Halland 4.6 41.1
Kalmar 4.6 50.8
Skaraborg 5 49.4
Jamtland 5 71.5
Kristianstad 8.3 42.4
Gotland 9 48.1
Author’s calculations. Source: Jordbruksstatistisk Arsbok (1995, p. 32) and as above. 
Note: for the counties marked with an there is not complete correspondence between 
the data for the general election and the referendum. These counties were divided into 
two areas, and in one case three, for the referendum data. To achieve comparability, an 
average percentage was calculated. While this is not ideal, the discrepancies are not 
great, and the end result only minimally distorted.
** Including agriculture, forestry and fishing.
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Appendix 7.4. Internationalism and attitude towards European integration.
7.4.A. Attitude towards the suggestion that we should “aim for a form of society with a 
more international outlook and less borders between people and countries” by vote in 
1994 referendum. Percent.
Attitude to the suggestion
Vote Bad
suggestion
Neither bad 
nor good 
suggestion
Good
suggestion
Sum
percent
Number of 
interviewee 
s
Yes 11 17 72 100 821
No 29 34 37 100 684
Blank 8 38 54 100 24
All 19 25 56 100 1529
7.4.B Attitude towards the suggestion that we should “aim for a multi-cultural society 
with great tolerance towards other people from other countries, with different religions 
and life-styles” by vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.
Attitude to the suggestion
Vote Bad
suggestion
Neither bad 
nor good 
suggestion
Good
suggestion
Sum
percent
Number of 
interviewee 
s
Yes 26 22 52 100 829
No 31 24 45 100 695
Blank 13 46 41 100 24
All 28 23 49 100 1548
7.4.C. Attitude towards the suggestion that we should “aim towards a society that 
protects traditional Swedish values” by vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.
Attitude to the suggestion
Vote Bad
suggestion
Neither bad 
nor good 
suggestion
Good
suggestion
Sum
percent
Number of 
interviewees
Yes 11 19 70 100 830
No 8 21 71 100 705
Blank 13 8 69 100 24
All 10 20 70 100 1559
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7.4.D. Attitude towards the suggestion that we should “reduce development aid” by vote 
in 1994 referendum. Percent.
Attitude to the suggestion
Vote Bad
suggestion
Neither bad nor 
good suggestion
Good
suggestion
Sum
percent
Number of 
interviewee 
s
Yes 47 30 23 100 826
No 55 24 21 100 705
Blank 54 33 13 100 24
All 51 27 22 100 1559
Source: Lindahl (1996, pp. 163-4). Author’s translations.
7.4.E. Arguments for and against Swedish EU-membership among voters intending to 
vote ‘yes’ and ‘no’ by factors with an international content. Percent.
‘yes’-voters arguments ‘no’-voters arguments
Category of argument Arguments
for
membership
Arguments
against
membership
Arguments
against
membership
Arguments
for
membership
National independence 0 7 12 0
EU’s relations with the 1 3 4 0
rest of the world 
Sweden will be isolated 36 0 2 15
without membership 
Open borders 5 22 17 9
Foreign and security 18 9 10 16
policy
Other categories 103 84 104 70
Number of interviewees 794 461 766 353
Source: Lindahl in Giljam and Holmberg (1996, p. 160). Author’s translations.
473
Appendix 7.5. The relationship between left-voting at the 1994 parliamentary election
and vote in the 1994 referendum.
VP SD SD+VP ‘No’-vote in 1994 
referendum.
Stockhom * 6.7 36.6 43.3 37.7
Halland 4.3 40.5 44.8 41.1
Jonkoping 4.4 41.9 46.3 50.7
Skaraborg 5.5 42.6 48.1 49.4
Kronoberg 5.8 42.8 48.6 47.6
Uppsala 5.8 43 48.8 45.5
Gotland 5.2 43.7 48.9 48.1
Kristianstad 3.5 45.4 48.9 42.4
Bohuslan and Gotheborg * 7.6 41.4 49 45.5
Malmohus * 3.7 45.9 49.6 34.4
Alvsborg * 5.7 45.5 51.2 50.3
Sweden 1994 6.2 45.4 51.6 46.8
Ostergotland 5.5 46.2 51.7 45
Kalmar 5.6 47.7 53.3 50.8
Kopparberg 7 49.6 56.6 60.4
Varmland 6.8 49.9 56.7 52.1
Sodermanland 5.4 51.9 57.3 45.3
Vastmanland 6.3 51.4 57.7 44.8
Orebro 7.1 51 58.1 52
Jamtland 6.8 51.6 58.4 71.5
Blekinge 6.5 53 59.5 52.6
Vasterbotten 7.3 52.2 59.5 62.3
Gavleborg 7.8 53.8 61.6 57.8
Vastemorrland 6.7 55.2 61.9 57.6
Norrbotten 11.4 60.7 72.1 64.6
Note: for the counties marked with a there is not complete correspondence between 
the data for the general election and the referendum. These counties were divided into 
two areas, and in one case three, for the referendum data. To achieve comparability, an 
average percentage was calculated. While this is not ideal, the discrepancies are not 
great, and the end result only minimally distorted.
Sources for data: Statistisk Ârsbok (1995, p. 398), Gilljam and Holmberg (1996, p. 199). 
Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 7.6. Election results and seat allocation in the Swedish parliament 
(‘Riksdag’), 1970-1994.
Election results.
Party 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994
MP 11.5 14.3 15.6 20.3 23.6 21.3 18.3 21.9 22.3
CP 19.9 25.1 24.1 18.1 15.5 9.8 11.3 8.5 7.7
FP 16.2 9.4 11.1 10.6 5.9 14.2 12.2 9.1 7.2
KD 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.6 2.9 7.1 4.1
SSD 45.3 43.6 42.7 43.2 45.6 44.7 43.2 37.7 45.4
VP 4.8 5.3 4.8 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.8 4.5 6.2
GP 0 0 0 0 1.7 1.5 5.5 3.4 5.0
ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.7 1.2
Other 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.9
Turn­ 883 90.8 91.8 90.7 91.4 89.9 86.0 86.7
out
The threshold of representation is four percent. so none of the parties in the ‘(
category have ever been represented in the Riksdag. Sources: 1970-1991: Pete
(1994, p. 60); 1994: Madeley, (1995, p. 425).
Party 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994
MP 41 51 55 73 86 76 66 80 80
CP 71 90 86 64 56 43 42 31 27
FP 58 34 39 38 21 51 44 33 26
KD - - - - - 1 - 26 14
SSD 163 156 152 154 166 159 156 138 162
VP 17 19 17 20 20 19 21 16 22
GP - - - - - - 20 - 18
ND - - - - - - - 25 -
Seats 350 350 349 349 349 349 349 349 349
Sources: 1970-1991: Petersson (1994, p. 63); 1994: Madeley, (1995, p. 425).
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1994 Riksdag elections. Results by county.
County MP CP FP KD GP ND SSD VP Other
Stockholm city &
Stockhom 32.3 3.8 9.7 3.3 5.4 1.3 36.6 6.7 1.0
Uppsala 22.3 7.9 8.9 3.8 6.1 1.2 43.0 5.8 0.9
Sodermanland 18.8 6.7 6.8 3.4 5.0 0.9 51.9 5.4 1.1
Ostergotland 21.6 7.7 6.6 4.8 5.1 1.4 46.2 5.5 1.1
Jonkoping 19.8 10.8 6.2 10.7 4.1 1.0 41.9 4.4 1.0
Kronoberg 21.5 13.4 5.4 4.8 4.8 0.9 42.8 5.8 0.9
Kalmar 18.9 13.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 1.3 47.7 5.6 0.6
Gotland 17.9 18.0 4.5 2.5 6.6 1.3 43.7 5.2 0.3
Blekinge 18.4 7.6 5.2 3.3 4.4 1.0 53.0 6.5 0.5
Kristianstad 25.1 9.8 5.2 4.1 4.1 1.5 45.4 3.5 1.4
Malmohus 28.1 5.1 6.4 2.7 4.0 1.7 45.9 3.7 2.4
Halland 25.3 12.7 6.6 3.7 4.6 1.5 40.5 4.3 0.7
Goteborg city &
Bohuslan 24 4.8 9.3 4.7 5.8 1.6 41.4 7.6 0.9
Alvsborg 19.7 10.3 6.7 4.9 5.5 1.2 45.5 5.7 0.5
Skaraborg 20.6 12.4 5.9 5.8 5.2 1.6 42.6 5.5 0.6
Varmland 18.5 9.4 6.1 3.4 4.3 1.0 49.9 6.8 0.6
Orebro 16.2 6.9 7.4 5.0 4.6 1.2 51.0 7.1 0.7
Vastmanland 18.9 6.1 7.2 3.3 4.6 1.2 51.4 6.3 1.0
Kopparberg 16.1 10.1 5.8 3.7 6.0 1.0 49.6 7.0 0.7
Gavleborg 13.1 9.1 5.8 3.2 5.5 1.1 53.8 7.8 0.5
Vastemorrland 13.0 9.2 6.0 3.9 4.8 0.7 55.2 6.7 0.6
Jamtland 12.9 15.0 4.4 2.3 5.8 0.5 51.6 6.8 0.6
Vasterbotten 11.1 9.4 8.0 5.1 5.8 0.4 52.2 7.3 0.7
Norrbotten 10.3 5.4 4.7 2.6 3.5 0.3 60.7 11.4 1.0
Sweden 1994 22.3 7.7 7.2 4.1 5.0 1.2 45.4 6.2 1.0
1991 21.9 8.5 9.1 7.1 3.4 6.7 37.7 4.5 1.0
1988 18.3 11.3 12.2 2.9 5.5 - 43.2 5.8 0.7
1985 21.3 12.4? 14.2 - 1.5 - 44.7 5.4 0.5
1982 23.6 15.5 5.9 1.9 1.7 - 45.6 5.6 0.3
Source: Statistisk Arsbok (1995, p. 398).
Degree of urbanity in Commune and party support.
Degree MP CP FP KD GP ND SSD VP Other Not
of vote
urbanity
All urban 38 3 14 4 7 5 25 4 0 9
90- 27 3 12 7 4 6 36 4 1 8
99.9%
70-89.9 19 11 8 8 3 7 40 3 1 9
50-69.9 14 15 5 8 3 10 39 5 1 9
30-49.9 11 14 18 7 2 0 39 9 0 20
Source: Statistisk Arsbok (1995, p. 400).
 ^Electoral co-operation with KD.
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Urban-rural ranking calculations.
MP CP FP KD GP ND SSD VP
Urban 1+2 33 3 13 6 6 6 31 4
Rural 4+5 13 15 12 8 3 5 39 7
U/R 2.6 0.2 1.1 0.7 2.2 1.1 0.8 0.6
Rank U-R 1 8 3 6 2 3 5 7
Authors calculations. Source for data: Statistisk Arsbok (1995, p. 400). 
North-South ranking calculations.
MP CP FP KD GP ND SSD VP
Avg. South 21.6 9.2 6.6 4.4 4.9 1.3 45.6 5.6
Avg. North 12.8 9.7 5.8 3.5 5.2 0.7 53.9 7.8
Ratio S/N 1.7 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.9 0.8 0.7
Rank S-N 1 5 4 3 6 2 7 8
Authors calculations. North: Kopparberg, Gavleborg, Vastemorrland, Jamtland, 
Vasterbotten, Norrbotten. Source for data: Statistisk Arsbok (1995, p. 398).
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